The Biology of Beauty

Nancy Etcoff, Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty (New York: Anchor Books 2000) 

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.  

This much is true by very definition. After all, the Oxford English Dictionary defines beauty as: 

A combination of qualities, such as shape, colour, or form, that pleases the aesthetic senses, especially the sight’. 

If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then the ‘eye of the beholder’ has been shaped by a process of natural, and sexual, selection to find certain things beautful — and, if beauty is in the ‘eye of the beholder’, then sexiness is located in a different part of the male anatomy but similarly subjective

Thus, beauty is defined as that which is pleasing to an external observer. It therefore presupposes the existence of an external observer, separate from the person or thing that is credited with beauty, from whose perspective the thing or individual is credited with beauty.[1]

Moreover, perceptions of beauty do indeed differ.  

To some extent, preferences differ between individuals, and between different races and cultures. More obviously, and to a far greater extent, they also differ as between species.  

Thus, a male chimpanzee would presumably consider a female chimpanzee as more beautiful than a woman. The average human male, however, would likely disagree – though it might depend on the woman. 

As William James wrote in 1890: 

To the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the she-bear. To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object which it is to her” (Principles of Psychology (vol 2): p387). 

Beauty is therefore not an intrinsic property of the person or object that is described as beautiful, but rather a quality attributed to that person or object by a third-party in accordance with their own subjective tastes. 

However, if beauty is then indeed a subjective assessment, that does not mean it is an entirely arbitrary one. 

On the contrary, if beauty is indeed in the ‘eye of the beholder’ then it must be remembered that the ‘eye of the beholder’—and, more importantly, the brain to which that eye is attached—has been shaped by a process of both natural and sexual selection

In other words, we have evolved to find some things beautiful, and others ugly, because doing so enhanced the reproductive success of our ancestors. 

Thus, just as we have evolved to find the sight of excrement, blood and disease disgusting, because each were potential sources of infection, and the sight of snakes, lions and spiders fear-inducing, because each likewise represented a potential threat to our survival when encountered in the ancestral environment in which we evolved, so we have evolved to find the sight of certain things pleasing on the eye. 

Of course, not only people can be beautiful. Landscapes, skylines, works of art, flowers and birds can all be described as ‘beautiful’. 

Just as we have evolved to find individuals of the opposite sex attractive for reasons of reproduction, so these other aspects of aesthetic preference may also have been shaped by natural selection. 

Thus, some research has suggested that our perception of certain landscapes as beautiful may reflect psychological adaptations that evolved in the context of habitat selection (Orians & Heerwagen 1992).  

However, Nancy Etcoff does not discuss such research. Instead, in ‘Survival of the Prettiest’, her focus is almost exclusively on what we might term ‘sexual beauty’. 

Yet, if beauty is indeed in the ‘in the eye of the beholder’, then sexiness is surely located in a different part of the male anatomy, but equally subjective in nature. 

Indeed, as I shall discuss below, even in the context of mate preferences, ‘sexiness’ and ‘beauty’ are hardly synonyms. As an illustration, Etcoff herself quotes that infamous but occasionally insightful pseudo-scientist and all-round charlatan, Sigmund Freud, whom she quotes as observing:  

The genitals themselves, the sight of which is always exciting, are nevertheless hardly ever judged to be beautiful; the quality of beauty seems, instead, to attach to certain secondary sexual characters” (p19: quoted from Civilization and its Discontents). 

Empirical Research 

Of the many books that have been written about the evolutionary psychology of sexual attraction (and I say this as someone who has read, at one time or another, a good number of them), a common complaint is that they are full of untested, or even untestable, speculation – i.e. what that other infamous scientific charlatan Stephen Jay Gould famously referred to as just so stories

This is not a criticism that could ever be levelled at Nancy Etcoff’s ‘Survival of the Prettiest’. On the contrary, as befits Etcoff’s background as a working scientist (not a mere journalist or popularizer), it is, from start to finish, it is full of data from published studies, demonstrating, among other things, the correlates of physical attractiveness, as well as the real-world payoffs associated with physical attractiveness (what is sometimes popularly referred to as ‘lookism’). 

Indeed, in contrast to other scientific works dealing with a similar subject-matter, one of my main criticisms of this otherwise excellent work would be that, while rich in data, it is actually somewhat deficient in theory. 

Youthfulness, Fertility, Reproductive Value and Attractiveness 

A good example of this deficiency in theory is provided by Etcoff’s discussion of the relationship between age and attractiveness. Thus, one of the main and recurrent themes of ‘Survival of the Prettiest’ is that, among women, sexual attractiveness is consistently associated with indicators of youth. Thus, she writes: 

Physical beauty is like athletic skill: it peaks young. Extreme beauty is rare and almost always found, if at all, in people before they reach the age of thirty-five” (p63). 

Yet Etcoff addresses only briefly the question of why it is that youthful women or girls are perceived as more attractive – or, to put the matter more accurately, why it is that males are sexually and romantically attracted to females of youthful appearance. 

Etcoff’s answer is: fertility

Female fertility rapidly declines with age, before ceasing altogether with menopause

There is, therefore, in Darwinian terms, no benefit in a male being sexually attracted to an older, post-menopausal female, since any mating effort expended would be wasted, as any resulting sexual union could not produce offspring. 

As for the menopause itself, this, Etcoff speculates, citing scientific polymath, popularizer and part-time sociobiologist Jared Diamond, evolved because human offspring enjoy a long period of helpless dependence on their mother, without whom they cannot survive. 

Therefore, after a certain age, it pays women to focus on caring for existing offspring, or even grandchildren, rather than producing new offspring whom, given their own mortality, they will likely not be around long enough to raise to maturity (p73).[2]

This theory has sometimes been termed the grandmother hypothesis.

However, the decline in female fertility with age is perhaps not sufficient to explain the male preference for youth. 

After all, women’s fertility is said to peak in their early- to mid-twenties.[3]

However, men’s (and boy’s) sexual interest, if anything, seems to peak in respect of females, if anything, somewhat younger, namely in their late-teens (Kenrick & Keefe 1992). 

To explain this, Douglas Kenrick and Richard Keefe propose, following a suggestion of Donald Symons, that this is because girls at this age, while less fertile, have higher reproductive value, a concept drawn from ecology, population genetics and demography, which refers to an individual’s expected future reproductive output given their current age (Kenrick & Keefe 1992). 

Reproductive value in human females (and in males too) peaks just after puberty, when a girl first becomes capable of bearing offspring. 

Before then, there is always the risk she will die before reaching sexual maturity; after, her reproductive value declines with each passing year as she approaches menopause. 

Thus, Kenrick and Keefe, like Symons before them, argue that, since most human reproduction occurs within long-term pair-bonds, it is to the evolutionary advantage of males to form long-term pair-bonds with females of maximal reproductive value (i.e. mid to late teens), so that, by so doing, they can monopolize the entirety of that woman’s reproductive output over the coming years. 

Yet the closest Etcoff gets to discussing this is a single sentence where she writes: 

Men often prefer the physical signs of a woman below peak fertility (under age twenty). Its like signing a contract a year before you want to start the job” (p72). 

Yet the theme of indicators of youth being a correlate of female attractiveness is a major theme of her book. 

Thus, Etcoff reports that, in a survey of traditional cultures: 

The highest frequency of brides was in the twelve to fifteen years of age category… Girls at this age are preternaturally beautiful” (p57). 

It is perhaps true that “girls at this age are preternaturally beautiful” – and Etcoff, being female, can perhaps even get away with saying this without being accused of being a pervert or ‘paedophile’ for even suggesting such a thing. 

Nevertheless, this age “twelve to fifteen” seems rather younger than most men’s, and even most teenage boys, ideal sexual partners, at least in western societies. 

Thus, for example, Kenrick and Keefe inferred from their data that around eighteen was the preferred age of sexual partner for most males, even those somewhat younger than this themselves.[4]

Of course, in primitive, non-western cultures, women may lose their looks more quickly, due to inferior health and nutrition, the relative unavailability of beauty treatments and because they usually undergo repeated childbirth from puberty onward, which takes a toll on their health and bodies. 

On the other hand, however, obesity is more prevalent in the West, decreases sexual attractiveness and increases with age. 

Moreover, girls in the west now reach puberty somewhat earlier than in previous centuries, and perhaps earlier than in the developing world, probably due to improved nutrition and health. This suggests that females develop secondary sexual characteristics (e.g. large hips and breasts) that are perceived as attractive because they are indicators of fertility, and hence come to be attractive to males, rather earlier than in premodern or primitive cultures. 

Perhaps Etcoff is right that girls “in the twelve to fifteen years of age category… are preternaturally beautiful” – though this is surely an overgeneralization and does not apply to every girl of this age. 

However, if ‘beauty’ peaks very early, I suspect ‘sexiness’ peaks rather later, perhaps late-teens into early or even mid-twenties. 

Thus, the latter is dependent on secondary sexual characteristics that develop only in late-puberty, namely larger breasts, buttocks and hips

Thus, Etcoff reports, rather disturbingly, that: 

When [the] facial proportions [of magazine cover girls] are fed into a computer, it guesstimates their age to be between six and seven years of age” (p151; citing Jones 1995). 

But, of course, as Etcoff is at pains to emphasize in the next sentence, the women pictured do not actually look like they are of this age, either in their faces let alone their bodies. 

Instead, she cites Douglas Jones, the author of the study upon which this claim is based, as arguing that the neural network’s estimate of their age can be explained by their display of “supernormal stimuli”, which she defines as “attractive features… exaggerated beyond proportions normally found in nature (at least in adults)” (p151). 

Yet much the same could be said of the unrealistically large, surgically-enhanced breasts favored among, for example, glamour models. These abnormally large breasts are likewise an example of “supernormal stimuli” that may never be found naturally, as suggested by Doyle & Pazhoohi (2012)

But large breasts are indicators of sexual maturity that are rarely present in girls before their late-teens. 

In other words, if the beauty of girls’ faces peaks at a very young age, the sexiness of their bodies peaks rather later. 

Perhaps this distinction between what we can term ‘beauty’ and ‘sexiness’ can be made sense of in terms of a distinction between what David Buss calls short-term and long-term mating strategies

Thus, if fertility peaks in the mid-twenties, then, in respect of short-term mating (i.e. one-night stands, casual sex, hook-ups and other one-off sexual encounters), men should presumably prefer partners of a somewhat greater age than their preferences in respect of long-term partners – i.e. of maximal fertility rather than maximum reproductive value – since in the case of short-term mating strategies there is no question of monopolizing the woman or girl’s long-term future reproductive output. 

In contrast, cues of beauty, as evinced by relatively younger females, might trigger a greater willingness for males to invest in a long-term relationship. 

This ironically suggests, contrary to contemporary popular perception, males’ sexual or romantic interest in respect of relatively younger women and girls (i.e. those still in their teens) would tend to reflect more ‘honourable intentions’ (i.e. more focussed on marriage or a long-term relationship rather than mere casual sex) than does their interest in older women. 

However, as far as I am aware, no study has ever demonstrated differences in men’s preferences regarding the preferred age-range of their casual sex partners as compared to their preferences in respect of longer-term partners. This is perhaps because, since commitment-free casual sex is almost invariably a win-win situation for men, and most men’s opportunities in this arena likely to be few and far between, there has been little selection acting on men to discriminate at all in respect of short-term partners. 

Are There Sex Differences in Sexiness? 

Another major theme of ‘Survival of the Prettiest’ is that the payoffs for good-looks are greater for women than for men. 

Beauty is most obviously advantageous in a mating context. But women convert this advantage into an economic one through marriage. Thus, Etcoff reports: 

The best-looking girls in high school are more than ten times as likely to get married as the least good-looking. Better looking girls tend to ‘marry up’, that is, marry men with more education and income then they have” (p65; see also Udry & Eckland 1984; Hamermesh & Biddle 1994). 

However, there is no such advantage accruing to better-looking male students. 

On the hand, according to Catherine Hakim, in her book Erotic Capital: The Power of Attraction in the Boardroom and the Bedroom (which I have reviewed here, here and here) in the workplace, the wage premium associated with being better looking is actually, perhaps surprisingly, greater for men than for women. 

For Hakim herself: 

This is clear evidence of sex discrimination… as all studies show women score higher than men on attractiveness” (Money, Honey: p246). 

However, as I explain in my review of her book, the better view is that, since beauty opens up so many other avenues to social advancement for women, notably through marriage, relatively more beautiful women corresponding reduce their work-effort in the workplace since they have need of pursuing social advancement through their careers when they can far more easily achieve it through marriage. 

After all, by bother to earn money when you can simply marry it instead. 

According to Etcoff, there is only one sphere where being more beautiful is actually disadvantageous for women, namely in respect of same-sex friendships: 

Good looking women in particular encounter trouble with other women. They are less liked by other women, even other good-looking women” (p50; citing Krebs & Adinolfy 1975). 

She does not speculate as to why this is so. An obvious explanation is envy and dislike of the sexual competition that beautiful women represent. 

However, an alternative explanation is perhaps that beautiful women do indeed come to have less likeable personalities. Perhaps, having grown used to receiving preferential treatment from and being fawned over by men, beautiful women become entitled and spoilt. 

Men might overlook these flaws on account of their looks, but, other women, immune to their charms, may be a different story altogether.[5]

All this, of course, raises the question as to why the payoffs for good looks are so much greater for women than for men? 

Etcoff does not address this, but, from a Darwinian perspective, it is actually something of a paradox which I have discussed previously

After all, among other species, it is males for whom beauty affords a greater payoff in terms of the ultimate currency of natural selection – i.e. reproductive success. 

It is therefore male birds who usually evolve more beautiful plumages, while females of the same species are often quite drab, the classic example being the peacock and peahen

The ultimate evolutionary explanation for this pattern is called Bateman’s principle, later formalized by Robert Trivers as differential parental investment theory (Bateman 1948; Trivers 1972). 

The basis of this theory is this: Females must make a greater minimal investment in offspring in order to successfully reproduce. For example, among humans, females must commit themselves to nine months pregnancy, plus breastfeeding, whereas a male must contribute, at minimum, only a single ejaculate. Females therefore represent the limiting factor in mammalian reproduction for access to whom males compete. 

One way in which they compete is by display (e.g. lekking). Hence the evolution of the elaborate tail of the peacock

Yet, among humans, it is females who seem more concerned with using their beauty to attract mates. 

Of course, women use makeup and clothing to attract men rather than growing or evolving long tails. 

However, behavior is no less subject to selection than morphology, so the paradox remains.[6]

Indeed, the most promising example of a morphological trait in humans that may have evolved primarily for attracting members of the opposite sex (i.e. a ‘peacock’s tail’) is, again, a female trait – namely, breasts

This is, of course, the argument that was, to my knowledge, first developed by ethologist Desmond Morris in his book The Naked Ape, which I have reviewed here, and which I discuss in greater depth here

As Etcoff herself writes: 

Female breasts are like no others in the mammalian world. Humans are the only mammals who develop rounded breasts at puberty and keep them whether or not they are producing milk… In humans, breast size is not related to the amount or quality of milk that the breast produces” (p187).[7]

Instead, human breasts are, save during pregnancy and lactation, composed predominantly of, not milk, but fat. 

This is in stark contrast to the situation among other mammals, who develop breasts only during pregnancy. 

Breasts are not sex symbols to other mammals, anything but, since they indicate a pregnant or lactating and infertile female. To chimps, gorillas and orangutans, breasts are sexual turn-offs” (p187). 

Why then does sexual selection seem, at least on this evidence, to have acted more strongly on women than men? 

Richard Dawkins, in The Selfish Gene (which I have reviewed here), was among the first to allude to this anomaly, lamenting: 

What has happened in modern western man? Has the male really become the sought-after sex, the one that is in demand, the sex that can afford to be choosy? If so, why?” (The Selfish Gene: p165). 

Yet this is surely not the case with regard to casual sex (i.e. hook-ups and one-night stands). Here, it is very much men who ardently pursue and women who are sought after. 

For example, in one study at a University campus, 72% of male students agreed to go to bed with a female stranger who propositioned them to this effect, yet not a single one of the 96 females approached agreed to the same request from a male stranger (Clark and Hatfield 1989). 

(What percentage of the students sued the university for sexual harassment was not revealed.) 

Indeed, patterns of everything from prostitution to pornography consumption confirm this – see The Evolution of Human Sexuality (which I have reviewed here). 

Yet humans are unusual among mammals in also forming long-term pair-bonds where male parental investment is the norm. Here, men have every incentive to be as selective as females in their choice of partner. 

In particular, in Western societies practising what Richard Alexander called socially-imposed monogamy (i.e. where there exist large differentials in male resource holdings, but polygynous marriage is unlawful) competition among women for exclusive rights to resource-abundant alpha males may be intense (Gaulin and Boser 1990). 

In short, the advantage to a woman in becoming the sole wife of a multi-millionaire is substantial. 

This, then, may explain the unusual intensity of sexual selection among human females. 

Why, though, is there not evidence of similar sexual selection operating among males? 

Perhaps the answer is that, since, in most cultures, arranged marriages are the norm, female choice actually played little role in human evolution. 

As Darwin himself observed in The Descent of Man as an explanation as to why intersexual selection seems, unlike among most other species, to operated more strongly on human females than on men:

Man is more powerful in body and mind than woman, and in the savage state he keeps her in a far more abject state of bondage than does the male of any other animal; therefore it is not surprising that he should have gained the power of selection” (The Descent of Man).

Instead, male mating success may have depended less upon what Darwin called intersexual selection and more upon intrasexual selection – i.e. less upon female choice and more upon male-male fighting ability (see Puts 2010). 

Male Attractiveness and Fighting Ability 

Paradoxically, this is reflected even in the very traits that women find attractive in men. 

Thus, although Etcoff’s book is titled ‘The Evolution of Prettiness’, and ‘prettiness’ is usually an adjective applied to women, and, when applied to men, is—perhaps tellingly—rarely a complement, Etcoff does discuss male attractiveness too.  

However, Etcoff acknowledges that male attractiveness is a more complex matter than female attractiveness: 

We have a clearer idea of what is going on with female beauty. A handsome male turns out to be a bit harder to describe, although people reach consensus almost as easily when they see him” (p155).[8]

Yet what is notable about the factors that Etcoff describes as attractive among men is that they all seem to be related to fighting ability. 

This is most obviously true of height (p172-176) and muscularity (p176-80). 

Indeed, in a section titled “No Pecs, No Sex”, though she focuses on the role of pectoral muscles in determining attractiveness, Etcoff nevertheless acknowledges: 

Pectoral muscles are the human male’s antlers. Their weapons of war” (p177). 

Thus, height and muscularity have obvious functional utility. 

This in stark contrast to traits such as the peacock’s tail, which are often a positive handicap to their owner. Indeed, one influential theory of sexual selection contends that it is precisely because they represent a handicap that they have evolved as a sexually-selected fitness indicator, because only a genetically superior male is capable of bearing the handicap of such an unwieldy ornament, and hence possession of such a handicap is paradoxically an honest signal of health. 

Yet, if men’s bodies have evolved more for fighting than attracting mates, the same is perhaps less obviously true of their faces. 

Thus, anthropologist David Puts proposes: 

Even [male] facial structure may be designed for fighting: heavy brow ridges protect eyes from blows, and robust mandibles lessen the risk of catastrophic jaw fractures” (Puts 2010: p168). 

Indeed, looking at the facial features of a highly dominant, masculine male face, like that of Mike Tyson, for example, one gets the distinct impression that, if you were foolish enough to try punching it, it would likely do more damage to your hand than to his face. 

Thus, if some faces are, as cliché contends, highly ‘punchable’, then others are presumably at the opposite end of this spectrum. 

This also explains some male secondary sexual characteristics that otherwise seem anomalous, for example, beards. These have actually been found in some studies “to decrease attractiveness to women, yet have strong positive effects on men’s appearance of dominance” (Puts 2010: p166). 

David Puts concludes: 

Men’s traits look designed to make men appear threatening, or enable them to inflict real harm. Men’s beards and deep voices seem designed specifically to increase apparent size and dominance” (Puts 2010: p168). 

Interestingly, Etcoff herself anticipates this theory, writing: 

Beautiful ornaments [in males] develop not just to charm the opposite sex with bright colors and lovely songs, but to intimidate rivals and win the intrasex competition—think of huge antlers. When evolutionists talk about the beauty of human males, they often refer more to their weapons of war than their charms, to their antlers rather than their bright colors. In other words, male beauty is thought to have evolved at least partly in response to male appraisal” (p74) 

Of course, these same traits are also often attractive to females. 

After all, if a tall muscular man has higher reproductive success because he is better at fighting, then it pays women to preferentially mate with tall, muscular men so that their male offspring will inherit these traits and hence themselves have high reproductive success, helping the spread the women’s own genes by piggybacking on the superior male’s genes.  

This is a version of sexy son theory

In addition, males with fighting prowess are better able to protect and provision their mates. 

However, this attractiveness to females is obviously secondary to the primary role in male-male fighting. 

Moreover, Etcoff admits, highly masculine faces are not always attractive. 

Thus, unlike the “supernormal” or “hyperfeminine” female faces that men find most attractive in women, women rated “hypermasculine” faces as less attractive (p158). This, she speculates, is because they are perceived as overaggressive and unlikely to invest in offspring

As to whether such men are indeed less willing to invest in offspring, this Etcoff does not discuss and there appears to be little evidence on the topic. But the association of testosterone with both physiological and psychological masculinization suggests that the hypothesis is at least plausible

Etcoff concludes: 

For men, the trick is to look masculine but not exaggeratedly masculine, which results in a ‘Neanderthal’ look suggesting coldness or cruelty” (p159). 

Examples of males with perhaps overly masculine faces are perhaps certain boxers, who tend to have highly masculine facial morphology (e.g. heavy brow ridges, deep set eyes, wide muscular jaws), but are rarely described as handsome. 

For example, I doubt anyone would ever call Mike Tyson handsome. But, then, no one would ever call him exactly ugly either – at least not to his face. 

An extreme example might be the Russian boxer Nikolai Valuev, whose extreme neanderthal-like physiognomy was much remarked on. 

Another example that sprung to mind was the footballer Wayne Rooney (also, perhaps not uncoincidentally, said to have been a talented boxer) who, when he first became famous, was immediately tagged by the newspapers, media and comedians as ugly despite – or indeed because of – his highly masculine, indeed thuggish, facial physiognomy

Likewise, Etcoff reports that large eyes are perceived as attractive in men, but these are a neotenous trait, associated with both immature infants and indeed with female beauty (p158). 

This odd finding Etcoff attributes to the fact that large eyes, as an infantile trait, evoke women’s nurturance, a trait that evolved in the context of parental investment rather than mate choice

Yet this is contrary to the general principle in evolutionary psychology of modularity of mind and the domain specificity of psychological adaptations, whereby it is assumed that that psychological adaptations for mate choice and for parental investment represent domain-specific modules with little or no overlap. 

Clearly, for psychological adaptations in one of these domains to be applied in the other would result in highly maladaptive behaviours, such as sexual attraction to infants and to your own close biological relatives.[9]

In addition to being more complex and less easy to make sense of than female beauty, male physical attractiveness is also of less importance in determining female mate choice than is female beauty in male mate choice

In particular, she acknowledges that male status often trumps handsomeness. Thus, she quotes a delightfully cynical, not especially poetic, line from the ancient Roman poet Ovid, who wrote: 

Girls praise a poem, but go for expensive presents. Any illiterate oaf can catch their eye, provided he’s rich” (quoted: p75). 

A perhaps more memorable formulation of the same idea is quoted on the same page from a less illustrious source, namely boxing promoter, numbers racketeer and convicted killer Don King, on a subject I have already discussed, namely the handsomeness (or not) of Mike Tyson, King remarking: 

Any man with forty two million looks exactly like Clark Gable” (quoted: p75). 

Endnotes

[1] I perhaps belabor this rather obvious point only because one prominent evolutionary psychologist, Satoshi Kanazawa, argues that, since many aspects of beauty standards are cross-culturally universal, beauty standards are not ‘in the eye of the beholder’. I agree with Kanazawa on the substantive issue that beauty standards are indeed mostly cross-culturally universal among humans (albeit not entirely so). However, I nevertheless argue, perhaps somewhat pedantically, that beauty remains strictly in the ‘eye of the beholder’, but it is simply that the ‘eye of the beholder’ (and the brain to which is attached) has been shaped by a process of natural selection so as to make different humans share the same beauty standards. 

[2] While Jared Diamond has indeed made many original contributions to many fields, this idea does not in fact originate with him, even though Etcoff oddly cites him as a source. Indeed, as far as I am aware, it is even especially associated with Diamond. Instead, it may actually originatea by another, lesser known, but arguably even more brilliant evolutionary biologist, namely George C Williams (Williams 1957). 

[3] Actually, pregnancy rates peak surprisingly young, perhaps even disturbingly young, with girls in their mid- to late-teens being most likely to become pregnant from any single act of sexual intercourse, all else being equal. However, the high pregnancy rates of teenage girls are said to be partially offset by their greater risk of birth complications. Therefore, female fertility is said to peak among women in their early- to mid-twenties.

[4] This Kenrick and Keefe inferred from, among other evidence, an analysis of lonely hearts advertisements, wherein, although the age of the female sexual/romantic partner sought was related to the advertised age of the man placing the ad (which Kenrick and Keefe inferred was a reflection of the fact that their own age delimited the age-range of the sexual partners whom they would be able to attract, and whom it would be socially acceptable for them to seek out) nevertheless the older the man, the greater the age-difference he sought in a partner. In addition, they reported evidence of surveys suggesting that, in contrast to older men, younger teenage boys, in an ideal world, actually preferred somewhat older sexual partners, suggesting that the ideal age of sexual partner for males of any age was around eighteen years of age (Kenrick & Keefe 1992).

[5] Etcoff also does not discuss whether the same is true of exceptionally handsome men – i.e. do exceptionally handsome men, like beautiful women, also have problems maintaining same-sex friendships. I suspect that this is not so, since male status and self-esteem is not usually based on handsomeness as such – though it may be based on things related to handsomeness, such as height, athleticism, earnings, and perceived ‘success with women’. Interestingly, however, French novelist Michel Houellebecq argues otherwise in his novel, Whatever, in which, after describing the jealousy of one of the main characters, the short ugly Raphael Tisserand, towards an particularly handsome male colleague, writes: 

Exceptionally beautiful people are often modest, gentle, affable, considerate. They have great difficulty in making friends, at least among men. They’re forced to make a constant effort to try and make you forget their superiority, be it ever so little” (Whatever: p63) 

[6] Thus, in other non-human species, behaviour is often subject to sexual selection, in, for example, mating displays, or the remarkable, elaborate and often beautiful, but non-functional, nests built by male bowerbirds, which Geoffrey Miller sees as analogous to human art. 

[7] An alternative theory for the evolution of human breasts is that they evolved, not as a sexually selected ornament, but rather as a storehouse of nutrients, analogous to the camel’s humps, upon which women can draw during pregnancy. On this view, the sexual dimorphism of their presentation (i.e. the fact that, although men do have breasts, they are usually much less developed than those of women) reflects, not sexual selection, but rather the calaric demands of pregnancy. 
However, these two alternative hypotheses are not mutually incompatible. On the contrary, they may be mutually reinforcing. Thus, Etcoff herself mentions the possibility that breasts are attractive precisely because: 

Breasts honestly advertise the presence of fat reserves needed to sustain a pregnancy” (p178.) 

On this view, men see fatty breasts as attractive in a sex partner precisely because only women with sufficient reserves of fat to grow large breasts are likely to be capable of successfully gestating an infant for nine months. 

[8] Personally, as a heterosexual male, I have always had difficulty recognizing ‘handsomeness’ in men, and I found this part of Etcoff’s book especially interesting for this reason. In my defence, this is, I suspect, partly because many rich and famous male celebrities are celebrated as ‘sex symbols’ and described as ‘handsome’ even though their status as ‘sex symbols’ owes more to the fact they are rich and famous than their actual looks. Thus, male celebrities sometimes become sex symbols despite their looks, rather than because of them. Many famous rock stars, for example, are not especially handsome but nevertheless succeed in becoming highly promiscuous and much sought after by women and girls as sexual and romantic partners. In contrast, men did not suddenly start idealizing fat or physically unattractive female celebrities as sexy and beautiful simply because they are rich famous celebrities.
Add to this the fact that much of what passes for good looks in both sexes is, ironically, normalness – i.e. a lack of abnormalities and averageness – and identifying which men women consider ‘handsome’ had, before reading Etcoff’s book, always escaped me.
However, Etcoff, for her part, might well call me deluded. Men, she reports, only claim they cannot tell which men are handsome and which are not, perhaps to avoid being accused of homosexuality

Although men think they cannot judge another man’s beauty, the agree among themselves and with women about which men are the handsomest” (p138). 

Nevertheless, there is indeed some evidence that judging male handsomeness is not as clear cut as Etcoff seems to suggests. Thus, it has been found that, not only do men claim to have difficulty telling handsome men from ugly men, but also women themselves are more likely to disagree among themselves about the physical attractiveness of members of the opposite sex as compared to men (Wood & Brumbaugh 2009Wake Forest University 2009). 
Indeed, not only do women not always agree with one another regarding the attractiveness of men, sometimes they can’t even agree with themselves. Thus, Etcoff reports: 

A woman makes her evaluations of men more slowly, and if another woman offers a different opinion, she may change her mind” (p76). 

This indecisiveness, for Etcoff, actually makes good evolutionary sense:

If women take a second look, compare notes with other women, or change their minds after more thought, it is not out of indecisiveness but out of wisdom. Mate choice is not just about fertility—most men are fertile most or all of their lives—but about finding a helpmate to bring up the baby” (p77). 

Another possible reason why women may consult other women as to whether a given man is attractive or not is sexy son theory
On this view, it pays for women to mate with men who are perceived as attractive by other women because then any offspring whom they bear by these men will likely inherit the very traits that made the father attractive to women, and hence themselves be attractive to women and hence be successful in spreading the woman’s own genes to subsequent generations. 
In other words, being attractive to other women is itself an attractive trait in a male. However, sexy son theory is not discussed by Etcoff.

[9] Another study discussed by Etcoff also reported anomalous results, finding that women actually preferred somewhat feminized male faces over both masculinized and average male faces (Perrett et al 1998). However, Etcoff cautions that: 

The Perrett study is the only empirical evidence to date that some degree of feminization may be attractive in a man’s face” (p159). 

Other studies concur that male faces that are somewhat, but not excessively, masculinized as compared to the average male face are preferred by women. 
However, one study published just after the first edition of ‘Survival of the Prettiest’ was written, holds the possibility of reconciling these conflicting findings. This study reported cyclical changes in female preferences, with women preferring more masculinized faces only when they are in the most fertile phase of their cycle, and at other times preferring more feminine features (Penton-Voak & Perrett 2000). 
This, together with other evidence, has been controversially interpreted as suggesting that human females practice a so-called dual mating strategy, preferring males with more feminine faces, supposedly a marker for a greater willingness to invest in offspring, as social partners, while surreptitiously attempting to cuckold these ‘beta providers’ with DNA from high-T alpha males, by preferentially mating with the latter when they are most likely to be ovulating (see also Penton-Voak et al 1999Bellis & Baker 1990). 
However, recent meta-analyses have called into question the evidence for cyclical fluctuations in female mate preferences (Wood et al 2014; cf. Gildersleeve et al 2014), and it has been suggested that such findings may represent casualties of the so-called replication crisis in psychology
While the intensity of women’s sex drive does indeed seem to fluctuate cyclically, the evidence for more fine-grained changes in female mate preferences should be treated with caution. 

References 

Bateman (1948), Intra-sexual selection in DrosophilaHeredity, 2(3): 349–368. 
Bellis & Baker (1990). Do females promote sperm competition?: Data for humansAnimal Behavior, 40: 997-999. 
Clark & Hatfield (1989) Gender differences in receptivity to sexual offers. Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality, 2(1), 39–55 
Doyle & Pazhoohi (2012) Natural and Augmented Breasts: Is What is Not Natural Most Attractive? Human Ethology Bulletin 27(4):4-14. 
Gaulin & Boser (1990) Dowry as Female Competition, American Anthropologist 92(4):994-1005. 
Gildersleeve et al (2014) Do women’s mate preferences change across the ovulatory cycle? A meta-analytic reviewPsychological Bulletin 140(5):1205-59. 
Hamermesh & Biddle (1994) Beauty and the Labor Market, American Economic Review 84(5):1174-1194.
Jones 1995 Sexual selection, physical attractiveness, and facial neoteny: Cross-cultural evidence and implications, Current Anthropology, 36(5):723–748. 
Kenrick & Keefe (1992) Age preferences in mates reflect sex differences in mating strategies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15(1):75-133. 
Orians & Heerwagen (1992) Evolved responses to landscapes. In Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (pp. 555–579). Oxford University Press. 
Penton-Voak et al (1999) Menstrual cycle alters face preferencesNature 399 741-2. 
Penton-Voak & Perrett DI (2000) Female preference for male faces changes cyclically: Further evidence. Evolution and Human Behavoir 21(1):39–48. 
Perrett et al (1998) Effects of sexual dimorphism on facial attractiveness. Nature 394(6696):884-7. 
Puts (2013) Beauty and the Beast: Mechanisms of Sexual Selection in Humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 31(3):157-175. 
Wake Forest University (2009) Rating Attractiveness: Consensus Among Men, Not Women, Study Finds. ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 27 June 2009. 
Trivers (1972) Parental investment and sexual selectionSexual Selection & the Descent of Man, Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 136-179. Chicago. 
Williams (1957) Pleiotropy, natural selection, and the evolution of senescence. Evolution. 11(4): 398–411. 
Wood & Brumbaugh (2009) Using Revealed Mate Preferences to Evaluate Market Force and Differential Preference Explanations for Mate Selection, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96(6):1226-44.
Udry & Eckland (1984) Benefits of Being Attractive: Differential Payoffs for Men and Women, Psychological Reports 54(1):47–56.
Wood et al (2014). Meta-analysis of menstrual cycle effects on women’s mate preferencesEmotion Review, 6(3), 229–249.  

The ‘Means of Reproduction’ and the Ultimate Purpose of Political Power

Laura Betzig, Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History (New Brunswick: AdelineTransation, 1983). 

Moulay Ismail Ibn Sharif, alias ‘Ismail the Bloodthirsty’, a late-seventeenth, early eighteenth century Emperor of Morocco is today little remembered, at least outside of his native Morocco. He is, however, in a strict Darwinian sense, possibly the most successful human ever to have lived. 

Ismail, you see, is said to have sired some 888 offspring. His Darwinian fitness therefore exceeded that of any other known person.[1]

Some have questioned whether this figure is realistic (Einon 1998). However, the best analyses suggest that, while the actual number of offspring fathered by Ismail may indeed be apocryphal, such a large progeny is indeed eminently plausible for a powerful ruler with access to a large harem of wives and/or concubines (Gould 2000; Oberzaucher & Grammer 2014).

Indeed, as Laura Betzig demonstrates in ‘Despotism and Differential Reproduction’, Ismail is exceptional only in degree.

Across diverse societies and cultures, and throughout human history, wherever individual males acquire great wealth and power, they convert this wealth and power into the ultimate currency of natural selection – namely reproductive success – by asserting and maintaining exclusive reproductive access to large harems of young female sex partners. 

A Sociobiological Theory of Human History 

Betzig begins her monograph by quoting a small part of a famous passage from the closing paragraphs of Charles Darwin’s seminal On the Origin of Species which she adopts as the epigraph to her preface. 

In this passage, the great Victorian naturalist tentatively extended his theory of natural selection to the question of human origins, a topic he conspicuously avoided in the preceding pages of his famous text. 

Yet, in this much-quoted passage, Darwin goes well beyond suggesting merely that his theory of evolution by natural selection might explain human origins in just the same way it explained the origin of other species. On the contrary, he also anticipated the rise of evolutionary psychology, writing of how: 

Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. 

Yet this is not the part of this passage quoted by Betzig. Instead, she quotes the next sentence, where Darwin makes another prediction, no less prophetic, namely that: 

Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history 

In this reference to “man and his history”, Darwin surely had in mind primarily, if not exclusively, the natural history and evolutionary history of our species.

Betzig, however, interprets Darwin more broadly, and more literally, and, in so doing, has both founded, and for several years, remained the leading practitioner of a new field – namely, Darwinian history.

This is the attempt to explain, not only the psychology and behaviour of contemporary humans in terms of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology and selfish gene theory, but also to explain the behaviour of people in past historical epochs in terms of the same theory.  

Her book length monograph, ‘Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History’ remains the best known and most important work in this field. 

The Historical and Ethnographic Record 

In making the case that, throughout history and across the world, males in positions of power have used this power so as to maximize their Darwinian fitness by securing exclusive reproductive access to large harems of fertile females, Betzig, presumably to avoid the charge of cherry picking, never actually even mentions Ismail the Bloodthirsty at any point in her monograph. 

Instead, Betzig uses ethnographic data taken from a random sample of cultures from across the world. Nevertheless, the patterns she uncovers are familiar and recurrent.

Powerful males command large harems of multiple fertile young females, to whom they assert, and defend, exclusive reproductive access. In this way, they convert their power into the ultimate currency of natural selection – namely, reproductive success or fitness.

Thus, citing and summarizing Betzig’s work, not only ‘Despotism and Differential Reproduction’, but also other works she has published on related topics, science writer Matt Ridley reports:

[Of] the six independent ‘civilizations’ of early history – Babylon, Egypt, India, China, the Aztecs and the Incas… the Babylonian king Hammurabi had thousands of slave ‘wives’ at his command. The Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten procured three hundred and seventeen concubines and ‘droves’ of consorts. The Aztec ruler Montezuma enjoyed four thousand concubines. The Indian emperor Udayama preserved sixteen thousand consorts in apartments guarded by eunuchs. The Chinese emperor Fei-ti had ten thousand women in his harem. The Inca… kept virgins on tap throughout the kingdom” (The Red Queen: p191-2; see Betzig 1993a).

In a contemporary context, I wonder whether the ostensibly ‘elite’ all-female bodyguard of Arab socialist dictator, Colonel Gadaffi, his so-called ‘Amazonian Guard’ (aka ‘Revolutionary Nuns’), served a similar function.

Given the innate biological differences between the sexes, physical and psychological, women are unlikely to make for good bodyguards anymore than they do effective soldiers in wartime, and, judging from photographs, Gadaffi’s elite bodyguard seem to have been chosen at least as much on account of their youth and beauty as on the basis of any martial prowess. Certainly they did little to prevent his exection by rebels in 2011.

Moreover, since his overthrow and execution, accusations of sexual abuse have inevitably surfaced, though how much credence we should give to these claims is debatable.[2]

Such vast harems as those monopolized by ancient Egyptian pharaohs, Chinese emperors and Babylonian kings seem, at first, wholly wasteful. This is surely more fertile females than even the horniest, healthiest and most virile of emperors could ever hope to have even sex with, let alone successfully impregnate, in a single lifetime. However, as Betzig acknowledges: 

The number of women in such a harem may easily have prohibited the successful impregnation of each… but, their being kept from bearing children to others increased the monarch’s relative reproductive accomplishment” (p70). 

In other words, even if these rulers were unable to successfully impregnate every concubine in their harem, keeping them cloistered and secluded nevertheless prevented other males from impregnating them, which increased the relative representation of the ruler’s genes in subsequent generations.

To this end, extensive efforts also were made to ensure the chastity of these women. Thus, even in ancient times, Betzig reports: 

Evidence of claustration, in the form of a walled interior courtyard, exists for Babylonian Mai; and claustration in second story rooms with latticed, narrow windows is mentioned in the Old Testament” (p79). 

Indeed, Betzig even proposes an alternative explanation for early evidence of defensive fortifications

Elaborate fortifications erected for the purposes of defense may [also] have served the dual (identical?) function of protecting the chastity of women of the harem” (p79). 

Indeed, as Betzig alludes to in her parenthesis, this second function is arguably not entirely separate to the first. 

After all, if all male-male competition is ultimately based on competition over access to fertile females, then this surely very much includes warfare. As Napoleon Chagnon emphasizes in his studies of warfare and intergroup raiding among the Yąnomamö Indians of the Amazonian rainforest, warfare among primitive peoples tends to be predicated on the capture of fertile females from among enemy groups.[3]

Therefore, even fortifications erected for the purposes of military defence, ultimately serve the evolutionary function of maintaining exclusive reproductive access to the fertile females contained therein. 

Other methods of ensuring the chastity of concubines, and thus the paternity certainty of emperors, included the use of eunuchs as harem guards. Indeed, this seems to have been the original reason eunuchs were castrated and later became a key element in palace retinues (see The Evolution of Human Sociality: p45). 

Chastity belts, however, ostensibly invented for the wives of crusading knights while the latter were away on crusade, seem to be a modern myth.

The movements of harem concubines were also highly restricted. Thus, if permitted to venture beyond their cloisters, they were invariably escorted. 

For example in the African Kingdom of Dahomey, Betzig reports: 

The king’s wives’… approach was always signalled by the ringing of a bell by the women servant or slave who invariably preceded them [and] the moment the bell is heard all persons, whether male or female , turn their backs, but all the males must retire to a certain distance” (p79). 

Similarly, inmates of the Houses of Virgins maintained by Inca rulers:

Lived in perpetual seclusion to the end of their lives… and were not permitted to converse, or have intercourse with, or to see any man, nor any woman who was not one of themselves” (p81-2). 

Feminists tend to view such practices as evidence of the supposed oppression of women

However, from a sociobiological or evolutionary psychological perspective, the primary victims of such practices were, not the harem inmates themselves, but rather the lower-status men condemned to celibacy and ‘inceldom’ as a consequence of royal dynasties monopolizing sexual access to almost all the fertile females in the society in question. 

The encloistered women might have been deprived of their freedom of movement – but many lower-status men in the same societies were deprived of almost all access to fertile female sex partners, and hence any possibility of passing on their genes, the ultimate evolutionary function of any biological organism. 

In contrast, the concubines secluded in royal harems were not only able to reproduce, but also lived lives of relative comfort, if not, in some cases, outright luxury, often being: 

Equipped with their own household and servants, and probably lived reasonably comfortable lives in most respects, except… for a lack of liberal masculine company” (p80). 

Indeed, seclusion, far from evidencing oppression, was primarily predicted on safety and protection. In short, to be imprisoned is not so bad when one is imprisoned in a palace! 

Finally, methods were also sometimes employed specifically to enhance their fertility of the women so confined. Thus, Ridley reports: 

Wet nurses, who allow women to resume ovulation by cutting short their breast-feeding periods, date from at least the code of Hammurabi in the eighteenth century BC… Tang dynasty emperors of China kept careful records of dates of menstruation and conception in the harem so as to be sure to copulate only with the most fertile concubines… [and] Chinese emperors were also taught to conserve their semen so as to keep up their quota of two women a day” (The Red Queen: p192). 

Corroborating Betzig’s conclusions but subsequent to the publication of her work, researchers have now uncovered genetic evidence of the fecundity of one particular powerful ruler (or ruling male lineage) – namely, a Y chromosome haplogroup, found in 8% of males across a large region of Asia and in one in two hundred males across the whole world – the features of which are consistent with its having spread across the region thanks to the exceptional prolificity of Genghis Khan, his male siblings and descendants (Zerjal et al 2003). 

Female Rulers? 

In contrast, limited to only one pregnancy every nine months, a woman, howsoever rich and powerful, can necessarily bear far fewer offspring than can be sired by a man enjoying equivalent wealth, power and access to multiple fertile sex partners, even with the aid of evolutionary novelties like wet nurses, bottle milk and IVF treatment. 

As a female analogue of Ismail the Bloodthirsty, it is sometimes claimed that a Russian woman gave birth to 69 offspring in the nineteenth-century. She was also supposedly, and very much unlike Ismail the Bloodthirsty, not a powerful and polygamous elite ruler, but rather a humble, monogamously married peasant woman. 

However, this much smaller figure is both physiologically implausible and poorly sourced. Indeed, even her name is unknown, and she is referred to only as the wife of Feodor Vassilyev. It is, in short, almost certainly an urban myth.[4]

Feminists have argued that the overrepresentation of males in positions of power is a consequence of such mysterious and non-existent phenomena as patriarchy or male dominance or the oppression of women.

In reality, however, it seems that, for women, seeking positions of power and wealth simply doesn’t have the same reproductive payoff as for men – because, no matter how many men a woman copulates with, she can usually only gestate, and nurse, one (or, in the case of twins or triplets, occasionally two or three) offspring at a time. 

This is the essence of Bateman’s Principle, later formalized by Robert Trivers as differential parental investment theory (Bateman 1948; Trivers 1972).

This, then, in Darwinian terms, explains why women are less likely to assume positions of great political power.

It is not necessarily that they wouldn’t want political power if it were handed to them, but rather that they are less willing to make the necessary effort, or take the necessary risks to attain power.

Indeed, among women, there may even be a fitness penalty associated with assuming political power or acquiring a high status job. Thus, such jobs tend to be, not only high status, but also usually high stress and not easily combined with motherhood.

Indeed, even among baboons, it has been found that high-ranking females actually suffer reduced fertility and higher rates of miscarriages, possibly on account of hormonal factors (Packer et al 1995).

Kingsley Browne, in his excellent book, Biology at Work: Rethinking Sexual Equality (which I have reviewed here), noting that female executives also tend to have fewer children, tentatively proposes that a similar mechanism may be at work among humans:

Women who succeed in business tend to be relatively high testosterone, which can result in lower female fertility, whether because of ovulatory irregularities or reduced interest in having children. Thus, rather than the high-powered career being responsible for the high rate of childlessness, it may be that high testosterone levels are responsible for both” (Biology at Work: p124).

Therefore, it may well be to woman’s advantage to marry a male with a high status, powerful job, but not to do such a job for herself. That way, she obtains the same wealth and status as her husband, and the same wealth and status for her offspring, but without the hard work it takes to achieve this status.

What is certainly true is that social status and political power does not have the same potential reproductive payoff for women as it did for, say, Ismail the Bloodthirsty.

This calculus, then, rather than the supposed oppression of women, explains, not only the cross-culturally universal over-representation of men in positions of power, but also much of the so-called gender pay gap in our own societies (see Kingsley Browne’s Biology at Work: reviewed here). 

Perhaps the closest women can get to producing such a vast progeny is maneuver their sons into having the opportunity to do so.

This might explain why such historical figures as Agrippina the Younger, the mother of Nero, and Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, are reported as having been so active, and instrumental, in securing the succession on behalf of their sons. 

The Purpose of Political Power? 

The notion that powerful rulers often use their power to gain access to multiple nubile sex partners is, of course, hardly original to sociobiology. On the contrary, it accords with popular cynicism regarding men who occupy positions of power. 

What a Darwinian perspective adds is the ultimate explanation of why political leaders do so – and why female political rulers, even when they do assume power, usually adopt a very different reproductive strategy. 

Moreover, a Darwinian perspective goes beyond popular cynicism in suggesting that access to multiple sex partners is not merely yet another perk of power. On the contrary, it is the ultimate purpose of power and reason why men evolved to seek power in the first place. 

As Betzig herself concludes: 

Political power in itself may be explained, at least in part, as providing a position from which to gain reproductively” (p85).[5]

After all, from a Darwinian perspective, political power in and of itself has no intrinsic value. It is only if power can be used in such a way as to maximize a person’s reproductive success or fitness that it has evolutionary value. 

Thus, as Steven Pinker has observed, the recurrent theme in science fiction film and literature of robots rebelling against humans to take over the world and overthrow humanity is fundamentally mistaken. Robots would have no reason to rebel against humans, simply because they would not be programmed to want to take over the world and overthrow humanity in the first place. 

On the other hand, humans have been programmed to seek wealth and power – and to resist oppression and exploitation. This is why revolutions are a recurrent feature of human societies and history.

But we have been programmed, not by a programmer or god-like creator, but rather by natural selection.

We have been programmed by natural selection to seek wealth and power only because, throughout human evolutionary history, those among our ancestors who achieved political power tended, like Ismail the Bloodthirsty, also to achieve high levels of reproductive success as a consequence. 

Darwin versus Marx 

In order to test the predictive power of her theory, Betzig contrasts the predictions made by sociobiological theory with a rival theory – namely, Marxism

The comparison is apposite since, despite repeated falsification at the hands of both economists and of history, Marxism remains, among both social scientists and laypeople, perhaps the dominant paradigm when it comes to explaining social structure, hierarchy and exploitation in human societies.  

Certainly, it has proven far more popular than any approach to understanding human dominance hierarchies grounded in ethology, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology or selfish gene theory

There are, it bears emphasizing, several similarities between the two approaches. For one thing, each theory traces its origins ultimately to a nineteenth-century Victorian founder resident in Britain at the time he authored his key works, namely Charles Darwin and Karl Marx respectively.  

More importantly, there are also substantive similarities in the content and predictions of both these alternative theoretical paradigms. 

In particular, each is highly cynical in its conclusions. Indeed, at first glance, Marxist theory appears superficially almost as cynical as Darwinian theory. 

Thus, like Betzig, Marx regarded most societies in existence throughout history as exploitative – and as designed to serve the interests, neither of society in general nor of the population of that society as a whole, but rather of the dominant class within that society alone – namely, in the case of capitalism, the bourgeoisie or capitalist employers. 

However, sociobiological and Marxist theory depart in at least three crucial respects. 

First, Marxists propose that exploitation will be absent in future anticipated communist utopias

Second, Marxists also claim that such exploitation was also absent among hunter-gatherer groups, where so-called primitive communism supposedly prevailed. 

Thus, the Marxist, so cynical with regard exploitation and oppression in capitalist (and feudal) society, suddenly turns hopelessly naïve and innocent when it comes to envisaging future unrealistic communist utopias, and when contemplating ‘noble savages’ in their putative ‘Eden before the fall’.

Unfortunately, however, in her critique of Marxism, Betzig herself nevertheless remains somewhat confused in respect of this key issue. 

On the one hand, she rightly dismisses primitive communism as a Marxist myth. Thus, she demonstrates and repeatedly emphasizes that:

Men accrue reproductive rights to wives of varying numbers and fertility in every human society” (p20).

Therefore, Betzig, contrary to the tenets of Marxism, concludes:

Unequal access to the basic resource which perpetuates life, members of the opposite sex, is a condition in [even] the simplest societies” (p32; see also Chagnon 1979).

Neither is universal human inequality limited only to access to fertile females. On the contrary, Betzig observes:

Some form of exploitation has been in evidence in even the smallest societies… Conflicts of interest in all societies are resolved with a consistent bias in favor of men with greater power” (p67).

On the other hand, however, Betzig takes a wrong turn in refusing to rule out the possibility of true communism somehow arising in the future. Thus, perhaps in a misguided effort to placate the many leftist opponents of sociobiology in academia, she writes:

Darwinism… [does not] preclude the possibility of future conditions under which individual interests might become common interests: under which individual welfare might best be served by serving the welfare of society… [nor] preclude… the possibility of the evolution of socialism” (p68). 

This, however, seems obviously impossible. 

After all, we have evolved to seek to maximize the representation of our own genes in subsequent generations at the expense of those of other individuals. Only a eugenic reengineering of human nature itself could ever change this. 

Thus, as Donald Symons emphasized in his seminal The Evolution of Human Sexuality (which I have reviewed here), reproductive competition is inevitable – because, whereas there is sometimes sufficient food that everyone is satiated and competition for food is therefore unnecessary and counterproductive, reproductive success is always relative, and therefore competition over women is universal. 

Thus, Betzig quotes Confucius as observing:

Disorder does not come from heaven, but is brought about by women” (p26). 

Indeed, Betzig herself elsewhere recognizes this key point, namely the relativity of reproductive success, when she observes, in a passage quoted above, that a powerful monarch benefits from sequestering huge numbers of fertile females in his harem because, even if it is unfeasible that he would ever successfully impregnate all of them himself, he nevertheless thereby prevents other males from impregnating them, and thereby increases the relative representation of his own genes in subsequent generations (p70). 

It therefore seems inconceivable that social engineers, let alone pure happenstance, could ever engineer a society in which individual interests were identical to societal interests, other than a society of identical twins or through the eugenic reingineering of human nature itself (see Peter Singer’s A Darwinian Left, which I have reviewed here).[6]

Marx and the Means of Reproduction

The third and perhaps most important conflict between the Darwinist and Marxist perspectives concerns what Betzig terms: 

The relative emphasis on production and reproduction” (p67).

Whereas Marxists view control of what they term the means of production as the ultimate cause of societal conflict, socioeconomic status and exploitation, for Darwinians conflict and exploitation instead focus on control over what we might term the means of reproduction – in other words fertile females, their wombs, ova and vaginas. 

Thus, Betzig observes: 

Marxism makes no explicit prediction that exploitation should coincide with reproduction” (p68). 

In other words, Marxist theory is silent on the crucial issue of whether high-status individuals will necessarily convert their political and economic power into the ultimate currency of Darwinian selection – namely, reproductive success

On this view, powerful male rulers might just as well be celibate as control and assert exclusive reproductive access to large harems of young fertile wives and concubines. 

In contrast, for Darwinians, the effort to maximize one’s reproductive success is the very purpose, and ultimate end, of all political power. 

As sociologist-turned-sociobiologist Pierre van den Berghe observes in his excellent The Ethnic Phenomenon (reviewed here): 

The ultimate measure of human success is no production but reproduction. Economic productivity and profit are means to reproductive ends, not ends in themselves” (The Ethnic Phenomenon: p165). 

Thus, production is, from a sociobiological perspective, just another means of gaining the resources necessary for reproduction. 

On the other hand, reproduction is, from a biological perspective, the ultimate purpose of life. 

Therefore, it seems that, for all his ostensible radicalism, Karl Marx was, in his emphasis on economics rather than sex, just another nineteenth-century Victorian sexual prude

The Polygyny Threshold Model Applied to Humans? 

One way of conceptualizing the tendency of powerful males to attract (or perhaps commandeer) multiple wives and concubines is the polygyny threshold model

This way of conceptualizing male and female reproductive and ecological competition was first formulated by ornithologist-ecologist Gordon Orians in order to model the mating systems of passerine birds (Orians 1969). 

Here, males practice so-called resource defence polygyny – in other words, they defend territories containing valuable resources (e.g. food, nesting sites) necessary for successful reproduction and provisioning of offspring. 

Females then distribute themselves between males in accordance with size and quality of male territories. 

On this view, if the territory of one male is twice as resource-abundant as that of another, he would, all else being equal, attract twice as many mates; if it is three times as resource-abundant, he would attract three times as many mates; etc. 

The result is rough parity in resource-holdings and reproductive success among females, but often large disparities among males. 

Applying the Polygyny Threshold Model to Modern America

Thus, applying the polygyny threshold model to humans, and rather simplistically substituting wealth for territory size and quality, we might predict that, if Jeff Bezos is a hundred thousand times richer than Joe Schmo, then, if Joe has only one wife, then Jeff should have around 100,000 wives.

But, of course, Jeff Bezos does not have 100,000 wives, nor even a mere 100,000 concubines. 

Instead, he has only one solitary meagre ex-wife, and she, even when married to him, was not, to the best of my knowledge, ever guarded by any eunuchs – though perhaps he would have been better off if she had been, since they might have prevented her from divorcing him and taking an enormous share of his wealth with her in the ensuing divorce settlement.[7]

Indeed, with the sole exception of the magnificent John McAfee, founder of the first commercially available antivirus software, who, after making his millions, moved to a developing country where he obtained for himself a harem of teenage concubines, with whom he allegedly never actually had sex, instead preferring to have them defecate into his mouth while sitting in a hammock, but with whom he is nevertheless reported to have somehow fathered some forty-seven children, most modern millionaires, and billionaires, despite their immense wealth and the reproductive opportunities it offers, seemingly live lives of stultifyingly bland bourgeois respectability.

The same is also true of contemporary political leaders. 

Indeed, if any contemporary western political leader does attempt to practice polygyny, even on a comparatively modest scale, then, if discovered, a so-called sex scandal almost invariably results. 

Yet, viewed in historical perspective, the much-publicized marital infidelities of, say, Bill Clinton, though they may have outraged the sensibilities of the mass of monogamously-married Middle American morons, positively pale into insignificance besides the reproductive achievements of someone like, say, Ismail the Bloodthirsty

Indeed, Clinton’s infidelities don’t even pack much of a punch beside those of a politician from the same nation and just a generation removed, namely John F Kennedy – whose achievements in the political sphere are vastly overrated on account of his early death, but whose achievements in the bedroom, while scarcely matching those of Ismail the Bloodthirsty or the Aztec emperors, certainly put the current generation of American politicians to shame. 

Why, then, does the contemporary west represent such a glaring exception to the general pattern of elite polygyny that Betzig has so successfully documented throughout so much of the rest of the world, and throughout so much of history? And what has become of the henpecked geldings who pass for politicians in the contemporary era? 

Monogamy as Male Compromise? 

According to Betzig, the moronic mass media moral panic that invariably accompanies sexual indiscretions on the part of contemporary Western political leaders and other public figures is no accident. Rather, it is exactly what her theory predicts. 

According to Betzig, the institution of monogamy as it operates in Western democracies represents a compromise between low-status and high status males. 

According to the terms of this compromise, high-status males agree to forgo polygyny in exchange for the cooperation of low status males in participating in the complexly interdependent economic systems of modern western polities (p105) – or, in biologist Richard Alexander’s alternative formulation, in exchange for serving as necessary cannon-fodder in wars (p104).[8]

Thus, whereas, under polygyny, there are never enough females to go around, under monogamy, at least assuming that there is a roughly equal sex ratio (i.e. a roughly equal numbers of men and women), then virtually almost all males are capable of attracting a wife, howsoever physically repugnant, ugly and just plain unpleasant

This is important, since it means that all men, even the relatively poor and powerless, nevertheless have a reproductive stake in society. This, then, in evolutionary terms, provides them with an incentive both:

1) To participate in the economy to support and thereby provide for their wife and family; and

2) To defend these institutions in wartime, if necessary with their lives.

The institution of monogamy has therefore been viewed as a key factor, if not the key factor, in both the economic and military ascendency of the West (see Scheidel 2008). 

Similarly, it has recently been argued that the increasing rates of non-participation of young males in the economy and workforce (i.e. the so-called NEET’ phenomenon) is a direct consequence of the reduction in reproductive opportunities to young males (Binder 2021).[9]

Thus, on this view, then, the media scandal and hysteria that invariably accompanies sexual infidelities by elected politicians, or constitutional monarchs, reflects outrage that the terms of this implicit agreement have been breached. 

This idea was anticipated by Irish playwright and socialist George Bernard Shaw, who observed in Man and Superman: Maxims for Revolutionaries, the preface to his play Man and Superman

Polygyny, when tried under modern democratic conditions, as by the Mormons is wrecked by the revolt of the mass of inferior men who are condemned to celibacy by it” (Shaw 1903). 

Socially Imposed Monogamy’?

Consistent with this theory of socially imposed monogamy, it is indeed the case that, in all Western democratic polities, polygyny is unlawful, and bigamy a crime. 

Yet these laws are seemingly in conflict with contemporary western liberal democratic principles of tolerance and inclusivity, especially in respect of ‘alternative lifestyles’ and ‘non-traditional relationships’.

Thus, for example, we have recently witnessed a successful campaign for the legalization of gay marriage in most western jurisdictions. However, strangely, polygynous marriage seemingly remains anathema – despite the fact that most cultures across the world and throughout history have permitted polygynous marriage, whereas few if any have ever accorded any state recognition to homosexual unions.

Indeed, strangely, whereas the legalization of gay marriage was widely perceived as ‘progressive’, polygyny is associated, not with sexual liberation with rather with highly traditional and sexually repressive groups such as Mormons and Muslims.[10]

Polygynous marriage was also, rather strangely, associated with the supposed oppression of women in traditional societies such as under Islam

However, most women actually do better, at least in purely economic terms, under polygyny than under monogamy, at least in highly stratified societies with large differences in resource-holdings as between males. 

Thus, if, as we have seen, Jeff Bezos is 100,000 times richer than Joe Schmo, then a woman is financially better off becoming the second wife, or the tenth wife (or even the 99,999th wife!), of Jeff Bezos rather than the first wife of poor Joe. 

Moreover, women also have another incentive to prefer Jeff to Joe. 

If she is impregnated by a polygynous male like Jeff, then her male descendants may inherit the traits that facilitated their father’s wealth, power and polygyny, and hence become similarly reproductively successful themselves, aiding the spread of the woman’s own genes in subsequent generations. 

Biologists call this good genes sexual selection or, more catchily, the sexy son hypothesis

Once again, however, George Bernard Shaw beat them to it when he observed in the same 1903 essay quoted above: 

Maternal instinct leads a woman to prefer a tenth share in a first rate man to the exclusive possession of a third rate one” (Shaw 1903). 

Thus, Robert Wright concludes: 

In sheerly Darwinian terms, most men are probably better off in a monogamous system, and most women worse off” (The Moral Animal: p96). 

Thus, women generally should welcome polygyny, while the only people opposed to polygyny should be: 

1) The women currently married to men like Jeff Bezos, and greedily unwilling to share their resource-abundant ‘alpha-male’ providers with a whole hundred-fold harem of co-wives and concubines; and

2) A glut of horny sexually-frustrated bachelor-‘incels’ terminally condemned to celibacy, bachelorhood and inceldom by promiscuous lotharios like Jeff Bezos and Ismail the Bloodthirsty greedily hogging all the hot chicks for themselves.

Who Opposes Polygyny, and Why? 

However, in my experience, the people who most vociferously and puritanically object to philandering male politicians are not low-status men, but rather women. 

Moreover, such women typically affect concern on behalf, not of the male bachelors and ‘incels’ supposedly indirectly condemned to celibacy by such behaviours, but rather the wives of such politicians – though the latter are the chief beneficiaries of monogamy, while these other women, precluded from signing up as second or third-wives to alpha-male providers, are themselves, at least in theory, among the main losers. 

This suggests that the ‘male compromise theory’ of socially-imposed monogamy is not the whole story. 

Perhaps then, although women benefit in purely financial terms under polygyny, they do not do so well in fitness terms. 

Thus, one study found that, whereas polygynous males (unsurprisingly) had more offspring than monogamously-mated males, they (perhaps also unsurprisingly) had fewer offspring per wife. This suggests that, while polygynously-married males benefit from polygyny, their wives incur a fitness penalty for having to share their husband (Strassman 2000). 

This probably reflects the fact that even male reproductive capacity is limited, as, notwithstanding the Coolidge effect (which has, to my knowledge, yet to be demonstrated in humans), males can only manage a certain number of orgasms per day. 

Women’s distaste for polygynous unions may also reflect the fact that even prodigiously wealthy males will inevitably have a limited supply of one particular resource – namely, time – and time spent with offspring by a loving biological father may be an important determinant of offspring success, which paid child-minders, and stepfathers, lacking a direct genetic stake in offspring, are unable to perfectly replicate.[11]

Thus, if Jeff Bezos were able to attract for himself the 100,000 wives that the polygyny threshold model suggests is his due, then, even if he were capable of providing each woman with the two point four children that is her own due, it is doubtful he would have enough time on his hands to spend much ‘quality time’ with each of his 240,000 offspring – just as one doubts Ismail the Bloodthirsty was himself an attentive father his own more modest mere 888. 

Thus, one suspects that, contrary to the polygyny threshold model, polygyny is not always entirely a matter of female choice (Sanderson 2001).

On the contrary, many of the women sequestered into the harems of rulers like Ismail the Bloodthirsty likely had little say in the matter. 

The Central Theoretical Problem of Human Sociobiology’ 

Yet, if this goes some way towards explaining the apparent paradox of socially imposed monogamy, there is, today, an even greater paradox with which we must wrestle – namely, why, in contemporary western societies, is there apparently an inverse correlation between wealth and number of offspring.

After all, from a sociobiological or evolutionary psychological perspective, this represents something of a paradox. 

If, as we have seen, the very purpose of wealth and power (from a sociobiological perspective) is to convert these advantages into the ultimately currency of natural selection, namely reproductive success, then why are the wealthy so spectacularly failing to do so in the contemporary west?[12]

Moreover, if status is not conducive to high reproductive success, then why have humans evolved to seek high-status in the first place? 

This anomaly has been memorably termed the ‘The central theoretical problem of human sociobiology’ in a paper by University of Pennsylvania demographer and eugenicist Daniel Vining (Vining 1986). 

Socially imposed monogamy can only go some way towards explaining this anomaly. Thus, in previous centuries, even under monogamy, wealthier families still produced more surviving offspring, if only because their greater wealth enabled them to successfully rear and feed multiple successive offspring to adulthood. In contrast, for the poor, high rates of infant mortality were the order of the day. 

Yet, in the contemporary west, it seems that the people who have the most children and hence the highest fitness in the strict Darwinian sense, are, at least according to popular stereotype, single mothers on government welfare. 

De Facto’ Polygyny 

Various solutions have been proposed to this apparent paradox. A couple amount to claiming that the west is not really monogamous at all, and, once this is factored in, then, at least among males, higher-status men do indeed have greater numbers of offspring than lower-status men. 

One suggestion along these lines is that perhaps wealthy males sire additional offspring whose paternity is misassigned, via extra-marital liaisons (Betzig 1993b). 

However, despite some sensationalized claims, rates of misassigned paternity are actually quite low (Khan 2010; Gilding 2005; Bellis et al 2005). 

If it is lower-class women who are giving birth to most of the offspring, then it is probably mostly males of their own socioeconomic status who are responsible for impregnating them, if only because it is the latter with whom they have the most social contact. 

Perhaps a more plausible suggestion is that wealthy high-status males are able to practice a form of disguised polygyny by through repeated remarriage. 

Thus, wealthy men are sometimes criticized for divorcing their first wives to marry much younger second- and sometimes even third- and fourth-wives. In this way, they manage monopolize the peak reproductive years of multiple successive young women. 

This is true, for example, of recent American President Donald Trump – the ultimate American alpha male – who has himself married three women, each one younger than her predecessor

Thus, science journalist Robert Wright contends: 

The United States is no longer a nation of institutionalized monogamy. It is a nation of serial monogamy. And serial monogamy in some ways amounts to polygyny.” (The Moral Animal: p101). 

This, then, is not so much ‘serial monogamy’ as it is ‘sequential’ or non-concurrent polygyny’. 

Evolutionary Novelties

Another suggestion is that evolutionary novelties – i.e. recently developed technologies such as contraception – have disrupted the usual association between status and fertility. 

On this view, natural selection has simply not yet had sufficient time (or, rather, sufficient generations) over which to mold our psychology and behaviour in such a way as to cause us to use these technologies in an adaptive manner – i.e. in order to maximize, not restrict, our reproductive success. 

An obvious candidate here is safe and effective contraception, which, while actually somewhat older than most people imagine, nevertheless became widely available to the population at large only over the course of the past century, which is surely not enough generations for us to have become evolutionarily adapted to its use.  

Thus, a couple of studies have found that that, while wealthy high-status males may not father more offspring, they do have more sex with a greater number of partners – i.e. behaviours that would have resulted in more offspring in ancestral environments prior to the widespread availability of contraception (Pérusse 1993: Kanazawa 2003). 

This implies that high-status males (or their partners) use contraception either more often, or more effectively, than low-status males (or their partners), probably because of their greater intelligence and self-control, namely the very traits that enabled them to achieve high socioeconomic status in the first place (Kanazawa 2005). 

Another evolutionary novelty that may disrupt the usual association between social status and number of surviving offspring is the welfare system

Welfare payments to single mothers undoubtedly help these families raise to adulthood offspring who would otherwise perish in infancy. 

In addition, by reducing the financial disincentives associated with raising additional offspring, they probably increase the number of offspring these women choose to have in the first place. 

While it is highly controversial to suggest that welfare payments to single mothers actually give the latter an actual financial incentive to bear additional offspring, they surely, at the very least, reduce the financial disincentives otherwise associated with bearing additional children. 

Therefore, given that the desire for offspring is probably innate, women would rationally respond by having more children.[13]

Feminist ideology also encourages women in particular to postpone childbearing in favour of careers. Moreover, it is probably higher-status females who are more exposed to feminist ideology, especially in universities, where feminist ideology is thoroughly entrenched and widely proselytized

In contrast, lower-status women are not only less exposed to feminist ideology encouraging them to delay motherhood in favour of career, but also likely have fewer appealing careers available to them in the first place. 

Finally, even laws against bigamy and polygyny might be conceptualized as an evolutionary novelty that disrupts the usual association between status and fertility. 

However, whereas technological innovations such as effective contraception were certainly not available until recent times, ideological constructs and religious teachings – including ideas such as feminism, prohibitions on polygyny, and the socialist ideology that motivated the creation of the welfare state – have existed ever since we evolved the capacity to create such constructs (i.e. since we became fully human). 

Therefore, one would expect that humans would have evolved resistance to ideological and religious teachings that go against their genetic interests. Otherwise, we would be vulnerable to indoctrination (and hence exploitation) at the hands third parties. 

Dysgenics? 

Finally, it must be noted that these issues are not only of purely academic interest. 

On the contrary, since socioeconomic status correlates with both intelligence and personality traits such as conscientiousness, and these traits are, in turn, substantially heritable, and moreover determine, not only individual wealth and prosperity, but also at the aggregate level, the wealth and prosperity of nations, the question of who has the offspring is surely of central concern to the future of society, civilization and the world. 

In short, what is at stake is the very genetic posterity that we bequeath to future generations. It is simply too important a matter to be delegated to the capricious and irrational decision-making of individual women. 

__________________________

Endnotes

[1] Actually, the precise number of offspring Ismail fathered is unclear. The figure I have quoted in the main body of the text comes from various works on evolutionary psychology (e.g. Cartwright, Evolution and Human Behaviour: p133-4; Wright, The Moral Animal: p247). However, another earlier work on human sociobiology, David Barash’s The Whisperings Within gives an even higher figure, of “1,056 offspring” (The Whisperings Within: p47). Meanwhile, an article produced by the Guinness Book of Records gives an even higher figure of at least 342 daughters and 700 sons, while a scientific paper by Elisabeth Oberzaucher and Karl Grammer gives a figure of 1171 offspring in total. The precise figure seems to be unknown and is probably apocryphal. Nevertheless, the general point – namely that a powerful male with access to a large harem and multiple wives and concubines, is capable of fathering many offspring – is surely correct.

[2] Thus, it is important to emphasise that sexual abuse allegations should certainly not automatically be accepted as credible, given the prevalence of false rape allegations, and indeed their incentivization, especially in this age of me too’ hysteria and associated witch-hunts. Indeed, western mainstream media is likely to be especially credulous respect to allegations in respect of a dictator which it and the political establishment it serves had long reviled and demonized.
Moreover, although, as noted above, given the innate psychological and physiological differences between the sexes, women are unlikely to be effective as conventional bodyguards any more than they are effective as soldiers in wartime, it has nevertheless been suggested that they may have provided a very different form of protection the Libyan dictator – namely as a highly effective ‘human shield’.
On this view, under the pretence of feminism, Gaddaffi may actually have been shrewdly taking advantage of misguided male chivalry and female privilege, not unreasonably surmising that any potential assassins and unsurgents would almost certainly be male, and hence chivalrous, paternalistic and protective towards women, especially since these assassins are also likely to be conservative Muslims, who formed the main bulk of the domestic opposition to his regime, and the deliberate killing of women is explicitly forbidden under Islamic law (Sahih Muslim 19: 4320; cf. Sihah Muslim 19: 4321).

[3] The capture of fertile females from among enemy groups is by no means restricted to the Yąnomamö. On the contrary, it may even form the ultimate evolutionary basis for intergroup conflict and raiding among troops of chimpanzees, our species’ closest extant relative. It is also alluded to, and indeed explicitly commanded, in the Hebrew Bible (e.g. Deuteronomy 20: 13-14; Numbers 31: 17-18), and was formerly prevalent in western culture as well.
It is also very much apparent, for example, in the warfare and raiding formerly endemic in the Gobi Desert of what is today Mongolia. Thus, the mother of Genghis Khan was, at least according to legend, herself kidnapped by the Great Khan’s father. Indeed, this was apparently an accepted form of courtship on the Mongolian Steppe, as Genghis Khan’s own wife was herself stolen from him on at least one occasion by rival Steppe nomads, resulting in a son of disputed paternity (whom the great Khan perhaps tellingly named Jochi, which is said to translate as ‘guest) and a later succession crisis.
Many anthropologists, it ought to be noted, dismiss Chagnon’s claim that Yanomami warfare is predicated on the capture of women. Perhaps the most famous is Chagnon’s own former student, Kenneth Good, whose main claim to fame is to have himself married a (by American standards, underage) Yąnomamö girl – who, in a dramatic falsification of her husband’s theory that would almost be amusing were it not so tragic, was then herself twice abducted and raped by raiding Yanomami war parties.

[4] It is ironic that John Cartwright, author of Evolution and Human Behaviour, an undergraduate level textbook on evolutionary psychology, is skeptical regarding the claim that Ismail the Bloodthirsty fathered 888 offspring, but nevertheless apparently takes at face value that claim that a Russian peasant woman had 69 offspring, a biologically far more implausible claim (Evolution and Human Behaviour: p133-4).

[5] However, here, Betzig is perhaps altogether overcautious. Thus, whether or not “political power in itself” is explained in this way (i.e. “as providing a position from which to gain reproductively”), certainly the human desire for political power must surely be explained in this way.

[6] The prospect of eugenically reengineering human nature itself so as to make utopian communism achievable, and human society less conflictual, is also unrealistic. As John Gray has noted in Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (reviewed here), if human nature is eugenically reengineered, then it will be done, not in the interests of society, let alone humankind, as a whole, but rather in the interests of those responsible for ordering or undertaking the project – namely, scientists and, more importantly, those from whom they take their orders (e.g. government, politicians, civil servants, big business, managerial elites). Thus, Gray concludes:

“[Although] it seems feasible that over the coming century human nature will be scientifically remodelled… it will be done haphazardly, as an upshot of struggles in the murky realm where big business, organized crime and the hidden parts of government vie for control” (Straw Dogs: p6).

[7] Here, it is important to emphasize that what is exceptional about western societies is not monogamy per se. On the contrary, monogamy is common in relatively egalitarian societies (e.g. hunter-gatherer societies), especially those living at or near subsistence levels, where no male is able to secure access to sufficient resources so as to provision multiple wives and offspring (Kanazawa and Still 1999). What is exceptional about contemporary western societies is the combination of:

1) Large differentials of resource-holdings between males (i.e. social stratification); and

2) Prescriptive monogamy (i.e. polygyny is not merely not widely practised, but also actually unlawful).

[8] Quite when a degree of de facto monogamy originated in the west seems to be a matter of some dispute. Betzig views it as very much a recent phenomenon, arising with the development of complex, interdependent industrial economies, which required the cooperation of lower-status males in order to function. Here, Betzig perhaps underestimates the extent to which even pre-industrial economies required the work and cooperation of low-status males in order to function.
Thus, Betzig argues that, in ancient Rome, nominally monogamous marriages concealed rampantly de facto polygyny, with emperors and other powerful males fathering multiple offspring with both slaves and other men’s wives (Betzig 1992). As evidence, she largely relies on salacious gossip about a few eminent Roman political leades.
Similarly, in medieval Europe, she argues that, despite nominal monogamy, wealthy men fathered multiple offspring through servant girls (Betzig 1995a; Betzig 1995b). In contrast, Kevin Macdonald persuasively contends that medieval monogamy was no mere myth and most illegitimate offspring born to servant girls were fathered by men of roughly their own station (Macdonald 1995a; Macdonald 1995b).

[9] Certainly, the so-called NEET and incel phenomena seem to be correlated with one another. NEETs are disproportionately likely to be incels, and incels are disproportionately likely to be NEETs. However, the direction of causation is unclear and probably works in both directions.
On the one hand, since women are rarely attracted to men without money or the prospects of money, men without jobs are rarely able to attract wives or girlfriends. However, on the other hand, men who, for whatever reason, perceive themselves as unable to attract a wife or girlfriend even if they did have a job, may see little incentive to getting a job in the first place or keeping the one they do have.
In addition, certain aspects of personality, and indeed psychopathology, likely predispose a man both to joblessness and inability to obtain a wife or girlfriend. These include mental illness, mental and physical disabilities, and conditions such as autism.
Finally, the NEET phenomenon cannot be explained solely by the supposed decline in marriage opportunities for young men, as might be suggested by simplistic reading of Binder (2021). Another factor is surely the increased affluence of society at large. In previous times, and in much of the developing world today, remaining voluntarily would likely result in penury and destitution for all but a tiny minority of the economic elite.

[10] Indeed, during the debates surrounding the legalization of gay marriage, the prospect of the legalization of polygynous marriage was rarely discussed, and, when it was raised, it was usually invoked by the opponents of gay marriage, as a sort of reductio ad absurdum of changes in marriage laws to permit gay marriage, something champions of gay marriage were quick to dismiss as preposterous scaremongering. In short, both sides in the acrimonious debates regarding gay marriage seem to have been agreed that legalizing polygynous unions was utterly beyond the pale.

[11] Thus, father absence is a known correlate of criminality and other negative life outcomes. In fact, however, the importance of paternal investment in offspring outcomes, and indeed of parental influence more generally, has yet to be demonstrated, since the correlation between father-absence and negative life-outcomes could instead reflect the heritability of personality, including those aspects of personality that cause people to have offspring out of wedlock, die early, divorce, abandon their children or have offspring by a person who abandons their offspring or dies early (see Judith Harris’s The Nurture Assumption, which I have reviewed here). 

[12] This paradox is related to another one – namely, why it is that people in richer societies tend to have lower fertility rates than poorer societies? This recent development, often referred to as the demographic transition, is paradoxical for the exact same reason that it is paradoxical for relatively wealthier people within western societies to have have fewer offspring than relatively poorer people within these same societies, namely that it is elementary Darwinism 101 that an organism with access to greater resources should channel those additional resources into increased reproduction. Interestingly, this phenomenon is not restricted to western societies. On the contrary, other wealthy industrial and post-industrial societies, such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea, have, if anything, even lower fertility rates than Europe, Australasia and North America.

[13] Actually, it is not altogether clear that women do have an innate desire to bear children. After all, in the EEA, there was no need for women to evolve a desire to bear children. All they required to a desire to have sexual intercourse (or indeed a mere willingness to acquiesce in the male desire for intercourse). In the absence of contraception, offspring would then naturally result. Indeed, other species, including presumably most of our pre-human ancestors, are surely wholly unaware of the connection between sexual intercourse and reproduction. A desire for offspring would then serve no adaptive function for these species at all. However, this did not stop these species from seeking out sexual opportunities and hence reproducing their kind. However, given anecdotal evidence of so-called ‘broodiness’ among women, I suspect women do indeed have some degree of innate desire for offspring.

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