Aurochs, Annuals, Africa and the Americas: A Review of Jared Diamond’s ‘Guns, Germs and Steel’

Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (London: Vintage, 1998)[note]

Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies’, authored by physiologist, ornithologist, anthropologist, evolutionary biologist, ecologist, bestselling popular science writer and all-round scientific polymath Jared Diamond, is an enormously ambitious work.

In it, Diamond seeks to answer what is perhaps both the greatest and the most controversial question in the entire field of human history – namely, why civilization, technological advancement and modernity emerged in the parts of the world that they did and not in other regions.

In doing so, he seeks to explain the rise of civilization, the conquest of continents and differential rates of development around the world throughout history right up to the present day – in short, more or less the entire course of human history and indeed much of prehistory as well.

Perhaps inevitably, Diamond fails in the hugely ambitious task he has set himself.

Yet, if Diamond ultimately fails in this project, nevertheless the intellectual journey upon which he takes his readers is a hugely enlightening and entertaining one, in which he introduces many novel ideas that are indeed surely a part of the answer to the historical question he has posed.

Moreover, it is a hugely thought-provoking book and perhaps its chief value is in having once again opened up to public discussion and scholarly debate this most important, yet also challenging and taboo, of historical questions.

Diamond’s Theory

In addition to being a hugely ambitious work, ‘Guns, Germs and Steel’ is also a very long book.

This is perhaps inevitable given the scale of his ambition. After all, one is unlikely to be able to explain the rise of civilization throughout the entire world and the entirety of human history in just a few paragraphs.

However, despite its scale, ‘Guns, Germs and Steel’ is still, in my view, an unnecessarily overlong book, and includes much repetition of material as well as the inclusion of much material that is tangential or, at best, peripheral to the book’s main theme and thesis.

Distilling its basic theory therefore easier said than done.

Neither is the book’s title of much help in this direction.

Guns, germs and steel are indeed a part of the story of how some groups came to expand and ultimately dominate the globe—but they are only a relatively late element this story, and certainly not the ultimate factors responsible.[1]

Instead, they represent just some of the means by which certain populations came to conquer, colonize, and displace other populations, although other technologies also played a role.

However, to attribute the conquest of continents to technologies such as guns and steel only raises the further question as to why it was certain peoples inhabiting certain regions who first developed and made use of these technologies and not other peoples in other regions.

Likewise, to attribute the depopulation of Native Americans and Australian Aboriginals to the germs carried by European colonizers may indeed be true, but it only raises the question as to why it was, not only Europeans who invaded America and Australia, and not  Native Americans and Australian Aboriginals who invaded Europe, but also why it was Europeans who carried more virulent infectious diseases than did Native Americans and Australian Aboriginals, such that it was the latter who were decimated by European diseases, not the European settlers wiped out by indigenous germs.[2]

In short, these are proximate causes that explain how Europeans came to conquer their colonies, but not the ultimate reason why they were able to do so

Yet the greater part of Diamond’s text is indeed devoted to answering this more fundamental question.

Diamond’s theory can be summarized thus:

The more advanced technological development of certain regions is traced ultimately to their domestication of plants and animals, or adoption of domestic species that were domesticated elsewhere.

Whether a population domesticated any plants or animals, or were able to adopt domestic species domesticated elsewhere, and how many such species they were able to domesticate or adopt, and how early, depended on three factors:

  1. How many, if any, species were available that were suitable for domestication in the area they inhabited?
  2. Whether they were in contact with other regions where species had been domesticated, or which had adopted domestic species that had been domesticated elsewhere?
  3. Whether climatic factors permitted the adoption in their own locale of these domesticates?

The adoption of domestic plants permitted higher population densities, which increased both:

  1. The potential for technological innovation, and
  2. The number and virulence of infectious diseases with which a population was afflicted.

Technological innovation was greater in more densely populated regions simply because, the most people there are, the greater the chances that some of them may come up with useful technological innovations, while greater population density also facilitates the spread and diffusion of these technologies.

Meanwhile, infectious diseases came to be more virulent and deadly in more densely populated regions because they spread more easily, and can hence afford to evolve to become more deadly, in densely populated environments where people are in closer contact with one another, and with one another’s waste materials, enabling the pathogens to spread from one person to another more easily.

On the other hand, in less densely populated regions, infectious diseases pass between different people much less easily. Therefore, there is selection pressure against a pathogen evolving to become deadly to its host, or at least to kill its host too quickly, because, if the pathogen kills its host before it has managed to spread to any new hosts (as is more likely in sparsely populated regions), its genes usually perish along with the host.

In addition, Diamond argues, the domestication of animals itself also leads to more infectious diseases because, according to Diamond, many infectious diseases which afflict us today first spread to humans via contact with domestic animals.

However, if the rise of civilization, and conquest of continents, is indeed ultimately attributable to the availability of potentially domesticable species, and of already domesticated species from other regions that can be readily adopted in one’s own region, then this only raises several further questions, namely:  

  1. Why some species are evidently domesticable and others apparently not?
  2. Why domesticable species were present in some regions but not others? and
  3. What factors prevented the transfer of these domesticates to some other regions?

Here, as we will see, Diamond provides compelling and quite persuasive theoretical reasons why there was:

  1. A lack of domesticable plants in Africa; and
  2. A lack of domesticable animals in the Americas and Australasia.

However, at the same time, he fails to adequately explain why there was, and indeed that there was (supposedly):

  1. A lack of domesticable plants in America; and
  2. A lack of domesticable animals in Africa.

Domesticated Plants in Eurasia vs Sub-Saharan Africa

Thus, with respect to the fact that tropical Africans domesticated few plants, Diamond explains that annual plants, namely those which complete their entire lifecycles within a single year, are ideal for exploitation and domestication by humans and many have come to represent important parts of our staple diets. This, Diamond explains, is because:

Within their mere one year of life, annual plants inevitably remain small herbs. Many of them instead put their energy into producing big seeds, which remain dormant during the dry season and are then ready to sprout when the rains come. Annual plants therefore waste little energy on making inedible wood or fibrous stems, like the body of trees and bushes. But many of the big seeds… are edible by humans. They constitute 6 of the modern world’s 12 major crops” (p136).

However, in the Tropics, which includes most of subSaharan Africa, seasonal variation in climate is minimal, and temperatures hence relatively stable all year round.

Therefore, annual plants are rare in subSaharan Africa and other tropical regions, since an organism is unlikely to evolve to calibrate its lifecycle in accordance with predictable annual (i.e. seasonal) changes in climate if annual changes in climate are minimal.

Meanwhile, those parts of subSaharan Africa where the climate was suitable for the cultivation of these crops, and which today enjoy high farm yields, namely Southern Africa, much of which enjoys a subtropical climate similar to that prevailing in the areas of Eurasia where agriculture first developed, were nevertheless unable to adopt crops domesticated in these latter regions prior to modern times, simply because they were not in sufficient contact with the Middle Eastern and North African civilizations, being separated by the Sahara and the Tropics, to both of which environments annual plants domesticated in the Middle East and Mediterranean region are wholly unsuited and hence could never penetrate prior to modern times.

Plant Domestication in the Americas

Unfortunately, however, while this explanation – namely the relative lack of annual plants in the Tropics – works quite well to explain the relative lack of plants domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa, it works much less well in explaining the rise of civilization in the Americas.

Thus, much of North America enjoys a subtropical or temperate climate similar to that prevailing in those regions of Eurasia where agriculture first developed and subsequently flourished. In these regions, given the seasonal variation in climate, annual plants are presumably common.

Yet, in these parts of North America, few important crops seem to have been domesticated, and advanced civilization was largely, if not wholly, absent.

Instead, the greatest civilizations of pre-Columbian America were centred squarely in the Tropics.

Thus, of what are generally regarded as the three greatest pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas (and arguably the only pre-Columbian American cultures to qualify as true ‘civilizations), the territories of two, namely the Mayan and Aztec, were entirely restricted to the Tropics, while the third, the Inca, though its vast empire expanded beyond Tropics, also had its origins, capital and heartland within this climatic zone.

Animal Domestication in Eurasia vs the Americas

What then of domesticated animals, the other factor emphasized by Diamond?

Whereas in respect of domesticated plants, Diamond has, as we have seen, an explanation that works well in explaining the relative absence of early agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa but rather fails to adequately explain the rise and spread (and the absence in some regions) of civilization in the Americas, with respect to domesticated animals, his explanation works rather better for the the Americas (and indeed for Australasia) than it does for Africa.

Thus, Diamond persuasively explains that the number of animals of the sort suitable for domestication was reduced in the Americas (and Australasia) by the sudden and late arrival of humans on this landmass.

Thus, whereas animal species of the Old World had long been subject to human predation, and hence evolved counter-adaptations, such as avoidance and fear of humans, animal species in the Americas, were entirely unprepared for the sudden influx of humans with their already developed and formidable hunting skills.

Most big mammals of Africa and Eurasia survived into modern times, because they had coevolved with protohumans for hundreds of thousands or millions of years. They thereby enjoyed ample time to evolve a fear of humans, as our ancestors’ initially poor hunting skills slowly improved” (p43)

In contrast, on the sudden arrival of humans in the Americas and Australasia, the indigenous fauna were suddenly confronted with anatomically modern, and comparatively technologically advanced, human hunters, with their already formidable hunting skills honed over thousands of years of evolution, cultural and biological, in Africa and Eurasia.

As evidence, he cites the extinctions that also occurred on isolated islands that had formerly been uninhabited by humans upon the arrival of the first human colonists, such as that of the famous “dodo of Mauritius”:

On every one of the well-studied oceanic islands colonized in the prehistoric era, human colonization led to an extinction spasm whose victims included the moas of New Zealand, the giant lemurs of Madagascar, and the big flightless geese of Hawaii” (p43).[3]

Thus, he not unreasonably concludes, the same process of mass extinctions surely occurred, albeit on a much wider scale, among the indigenous fauna of the Americas and Australasia when humans first arrived en masse during prehistory.

This then explains the disappearance in America of so many large animals of the sort that might have been potentially domesticable at around the same time the first humans arrived there.[4]

As a general rule, predation rarely leads to the complete extinction of a species, because, as the prey species decreases in number due to predation, predators either switch to an alternative source of food as a substitute for the prey that has become increasingly scarce, or themselves begin to decline in numbers due to declining numbers of prey on whom to feed, either of which allow the prey species to recover in numbers.

However, among humans, hunting is often motivated as much by status competition as by caloric needs (Hawkes 1991).

This results in particular prestige being associated with claiming the carcass of an especially rare prey.

This means that, even when a prey species is on the verge of extinction, and continuing to hunt this species makes no sense in terms of optimal foraging theory, humans may continue to hunt down the last surviving members of a species.

Thus, humans have the unique and dubious distinction of having driven many species to extinction through predation.

Animal Domestication in Sub-Saharan Africa

Yet, if this sudden and late influx of formidable human hunters explains the relative lack of domesticable animals in the Americas and Australia, this explanation certainly cannot apply to Africa, which, far from experiencing a late influx of humans, is the region where anatomically modern humans first evolved.

Therefore, indigenous prey species in Africa will have gradually evolved counteradaptations to human predation, not least fear and avoidance of humans, at the same time that humans ourselves were gradually evolving to become such formidable hunters.

This is in stark contrast to the situation, not only in Australasia or the Americas, as emphasized by Diamond, but also, as not mentioned by Diamond, even in Eurasia itself.

Thus, just as the indigenous fauna of Australasia and the Americas were wholly unprepared for the sudden influx of anatomically modern humans who quite suddenly arrived in their midst, so, in a much earlier period, the indigenous fauna of Eurasia were perhaps faced with much the same predicament, and mortal danger, being suddenly faced with the first anatomically modern humans to venture beyond the African continent, yet with their already formidable hunting skills honed over many years of evolution in Africa.[5]

Indeed, the indigenous fauna of Eurasia may even have faced this mortal danger repeatedly, having been confronted with successive waves of hominid (Homo erectus, Homo heidelbergensis) that had successively migrated out of Africa, each of which were likely formidable hunters, and each successive wave perhaps more formidable than that which preceded it.

It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that Africa is famous for its exotic large wild animals, which is why it is a popular destination for safari expeditions.

Thus, according to Diamond’s own reckoning, Africa is today home to almost as many species of large terrestrial mammal as is Eurasia, with 51 such species being indigenous to Africa, as compared to 72 that are found in Eurasia (p162). This, of course, means that, relative to its much smaller overall land mass, Africa actually has a much greater concentration of different large terrestrial mammalian species than does Eurasia.[6]

Why then were no indigenous species of animal, apart from Guinea fowl and donkeys, successfully domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa?

Diamond himself acknowledges the paradox, conceding:

The lack of domestic mammals indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa is especially astonishing, since a main reason why tourists visit Africa today is to see its abundant and diverse wild animals” (p161).

Thus, he acknowledges:

The percentage of [large terrestrial herbivorous or omnivorous mammals] actually domesticated [of those available in each region] is highest in Eurasia (18 percent) and is especially low in subSaharan Africa (no species domesticated out of 51 candidates!” (p163).[7]

However, explains away this paradox by insisting that, although there were indeed a large number of superficially seemingly domesticable mammals in subSaharan Africa, it just so happens that, purely by chance, none of these species were in fact amenable to domestication.

Yet, rather than presenting any general systematic reason why so few African animals were domesticable, Diamond simply argues this was just bad luck. It just so happened that, purely by chance, and for various quite different reasons, no African animals were capable of being domesticated, but rather each were possessed of one or more traits that absolutely precluded their successful domestication.

Given the large number of terrestrial herbivores in Africa, this is unlikely purely on statistical grounds.

Yet Diamond proceeds on a purely ad hoc, piecemeal basis, discussing why several of the more obvious candidates were in fact unsuitable for domestication.

His arguments, moreover, are not always entirely persuasive.

Zebras

A case in point are zebras, a herbivorous odd-toed ungulate, indigenous to much of East and Southern Africa.

Zebras, Diamond concedes, seem superficially eminently suitable for domestication.

Thus, zebras feed on grasses that we cannot consume. This means they do not compete with humans for food, but rather convert a food we cannot consume (namely, grass) into foods we can (namely, zebra meat and milk).

Moreover, zebras are closely related to horses and donkeys, whose wild ancestors have, of course, been successfully domesticated by humans. They also resemble horses and donkeys both morphologically and behaviourally.[8]

This suggests that, since donkeys and horses were, of course, successfully domesticated, surely zebras could have been domesticated in just the same way.

Indeed, with only a little imagination, one can easily envisage a domesticated zebra, not only being farmed for its milk and meat, but also being used as a draft and pack animal, and being ridden, both for transport and perhaps into battle.

However, despite superficial appearances, Diamond nevertheless insists that zebras are in fact wholly undomesticable, something he attributes primarily to what he terms their “nasty disposition” (p171-2).

Yet this argument strikes me as immediately suspect.

After all, African wild asses, the ancestors of domestic donkeys, are also known to be quite aggressive, at least with one another, while the wild ancestor of the domestic horse is now extinct, conveniently precluding a direct behavioural comparison.

Moreover, the fact that zebras, while never domesticated, have been successfully tamed, as Diamond himself acknowledges, seems to rule out Diamond’s claim that their “nasty disposition” alone prevents exploitation by humans.

Aurochs

Another comparison is even more devastating to Diamond’s argument, namely that of a wild animal that, unlike zebras, early humans did successfully domesticate, and whose wild ancestor is also extinct, but whose highly aggressive behavioural disposition can be readily inferred and whose physical formidability is surely not in doubt – namely the auroch, the wild ancestor of domestic cattle.

Domestic bulls remain a physically formidable and aggressive animal. This is among the reasons they are favoured in blood sports such as bull-baiting, bull riding and bullfighting.[9]

Yet the wild ancestor of cattle, the auroch, was much larger and more formidable even than the domestic bull.

Moreover, it was surely also undoubtedly far more aggressive as well, since the reduction of aggression, so as to make animals more easily manageable by humans, is an early, universal and important consequence of domestication.

Indeed, the domestication of the formidable auroch perhaps even forces us to reconsider whether hippos and rhinos, the prospect for whose domestication Diamond, seemingly not unreasonably, dismisses in little more than a sentence, might also have been potentially domesticable.[10]

Moreover, aurochs, and indeed modern cattle, also evince yet another trait that, at least according to Diamond, supposedly precludes a species’ domestication – namely, it is not advisable to keep multiple adult males in close proximity to one another in the same enclosure during the breeding season.

Thus, Diamond argues that “one of the main factors” that precluded the domestication of African antelope is the fact that:

Males of those herds space themselves into territories and fight fiercely with each other when breeding” (p174).

But the same is also true of bulls. Thus, dairy farmers well know that it is not generally advised to keep more than one bull in a single enclosed field at any time, and, as with antelope, especially not during the breeding season.[11]

Yet, if this is true of modern domestic bulls, then it was undoubtedly even more true of the first wild aurochs to be tamed, prior to their full domestication, since, as we have already seen, the reduction of aggression is among the principle aims, and effects, of the domestication process.

Yet according to Diamond, if males of a given species “disperse themselves into territories and fight fiercely with each other when breeding”, then this absolutely precludes any possibility of their successful domestication.

We are fortunate that our ancient Eurasian forebears, those who successfully domesticated the formidable wild auroch, never took the trouble to read Jared Diamond’s celebrated nonfiction bestseller, for, if they had, they would no doubt have abandoned the project as futile at the outset.

Modern Domestication

As the final definitive evidence that the failure of the indigenous peoples of Africa, Australasia and the Americas to domesticate indigenous fauna and flora did not betoken any deficiency on their own part as compared to Eurasians, but rather reflected the inherent unsuitability for domestication of the various species available, Diamond points to the inability of white colonists in Africa, America and Australasia, and even of modern scientists, to domesticate any of the indigenous species of Africa, Australasia and the Americas that natives had also failed to domesticate.

His argument seems to be that, if the white colonists in Africa also failed to domesticate zebras, then it cannot be racial factors that prevented indigenous black Africans from doing so; and, if even modern scientists, with all the modern technologies and scientific knowledge available to them, have proven unable to domesticate, say, zebras, then what hope did ancient Africans have. Clearly, zebras must simply be intrinsically undomesticable.

However, the problem with this argument is that the process of domestication is necessarily a gradual one, involving selective breeding over many generations. Therefore, even with the aid of modern scientific knowledge, by its very nature, it can occur only over many generations.[12]

Yet most of subSaharan Africa was colonized by Europeans only from the late nineteenth century. Therefore, white western settlers arrived in Africa only a few generations ago, and in Australia and the Americas, only a few generations before that.[13]

Moreover, in most of subSaharan Africa, they were few in number, and mostly left during the process of decolonization only a few generations later, or soon thereafter.

Therefore, they had little time in which to domesticate any indigenous fauna or flora.

Perhaps more importantly, they also often had little incentive.

After all, why begin the slow, difficult and uncertain process of domesticating indigenous fauna and flora when they already had their own domesticates, already domesticated in Eurasia, which they could often readily transplant to their new homes?

For example, wheat, rice and barley were all first domesticated in Eurasia, but, transplanted to the Americas, they are now among the most important staple crops of North America.[14]

Shape, Axis and Orientation of Continents

What then are the factors that prevented ancient peoples from simply adopting the domesticates that had already been domesticated in other regions?

One important factor identified by Diamond is isolation. A people isolated from other civilizations or peoples by geographic barrers obviously cannot adopt the domesticates of the latter, and nor can they copy, reverse engineer and adopt their technologies, for the simple reason that they never come into contact with these technologies.

Thus, of all the world’s continents, Australia was undoubtedly the most isolated, being separated from Eurasia and the Americas by vast oceans.[15]

Yet, besides oceans, deserts, tundra and mountains, another less obvious factor identified by Diamond as precluding the successful transfer of domesticates in ancient times is the shape, axis and orientation of the various continents.

Thus, Eurasia, which Diamond identifies as a single cultural zone, and which, for his purposes, includes North Africa (p161), is, he observes, orientated primarily on an east-west axis, from Japan and Korea in the Far East, to Western Europe and the Maghreb thousands of miles away in the west.

Since climate varies primarily with latitude (i.e. distance from the equator, and from the North and South Poles), and not with longitude, this means that, despite its vast size, many distant regions of Eurasia nevertheless enjoy very similar climates, making the transfer of domesticates adapted to these climates between these different regions quite feasible.

Thus, many domesticates that were first domesticated in one part of the vast Eurasian landmass nevertheless came to be adopted in many other parts of Eurasia far from region of initial domestication even in ancient times.

For example, barley, first domesticated in the Fertile Crescent, nevertheless came to be adopted as far away as Europe and East Asia in prehistoric times.

In contrast, Diamond argues that both Africa and the Americas are oriented primarily on a north-south axis.

Thus, North and South America, considered as a single continent, is a tall, thin landmass, being very narrow in places, especially at the Isthmus of Panama, which, at its narrowest point, is less than fifty miles across, but, on a north-south axis, stretches from the Arctic tundra of Northern Canada to Cape Horn in Chile at its southern tip several thousands of miles away.

These different regions obviously enjoy very different climates, making the transfer of domesticates across the continent in a northern and southerly direction very difficult for plants and animals adapted to a specific climate.

The Axis and Orientation of Africa

Again, however, this explanation does not work quite as well for Africa as it does for the Americas.

Thus, once we exclude North Africa, which, as we have seen, Diamond classifies as a part of the Eurasian cultural zone, being culturally, biologically, racially and climatically continuous with the Middle East and Mediterranean region (p161), subSaharan Africa is not an especially tall, narrow continent. On the contrary, it is, at its maximum extent, as wide as it is tall.

Thus, the total distance from the Somalian coast in East Africa to the Senegalese coast in West Africa, the widest expanse of the continent, is about 4,500 miles, which is very similar to the distance from the southern edge of the Sahara Desert to the most southerly tip of South Africa.

This is also much wider than the greatest east-west expanse of either North or South America.

Thus, astrophysicist-turned-historian Michael Hart, assessing Diamond’s theory, observes:

SubSaharan Africa, where a vast stretch of savannah (the Sudan, situated between the Sahara and the tropical rainforest) stretches 3500 miles in an east-west direction, from the highlands of Ethiopia to Senegal… [T]ransmission of technology and domesticates could — and repeatedly did — take place along the Sudan, and also across Ethiopia” (Understanding Human History: p176).

In short, Africa obviously does not enjoy the same vast East-West expanse as Eurasia, but, by the same token, it benefits from a vastly greater east-west expanse than does either North or South America.

Yet, in most respects, the pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas seem to have been much more advanced than any indigenous sub-Saharan African culture.

The Axis and Orientation of the Americas

Indeed, if this explanation doesn’t work well for Africa, on closer inspection, it doesn’t work that well for America either.

While America is indeed a tall thin landmass, two of the three greatest pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas, namely the Aztec and Mayan, were both concentrated in central America, where the continent is at its narrowest.

Being located in this part of the Americas, they were therefore especially disadvantaged according to Diamond’s theory, as they were therefore likely unable to adopt any domesticates domesticated anywhere else in the American landmass for climatic reasons.

However, despite this disadvantage, they nevertheless built the most impressive civilizations of the pre-Columbian Americas.

Conversely, the Americas are at their widest in North America, much of which also enjoys a temperate and subtropical climate ideal for agriculture and where advanced agriculture today thrives. Yet it was precisely in these regions that advanced civilization was largely if not entirely absent prior to the arrival of Europeans.

Relative Degrees of Cultural Isolation

Indeed, the achievements of the Mesoamerican civilizations, especially the Maya, were not only far more impressive than what was achieved in elsewhere in the Americas, but also much more impressive than anything achieved in subSaharan Africa.

However, the civilizations of the Americas were also disadvantaged as compared to those of subSaharan Africa in yet another respect – namely whereas the civilizations of Mesoamerica were entirely cut off from cultural exchange with the civilizations of Eurasia for thousands of years, this was never true to anything like the same degree in sub-Saharan Africa.

On the contrary, trade and cultural exchange between subSaharan Africa and the peoples and civilizations of North Africa and the Middle East was extensive and longstanding, especially across down the Nile Valley and across the Red Sea into the Horn of Africa, down the Swahili coast in coastal East Africa, and thence indirectly into the remainder of subSaharan Africa.[16]

In contrast, contact, let alone cultural diffusion, between Eurasian civilization and the emerging civilizations of meso-America can be ruled out almost entirely.

The great civilizations of meso-America emerged entirely independently of those in Eurasia.

Astrophysicist-turned-historian Michael Hart reports:

[S]ubSaharan Africa was not completely cut off from Eurasia, and some important aspects of Eurasian technology and culture did reach [subSaharan Africa]. Techniques of pottery-making, bronze working, and ironworking reached [subSaharan Africa] from the Middle East, as did the use of domesticated camels [whereas] domestic sheep and goats were introduced into [subSaharan Africa] from the Middle East by 4 kya. In contrast, prior to 1492, no Neolithic flora, fauna, or technology ever spread from the Old World to the Western Hemisphere” (Understanding Human History: p176).

Thus, anthropologist and physiologist John R Baker, who, in his magnus opus Race (reviewed here), even credits the remarkable Mayan civilization, alongside other impressive achievements (e.g. in astronomy), with being the first people to have  independently ‘invented the concept of zero’, laments increulously:

How, on the environmental hypothesis, can one explain the fact that the Negrids inhabiting the tropical rain-forest of central Africa made not even a start in mathematics, while the Maya of the Guatemalan tropical rain-forest, equally cut off from all contacts with civilized people, made astounding progress in this subject, and at one time were actually ahead of the whole of the rest of the world in one important branch of it?” (Race: p527-8)[17]

Similarly, Hart, assessing Diamond’s theory incredulously, concludes:

By 1000 AD, Mesoamerica was far more advanced than [subSaharan Africa] was, or ever had been. For example, Mesoamericans had originated writing on their own, had constructed many large stone structures, and had built large cities (rivaling any existing in Europe, and far larger than any in [subSaharan Africa). Furthermore, the Mayan achievements in mathematics and astronomy dwarf any intellectual achievements in [subSaharan Africa]” (Understanding Human History: p177).

Elephants in the Room?

Why then does Diamond fail in his endeavour?

Partly this reflects the scale of the task he has set himself. As discussed above, Diamond aspires to do nothing less than to explain the rise and spread of human civilizations across the entirety of the globe throughout the entirety of human history and much of prehistory. It is therefore hardly a surprise that he ultimately fails in the gargantuan task that he has set himself

Yet it hardly helps that Diamond restricts the range of factors that he is willing to consider.

Thus, he dismisses outright the idea that innate racial differences might play a role in explaining the different rates of technological and societal development among different races (see Understanding Human History and IQ And Global Inequality).

Admittedly, he does briefly alludes to this possibility in his Prologue, but only so as to dismiss it summarily:

Sound evidence for the existence of human differences in intelligence that parallel human differences in technology is lacking” (p19).

Yet, in his very next paragraph, he acknowledges the existence of an enormous” literature in psychometrics, intelligence research and behaviour genetics that shows just that (p19).

However, he dismisses this literature, not only on scientific grounds, but also on moral grounds. Thus, he writes:

The objection to such racist explanations is not just that they are loathsome, but also that they are wrong” (p19)

Yet, in saying that his objection is “not just” that these sorts of explanations are “loathsome”, he implicitly concedes that the supposedly loathsomeness of such explanations is indeed part of his objection. In other words, Diamond has allowed his moral convictions to influence his scientific judgement, what Bernard Davies, in just this context, referred to as the moralistic fallacy.

Yet quite why such theories are supposedly so “loathsome” Diamond does not take the trouble to explain. He presumably takes it as given, or as self-evident, and assumes that his readership shares his moral revulsion, as most of them no doubt do.[18]

Yet we would do well to remember that, if ideas are indeed loathsome, this has no bearing on whether they are also true.

For example, many Christians considered the heliocentric astronomical model introduced by Copernicus and Galileo similarly objectionable; many still consider the Darwin’s theory of natural selection objectionable. Yet this does not lead us to reject these theories.

The fact that many people die horrible painful deaths through no fault of their own may also be “loathsome”, but this does nothing to prevent it also being true.

Moreover, we must ask why anyone would consider theories of racial differences in intelligence so objectionable in the first.

After all, almost everyone accepts that different individuals differ in intelligence. Few of us have any difficulty accepting that, for example, Albert Einstein is probably more intelligent than we will ever be. Why are group differences any more difficult to accept?

Maturity is coming to accept that you cannot be the best at everything, and indeed are unlikely to be the very best at anything.

Indeed, most of us do indeed accept the existence of group differences in ability, certainly of sex differences, and indeed even of racial differences, in other spheres. For example, most white Americans, I suspect, have little difficulty accepting that blacks are, on average, better at basketball, Kenyans better at marathons, and Asians at math.

Accepting the existence of race differences in intelligence seems, in principle, little different.

Indeed, for most people, being intelligent isn’t all that important. Most men, I suspect, would rather be considered brave, strong and athletic than a brainy nerd, and most women, in my experience, would rather be considered pretty or beautiful than as what was once formerly derisively termed a ‘bluestocking’.

As to the other part of Diamond’s objection to race realist theories, namely, not that they are “loathsome”, but also that they are “wrong”, we might question whether someone who has such an oddly visceral emotional reaction to a scientific theory as to refer to it as “loathsome” is really the person best suited to accurately assess its objective merits.

Yet, although he acknowledges the existence of an enormous” literature in psychometrics, intelligence research and behaviour genetics on the question of race differences in intelligence and their alleged societal correlates, Diamond does not engage with this literature at all, but rather curtly dismisses this entire body of research in just a single paragraph (p19).

Given Diamond’s own cursory dismissal of this research tradition, a review of Diamond’s book is therefore not the place to discuss this body of scientific research.

However, for those interested, I have previously discussed this body of research here, here, here, here and, in the most depth, here.

With respect to the possible consequences of these differences for different levels of development and technological progress in different parts of the world, I discuss this matter here, here and here.

Conclusion

In conclusion, with regard to the topic of differential rates of development in different parts of the globe both today and throughout history, we still await a full explanation. This is a vast and important topic upon which much research, discussion and debate is surely yet to be conducted.

But one thing is surely certain—any complete explanation, and completely convincing explanation, will surely have to consider, not only the geographic factors so monolithically focussed upon by Diamond, but also the full range of possible contributing factors, howsoever politically incorrect the latter might be.


[Note] Readers may be interested that I am now cross-posting this and future posts at https://contemporaryheretic.substack.com for those who prefer that format. [NB: Not THEcontemporaryheretic.substack.com, which address was already taken by someone else.] This specific post is accessible at: https://contemporaryheretic.substack.com/p/aurochs-annuals-africa-and-the-americas

[1] A more obvious, and perhaps more accurate title, might have been ‘Yali’s Question’, a reference to the question, supposedly posed by a New Guinean native of Diamond’s acquaintance, as to why the newly arrived European colonizers had so much more cargo (i.e. imported technologies and other useful manufactured products) than did the indigenous aboriginals, that he claims provoked him to investigate the ultimate causes of differential development in different regions of the globe and among different peoples.

[2] Whereas the diseases introduced by European colonizers brought death and destruction in their wake throughout the Americas, often travelling ahead of their original European hosts, and hence decimating indigenous populations long before Europeans even arrived in many parts of America, indigenous American diseases seem to have had much less of an impact on their European colonizers themselves. To my knowledge, the only major infectious disease thought to have been introduced into Europe from the Americas is syphilis, though even this is in doubt, as the origin of this once devastating disease is still much disputed.

[3] As for indigenous birds and mammals of the Galapagos Islands and Antarctic, which humans discovered and inhabited only in recent times, these species, Diamond reports, were saved from extinction only by “protective measures” imposed by early pioneering conservationists, and otherwise remain “incurably tame” (i.e. hopelessly unafraid of humans, and hence vulnerable to human predation) to this day (p43).

[4] Actually, although he makes very clear that this is the hypothesis that he favours, Diamond actually remains strictly agnostic regarding the causes of the mass extinctions that engulfed the Americas and Australasia around the time of the arrival of the first humans. Thus, he notes that an alternative theory is that “America’s big mammals instead became extinct because of climate changes at the end of the last Ice Age, but comments sardonically:

The Americas’ big animals had already survived the ends of 22 previous Ice Ages. Why did most of them pick the 23rd to expire in concert, in the presence of all those supposedly harmless humans? Why did they disappear in all habitats, not only in habitats that contracted but also in ones that greatly expanded at the end of the last Ice Age?” (p47).

Yet, despite this persuasive argument, Diamond nevertheless charitably concedes “the debate remains unresolved” (Ibid.).
Likewise, he reports, it has been argued that the indigenous fauna of Australia and New Guinea that died out around the time of the first arrival of humans in that continent may instead have “succumbed instead to a change in climate, such as a severe drought on the already chronically dry Australian continent” (p43).
Again, however, Diamond is skeptical, observing:

I can’t fathom why Australia’s giants should have survived innumerable droughts in their tens of millions of years of Australian history, and then have chosen to drop dead almost simultaneously (at least on a time scale of millions of years) precisely and just coincidentally when the first humans arrived” (p43).

Those who doubt the human role in prehistoric mass extinctions typically attribute these theories to human arrogance and anthropocentrism. It is true, they observe, that humans today, with our advanced technologies (e.g. guns), are indeed formidable predators capable of wreaking unparalleled environmental damage. However, ancient hunter-gatherers were no doubt much less formidable.
This is indeed true. However, as compared, not to modern technologically advanced humans, but rather to other species of predator, our ancient ancestors may already have been formidable hunters, long before we evolved modern technologies such as guns.
Indeed, our greatest innovation was likely the capacity for cultural and technological innovation itself.
Thus, whereas other species must usually biologically evolve a new hunting technique, or superior weaponry (e.g. sharper teeth, longer claws), which takes many generations of gradual natural selection, humans are unique in our capacity to invent a new hunting method, or a new weapon (spear, bow and arrow). This new invention may be quite sudden, and can spread through an entire population in less than generation.
Prey species lack this same capacity for rapid innovation. They are therefore always playing catch-up. Therefore, in the ongoing evolutionary arms race between predator and prey, humans are at an enormous advantage as compared to any other species.
Even ancient man was therefore no doubt a formidable apex predator.

[5] An alternative possibility, which might explain why the indigenous fauna of Europe did not come to be hunted to extinction on the first arrival of humans in the same way as did the indigenous fauna of Australasia and the Americas when humans later arrived in these regions, is that the first humans to venture out of Africa were perhaps not yet such formidable hunters. Thus, it is known that the diet of hunter-gatherer groups in tropical subSaharan Africa is dependent more on plant food than on meat, with the former providing most of the caloric requirements of the group. However, as one moves from the tropics into temperate climes, meat comes to provide an increasing proportion of the hunter-gatherer diets, because plant foods are less widely available, especially during the cold winter months, necessitating an increasingly reliance on carnivory, which reaches an extreme in the Arctic and sub-Arctic, where plant foods are almost entirely unavailable for most of the year, and foragers such as Eskimos ate a largely carnivorous diet.
Alternatively, perhaps Eurasian prey species were not so vulnerable to the sudden influx of formidable human hunters, because they had, unlike species in the Americas, previously been exposed to earlier waves of prehuman hominid who had spread out of Africa, but who were somewhat less formidable hunters, at least on first arrival, allowing the indigenous fauna to gradually develop counteradaptations to hominid predation as successive waves of hominids successively colonized the region.

[6] Of course, it is possible the relatively greater number of large terrestrial herbivores in Africa as compared to Europe is partly attributable to certain species in Europe being driven to extinction in historical times by human predation and habitat loss. For example, tarpans, the last surviving subspecies of wild horse, are thought to have gone extinct in the late-nineteenth century, while wolves (not, of course, a herbivore) were driven to extinction in the British Isles some time earlier. However, for the theoretical reasons discussed above (namely, Africa is where anatomically modern humans first evolved, such that prey species will have evolved counter adaptations to human predation as humans themselves gradually evolved to become formidable hunters), it is likely that Africa had a relatively large number of large terrestrial mammals, as compared to Europe and other continents, even in ancient times, namely the timescale of interest for the purposes of evaluating Diamond’s theory.

[7] Actually, the latest evidence, not available to Diamond at the time he authored his book, has modified this conclusion somewhat. Thus, whereas Diamond reports that not a single large terrestrial herbivorous or omnivorous mammal was domesticated out of the fifty or so available in sub-Saharan Africa, the latest genetic evidence suggests that African wild asses (i.e. donkeys) were first domesticated, not in North Africa as formerly thought, but rather in East Africa, albeit possibly the Horn of Africa, which is culturally and racially, closely linked to the Middle East. In addition, it ought to be noted that guineafowl were also first domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa, but, as a bird species, obviously do not qualify as a large terrestrial herbivorous or omnivorous mammal.

[8] Actually, as discussed in the previous endnote, though it was formerly thought that they had first been domesticated in North Africa, the latest DNA evidence suggests that donkeys themselves were first domesticated in East Africa. This would mean that, contrary to what Diamond claims, one large terrestrial herbivorous mammal was domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa, namely donkeys. Along with the guineafowl, this would mean that at least two species of animal were first domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa.

[9] Though today concern is, understandably, primarily focussed at the suffering experienced by the bull (understandably since, unlike the human participants, the bull is unable to express consent to participating in the sporting spectacle), it ought to be noted that both bull riding and bullfighting are also dangerous sports for the human participant. Indeed, bull riding, an American rodeo sport, seems to be an exceptionally dangerous sport, almost unbelievably so. Indeed, relative to the its short duration (a bull ride is considered successful if the rider manages to stay on the bucking bull for just eight seconds, but, today, only a minority of elite riders manage to stay on even this long), bull riding is, I suspect, the most dangerous sport this side of Russian roulette.
Bull baiting, a once popular, now banned, blood sport of British origin, that involved pitting a pack of dogs (specially bred ‘bulldogs’) and against a bull, was also more dangerous for the dogs than for the bull, in the sense that more dogs died in the process than did bulls, even though the death of the bull, and its consumption as meat, was, along with entertainment and spectacle, among the ostensible purposes of the practice, an odd folk belief holding that meat from bulls that had been ‘baited’ was more tender and succulent.
I recount these facts to emphasize that, even after domestication, the bull remains a formidable and potentially deadly adversary, both for humans and packs of fierce dogs.

[10] Elephants, Diamond argues, were not worth domesticating, not so much on account of their size, but rather because of their slow developmental rate:

What would-be… elephant rancher would wait 15 years for his herd to reach adult size? Modern Asians who want work elephants find it much cheaper to capture them in the wild and tame them” (p169).

[11] Cattle farmers today generally advise that it is possible, albeit ill-advised unless absolutely necessary due to, say, limited available land, to keep two bulls in a single field, but only under certain conditions (e.g. not during the mating season), and, even then, they must be carefully managed. However, since the reduction of aggression is one of the principle aims and effects of domestication, and therefore wild male aurochs were almost certainly far more aggressive than modern bulls, this may not have been possible for the first tame aurochs, prior to full domestication.

[12] Scientific knowledge has certainly sped up the process of domestication. The ancient humans responsible for beginning the process of domesticating the first wild species probably had little idea what they were doing, and inadvertently selected for certain traits rather than doing so deliberately as a consequence of an understanding of heredity. In contrast, a famous Russian experiment allowed for the partial (self-)domestication of foxes in just a few decades.
Most recently, scientists have even developed various forms of genetic engineering which allow them to directly edit the genome of a species, remove or deactivate genes, insert genes from different species and rearrange genetic sequences. However, these techniques are, even today, very much in their infancy. Certainly, it is not yet possible to domesticate a wild species through genetic engineering alone, and nor can such techniques, as yet, even speed up the process to any significant degree. Successfully domesticating a wild species still requires many generations of selective breeding.

[13] Of course, human generations are generally longer than the generation time for most domesticated and wild species. Therefore, more generations will have passed among the species in question than among the humans who failed to domesticate them. However, this still leaves only a relatively short period of time, and number of generations, given that domestication can take literally thousands of years.

[14] Admittedly, the transplant of plants and animals that were first domesticated in one region to another region was not always possible, often because climatic or other environmental factors precluded this. Indeed, this is a major theme of Diamond’s book. Thus, plants first domesticated in the Fertile Crescent were often unsuited to tropical Africa, but sometimes could be adopted in Southern African where the climate is more similar to that prevailing in much of Eurasia.
Also, since I have focussed here on the failure of Africans to domesticate zebras, it is worth noting the difficulty of transplanting their fellow equine, the domestic horse, to sub-Saharan Africa, where they were afflicted with sleeping sickness spread by the tsetse fly. However, while this may indeed explain the failure of sub-Saharan Africans to adopt horses, nevertheless horses were introduced and widely and successfully employed in colonial Africa, especially in Southern Africa, which, for climatic reasons, was the only part of sub-Saharan Africa settled by large numbers of whites.
Interestingly, the ill-suitedness of horses to sub-Saharan Africa due to the prevalence of sleeping sickness has been posited as the reason Africa never developed the wheel, since, in the absence of the suitable draft animal, wheels are supposedly of little value. For example, Diamond himself makes a similar argument in respect of the failure of pre-Columbian Mesoamerican civilizations to make full use of the wheel, lamenting how, for the geographic reasons discussed above:

The wheels invented in Mesoamerica as parts of toys never met the llamas domesticated in the Andes, to generate wheeled transport for the New World” (p367).

The problem with this argument, however, is that wheels are useful even in the absence of a draft animal. First, they can be used for non-transport purposes – namely, the spinning wheel, the potter’s wheel, even water wheels. Indeed, in Eurasia, the potter’s wheel was actually invented and used before the use of wheels for transport purposes.
Moreover, even for transport, wheels are useful even in the absence of a draft animal. Thus, humans ourselves can be employed as a draft animal, as with wheelbarrows and pulled rickshaws. Ironically, Diamond himself acknowledges as much elsewhere, writing of how:

[Wheels] had become the basis of most Eurasian land transport—not only for animal-drawn vehicles but also for human-powered wheelbarrows, which enabled one or more people, still using just human muscle power, to transport much greater weights than they could have otherwise” (p359).

Thus, he acknowledges the paradox whereby, in Mesoamerica, the use of wheels was confined to what appear to be toys and the technology eventually, he reports, disappeared altogether, even though, he concedes, even without a draft animal, “they could presumably have been useful in human-powered  wheelbarrows” (p370).

[15] Although in this piece, I have focussed on the situation in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, it ought to be noted that Australia had many other manifest geographic disadvantages as compared to other continents, as Diamond himself rightly emphasizes. Thus, quite apart from their isolation from other continents, the climate and terrain of much of Australia, namely the Australian Outback is such that it can support only a very low population density, and then only in very trying conditions and at bare subsistence levels. Meanwhile, those few regions of the continent where conditions were more hospitable, and which are today quite densely populated, were, not only isolated from other continents, but also from one another by largely uninhabitable intermediate areas of the interior.
Even more isolated than Australia were some Pacific islands. However, unlike Australia, these were generally settled by humans relatively late in human history, and hence often benefited from the technologies, and the domesticates, that the settlers brought with them, not least the advanced seafaring knowledge that enabled them to reach and settle these remote Pacific Islands in the first place.

[16] Interestingly, author Tim Marshall, in his book Prisoners of Geography, identifies one factor that supposedly impeded the movement of peoples, and hence of technologies, within Africa, namely a lack of navigable rivers. Whereas in much of Eurasia, transport by river was, prior to modern times, usually easier and quicker than by land, in Africa this was not generally possible, because, although replete with rivers, many rivers in Africa have waterfalls that make transport by river very dangerous if not impossible.

[17] Actually, it is now generally believed that the first to  invent the concept of zero was neither the Mayans nor the Indians, nor indeed Islamic civilization, which is also sometimes credited with this achievement. In fact, both the Indians and the Muslims seem to have inherited this innovation from the ancient Babylonians, although it was Indians who took full advantage of this innovation by developing mathematics in such a way as this innovation made possible. The Maya, like the Mesopotamians, also failed take full mathematical advantage of this innovation, but, unlike both the Indians and the Muslims, they can claim to have independently hit upon this innovation, not adopted it from without.

[18] Curiously, despite his oddly visceral aversion and distaste for theories of racial differences in intelligence, and curt dismissal of such theories as both “loathsome” and scientifically unsupported just a couple of paragraphs previously, Diamond nevertheless then proceeds to proffer one such theory of his own, speculatively theorizing:

“In mental ability New Guineans are probably genetically superior to Westerners, and they surely are superior in escaping the devastating developmental disadvantages under which most children in industrialized societies grow up” (p21). 

Thus, he contends that, whereas New Guineans have to survive on their wits, using their intelligence to avoid dying from such causes as “murder, chronic tribal warfare, accidents, and problems in procuring food”, in densely populated western societies most early mortality was a consequence of disease, which, Diamond argues, would have struck quite randomly, or as a consequence of random biochemical variations between individuals, rather than being related to intelligence. Thus, he concludes:

Natural selection promoting genes for intelligence has probably been far more ruthless in New Guinea than in more densely populated, politically complex societies, where natural selection for body chemistry was instead more potent” (p21).

In addition, he argues that the intelligence of westerners is surely suppressed due to their spending too much time watching television and movies in childhood (p21). In fact, however, since IQs have increased over the course of the twentieth century concomitantly with increases in television viewership, it is far from obvious that inceased time watching television, or playing computer games, necessarily suppresses intellectual development. On the contrary, some researchers have even suggested that increasingly complex and stimulating visual media may be behind some of this increase.
At any rate, Richard Lynn reports the average IQ of New Guineans as just 62 (Race Differences in Intelligence: p112-3). Although he bases this on only a few studies, this average IQ is almost identical that reported for Australian Aboriginals, to whom New Guineans are closely related, and for whom Lynn has much more abundent data from the Australian school system (Race Differences in Intelligence: p104).

References

Hawkes (1991) Showing off: Tests of an hypothesis about men’s foraging goals. Ethology and Sociobiology 12(1): 29-54.

Sarich and Miele’s ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’: A Rare Twenty-First Century Hereditarian Take on Race Differences Published by a Mainstream Publisher and Marketed to a General Readership

Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele, Race: The Reality of Human Differences (Cambridge, MA: Westport Press 2004)

First published in 2004, ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’ by anthropologist and biochemist Vincent Sarich and science writer Frank Miele is that rarest of things in this age of political correctness – namely, a work of popular science presenting a hereditarian perspective on that most incendiary of topics, namely the biology of race and of racial differences.

It is refreshing that, even in this age of political correctness, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, a mainstream publisher still had the courage to publish such a work.

On first embarking on reading ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’ I therefore had high expectations, hoping for something approaching an updated, and more accessible, equivalent to John R Baker’s seminal Race (which I have reviewed here).

Unfortunately, however, ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’, while it contains much interesting material, is nevertheless, in my view, a disappointment and something of a missed opportunity.

Race and the Law

Despite their subtitle, Sarich and Miele’s primary objective in authoring ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’ is, it seems, not to document, or to explain the evolution of, the specific racial differences that exist between populations, but rather to defend the race concept itself.

The latter has been under attack at least since Ashley Montagu’s Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, first published in 1942, perhaps the first written exposition of race denial.

Thus, Sarich and Miele frame their book as a response to the then-recent PBS documentary Race: The Power of an Illusion, which, like Montagu, also espoused the by-then familiar line that human races do not exist, save as a mere illusion or social construct.

As evidence that, on the contrary, race is indeed a legitimate biological and taxonomic category, Sarich and Miele begin by discussing, not the field of biology, but rather that of law, discussing the recognition accorded the race concept under the American legal system.

They report that, in the USA:

There is still no legal definition of race; nor… does it appear that the legal system feels the need for one” (p14).

Thus, citing various US legal cases where race of the plaintiff was at issue, Sarich and Miele conclude:

The most adversarial part of our complex society [i.e. the legal system], not only continues to accept the existence of race, but also relies on the ability of the average individual to sort people into races” (p14).

Moreover, Sarich and Miele argue, not only do the courts recognise the existence of race, they also recognise its ultimate basis in biology.

Thus, in response to the claim that race is a mere social construct, Sarich and Miele cite the recognition the criminal courts accord to the evidence of forensic scientists, who can reliably determine the racial background of a criminal from microscopic DNA fragments (p19-23).

If race were a mere social construction based upon a few highly visible features, it would have no statistical correlation with the DNA markers that indicate relatedness” (p23).[1]

Indeed, in criminal investigations, Sarich and Miele observe in a later chapter, racial identification can be a literal matter of life and death.

Thus, they refer to the Baton Rouge serial killer investigation, where, in accordance with the popular, but wholly false, notion that serial killers are almost invariably white males, the police initially focussed solely on white suspects, but, after DNA analysis showed that the offender was of predominantly African descent, shifted the focus of their investigation and eventually successfully apprehended the killer, preventing further killings (p238).[2]

Another area where they observe that racial profiling can be literally a matter of life and death is the diagnosis of disease and prescribing of appropriate and effective treatment – since, not only do races differ in the prevalence, and presentation, of different medical conditions, but they also differ in their responsiveness and reactions to different forms of medication. 

However, while folk-taxonomic racial categories do indeed have a basis in real biological differences, they are surely also partly socially-constructed as well.

For example, in the USA, black racial identity, including eligibility for affirmative action programmes, is still largely determined by the same so-called one-drop-rule that also determined racial categorization during the era of segregation and Jim Crow.

This is the rule whereby a person with any detectable degree of black African ancestry, howsoever small (e.g. Barack Obama, Colin Powell), is classed as ‘African-American’ right alongside a recent immigrant from Africa of unadulterated sub-Saharan African ancestry.

This obviously has far more to do with social and political factors, and with America’s unique racial history, than it does with biology and hence shows that folk-taxonomic racial categories are indeed part ‘socially-constructed’.[3]

Similarly, the racial category Hispanic’ or ‘Latino obviously has only a distant and indirect relationship to race in the biological sense, including as it does persons of varying degrees of European, Native American and also black African ancestry.[4]

It is also unfortunate that, in their discussion of the recognition accorded the race concept by the legal system, Sarich and Miele restrict their discussion entirely to the contemporary US legal system.

In particular, it would be interesting to know how the race of citizens was determined under overtly racialist regimes, such as under the Apartheid regime in South Africa,[5] under the Nuremberg laws in National Socialist Germany,[6] or indeed under Jim Crow laws in the South in the USA itself in the early twentieth century,[7] where the stakes were, of course, so much higher.

Also, given that Sarich and Miele rely extensively in later chapters on an analogy between human races and dog breeds (what he calls the “canine comparison”: p198-203; see discussion below), a discussion of the problems encountered in drafting and interpreting so-called breed-specific legislation to control so-called ‘dangerous dog breeds’ would also have been relevant and of interest.[8]

Such legislation, in force in many jurisdictions, restricts the breeding, sale and import of certain breeds (e.g. Pit Bulls, Tosas) and orders their registration, neutering and sometimes even their destruction. It represents, then, the rough canine equivalent of the Nuremberg laws.

A Race Recognition Module?

According to Sarich and Miele, the cross-cultural universality of racial classifications suggests that humans are innately predisposed to sort humans into races.

As evidence, they cite Lawrence Hirschfeld’s finding that, at age three, children already classify people by race, and recognise both the immutable and hereditary nature of racial characteristics, giving priority to race over characteristics such as clothing, uniform or body-type (p25-7; Hirschfeld 1996).[9]

Sarich and Miele go on to also claim:

The emerging discipline of evolutionary psychology provides further evidence that there is a species-wide module in the human brain that predisposes us to sort the members of our species into groups based on appearance, and to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (p31).

However, they cite no source for this claim, either in the main body of the text or in the associated notes for this chapter (p263-4).[10]

Certainly, Pierre van den Berghe and some other sociobiologists have argued that ethnocentrism is innate (see The Ethnic Phenomenon: reviewed here). However, van den Berghe is also emphatic and persuasive in arguing that the same is not true of racism, as such.

Indeed, since the different human races were, until recent technological advances in transportation (e.g. ships, aeroplanes), largely separated from one another by the very oceans, deserts and mountain-ranges that reproductively isolated them from one another and hence permitted their evolution into distinguishable races, it is doubtful human races have been in contact for sufficient time to have evolved a race-classification module.[11]

Moreover, if race differences are indeed real and obvious as Sarich and Miele contend, then there is no need to invoke – or indeed to evolve – a domain-specific module for the purposes of racial classification. Instead, people’s tendency to categorise others into racial groups could simply reflect domain-general mechanisms (i.e. general intelligence) responding to real and obvious differences.[12]

History of the Race Concept

After their opening chapter on ‘Race and the Law’, the authors move on to discussing the history of the race concept and of racial thought in their second chapter, which is titled ‘Race and History’.

Today, it is often claimed by race deniers that the race concept is a recent European invention, devised to provide a justification for such nefarious, but by no means uniquely European, practices as slavery, segregation and colonialism.[13]

In contrast, Sarich and Miele argue that humans have sorted themselves into racial categories ever since physically distinguishable people encountered one another, and that ancient peoples used roughly the same racial categories as nineteenth-century anthropologists and twenty-first century bigots.

Thus, Sarich and Miele assert in the title of one of their subheadings:

“[The concept of] race is as old as history or even prehistory” (p57).

Indeed, according to Sarich and Miele, even ancient African rock paintings distinguish between Pygmies and Capoid Bushmen (p56).

Similarly, they report, the ancient Egyptians showed a keen awareness of racial differences in their artwork.

This is perhaps unsurprising since the ancient Egyptians’ core territory was located in a region where Caucasoid North Africans came into contact with black Africans from South of the Sahara through the Nile Valley, unlike in most other parts of North Africa, where the Sahara Desert represented a largely insurmountable barrier to population movement.

While not directly addressing the controversial question of the racial affinities of the ancient Egyptians, Sarich and Miele report that, in their own artwork:

The Egyptians were painted red; the Asiatics or Semites yellow; the Southerns or Negroes, black; and the Libyans, Westerners or Northerners, white, with blue eyes and fair beards” (p33).[14]

Indeed, rather than being purely artistic in intent, Sarich and Miele go further, even suggesting that at least some Egyptian artwork had an explicit taxonomic function:

“[Ancient] Egyptian monuments are not mere ‘portraits but an attempt at classification” (p33).

They even refer to what they call “history’s first [recorded] colour bar, forbidding blacks from entering Pharaoh’s domain”, namely an an Egyptian stele (i.e. stone slab functioning as a notice), which other sources describe as having been erected during the reign of Pharaoh Sesostris III (1887-1849 BCE) at Semna near the Second Cataract of the Nile, part of the inscription of which reads, in part:

No Negro shall cross this boundary by water or by land, by ship or with his flocks, save for the purpose of trade or to make purchases in some post” (p35).[15]

Sarich and Miele also interpret the famous caste system of India as based ultimately in racial difference, the lighter complexioned invading Indo-Aryans establishing the system to maintain their dominant social position and their racial integrity vis à vis the darker-complexioned indigenous Dravidian populations whom they conquered and subjugated.

Thus, Sarich and Miele claim:

The Hindi word for caste is varna. It means color (that is, skin color), and it is as old as Indian history itself” (p37).[16]

There is indeed evidence of racial prejudice and notions of racial supremacy in the earliest Hindu texts. For example, in the Rigveda, thought to be the earliest of ancient Hindu texts:

The god of the Aryas, Indra, is described as ‘blowing away with supernatural might from earth and from the heavens the black skin which Indra hates.’ The dark people are called ‘Anasahs’—noseless people—and the account proceeds to tell how Indra ‘slew the flat-nosed barbarians.’ Having conquered the land for the Aryas, Indra decreed that the foe was to be ‘flayed of his black skin’” (Race: The History of an Idea in America: p3-4).[17]

Indeed, higher caste groups have relatively lighter complexions than lower caste groups residing in the same region of India even today (Jazwal 1979Mishra 2017).

However, most modern Indologists reject the notion that the term ‘varna’ was originally coined in reference to differences in skin colour and instead argue that colour was simply used as a method of classification, or perhaps in reference to clothing.[18]

According to Sarich and Miele, ancient peoples also believed races differed, not only in morphology, but also in psychology and behaviour.

In general, ancient civilizations regarded their own race’s characteristics more favourably than those of other groups. This, Sarich and Miele suggest, reflected, not only ethnocentrism, which is, in all probability, a universal human trait, but also the fact that great civilizations of the sort that leave behind artwork and literature sophisticated enough to permit moderns to ascertain their views on race did indeed tend to be surrounded by less advanced neighbours (p56).

In the vast majority of cases, their opinions of other peoples, including the ancestors of the Western Europeans who supposedly ‘invented’ the idea of race, are far from flattering, at times matching modern society’s most derogatory stereotypes” (p31).

Thus, Thomas F Gossett, in his book Race: The History of an Idea in America, reports that:

Historians of the Han Dynasty in the third century B.C. speak of a yellow-haired and green-eyed barbarian people in a distant province ‘who greatly resemble monkeys from whom they are descended’” (Race: The History of an Idea in America: p4).

Indeed, the views expressed by the ancients regarding racial differences, or at least those examples quoted by Sarich and Miele, are also often disturbingly redolent of modern racial stereotypes.

Thus, in ancient Roman and Greek art, Sarich and Miele report:

“Black males are depicted with penises larger than those of white figures” (p41).

Likewise, during the Islamic Golden Age, Sarich and Miele report that:

Islamic writers… disparaged black Africans as being hypersexual yet also filled with simple piety, and with a natural sense of rhythm” (p53).

Similarly, the Arab polymath Al Masudi is reported to have quoted the Roman physician-philosopher Galen, as claiming blacks possess, among other attributes:

A long penis and great merriment… [which] dominates the black man because of his defective brain whence also the weakness of his intelligence” (p50).

From these and similar observations, Sarich and Miele conclude:

European colonizers did not construct race as a justification for slavery but picked up an earlier construction of Islam, which took it from the classical world, which in turn took it from ancient Egypt” (p50).

The only alternative, they suggest, is the obviously implausible suggestion that:

Each of these civilisations independently ‘constructed’ the same worldview, and that the civilisations of China and India independently ‘constructed’ similar worldviews, even though they were looking at different groups of people” (p50).

There is, of course, another possibility the authors never directly raise, but only hint at – namely, perhaps racial stereotypes remained relatively constant because they reflect actual behavioural differences between races that themselves remained constant simply because they reflect innate biological dispositions that have not changed significantly over historical time.

Race, Religion, Science and Slavery

Sarich and Miele’s next chapter, ‘Anthropology as the Science of Race’, continues their history of racial thought from biblical times into the age of science – and of pseudo-science.

They begin, however, not with science, or even with pseudo-science, but rather with the Christian Bible, which long dominated western thinking on the subject of race, as on so many other subjects.

At the beginning of the chapter, they quote from John Hartung’s controversial essay, Love Thy Neighbour: The Evolution of In-Group Morality, which was first published in the science magazine, Skeptic (p60; Hartung 1995).

However, although the relevant passages appear in quotation marks, neither Hartung himself, nor his essay is directly cited, and, where I not already familiar with this essay, I would be none the wiser as to where this series of quotations had actually been taken from.[19]

In the passage quoted, Hartung, who, in addition to being an anaesthesiologist, anthropologist and human sociobiologist, known for his pioneering cross-cultural studies of human inheritance patterns, is also something of an amateur (atheist) biblical scholar, argues that Adam, in the Biblical account of creation, is properly to be interpreted, not as the first human, but rather only as the first Jew, the implication being that, and the confusion arising because, in the genocidal weltanschauung of the Old Testament, non-Jews are, at least according to Hartung, not really to be considered human at all.[20]

This idea seems to have originated, or at least received its first full exposition, with theologian Isaac La Peyrère, whom Sarich and Miele describe only as a “Calvinist”, but who, perhaps not uncoincidentally, is also widely rumoured to be of Sephardi converso or even crypto-Jewish marrano ancestry.

Thus, Sarich and Miele conclude:

The door has always been open—and often entered—by any individual or group wanting to confine ‘adam’ to ‘us’ and to exclude ‘them’” (p60).

This leads to the heretical notion of the pre-Adamites, which has also been taken up by such delightfully bonkers racialist religious groups as the Christian Identity movement.[21]

However, mainstream western Christianity always rejected this notion.

Thus, whereas today many leftists associate atheism, the Enlightenment and secularism with anti-racist views, historically there was no such association.

On the contrary, Sarich and Miele emphasize, it was actually polygenism – namely, the belief that the different human races had separate origins, a view that naturally lent itself to racialism – that was associated with religious heresy, free-thinking and the Enlightenment.

In contrast, mainstream Christianity, of virtually all denominations, has always favoured monogenism – namely, the belief that, for all their perceived differences, the various human races nevertheless shared a common origin – as this was perceived as congruent with (the orthodox interpretation of) the Old Testament of the Bible.

Thus, for example, both Voltaire and David Hume identified as polygenists – and, although their experience with and knowledge of black people was surely minimal and almost entirely second-hand, each also both expressed distinctly racist views regarding the intellectual capacities of black Africans.

Moreover, although the emerging race science, and cranial measurements, of the nineteenth century American School’ of anthropology is sometimes credited with lending ideological support to the institution of slavery in the American South, or even as being cynically formulated precisely in order to defend this institution, in fact Southern slaveholders had little if any use for such ideas.

After all, the American South, as well as being a stronghold of slavery, racialism and white supremacist ideology, was also, then as now, the Bible Belt – i.e. a bastion of intense evangelical Protestant Christian fundamentalism.

But the leading American School anthropologists, such as Samuel Morton and Josiah Nott, were all heretical polygenists.

Thus, rather than challenge the orthodox interpretation of the Bible, Southern slaveholders, and their apologists, preferred to defend slavery by invoking, not the emerging secular science of anthropology, but rather Biblical doctrine.

In particular, they sought to justify slavery by reference to the so-called curse of Ham, an idea which derives from Genesis 9:22-25, a very odd passage of the Old Testament (odd even by the standards of the Old Testament), which was almost certainly not originally intended as a reference to black people.[22]

Thus, the authors quote historian William Stanton, who, in his book The Leopard’s Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America 1815-59 concludes that, by rejecting polygenism and the craniology of the early American physical anthropologists:

The South turned its back on [what was by the scientific standards of the time] the only intellectually respectable defense of slavery it could have taken up” (p77)

As for Darwinism, which some creationists also claim was used to buttress slavery, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species was only published in 1959, just a couple of years before the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862 and final abolition of slavery in North America and the English-speaking world.[23]

Thus, if Darwinian theory was ever used to justify the institution of slavery, it clearly wasn’t very effective in achieving this end.

Into the ‘Age of Science’ – and of Pseudo-Science

The authors continue their history of racial thinking by tracing the history of the discipline of anthropology, from its beginnings as ‘the science of race’, to its current incarnation as the study of culture (and, to a lesser extent, of human evolution), most of whose practitioners vehemently deny the very biological reality of race, and some of whom deny even the possibility of anthropology being a science.

Giving a personal, human-interest focus to their history, Sarich and Miele in particular focus on three scientific controversies, and personal rivalries, each of which were, they report, at the same time scientific, personal and political (p59-60). These were the disputes between, respectively:

1) Ernst Haeckel and Rudolf Virchow;

2) Franz Boas and Madison Grant; and

3) Ashley Montagu and Carleton Coon.

The first of these rivalries, occurring as it did in Germany in the nineteenth century, is perhaps of least interest to contemporary North American audiences, being the most remote in both time and place.

However, the outcomes of the latter two disputes, occurring as they did in twentieth century America, are of much greater importance, and their outcome gave rise to, and arguably continues to shape, the current political and scientific consensus on racial matters in America, and indeed the western world, to this day.

Interestingly, these two disputes were not only about race, they were also arguably themselves racial, or at least ethnic, in character.

Thus, perhaps not uncoincidentally, whereas both Grant and Coon were Old Stock American patrician WASPs, the latter proud to trace his ancestry back among the earliest British settlers of the Thirteen Colonies, both Boas and Montagu were recent Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe.[24]

Therefore, in addition to being personal, political and scientific, these two conflicts were also arguably racial, and ultimately indirectly concerned with the very definition of what it meant to be an ‘American’.

The victory of the Boasians was therefore both coincident with, and arguably both heralded and reflected (and perhaps even contributed towards, or, at least, was retrospectively adopted as a justification for), the displacement of Anglo-Americans as the culturally, socially, economically and politically dominant ethnic group in the USA, the increasing opening up of the USA to immigrants of other races and ethnicities, and the emergence of a new elite, no longer composed exclusively, or even predominantly, of people of any single specific ethnic background, but increasingly overwhelmingly disproportionately Jewish.

Sarich and Miele, to their credit, do not entirely avoid addressing the ethnic dimension to these disputes. Thus, they suggest that Boas and Montagu’s perception of themselves as ethnic outsiders in Anglo-America may have shaped their theories (p89-90).[25]

However, this is topic is explored more extensively by Kevin Macdonald in the second chapter of his controversial, anti-Semitic and theoretically flawed, The Culture of Critique (which I have reviewed here).

Boas, and his student Montagu, were ultimately to emerge victorious, not so much on account of the strength of their arguments, as on the success of their academic politicking, in particular Boas’s success in training students, including Montagu himself, who would go on to take over the social science departments of universities across America.

Among these students were many figures who were to become even more famous, and arguably more directly influential, than Boas himself, including, not only Montagu, but also Ruth Benedict and, most famous of all, the anthropologically inept Margaret Mead.[26]

Nevertheless, Sarich and Miele trace the current consensus, and sacrosanct dogma, of race-denial ultimately to Boas, whom they credit with effectively inventing anew the modern discipline of anthropology as it exists in America:

It is no exaggeration to say that Franz Boas (1858-1942) remade American anthropology in his own image. Through the influence of his students, Margaret Mead (Coming of Age in Samoa and Sex and Temperament in Three [Primitive] Societies[sic]), Ruth Benedict (Patterns of Culture) and Ashley Montagu (innumerable titles, especially the countless editions of Man’s Most Dangerous Myth) Boas would have more influence on American intellectual thought than Darwin did. For generations hardly anyone graduated an American college without having read at least one of these books” (p86).

Thus, today, Boas is regarded as the father of American anthropology, whereas both Grant and Coon are mostly dismissed (in Coon’s case, unfairly) as pseudo-scientists and racists.

The Legacy of Boas

As to whether the impact of Boas and his disciples was, on balance, a net positive or a net negative, Sarich and Miele are ambivalent:

The cultural determinism of the Boasians served as a useful corrective to the genetic determinism of racial anthropology, emphasizing the variation within races, the overlap between them and the plasticity of human behavior. The price, however, was the divorcing of the science of man from the science of life in general. The evolutionary perspective was abandoned, and anthropology began its slide into the abyss of deconstructionism” (p91).

My own view is more controversial: I have come to believe that the influence of Boas on American anthropology has been almost entirely negative.

Admittedly, the Nodicism of his rival, Grant, was indeed a complete non-starter. After all, civilization actually came quite late to Northern Europe, originating in North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, arriving in Northern Europe much later, by way the Mediterranean region.

However, this view is arguably no less preposterous than the racial egalitarianism that currently prevails as a sacrosanct contemporary dogma, and which holds that all races are exactly equal in all abilities, which, quite apart from being contradicted by the evidence, represents a manifestly improbable outcome of human evolution.

Moreover, Nordicism may have been bad science, but it was at least science – or at least purported to be science – and hence was susceptible to falsification, and was indeed soon to be decisively falsified by pre-war and post-war rise of Japan among other events and indeed scientific findings.

In contrast, as persuasively argued by Kevin Macdonald in The Culture of Critique (which I have reviewed here), Boasian anthropology was not so much a science as an anti-science (not theory but an “anti-theory” according to Macdonald: Culture of Critique: p24), because, in its radical cultural determinism and cultural relativism, it rejected any attempt to develop a general theory of societal evolution, or societal differences, as premature, if not inherently misguided.

Instead, the Boasians endlessly emphasized, and celebrated (and indeed  sometimes exaggerated and fabricated), “the vast diversity and chaotic minutiae of human behavior”, arguing that such diversity precluded any general theory of social evolution as had formerly been favoured, let alone any purported ranking of societies and cultures (let alone races) as superior or inferior in relation to one another.

The Boasians argued that general theories of cultural evolution must await a detailed cataloguing of cultural diversity, but in fact no general theories emerged from this body of research in the ensuing half century of its dominance of the profession… Because of its rejection of fundamental scientific activities such as generalization and classification, Boasian anthropology may thus be characterized more as an anti-theory than a theory of human culture” (Culture of Critique: p24).

The result was that behavioural variation between groups, to the extent there was any attempt to explain it at all, was attributed to culture. Yet, as evolutionary psychologist David Buss, writes:

“[P]atterns of local within-group similarity and between-group differences are best regarded as phenomena that require explanation. Transforming these differences into an autonomous causal entity called ‘culture’ confuses the phenomena that require explanation with a proper explanation of those phenomena. Attributing such phenomena to culture provides no more explanatory power than attributing them to God, consciousness, learning, socialization, or even evolution, unless the causal processes that are subsumed by these labels are properly described. Labels for phenomena are not proper causal explanations for them” (Evolutionary Psychology: p411).

To attribute all cultural differences simply to culture and conclude that that is an adequate explanation is to imply that all cultural variation is simply random in nature. This amounts to effectively accepting the null hypothesis as true and ruling out a priori any attempt to generate a causal framework for explaining, or making predictions regarding, cultural differences. It therefore amounts, not to science, but to an outright rejection of science, or at least of applying science to human cultural differences, in favour of obscurantism.

Meanwhile, under the influence of postmodernism (i.e. “the abyss of deconstructionism” to which Sarich and Miele refer) much of cultural anthropology has ceased even pretending to be a science, dismissing all knowledge, science included, as mere disguised ideology, no more or less valid than the religious cosmologies, eschatologies and creation myths of the scientific and technologically primitive peoples whom anthropologists have traditionally studied, and hence precluding the falsification of post-modernist claims, or indeed any other claims, a priori.

Moreover, contrary to popular opinion, the Nordicism of figures such as Grant seems to have been rather less dogmatically held to, both in the scientific community and society at large, than is the contemporary dogma of racial egalitarianism.

Indeed, quite apart from the fact that it was not without eminent critics even in its ostensible late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century heyday (not least Boas himself), the best evidence for this is the speed with which this belief system was abandoned, and subsequently demonized, in the coming decades.

In contrast, even with the findings of population genetics increasing apace, the dogmas of both race denial and racial egalitarianism, while increasingly scientifically indefensible, seemingly remain ever more entrenched in the universities.

Digressions: ‘Molecular Clocks’, Language and Human Evolution

Sarich and Miele’s next chapter, ‘Resolving the Primate Tree’, recounts how the molecular clock method of determining when species (and races) diverged was discovered.

To summarize: Geneticists discovered they could estimate the time when two species separated from one another by measuring the extent to which the two species differ in selectively-neutral genetic variation – in other words, those parts of the genome that do not affect an organism’s phenotype in such a way as to affect its fitness, are therefore not subject to selection pressures and hence mutate at a uniform rate, hence serving as a ‘clock’ by which to measure when the species separated from one another.

The following chapter, ‘Homo Sapiens and Its Races’, charts the application of the ‘molecular clock’ method to human evolution, and in particular to the evolution of human races.

The molecular clock method of dating the divergence of species from one another is certainly relevant to the race question, since it allows us to estimate, not only when our ancestors split from those of the chimpanzee, but also when different human races separated from one another – though this latter question is somewhat more difficult to determine using this method, since it is complicated by the fact that races can continue to interbreed with one another even after their initial split, whereas species, once they have become separate species, by definition no longer interbreed, though there may be some interbreeding during the process of speciation itself (i.e. when the separate lineages were still only races or populations of the same species).

However, devoting a whole chapter to a narrative describing how the molecular clock methodology was developed seems excessive in a book ostensibly about human race differences, and is surely an unnecessary digression.

Thus, one suspects the attention devoted to this topic by the authors reflects the central role played by one of the book’s co-authors (Vincent Sarich) in the development of this scientific method. This chapter therefore permits Sarich to showcase his scientific credentials and hence lends authority to his later more controversial pronouncements in subsequent chapters.

The following chapter, ‘The Two Miracles that Made Mankind’, is also somewhat off-topic. Here, Sarich and Miele address the question of why it was that our own African ancestors who ultimately outcompeted and ultimately displaced rival species of hominid.[27]

In answer, they propose, plausibly but not especially originally, that our descendants outcompeted rival hominids on account of one key evolutionary development in particular – namely, our evolution of a capacity for spoken language.

Defining ‘Race

At last, in Chapters Seven and Eight, after a hundred and sixty pages and over half of the entire book, the authors address the topic which the book’s title suggested would be its primary focus – namely, the biology of race differences.

The first of these is titled ‘Race and Physical Differences’, while the next is titled ‘Race and Behavior’.

Actually, however, both chapters begin by defending the race concept itself.

Whether the human race is divisible into races ultimately depends on how one defines ‘races’. Arguments are to whether human races exist therefore often degenerate into purely semantic disputes regarding the meaning of the word ‘race.

For their purposes, Sarich and Miele themselves define ‘races as:

Populations, or groups of populations, within a species, that are separated geographically from other such populations or groups of populations and distinguishable from them on the basis of heritable features” (p207).[28]

There is, of course, an obvious problem with this definition, at least when applied to contemporary human populations – namely, members of different human races are often no longer “separated geographically” from one another, largely due to recent migrations and population movements.

Thus, today, people of many different racial groups can be found in a single city, like, say, London.

However, the key factor is surely, not whether racial groups remain “separated geographically” today, but rather whether they were “separated geographically” during the period during which they evolved into separate races.

To answer this objection, Sarich and Miele’s definition of ‘races’ should be altered accordingly.

Races as Fuzzy Sets

Sarich and Miele protest that other authors have, in effect, defined races out of existence by semantic sophistry, namely by defining the word ‘race’ in such a way as to rule out the possibility of races a priori.

Thus, some proposed definitions demand that, in order to qualify as true ‘races’, populations must have discrete, non-overlapping boundaries, with no racially-mixed, clinal or hybrid populations to blur the boundaries.

However, Sarich and Miele point out, any populations satisfying this criterium would not be ‘races’ at all, but rather entirely separate species, since, as I have discussed previously, it is the question of interfertility and reproductive isolation that defines a species (p209).[29]

In short, as biologist John Baker, in his excellent Race (reviewed here), also pointed out, since ‘race’ is, by very definition, a sub-specific classification, it is inevitable that members of different races will sometimes interbreed with one another and produce mixed, hybrid or clinal populations at their borders, because, if they did not interbreed with one another, then they would not be members of different races but rather of entirely separate species.

Thus, the boundaries between subspecies are invariably blurred or clinal in nature, the phenomenon being so universal that there is even a biological term for it, namely intergradation.

Of course, this means that the dividing line where one race is deemed to begin and another to end will inevitably be blurred. However, Sarich and Miele reject the notion that this means races are purely artificial or a social construction.

The simple answer to the objection that races are not discrete, blending into one another as they do is this: They’re supposed to blend into one another and categories need not be discrete. It is not for us to impose our cognitive difficulties upon the Nature.” (p211)

Thus, they characterize races as fuzzy sets – which they describe as a recently developed mathematical concept that has nevertheless been “revolutionarily productive” (p209).

By analogy, they discuss our colour perception when observing rainbows, observing:

Red… shade[s] imperceptibly into orange and orange into yellow but we have no difficulties in agreeing as to where red becomes orange, and orange yellow” (p208-9).

However, this is perhaps an unfortunate analogy. After all, physicists and psychologists are in agreement that different colours, as such, don’t really exist – at least not outside of the human minds that perceive and recognise them.[30]

Instead, the electromagnetic spectrum varies continuously. Colours are imposed on only by human visual system as a way of interpreting this continuous variation.[31]

If racial differences were similarly continuous, then surely it would be inappropriate to divide peoples into racial groups, because wherever one drew the boundary would be entirely arbitrary.[32]

Yet a key point about human races is that, as Sarich and Miele put it:

“[Although] races necessarily grade into one another, but they clearly do not do so evenly” (p209).

In other words, although racial differences are indeed clinal and continuous in nature, the differentiation does not occur at a constant and uniform rate. Instead, there is some clustering and definite if fuzzy boundaries are nevertheless discernible.

As an illustration of such a fuzzy but discernible boundary, Sarich and Miele give the example of the Sahara Desert, which formerly represented, and to some extent still does represent, a relatively impassable obstacle (a “a geographic filter”, in Sarich and Miele’s words: p210) that impeded population movement and hence gene flow for millennia.

The human population densities north and south of the Sahara have long been, and still are, orders of magnitude greater than in the Sahara proper, causing the northern and southern units to have evolved in substantial genetic independence from one another” (p210).

The Sahara hence represented the “ancient boundary” between the racial groups once referred to by anthropologists as the Caucasoid and Negroid races, politically incorrect terms which, according to Sarich and Miele, although unfashionable, nevertheless remain useful (p209-10).

Analogously, anthropologist Stanley Garn reports:

The high and uninviting mountains that mark the Tibetan-Indian border… have long restricted population exchange to a slow trickle” (Human Races: p15).

Thus, these mountains (the Himalayas and Tibetan Plateau), have traditionally marked the boundary between the Caucasoid and what was once termed the Mongoloid race.[33]

Meanwhile, other geographic barriers were probably even more impassable. For example, oceans almost completely prevented gene-flow between the Americas and the Old World, save across the Berring strait between sparsely populated Siberia and Alaska, for millennia, such that Amerindians remained almost completely reproductively isolated from Eurasians and Africans.

Similarly, genetic studies suggest that Australian Aboriginals were genetically isolated from other populations, including neighbouring South-East Asians and Polynesians, for literally thousands of years.

Thus, anthropologist Stanley Garn concludes:

The facts of geography, the mountain ranges, the deserts and the oceans, have made geographical races by fencing them in” (Human Races: p15).

However, with improved technologies of transportation – planes, ocean-going vessels, other vehicles – such geographic boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant.

Thus, increased geographic mobility, migration, miscegenation and intermarriage mean that the ‘fuzzy’ boundaries of these fuzzy sets are fast becoming even ‘fuzzier’.

Thus, if meaningful boundaries could once be drawn between races, and even if they still can, this may not be the case for very much longer.

However, it is important to emphasize that, even if races didn’t exist, race differences still would. They would just vary on a continuum (or a cline, to use the preferred biological term).

To argue that races differences do not exist simply because they are continuous and clinal in nature would, of course, be to commit a version of the continuum fallacy or sorties paradox, also sometimes called the fallacy of the heap or fallacy of the beard.

Moreover, just as populations differ in, for example, skin colour on a clinal basis, so they could also differ in psychological traits (such as average intelligence and personality) in just the same way.

Thus, paradoxically, the non-existence of human races, even if conceded for the sake of argument, is hardly a definitive, knock-down argument against the existence of innate race differences in intelligence, or indeed other racial differences, even though it is usually presented as such by those who espouse this view.

Whether ‘races’ exist is debatable and depends on precisely how one defines ‘races’—whether race differences exist, however, is surely beyond dispute.

Debunking Diamond

The brilliant and rightly celebrated scientific polymath and popular science writer Jared Diamond, in an influential article published in Discovery magazine, formulated another even less persuasive objection to the race concept as applied to humans (Diamond 1994).

Here, Diamond insisted that racial classifications among humans are entirely arbitrary, because different populations can be grouped into different ways if one uses different characteristics by which to group them.

Thus, if we classified races, not by skin colour, but rather by the prevalence of the sickle cell gene or of lactase persistence, then we would, he argues, arrive at very different classifications. For example, he explains:

Depending on whether we classified ourselves by antimalarial genes, lactase, fingerprints or skin color, we could place Swedes in the same race as (respectively) either Xhosas, Fulani, the Ainu of Japan or Italians” (p164).

Each of these classifications, Diamond insists, would be “equally reasonable and arbitrary” (p164).

To these claims, Sarich and Miele respond:

Most of us, upon reading these passages, would immediately sense that something was very wrong with it, even though one might have difficulty specifying just what” (p164).

Unfortunately, however, Sarich and Miele are, in my view, not themselves very clear in explaining precisely what is wrong with Diamond’s argument.

Thus, one of Sarich and Miele’s grounds for rejecting this argument is that:

The proportion of individuals carrying the sickle-cell allele can never go above about 40 percent in any population, nor does the proportion of lactose-competent adults in any population ever approach 100 percent. Thus, on the basis of the sickle-cell gene, there are two groups… of Fulani, one without the allele, the other with it. So those Fulani with the allele would group not with other Fulani, but with Italians with the allele” (p165).

Here their point seems to be that it is not very helpful to classify races by reference to a trait that is not shared by all members of any race, but rather differs only in relative prevalence.

Thus, they conclude:

The concordance issue… applies within groups as well as between them. Diamond is dismissive of the reality of the FulaniXhosas African racial unit because there are characters discordant with it [e.g. lactase persistence]… Well then, one asks in response, what about the Fulani unit itself? After all, exactly the same argument could be made to cast the reality of the category ‘Fulani’ into doubt” (p165).

However, this conclusion seems to represent exactly what many race deniers do indeed argue – namely that all racial and ethnic groups are indeed pure social constructs with no basis in biology, including terms such as ‘Fulani’ and ‘Italian’, which are, they would argue, as biologically meaningless and socially constructed as terms such as ‘Negroid’ and ‘Caucasoid’.[34]

After all, if a legitimate system of racial classification indeed demands that some Fulani tribesmen be grouped in the same race as Italians while others are grouped in an entirely different racial taxa, then this does indeed seem to suggest racial classifications are arbitrary and unhelpful.

Moreover, the fact that there is much within-population variation in genes such as those coding for sickle-cell or lactase persistence surely only confirms Richard Lewontin’s famous argument (see below) that there is far more genetic variation within groups than between them.

Sarich and Miele’s other rejoinder to Diamond is, in my view, more apposite. Unfortunately, however, they do not, in my opinion, explain themselves very well.

They argue that:

“[The absence of the sickle-cell gene] is a meaningless association because the character involved (the lack of the sickle-cell allele) is an ancestral human condition. Associating Swedes and Xhosas thus says only that they are both human, not a particularly profound statement” (p165).

What I think Sarich and Miele are getting at here is that, whereas Diamond proposes to classify groups on the basis of a single characteristic, in this case the sickle-cell gene, most biologists favour a so-called cladistic taxonomy, where organisms are grouped together not on the basis of shared characteristics as such at all, but rather on the basis of shared ancestry.

In other words, orgasms are grouped together because they are more closely related to one another (or shared a common ancestor more recently) than are other organisms that are put into a different group.

From this perspective, shared characteristics are relevant only to the extent they are (interpreted as) homologous and hence as evidence of shared ancestry. Traits that evolved independently through convergent or parallel evolution (i.e. in response to analogous selection pressures in separate lineages) are irrelevant.

Yet the genes responsible for lactase persistence, one of the traits used by Diamond to classify populations, evolved independently in different populations through gene-culture co-evolution in concert with the independent development of dairy farming in different parts of the world, an example of convergent evolution that does not suggest relatedness. Indeed, not only did lactase continuance evolve independently in different races, it also seems to have evolved quite different mutations in different genes (Tishkoff et al 2007).[35]

However, Diamond’s proposed classification is especially preposterous. Even pre-Darwinian systems of taxonomy, which did indeed classify species (and subspecies) on the basis of shared characteristics rather than shared ancestry, nevertheless did so on the basis of a whole suite of traits that were clustered together.

In contrast, Diamond proposes to classify races on the basis of a single trait, apparently chosen arbitrarily – or, more likely, to illustrate the point he is attempting to make.

Genetic Differences

In an even more influential and widely-cited paper, Marxist biologist Richard Lewontin claimed that 85% of genetic variation occurred within populations and only 6% accounted for the differences between races (Lewontin 1972).[36]

The most familiar rejoinder to Lewontin’s argument is that of Edwards who pointed out that, while Lewontin’s figures are correct when one looks at individual genetic loci, if one looks at multiple loci, then one can identify an individual’s race with precision that approaches 100% the more loci that are used (Edwards 2003).

However, Edwards’ paper was only published in 2003, just a year before ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’ itself came off the presses, so Sarich and Miele may not have been aware of Edwards’ critique at the time they actually wrote the book.[37]

Perhaps for this reason, then, Sarich and Miele respond rather differently to Lewontin’s arguments.

First, they point out:

“[Lewontin’s] analysis omits a third level of variability–the within-individual one. The point is that we are diploid, getting one set of chromosomes from one parent and a second from the other” (p168-9).

Thus Sarich and Miele conclude:

The… 85 percent will then split half and half (42.5%) between the intra- and inter-individual within-population comparisons. The increase in variability in between-population comparisons is thus 15 percent against the 42.5 percent that is between individual within-population. Thus, 15/4.5 = 32.5 percent, a much more impressive and, more important, more legitimate value than 15 percent.” (p169).

However, this seems to me to be just playing around with numbers in order to confuse and obfuscate.

After all, if as Lewontin claims, most variation is within-group rather than between group, then, even if individuals mate endogamously (i.e. with members of the same group as themselves), offspring will show substantial variation between the portion of genes they inherit from each parent.

But, even if some of the variation is therefore within-individual, this doesn’t change the fact that it is also within-group.

Thus, the claim of Lewontin that 85% of genetic variation is within-group remains valid.

Morphological Differences

Sarich and Miele then make what seems to me to be a more valid and important objection to Lewontin’s figures, or at least to the implication he and others have drawn from them, namely that racial differences are insignificant. Again, however, they do not express themselves very clearly.

Their argument seems to be that, if we are concerned with the extent of physiological and psychological differentiation between races, then it actually makes more sense to look directly at morphological differences, rather than genetic differences.

After all, a large proportion of our DNA may be of the nonfunctional non-coding or ‘junk’ variety, some of which may have little or no effect an organism’s phenotype.

Thus, in their chapter ‘Resolving the Primate Tree’, Sarich and Miele themselves claim that:

Most variation and change at the level of DNA and proteins have no functional consequences” (p121; p126).

They conclude:

Not only is the amount of between-population genetic variation very small by the standards of what we observe in other species… but also… most variation that does exist has no functional, adaptive significance” (p126).

Thus, humans and chimpanzees may share around 98% of each other’s DNA, but this does not necessarily mean that we are 98% identical to chimpanzees in either our morphology, or our psychology and behaviour. The important thing is what the genes in question do, and small numbers of genes can have great effects while others (e.g. non-coding DNA) may do little or nothing.[38]

Indeed, one theory has it that such otherwise nonfunctional biochemical variation may be retained within a population by negative frequency dependent selection because different variants, especially when recombined in each new generation by sexual reproduction, confer some degree of protection against infectious pathogens.

This is sometimes referred to as ‘rare allele advantage’, in the context of the ‘Red Queen theory’ of host-parasite co-evolutionary arms race.

Thus, evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides explain:

The more alternative alleles exist at more loci—i.e., the more genetic polymorphism there is—the more sexual recombination produces genetically differentiated offspring, thereby complexifying the series of habitats faced by pathogens Most pathogens will be adapted to proteins and protein combinations that are common in a population, making individuals with rare alleles less susceptible to parasitism, thereby promoting their fitness. If parasitism is a major selection pressure, then such frequency-dependent selection will be extremely widespread across loci, with incremental advantages accruing to each additional polymorphic locus that varies the host phenotype for a pathogen. This process will build up in populations immense reservoirs of genetic diversity coding for biochemical diversity” (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: p33).

Yet, other than conferring some resistance to fast-evolving pathogens, such “immense reservoirs of genetic diversity coding for biochemical diversity” may have little adaptive or functional significance and have little or no effect on other aspects of an organism’s phenotype.

Lewontin’s figures, though true, are therefore potentially misleading. To see why, behavioural geneticist Glayde Whitney suggested that we “might consider the extent to which humans and macaque monkeys share genes and alleles”. On this basis, he reported:

If the total genetic diversity of humans plus macaques is given an index of 100 percent, more than half of that diversity will be found in a troop of macaques or in the [then quite racially homogenous] population of Belfast. This does not mean Irishmen differ more from their neighbors than they do from macaques — which is what the Lewontin approach slyly implies” (Whitney 1997).

Anthropologist Peter Frost, in an article for Aporia Magazine critiquing Lewontin’s analysis, or at least the conclusions he and others have drawn from them, cites several other examples where:

Wild animals… show the same pattern of genes varying much more within than between populations, even when the populations are related species and, sometimes, related genera (a taxonomic category that ranks above species and below family)“ (Frost 2023).

However, despite the minimal genetic differentiation between races, different human races do differ from one another morphologically to a significant degree. This much is evident simply from looking at the facial morphology, or bodily statures, of people of different races – and indirectly apparent by observing which races predominate in different athletic events at the Olympics.

Thus, Sarich and Miele point out, when one looks at morphological differences, it is clear that, at least for some traits, such as “skin colorhair formstaturebody build”, within-group variation does not always dwarf between-group variation (p167).

On the contrary, Sarich and Miele observe:

Group differences can be much greater than the individual differences within them; in, for example, hair from Kenya and Japan, or body shape for the Nuer and Inuit” (p218).

Indeed, in respect of some traits, there may be almost no overlap between groups. For example, excepting suffers of rare, abnormal and pathological conditions like albinism, even the lightest complexioned Nigerian is still darker in complexion and skin colour than is the darkest indigenous Swede.

If humans differ enough genetically to cause the obvious (and not so obvious) morphological differences between races, differences which are equally obviously genetic in origin, then it necessarily follows that they also differ enough genetically to allow for a similar degree of biological variation in psychological traits, such as personality and intelligence.

That human populations are genetically quite similar to one another indicates, Sarich and Miele concede, that the different races separated and became reproductively isolated from one another only quite recently, such that random variation in selectively-neutral DNA has not had sufficient time to accumulate through random mutation and genetic drift.

However, the fact that, within this short period, quite large morphological differences have nevertheless evolved suggests the presence of strong selective pressures selecting for such morphological differentiation.

They cite archaeologist Glynn Isaac as arguing:

It is the Garden-of-Eden model [i.e. out of Africa theory], not the regional continuity model [i.e. multiregionalism], that makes racial differences more significant functionally… because the amount of time involved in the raciation process is much smaller, but the degree of racial differentiation is the same and, for human morphology, large. The shorter the period of time required to produce a given amount of morphological difference, the more selectively/adaptively/functionally important those differences become” (p212).

Thus, Sarich and Miele conclude:

So much variation developing in so short a period of time implies, indeed almost requires, functionality; there is no good reason to think that behavior should somehow be exempt from this pattern of functional variability” (p173).

In other words, if different races have been subjected to divergent selection pressures that have led them to diverge morphologically, then these same selection pressures will almost certainly also have led them to psychologically diverge from one another.

Indeed, at least one well-established morphological difference seems to directly imply a corresponding psychological difference – namely, differences in brain size as between races would seem to suggest differences in intelligence, as I have discussed in greater detail both previously and below.

Measuring Morphological Differences

Continuing this theme, Sarich and Miele argue that human racial groups actually differ more from one another morphologically than do many non-human mammals that are regarded as entirely separate species.

Thus, Sarich quotes himself as claiming:

Racial morphological distances within our species are, on the average, about equal to the distances among species within other genera of mammals. I am not aware of another mammalian species whose constituent races are as strongly marked as they are in ours… except, of course, for dogs” (p170).

I was initially somewhat skeptical of this claim. Certainly, it seems to us that, say, a black African looks very different from an East Asian or a white European. However, this may simply be because, being human, and in close day-to-day contact with humans, we are far more readily attuned to differences between humans than differences between, say, chimpanzees, or wolves, or sheep.[39]

Indeed, there is even evidence that we possess an innate domain-specificface recognition module’ that evolved to help us to distinguish between different individuals, and which seems to be localized in certain areas of the brain, including the so-called ‘fusiform facial area’, which is located in the fusiform gyrus.

Indeed, as I have already noted in an earlier endnote, a commenter on an earlier version of this book review plausibly suggested that our tendency to group individuals by race could represent a by-product of our facial recognition faculty.

However, the claim that the morphological differences between human races are comparable in magnitude to those between some different species or nonhuman organism is by no means original to Sarich and Miele.

For example, John R Baker makes a similar claim in his excellent book, Race (which I have reviewed here), where he asserts:

Even typical Nordids and typical Alpinids, both regarded as subraces of a single race (subspecies), the Europid [i.e. Caucasoid), are very much more different from one another in morphological characters—for instance in the shape of the skull—than many species of animals that never interbreed with one another in nature, though their territories overlap” (Race: p97).

Thus, Baker claims:

Even a trained anatomist would take some time to sort out correctly a mixed collection of the skulls of Asiatic jackals (Canis aureus) and European red foxes (vulpes vulpes), unless he had made a special study of the osteology of the Canidae; whereas even a little child, without any instruction whatever, could instantly separate the skulls of Eskimids from those of Lappids” (Race: p427).

Indeed, Darwin himself made a not dissimilar claim in The Descent of Man, where he observed:

If a naturalist, who had never before seen a Negro, Hottentot, Australian, or Mongolian, were to compare them, he would at once perceive that they differed in a multitude of characters, some of slight and some of considerable importance. On enquiry he would find that they were adapted to live under widely different climates, and that they differed somewhat in bodily constitution and mental disposition. If he were then told that hundreds of similar specimens could be brought from the same countries, he would assuredly declare that they were as good species as many to which he had been in the habit of affixing specific names” (The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex).

However, Sarich and Miele attempt to go one better than both Baker and Darwin – namely, by not merely claiming that human races differ morphologically from one another to a similar or greater extent than many separate species of non-human animal, but also purporting to prove this claim statistically as well.

Thus, relying on “cranial/facial measurements on 29 human populations, 2,500 individuals 28 measurements… 17 measurements on 347 chimpanzees… and 25 measures on 590 gorillas” (p170), Sarich and Miele’s conclusion is dramatic: reporting the “percent increases in distance going from within-group to between-group comparisons of individuals”, measured in terms of “the percent difference per size corrected measurement (expressed as standard deviation units)”, a greater percentage of the total variation among humans is found between different human groups than is found between some separate species of non-human primate.

Thus, Sarich and Miele somewhat remarkably conclude:

Racial morphological distances in our species [are] much greater than any seen among chimpanzees or gorillas, or, on the average, some tenfold greater than those between the sexes” (p172-3).

Interestingly, and consistent with the general rule that Steve Sailer has termed ‘Rushton’s Rule of Three, whereby blacks and Asians respectively cluster at opposite ends of a racial spectrum for various traits, Sarich and Miele report:

The largest differences in Howells’s sample are found when comparing [black sub-Saharan] Africans with either Asians or Asian-derived (Amerindian) populations” (p172).

Thus, for example, measured in this way, the proportion of the total variation that separates East Asians from African blacks is more than twice that separating chimpanzees from bonobos.

This, however, is perhaps a misleading comparison, since chimpanzees and bonobos are known to be morphologically very similar to one another, to such an extent that, although now recognized as separate species, they were, until quite recently, considered as merely different subspecies of a single species.

Another problem with Sarich and Miele’s conclusion is that, as they themselves report, it relies entirely on “cranial/facial measurements” and thus it is unclear whether the extent of these differences generalize to other parts of the body.

Yet, despite this limitation, Sarich and Miele report their results as applying to “racial morphological distances” in general, not just facial and cranial differences.

Finally, Sarich and Miele’s analysis in this part of their book is rather technical.

I feel that the more appropriate place to publish such an important and provocative finding would have been a specialist journal in biological anthropology, which would, of course, include a full methodolgy section and also be subject to full peer review before publication.

Domestic Dog Breeds and Human Races

Sarich and Miele argue that the only mammalian species with greater levels of morphological variation between subspecies than humans are domestic dogs.

Thus, psychologist Daniel Freedman, writing in 1979, claimed:

A breed of dog is a construct zoologically and genetically equivalent to a race of man” (Human Sociobiology: p144).

Of course, morphologically, dog breeds differ enormously, far more than human races.

However, the logistical problems of a Chihuahua mounting a mastiff notwithstanding, all are thought to be capable of interbreeding with one another, and also with wild wolves, and are hence all dog breeds, together with wild wolves, are generally considered by biologists to represent a single species.

Moreover, Sarich and Miele report that genetic differences between dog breeds, and between dogs and wolves, were so slight that, at the time Sarich and Miele were writing, researchers had only just begun to be able to genetically distinguish some dog breeds from others (p185).

Of course, this was written in 2003, and genetic data in the years since then has accumulated at a rapid pace.

Moreover, even then, one suspects that the supposed inability of geneticists to distinguish one dog breed from another reflected, not so much the limited genetic differentiation between breeds, as the fact that, understandably, far fewer resources had been devoted to decoding the canine genome that were devoted to decoding that of humans ourselves.

Thus, today, far more data is available on the genetic differences between breeds and these differences have proven, unsurprisingly given the much greater morphological differences between dog breeds as compared to human races, to be much greater than those between human populations.

For example, as I have discussed above, Marxist-biologist Richard Lewontin famously showed that, for humans, there is far greater genetic variation within races than between races (Lewontin 1972).

It is sometimes claimed that the same is true for dog breeds. For example, self-styled ‘race realist’ and ‘white advocate’, and contemporary America’s leading white nationalist public intellectual (or at least the closest thing contemporary America has to a white nationalist public intellectual), Jared Taylor claims, in a review of Edward Dutton’s Making Sense of Race, that:

People who deny race point out that there is more genetic variation within members of the same race than between races — but that’s true for dog breeds, and not many people think the difference between a terrier and a pug is all in our minds” (Taylor 2021).

Actually, however, Taylor appears to be mistaken.

Admittedly, some early mitochondrial DNA studies did seemingly support this conclusion. Thus, Coppinger and Schneider reported in 1994 that:

Greater mtDNA differences appeared within the single breeds of Doberman pinscher or poodle than between dogs and wolves… To keep the results in perspective, it should be pointed out that there is less mtDNA difference between dogs, wolves and coyotes than there is between the various ethnic groups of human beings, which are recognized as belonging to a single species” (Coppinger & Schneider 1994).

However, while this may be true for mitochondrial DNA, it does not appear to generalize to the canine genome as a whole. Thus, in her article ‘Genetics and the Shape of Dogs’ geneticist Elaine Ostrander, an expert on the genetics of domestic dogs, reports:

Genetic variation between dog breeds is much greater than the variation within breeds. Between-breed variation is estimated at 27.5 percent. By comparison, genetic variation between human populations is only 5.4 percent” (Ostrander 2007).[40]

However, the fact that both morphological and genetic differentiation between dog breeds far exceeds that between human races does not necessarily mean that an analogy between dog breeds and human races is entirely misplaced.

All analogies are imperfect, otherwise they would not be analogies, but rather identities (i.e. exactly the same thing).

Indeed, one might argue that dog breeds provide a useful analogy for human races precisely because the differences between dog breeds are so much greater, since this allows us to see the same principles operating but on a much more magnified scale and hence brings them into sharper focus.

Breed and Behaviour

As well as differing morphologically, dog breeds are also thought to differ behaviourally as well.

Anecdotally, some breeds are said to be affectionate and ‘good with children’, others standoffish, independent, territorial and prone to aggression, either with strangers or with other dogs.

For example, psychologist Daniel Freedman, whose study of average differences in behaviour among both dog breeds, conducted as part of his PhD, and his later analogous studies of differences in behaviour of neonates of different races, are discussed by Sarich and Miele in their book (p203-7), observed:

I had worked with different breeds of dogs and I had been struck by how predictable was the behavior of each breed” (Human Sociobiology: p144).

Freedman’s scientifically rigorous studies of breed differences in behaviour confirmed that at least some such differences are indeed real and seem to have an innate basis.

Thus, studying the behaviours of newborn puppies to minimize the possibility of environmental effects affecting behaviour differences, just as he later studied differences in the behaviour of human neonates, Freedman reports:

The breeds already differed in behavior. Little beagles were irrepressibly friendly from the moment they could detect me, whereas Shetland sheepdogs were most sensitive to a loud voice or the slightest punishment; wire-haired terriers were so tough and aggressive, even as clumsy three-week olds, that I had to wear gloves in playing with them; and, finally, basenjis, barkless dogs originating in central Africa, were aloof and independent” (Human Sociobiology: p145).

Similarly, Hans Eysenck reports the results of a study of differences in behaviour between different dog breeds raised under different conditions then left alone in a room with food they had been instructed not to eat. He reports:

Basenjis, who are natural psychopaths, ate as soon as the trainer had left, regardless of whether they had been brought up in the disciplined or the indulgent manner. Both groups of Shetland sheep dogs, loyal and true to death, refused the food, over the whole period of testing, i.e. eight days! Beagles and fox terriers responded differentially, according to the way they had been brought up; indulged animals were more easily conditioned, and refrained longer from eating. Thus, conditioning has no effect on one group, regardless of upbringing—has a strong effect on another group, regardless of upbringing—and affects two groups differentially, depending on their upbringing” (The IQ Argument: p170).

These differences often reflect the purpose for which the dogs were bred. For example, breeds historically bred for dog fighting (e.g. Staffordshire bull berriers) tend to be aggressive with other dogs, but not necessarily with people; those bred as guard dogs (e.g. mastiffs, Dobermanns) tend to be highly territorial; those bred as companions sociable and affectionate; while others have been bred to specialize in certain highly specific behaviours at which they excel (e.g. pointers, sheep dogs).

For example, the author of one recent study of behavioural differences among dog breeds interpreted her results thus:

Inhibitory control may be a valued trait in herding dogs, which are required to inhibit their predatory responses. The Border Collie and Australian Shepherd were among the highest-scoring breeds in the cylinder test, indicating high inhibitory control. In contrast, the Malinois and German Shepherd were some of the lowest-scoring breeds. These breeds are often used in working roles requiring high responsiveness, which is often associated with low inhibitory control and high impulsivity. Human-directed behaviour and socio-cognitive abilities may be highly valued in pet dogs and breeds required to work closely with people, such as herding dogs and retrievers. In line with this, the Kelpie, Golden Retriever, Australian Shepherd, and Border Collie spent the largest proportion of their time on human-directed behaviour during the unsolvable task. In contrast, the ability to work independently may be important for various working dogs, such as detection dogs. In our study, the two breeds which were most likely to be completely independent during the unsolvable task (spending 0% of their time on human-directed behaviour) were the German Shepherd and Malinois” (Juntilla et al 2022).

Indeed, recognition of the different behaviours of dog breeds even has statutory recognition, with controversial breed-specific legislation restricting the breeding, sale and import of certain so-called dangerous dog breeds and ordering their registration, neutering and in some cases destruction.

Of course, similar legislation restricting the import and breeding, let alone ordering the neutering or destruction, of ‘dangerous human races’ (perhaps defined by reference to differences in crime rates) is currently politically unthinkable.

Therefore, as noted above, breed-specific legislation is the rough canine equivalent of the Nuremberg Laws.

Breed Differences in Intelligence

In addition, just as there are differences between human races in average IQ (see below; see also here, here and especially here) so some studies have suggested that, on average, dog breeds differ in average intelligence.

However, there are some difficulties, for these purposes, in measuring, and defining, what constitutes intelligence among domestic dogs.[41]

Since the subject of race differences in intelligence almost always lurks in the background of any discussion of the biology of race, and, since this topic is indeed discussed at some length by Sarich and Miele in a later chapter (and indeed in a later part of this review), it is perhaps worth discussing some of these difficulties and the extent to which they mirror similar controversies regarding how to define and measure human intelligence, especially differences between races.

Thus, research by Stanley Coren, reported in his book, The Intelligence of Dogs, and also widely reported upon in the popular press, purported to rank dog breeds by their intelligence.

However, the research in question, or at least the part reported upon in the media, actually seems to have relied exclusively on measurements of the ability of the different dogs to learn, and obey, new commands from their masters/owners with the minimum of instruction.[42]

Moreover, this ability also seems, in Coren’s own account, to have been assessed on the basis of the anecdotal impression of dog contest judges, rather then direct quantitative measurement of behaviour.

Thus, the purportedly most intelligent dogs were those able to learn a new command in less than five exposures and obey at least 95 percent of the time, while the purportedly least intelligent were those who required more than 100 repetitions and obey around 30 percent of the time.

An ability to obey commands consistently with a minimum of instruction does indeed require a form and degree of social intelligence – namely the capacity to learn and understand the commands in question.

However, such a means of measurement not only measures only a single quite specific type of intelligence, it also measures another aspect of canine psychology that is not obviously related to intelligence – namely, obedience, submissiveness and rebelliousness.

This is because complying with commands requires not only the capacity to understand commands, but also the willingness to actually obey them.

Some dogs might conceivably understand the commands of an owner, or at least have the capacity to understand if they put their mind to it, but nevertheless refuse to comply, or even refuse to learn, out of sheer rebelliousness and independent spirit. Most obviously, this might be true of wild wolves which have not been domesticated or even tamed, though it may also be true of dog breeds.[43]

Analogously, when a person engages in a criminal act, we do not generally assume that this is because s/he failed to understand that the conduct complained of was indeed a transgression of the law. Instead, we usually assume that s/he knew that the behaviour complained of was criminal, but, for whatever reason, decided to engage in the behaviour anyway.[44]

Thus, a person who habitually refuses to comply with rules of behaviour set down by those in authority (e.g. school authorities, law enforcement) is more likely to be diagnosed with, say, oppositional defiant personality disorder or psychopathy than with low intelligence as such. Much the same might be true of some dog breeds, and indeed some individual dogs (and indeed wild or tame wolves).[45]

Sarich and Miele, in their discussion of Daniel Freedman’s research on behavioural differences among breeds, provide a good illustration of these problems. Thus, they describe how, one of the tests conducted by Freedman involved measuring how well the different breeds navigated “a series of increasingly difficult mazes”. This would appear to be a form of intelligence test measuring spatial intelligence. However, in fact, they report, perhaps surprisingly:

The major breed differences were not in the ability to master the mazes (a rough measure of canine IQ) but in what they would do when they were placed in a maze they couldn’t master. The beagles would howl, hoping perhaps that another member of their pack would howl back and lead them to the goal. The inhibited Shelties would simply lie down on the ground and wait. Pugnacious terriers would try to tear down the walls of the maze, but the basenjis saw no reason they had to play by a human’s rules and tried to jump over the walls of the maze” (p202).

Far from demonstrating low intelligence, the behaviour of the terriers, and especially the basenjis might even be characterized as an impressive form of lateral thinking, inventiveness and creativity – devising a different way to escape the maze than that intended by the experimenter.

However, it more likely reflects the independent and rebellious personality of basenjis, a breed which is, according to Sarich and Miele, more recently domesticated than other most breeds, related to semi-domesticated pariah dogs, and who, they report, “dislike taking orders and are born canine scofflaws” (p201-2).

You may also recall that psychologist Hans Eysenck, in a passage quoted in greater length in the preceding section of this review, described this same breed, perhaps only semi-jocularly, as “natural psychopaths” (The IQ Argument: p170).

Consistent with this, Stanley Coren reports that they are the second least trainable dog, behind only Afghan Hounds.

Natural, Artificial and Sexual Selection

Of course, domestic dog breeds are a product, not of natural selection, of rather of artificial selection, i.e. selective breeding by human breeders, often to deliberately produce strains with different traits, both morphological and behavioural.

This, one might argue, makes dog breeds quite different to human races, since, although many have argued that humans are ourselves, in some sense, a domesticated species, albeit a self-domesticated one (i.e. we have domesticated ourselves, or perhaps one another), nevertheless most traits that differentiate human races seems to be a product of natural selection, in particular adaptation to different geographic regions and their climates.[46]

However, the processes of natural and artificial selection are directly analogous to each other. Indeed, they are so similar that it was the selective breeding of domestic animals by agriculturalists that helped inspire Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and was also used by Darwin to explain and illustrate this theory in The Origin of Species.

Moreover, many eminent biologists have argued that at least some racial differences are the product, not of natural selection (in the narrow sense), but rather of sexual selection, in particular mate choice.

Yet mate choice is arguably even more analogous to artificial selection than is natural selection, since both mate choice and artificial selection involve deliberate choice as to which individual with whom to breed by a third-party, namely, in the case of artificial selection, the human breeder, or, in respect of mate choice, the prospective mate.

As Sarich and Miele themselves observe:

Unlike for dog breeds, no one has deliberately exercised that level of selection on humans, unless we exercised it on ourselves, a thought that has led evolutionary thinkers from Charles Darwin to Jared Diamond to attribute human racial variation to a process termed ‘sexual’ rather than ‘natural’ selection” (p236).

Thus, Darwin himself went as far as to claim in The Descent of Man that “as far as we are enabled to judge… none of the differences between the races of man are of any direct or special service to him”, and instead proposes:

The differences between the races of man, as in colour, hairiness, form of features, etc., are of a kind which might have been expected to come under the influence of sexual selection” (The Descent of Man: p189-90).

Darwin’s claim that none of the physical differences between races have any survival value is now clearly untenable, as anthropologists and biologists have demonstrated that many observed race differences, for example, in skin colour, nose shape, and bodily dimensions, represent, at least in part, climatic adaptations.[47]

However, the view that sexual selection has also played some role in human racial differentiation remains plausible, and has been championed in recent years by scientific polymath and populariser Jared Diamond in chapter six of his book The Third Chimpanzee, which he titles ‘Sexual Selection and the Origin of Human Races’ (The Third Chimpanzee: pp95-105), and especially by anthropologist Peter Frost in a series of papers and blog posts (e.g. Frost 2008).

For example, as emphasized by Frost, differences in hair colour, eye colour and hair texture, having no obvious survival benefits, yet often being associated with perceptions of beauty, might well be attributed, at least in part, to sexual selection (Frost 2006; Frost 2014; Frost 2015).

The same may be true of racial and sexual differentiation levels of muscularity and in the distribution of body fat, as discussed later in this review.

For example, John R Baker, in his monumental magnus opus, Race (reviewed here), argues that the large protruding buttocks evinced among some San women likely reflect sexual selection (Race: p318).[48]

Meanwhile, both Frost and Diamond argue that even differences in skin colour, although partly reflecting the level of exposure to ultraviolet radiation from the sun in different regions of the globe and at different latitudes, and affecting vitamin D synthesis and susceptibility to sunburn and melanoma, all of which were subject to natural selection to some degree, likely also reflects mate choice and sexual selection as well, given that skin tone does not perfectly correlate with levels of exposure to UV rays in different regions, yet a lighter than average complexion seems to be cross-culturally associated with female beauty (van den Berghe and Frost 1986; Frost 1994; Frost 2014).

Similarly, in his recent book A Troublesome Inheritance, science writer Nicholas Wade, citing a study suggesting that an allele carried by East Asian people is associated with both thicker hair and smaller breasts in mice, suggests that this gene may have spread among East Asians as a consequence of sexual selection, with males preferring females as mates who possess one or both of these traits (A Troublesome Inheritance: p89-90).

Similarly, Wade also proposes that the greater prevalence of dry earwax among Northeast Asians, and, to a lesser degree, among Southeast Asians, Native Americans and Northern Europeans may reflect sexual selection and mate choice, because this form of earwax is also associated with a less strong body odour, and, in colder regions, where people spend more of their time indoors, Wade surmises that this is likely to be more noticeable, as well as unpleasant in a sexual partner (A Troublesome Inheritance: p90-91).[49]

Finally, celebrated Italian geneticist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza proposes, in his book Genes Peoples and Languages that, although the “fatty folds of skin” around the eyes characteristic of East Asian peoples likely evolved to protect against “the cold Siberian air” and represent “adaptions to the bitter cold of Siberia”, nevertheless, since “these eyes are often considered beautiful” they “probably diffused by sexual selection from northeastern Asia into Southeast Asia where it is not at all cold” (Genes Peoples and Languages: p11).

Curiously, in this context, however, Sarich and Miele, save for the passing mention of Darwin and Diamond quoted above, not only make no mention of sexual selection as a possible factor in human racial differentiation, but also make the odd claim in relation to sexual selection that:

There has been no convincing evidence of it [i.e. sexual selection] yet in humans” (p186).[50]

As noted, this is a rather odd, if not outright biologically ignorant, claim.

It is true that some of the more outlandish claims of evolutionary psychologists for sexual selection – for example, Geoffrey Miller’s intriguing theory that human intelligence evolved through sexual selection – remain unproven, as indeed does the claim that sexual selection played an important role in human racial differentiation.

However, there is surely little doubt, for example, human body-size dimorphism is a product of sexual selection (more specifically intra-sexual selection), since levels of body-size dimorphism is consistently correlated with levels of polygyny across many mammalian species.

A strong claim can also be made that the permanant breasts that are unique to human females evolved as a product of intersexual selection. (see discussion here).

Sexual selection has also surely acted on human psychology, resulting in, among other traits, the greater levels of violent aggression among males.

On the other hand, Sarich and Miele may be on firmer ground when, in a later chapter, while not denying that sexual selection may have played a role in other aspects of human evolution, they nevertheless insist:

No one has yet provided any hard evidence showing that process [i.e. sexual selection] has produced racial differences in our species” (p236).

However, while this may be true, the idea that sexual selection has played a key role in human racial differentiation certainly remains a plausible hypothesis.

Physical Differences and Athletic Performance

Although they emphasize that morphological differences between human races are greater than those among some separate species of nonhuman animal, and also that such morphological differences provide, for many purposes, a more useful measure of group differences than genetic differences, nevertheless, in the remainder of the chapter on ‘Physical Race Differences’, Sarich and Miele actually have surprisingly little to say about the actual physical differences that exist as between races, nor how and why such differences evolved.

There is no discussion of, for example, Thomson’s nose rule, which seems to explain much of the variation in nose shape among races, nor of Bergmann’s rule and Allen’s rule, which seem to explain much of the variation among humans in body-size and relative bodily proportions.

Instead, Sarich and Miele focus on what is presumably an indirect effect of physiological race differences – namely, differences in athletic performance as between races.

Even this topic is not treated thoroughly. Indeed, the authors talk of “such African dominance as exists in the sporting world” (p182) almost as if this applied to all sports equally.

Yet, just as people of black African descent are conspicuously dominant in certain athletic events (basketball, the 100m sprint), so they are noticeably absent among elite athletes in certain other sports, not least swimming – and, just as the overrepresentation of people of West African descent among elite sprinters, and East Africans among elite distance runners, has been attributed to biological differences, so has their relative absence among elite swimmers, which is most often attributed to differences in bone density and fat distribution, each of which affect buoyancy.

Yet, not only does Sarich and Miele’s chapter on ‘Physical Race Differences’ focus almost exclusively on differences in athletic ability, but a large part of the chapter is devoted to differences in performance in one particular sport, namely the performance of East Africans, especially Kenyans (and especially members a single tribe, the Kelenjin), in long-distance running.

Yet, even here, their analysis is almost exclusively statistical, demonstrating the improbability that this single tribe, who represent, of course, only a tiny proportion of the world’s population, would achieve such success by chance alone if they did not have some underlying innate biological advantage.

They say little of the actual physiological factors that actually make East Africans such as the Kelenjin such great distance runners, nor of the evolutionary factors that selected for these physiological differences.

Others have attributed this advantage to their having evolved to survive at a relatively high altitude, in a mountainous region on the borders of Kenya and Uganda, to which region they are indigenous, as well as their so-called ‘elongate’ body-type, which seems to have evolved as an adaptation to climate.

Amusingly, however, behavioural geneticist Glayde Whitney proposes yet another factor that might explain why the Kelenjin are such excellent runners – namely, according to him, they long had a notorious reputation among their East African neighbours as cattle thieves.

However, unlike cattle thieves in the Old West, they lacked access to horses (which, in sub-Saharan Africa are afflicted with sleeping sickness spread by the tsetse fly) and having failed to domesticate any equivalent indigenous African animal such as the zebra, had instead to escape with their plunder on foot. The result, Whitney posits, was strong selection pressure for running ability in order to outrun and escape any pursuers:

Why are the Kalenjin such exceptional runners? There is some speculation that it may be because the tribe specialized in cattle thievery. Anyone who can run a great distance and get away with the stolen cattle will have enough wealth to meet the high bride price of a good spouse. Because the Kalenjin were polygamous, a really successful cattle thief could afford to buy many wives and make many little runners. This is a good story, anyway, and it might even be true” (Whitney 1999).

The closest Sarich and Miele themselves come to providing a physiological explanation for black sporting success is a single sentence where they write:

Body-fat levels seem to be at a minimum among African populations; the levels do not increase with age in them, and Africans in training can apparently achieve lower body-fat levels more readily than is the case for Europeans and Asians” (p182).

This claim seems anecdotally plausible, at least in respect of young African-American males, many of whom appear able to retain lean, muscular physiques, despite seemingly subsisting on a diet composed primarily of fried chicken with a regrettable lack of healthy alternatives such as watermelon.

However, as was widely discussed in relation to the higher mortality rates experienced among black people (and among fat people) during the recent coronavirus pandemic, there is also some evidence of higher rates of obesity among African-Americans.

Actually, however, this problem seems to be restricted to black women, who evince much higher rates of obesity than do women of most other races in the USA.[51]

African-American males, on the other hand, seem to have similar rates of obesity to white American males.

Thus, according to data cited by the US Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Minority Health, more than 80% African American women are obese or overweight, as compared to only 65% of white women. However, among males the pattern is reversed, with a somewhat higher proportion of white men being overweight or obese than black men (75% of white men versus only about 71% of black men) (US Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Minority Health 2020).

This pattern is replicated in the UK, where black women have higher rates of obesity than white women, but, again, black men have rather lower rates of obesity than white men, with East Asians consistently having the lowest rates of obesity among both sexes.

That similar patterns are observed in both the UK and the USA suggests that the differences reflect an innate race difference – or rather an innate race difference in the magnitude of an innate sex difference, namely in body fat levels, which are higher among women than among men in all racial groups.[52]

This may perhaps be a product of sexual selection and mate choice.

Thus, if black men do indeed, as popular stereotype suggests, like big butts, then black women may well have evolved to have bigger butts through sexual selection.[53]

At least in the US, there is indeed some evidence that mating preferences differ between black and white men with regard to preferred body-types, with black men preferring somewhat heavier body-types (Allison et al 1993; Thompson et al 1996; Freedman et al 2004), though other research suggest little or no significant differences in preferences for body-weight as between black and white men (Singh 1994; Freedman et al 2006).[54]

Sexual selection or, more specifically, mate choice may similarly explain the evolution of fatty breasts among women of all races and the evolution of fatty protruding buttocks among Khoisan women of Southern Africa (which I have written about previously and alluded to above).

Conversely, if the greater fat levels observed among black women is a product of sexual selection and, in particular, of mate choice, then perhaps the greater levels of muscularity and athleticism apparently observed among black men may also be a product of intrasexual selection or male-male competition (e.g. fighting).

Thus, it is possible that levels of intrasexual selection operating on males may have been elevated in sub-Saharan Africa because of the greater prevalence of polygyny in this region, since polygyny intensifies reproductive competition by increasing the reproductive stakes (see Sanderson, Race and Evolution: p92-3; Draper 1989; Frost 2008).

At any rate, other physical differences between the races besides differences in body fat levels also surely play a role in explaining the success of African-descended athletes in many sports.

For example, African populations tend to have somewhat longer legs and arms relative to their torsos than do Europeans and Asians. This reflects Allen’s rule of thermal regulation, whereby organisms that evolved in colder climates evolve to have relatively shorter limbs and other appendages, both to minimize the ratio of surface area to volume, and hence proportion of the body is directly exposed to the elements, and also because it is the extremities that are especially vulnerable to frostbite.

Thus, blacks, having evolved in the tropics, have relatively longer legs and arms than do Europeans and Asians.[55]

Greater relative leg length, sometimes measured by the ratio of sitting to standing height, is surely an advantage in running events, which might partially explain black success in track events and indeed many other sports that also involve running It may also explain African-American performance in sports that involve jumping as well (e.g. basketball, the high jump and long jump), since leg length also confers an advantage here.

Meanwhile, greater relative arm length, sometimes measured by armspan to height ratio, is likely an advantage in sports such as basketball, boxing and racquet sports, since it confers greater reach.

Yet, at least some of the factors that benefit East Africans in distance events are opposite to those that favour West Africans in sprinting (e.g. the relative proportions of fast- versus slow-twitch muscle fibres; a mesomorphic versus an ectomorphic body-build). This suggests that it is, at best, a simplification to talk about a generalized African advantage in running, let alone in athletics as a whole.

Neither do the authors discuss the apparent anomaly whereby racially-mixed African-Americans and West Indians outcompete indigenous West Africans, who, being unmixed, surely possess whatever qualities benefit African-Americans in even greater abundance than do their transatlantic cousins.[56]

Sarich and Miele also advance another explanation for the superior performance of blacks in running events, which stikes me as a very odd argument and not at all persuasive. Here, they argue that, since anatomically modern humans first evolved in Africa:

Our basic adaptations are African. Given that, it would seem that we would have had to make adaptive compromises, such as to cold weather, when populating other areas of the world, thus taking the edge off our ‘African-ness’” (p182)

As a result of our distinctive adaptations having first evolved in Africa, Sarich and Miele argue:

Africans are better than the rest of us at some of those things that most make us human, and they are better because their separate African histories have given them, in effect, better genes for recently developed tests of some basic human adaptations. The rest of us (or, more fairly, our ancestors) have had to compromise some of those African specializations in adapting to more temperate climates and more varied environments. Contemporary Africans, through their ancestors, are advantaged in not having had to make such adaptations, and their bodies, along with their resulting performances, show it” (p183).

Primary among these “basic adaptations”, “African specializations” and “things that most make us human” are, they argue, bipedalism (i.e. walking on two legs). This then, they seem to be arguing, explains African dominance in running events, which represent, if you like, the ultimate measure of bipedal ability.

This argument strikes me as completely unpersuasive, if not wholly nonsensical.

After all, another of our “basic adaptations”, even more integral to what “makes us human” than bipedalism is surely our high levels of intelligence and large brains (see discussion below) as compared to other primates.

Yet Africans notoriously do not appear to have “better genesfor this trait, at least as measured in yet another of those “recently developed tests of some basic human adaptations”, namely IQ tests.

Athletic and Cognitive Ability

This, of course, leads us directly to another race difference that is the subject of even greater controversy – namely race differences in intellectual ability.

The real reason we are reluctant to discuss athletic superiority is, Sarich and Miele contend, because it is perceived as also raising the spectre of intellectual inferiority.

In short, if races differ sufficiently genetically to cause differences in athletic performance, then it is surely possible they also differ sufficiently genetically to cause differences in academic performance and performance on IQ tests.

However, American high school movie stereotypes of ‘dumb jocks’ and ‘brainy nerds’ notwithstanding, there is no necessary inverse correlation between intellectual ability and ability at sports.

Indeed, Sarich and Miele argue that athletic ability is actually positively correlated with intellectual ability.

I can see no necessary, or even likely, negative correlation between the physical and the mental. On the contrary, the data show an obvious, strong, positive correlation among class, physical condition, and participation in regular exercise in the United States” (p182).

Thus, they report:

Professional football teams have, in recent years, been known to use the results of IQ tests as one indicator of potential in rookies. And a monumental study of intellectually gifted California schoolchildren begun by Lewis Terman in the 1920s that followed them through their lives showed clearly that they were also more gifted physically than the average” (p183).[57]

It is likely true that intelligence and athletic ability are positively correlated – if only because many of the same things that cause physical disabilities (e.g. physical trauma, developmental disorders) also often cause mental disability. Down syndrome, for example, causes both mental and physical disability; and, if you are crippled in a car crash, you may also suffer brain damage.

Admittedly, there may be some degree of trade-off between performance in different spheres, if only because the more time one devotes to playing sports, then, all else being equal, the less time one has left to devote to one’s studies, and, in both sports and academics, performance usually improves with practice.

On the other hand, however, it may be that doing regular exercise and working hard at one’s studies are positively correlated because both reflect the same underlying personality trait of conscientiousness.

On this view, the real trade-off may be, not so much between spending time, on the one hand, playing sports and exercising and, on the other, studying, as it is between, on the one hand, engaging in any or all of these productive endeavours and, on the other hand, engaging in wasteful and unproductive endeavours such as watching television, playing computer games and shooting up heroin.

As for the American high school movie stereotype of the ‘dumb jock’, this, I suspect, may partly reflect the peculiar American institution of athletic scholarships, whereby athletically gifted students are admitted to elite universities despite being academically underqualified.

On the other hand, I suspect that the ‘brainy nerd’ stereotype may have something to do with a mild subclinical presentation of the symptoms of high-functioning autism.

This is not to say that ‘nerdishness’ and autism are the same thing, but rather that ‘nerdishness’ represents a milder subclinical presentation of autism symptoms not sufficient to justify a full-blown diagnosis of autism. Autistic traits are, after all, a matter of degree.

Thus, it is notable that the symptoms of autism include many traits that are also popularly associated with the nerd stereotype, such as social awkwardness, obsessive ‘nerdyspecial interests and perhaps even with that other popular stereotype of ‘nerds’, namely having to wear glasses.

More relevant for our purposes, high functioning autism is also associated with poor physical coordination and motor skills, which might explain the stereotype of ‘nerds’ performing poorly at sports.

On the other hand, however, contrary to popular stereotype, autism is not associated with above average intelligence.[58]

In fact, although autistic people can present the whole range of intelligence, from highly gifted to intellectually disabled, autism is overall said to be associated with somewhat lower average intelligence than is observed in the general population.

This is consistent with the fact that autism is indeed, contrary to the claims of some neurodiversity advocates, a developmental disorder and disability.

However, I suspect autism may be underdiagnosed among those of higher intelligence, precisely because they are able to use their higher general intelligence to compensate for and hence ‘mask’ their social impairments such that they go undetected and often undiagnosed.

Moreover, autism has a complex and interesting relationship with intelligence, and autism seems to be associated with special abilities in specific areas (Crespi 2016).

There is also some evidence, albeit mixed, that autistic people score relatively higher in performance IQ and spatio-visual ability than in verbal IQ. Given there is some evidence of a link between spatio-visual intelligence and mathematical ability, this might plausibly explain the stereotype of nerds being especially proficient in mathematics (i.e. ‘maths nerds’).

Overall, then, there is little evidence of, or any theoretical reason to anticipate, any trade-off or inverse correlation between intellectual and athletic ability. On the contrary, there is probably some positive correlation between the intelligence and athletic ability, if only because the same factors that cause intellectual disabilities – physical trauma, brain damage, birth defects, chromosomal abnormalities – also often cause physical disabilities.

On the other hand, however, Philippe Rushton, in the ‘Preface to the Third Edition’ of his book, Race Evolution and Behavior (which I have reviewed here), contends that some of the same physiological factors that cause blacks to excel in some athletic events are also indirectly associated with other racial differences that perhaps portray blacks in a less flattering light.

Thus, Rushton reports that the reason blacks tend, on average, to be faster runners is because:

Blacks have narrower hips [than whites and East Asians] which gives them a more efficient stride” (Race Evolution and Behavior: p11).

But, he continues, the reason why blacks are able to have narrower hips, and hence more efficient stride, is that they give birth to smaller-brained, and hence smaller headed, infants:

The reason why Whites and East Asians have wider hips than Blacks, and so make poorer runners, is because they give birth to larger brained babies” (Race Evolution and Behavior: p12).[59]

Yet, as discussed below, brain size is itself correlated with intelligence, both as between species, and as between individual humans.

Similarly, Rushton argues:

Blacks have from 3 to 19% more of the sex hormone testosterone than Whites or East Asians. These testosterone differences translate into more explosive energy, which gives Blacks the edge in sports like boxing, basketball, football, and sprinting” (Race Evolution and Behavior: p11).

However, higher levels of testosterone also has a downside, not least since:

The hormones that give Blacks an edge at sports makes them more masculine in general — physically active in school, and more likely to get into trouble” (Race Evolution and Behavior: p12).

In other words, if higher levels of testosterone gives blacks an advantage in some sports, they perhaps also result in the much higher levels of violent crime and conduct disorders reported among people of black African descent (see Ellis 2017).[60]

Intelligence

Whereas their chapter on ‘Race and Physical Differences’ focussed mostly on differences in athletic ability, Sarich and Miele’s chapter on ‘Race and Behavior’, focuses, perhaps inevitably, almost exclusively on race differences in intelligence.

However, though it certainly has behavioural correlates, intelligence is not, strictly speaking, an element of behaviour as such. The chapter would therefore arguably be more accurately titled ‘Race and Psychology’ – or indeed ‘Race and Intelligence’, since this is the psychologial difference upon which they focus almost to the exclusion of all others.[61]

Moreover Sarich and Miele do not even provide a general, let alone comprehensive, review of all the evidence on the subject of race differences in intelligence, their causes and consequences. Instead, they focus on two very specific issues and controversies:

  1. Race differences in brain size; and
  2. The average IQ of blacks in sub-Saharan Africa.

Yet, despite the title of the Chapter, neither of the these reflect a difference in behaviour as such.

Indeed, race differences in brain-size are actually a physical difference – albeit a physical difference presumed, not unreasonably, to be associated with a psychological difference – and therefore should, strictly speaking, have gone in their previous chapter on ‘Race and Physical Differences’.

Brain Size

Brain-size and its relation to both intelligence and race is a topic I have written about previously. As between individuals, there exists a well-established correlation between brain-size and IQ (Pietschnig et al 2015; Rushton and Ankney 2009).

Nicholas Mackintosh, himself by no means a doctrinaire hereditarian and a critic of hereditarian theories with respect to race differences in intelligence, nevertheless reports in the second edition of his undergraduate textbook on IQ and Human Intelligence, published in 2011:

Although the overall correlation between brain size and intelligence is not very high, there can be no doubt of its reliability” (IQ and Human Intelligence: p132).

Indeed, Sarich and Miele go further. In a critique of the work of infamous scientific charlatan Stephen Jay Gould, to whom they attribute the view that “brain size and intellectual performance have nothing to do with one another”, they retort:

Those large brains of ours could not have evolved unless having large brains increased fitness through what those large brains made possible-that is, through minds that could do more” (p213).

This is especially so given the metabolic expense of brain tissue and other costs of increased brain size, such that, to have evolved during the course of human evolution, our large brains must have conferred some compensating advantage.

Thus, dismissing Gould as a “behavioral creationist”, given his apparent belief that the general principles of natural selection somehow do not apply to behaviour, or at least not to human behaviour, the authors forthrightly conclude:

The evolutionary perspective demands that there be a relationship-in the form of a positive correlation-between brain size and intelligence… Indeed, it seems to me that a demonstration of no correlation between brain size and cognitive performance would be about the best possible refutation of the fact of human evolution” (p214).

Here, the authors go a little too far. Although, given the the metabolic expense of brain tissue and other costs associated with increased brain size, larger brains must have conferred some selective advantage to offset these costs, it need not necessarily have been an advantage in intelligence, certainly not in general intelligence. Instead, increased brain-size could, at least in theory, have evolved in relation to some specific ability, or cognitive or neural process, other than intellectual ability.

Yet, despite this forthright claim, Sarich and Miele then go on to observe that one study conducted by one of Sarich’s graduate students, in collaboration with Sarich himself, actually found no association between brain size and IQ as between siblings from the same family (Schoenemann et al 2000).

This, Sarich and Miele explain, suggests the relationship between brain-size and IQ is not causal, but rather that some factor that differs as between families is responsible for causing both larger brains and the higher IQs. However, they explain, “the obvious candidates” (e.g. socioeconomic status, nutrition) do not have nearly a big enough effect to account for this (p222).

However, they fail to note that other studies have found a correlation between brain size and IQ scores even within families, suggesting that brain size does indeed cause higher intelligence (e.g. Jensen & Johnson 1994; Lee et al 2019).

Indeed, according to Rushton and Ankney (2009: 695), even prior to the Lee et al study, four studies had already established a correlation between brain-size and IQ even within families, a couple of them published before Sarich and Miele’s book.

Of course, Sarich and Miele can hardly be faulted for failing to cite Lee et al (2019), since that study had not been published at the time their book was written. However, other studies (e.g. Jensen & Johnson 1994) had already been published at the time Sarich and Miele authored their book.

Brain-size is also thought to correlate with intelligence as between species, at least after controlling for body-size (see encephalization quotient).

However, comparing the intelligence of different species obviously represents a difficult endeavour.

Quite apart from the practical challenges (e.g. building a maze for a mouse to navigate in the laboratory is simple enough, building a comparable maze for elephants presents more difficulties), there is the fact that, whereas most variation in human intelligence, both between individuals and between groups, is captured by a single g factor, different species no doubt have many different specialist abilities.[62]

For example, migratory birds surely have special abilities in respect of navigation. However, these are not necessarily reflective of their overall general intelligence.

In other words, if you think a culture-fair’ IQ test is an impossibility, then try designing a ‘species-fair’ test!

If brain-size correlates with intelligence both as between species and as between individual humans, it seems probable that race differences in brain-size also reflect differences in intelligence.

However, larger brains do not automatically, or directly, confer, or cause, higher levels of intelligence.

For example, most dwarves have IQs similar to those of non-dwarves, despite having smaller brains, but, save in the case of ‘proportionate dwarves’, larger brains relative to their body-size. Neither is macrocephaly (i.e. abnormally and pathologically large head-size) associated with exceptional intelligence.

The reason that disproportionate dwarves and people afflicted with macrocephaly do not have especially high intelligence, despite larger brains relative to their body size, is probably because these are abnormal pathological conditions. The increased brain-size did not evolve through natural selection, but rather represents some kind of malfunction in development.

Therefore, whereas increases in brain size that evolved through natural selection must have conferred some advantage to offset the metabolic expense of brain tissue and other costs associated with increased brain size, these sort of pathological increases in brain-size need not have any compensating advantages, since they did not evolve through natural selection at all, and the increased relative brain size may indeed be wasted.

Likewise, although sex differences in brain-size are greater than those between races, at least before controlling for body-size, sex differences in IQ are either small or non-existent.[63]

Meanwhile, Neanderthals had larger brains than modern humans, despite a shorter, albeit more robust, stocky and more muscular frame, and with somewhat heavy overall body weight.

As with so much discussion of the topic of race differences in intelligence, Sarich and Miele focus almost exclusively on the topic of differences between whites and blacks, the authors reporting:

With respect to the difference between American whites and blacks, the one good brain-size study that has been done indicates a difference between them of about 0.8 SD [i.e. 0.80 of a standard deviation]; this could correspond to an IQ difference of about 5 points, or about one-third of the actual differential [actually] found [between whites and blacks in America]” (p217)

The remainder of the differential presumably relates to internal differences in brain-structure as between the races in question, whether these differences are environmental or innate in origin.

Yet Sarich and Miele say little if anything to my recollection about the brain-size of other groups, for example Australian Aboriginals or East Asians.

Neither, most tellingly, do they discuss the brain-size of the race of mankind gifted with the largest average brain size – namely, Eskimos.

Yet the latter are not renowned for their contributions to science, the arts or civilization.

Moreover, according to Richard Lynn, their average IQ is only 91, as compared to an average IQ of 100 for white Europeans – high for a people who, until recently, subsisted as largely hunter-gatherers (other such groups – Australian Aborigines, San Bushmen, Native Americans – have low average IQs), but well below whites, East Asians and Ashkenazi Jews, each of whom possess, on average, smaller brains than Eskimos  (see Race Differences in Intelligence: reviewed here).

In general, a clear pattern emerges in respect of the relative brain-size of different human populations. In general, the greater the latitude of the region in which a given population evolved, the greater their brain-size. Hence the large brains of Eskimos (Beals et al 1984).

This then seems to be a climatic adaptation. Some racialists like Richard Lynn and Philippe Rushton have argued that this reflects the greater cognitive demands of surviving in a cold climate (e.g. building shelter, making fire, clothes, obtaining sufficient foods in regions where plant foods are rare throughout the winter).

In contrast, to the extent that race and population differences in average brain size are even acknowledged by mainstream anthropologists, they are usually attributed to the Bergmann’s rule of temperature regulation. Thus, the authors of one recent undergraduate level anthropology textbook on biological anthropology contend:

Larger and relatively broader skulls lose less heat and are adaptive in cold climates; small and relatively narrower skulls lose more heat and are adaptive in hot climates” (Human Biological Variation: p285).[64]

As noted, this seems to be an extrapolation of Bergmann’s rule of temperature regulation. Put simply, in a cold climate, it is adaptive to minimize the proportion of the body that is directly exposed to the elements, or, in other words, to minimize the ratio of surface-area-to-volume.

As the authors of another undergraduate level textbook on physical anthropology explain:

“The closer a structure approaches a spherical shape, the lower will be the surface-to-volume ratio. The reverse is true as elongation occurs—a greater surface area to volume is formed, which results in more surface to dissipate heat generated within a given volume. Since up to 80 percent of our body heat may be lost through our heads on cold days, one can appreciate the significance of shape” (Human Variation: Races, Types and Ethnic Groups, 5th Ed: p188).

However, it seems implausible that an increase in metabolically expensive brain tissue would have evolved solely for regulating temperature, when the same result could have been achieved at less metabolic cost by modifying only the external shape of the skull.

Moreover, perhaps tellingly, it seems that brain size correlates more strongly with latitude than do other measures of body-size. Thus, in their review of the data on population differences in cranial capacity, Beals et al report:

Braincase volume is more highly correlated with climate than any of the summative measures of body size. This suggests that cranial morphology may be more influenced by the thermodynamic environment than is the body as a whole” (Beals et al 1984: p305).

Given that, contrary to popular opinion, we do not in fact lose an especially large proportion of our body heat from our heads, certainly not the eighty percent claimed by Molnar in the anthropology textbook quoted above, this is not easy to explain interms of temperature regulation alone.

At any rate, even if differences in brain size did indeed evolve solely for the purposes of temperature regulation, then it is still surely possible that differences in average intelligence evolved as a byproduct of such increases in brain-size.

Measured IQs in Sub-Saharan Africa

With regard to the second controversial topic upon which Sarich and Miele focus their discussion in their chapter on ‘Race and Behavior’, namely that of the average IQ in sub-Saharan Africa, the authors write:

Perhaps the most enigmatic and controversial results in the IQ realm pertain to sub-Saharan Africans and their descendants around the world. The most puzzling single finding is the apparent mean IQ of the former of about 70” (p225).

This figure applies, it ought to be emphasized, only to black Africans still resident within sub-Saharan Africa. Blacks resident in western economies (except Israel, oddly), whether due to racial admixture or environmental factors, or a combination of the two, generally score much higher, though still substantially below whites and Asians, with average IQs of about 85, compared, of course, to a white average of 100 (see discussion here).

The figure seems to come originally from the work of Richard Lynn on national IQs (reviewed here, for discussion of black IQs in particular: see here, here and here), and has inevitably provoked much criticism and controversy.[65]

While the precise figure has been questioned, it is nevertheless agreed that the average IQ of blacks in sub-Saharan Africa is indeed very low, and considerably lower than that of blacks resident in western economies, unsurprisingly given the much higher living standards of the latter.[66]

For their part, Sarich and Miele seem to accept Lynn’s conclusion, albeit somewhat ambiguously. Thus, they conclude:

One can perhaps accept this [figure] as a well-documented fact” (p225).

Yet including both the word “perhaps” and the phrase “well-documented” in a single sentence and in respect of the same ostensible “fact” strikes me as evidence of evasive fence-sitting.

An IQ of below 70 is, in Western countries, regarded as indicative of, and inconclusive evidence for, mental retardation, though mental disability is not, in practice, diagnosed by IQ alone.[67]

However, Sarich and Miele report:

Interacting with [Africans] belies any thought that one is dealing with an IQ 70 people” (p226).[68]

Thus, Sarich and Miele point out that, unlike black Africans:

Whites with 70 IQ are obviously substantially handicapped over and above their IQ scores” (p225).

In this context, an important distinction must be recognised between, on the one hand, what celebrated educational psychologist Arthur Jensen calls “biologically normal mental retardation” (i.e. individuals who are simply at the tail-end of the normal distribution), and, on the other, victims of conditions such as chromosomal abnormalities like Down Syndrome or of brain damage, who tend to be impaired in other ways, both physical and psychological, besides intelligence (Straight Talk About Mental Tests: p9).

Thus, as he explains in his more recent and technical book, The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability:

There are two distinguishable types of mental retardation, usually referred to as ‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ or, more commonly, as ‘familial’ and ‘organic’… In familial retardation there are no detectable causes of retardation other than the normal polygenic and microenvironmental sources of IQ variation that account for IQ differences throughout the entire range of IQ… Organic retardation, on the other hand, comprises over 350 identified etiologies, including specific chromosomal and genetic anomalies and environmental prenatal, perinatal, and postnatal brain damage due to disease or trauma that affects brain development. Nearly all of these conditions, when severe enough to cause mental retardation, also have other, more general, neurological and physical manifestations of varying degree… The IQ of organically retarded children is scarcely correlated with the IQ of their first-order relatives, and they typically stand out as deviant in other ways as well” (The g Factor: p368-9).

Clearly, given that the entire normal distribution of IQ among blacks is shifted downwards, a proportionally greater number of blacks with IQs below any given threshold will simply be at the tail-end of the normal distribution for their race rather than suffering from, say, chromosomal abnormalities, as compared to whites or East Asians with the same low IQs.

Thus, as Sarich and Miele themselves observe:

Given the nature of the bell curve for intelligence and the difference in group means, there are proportionately fewer whites with IQs below 75, but most of these are the result of chromosomal or single-gene problems and are recognizable as such by their appearance as much as by their behavior” (p230).

This, then, is why low-IQ blacks appear relatively more competent and less stereotypically ‘retarded’ than whites or East Asians with comparably low IQs, since the latter are more likely to have deficits in other areas, both physical and psychological.

Thus, leading intelligence researcher Nicholas Mackintosh reports that low-IQ blacks perform much better than whites of similarly low IQ in respect of so-called adaptive behaviours – i.e. the ability to cope with day-to-day life (e.g. feed, dress, clean, interact with others in an apparently ‘normal’ manner).

Indeed, Mackintosh reports that, according to one sociological study first published in 1973:

If IQ alone was used as a criterion of disability, ten times as many blacks as whites would have been classified as disabled; if adaptive behaviour measures were added to IQ, this difference completely vanished” (IQ and Human Intelligence: p356-7).

This is indeed among the reasons that IQ alone is now no longer deemed a sufficient ground in and of itself for diagnosing a person as suffering from a mental disability.

Similarly, Jensen himself reports:

In social and outdoor play activities… black children with IQ below seventy seldom appeared as other than quite normal youngsters— energetic, sociable, active, motorically well coordinated, and generally indistinguishable from their age-mates in regular classes. But… many of the white children with IQ below seventy… appeared less competent in social interactions with their classmates and were motorically clumsy or awkward, or walked with a flatfooted gait” (The g Factor: p367).[69]

Indeed, in terms of physical abilities, some black people with what are, at least by white western standards, very low IQs, can even be talented athletes, a case-in-point being celebrated world heavyweight boxing champion, Muhammad Ali, who tested so low in an IQ test that was used by the armed services for recruitment purposes that he was initially rejected as unfit for military service.[70]

In contrast, I am unaware of any successful white or indeed Asian athletes with comparably low IQs.

In short, according to this view, most sub-Saharan Africans with an IQs less than or equal to 70 are not really mentally handicapped at all. On the contrary, they are within the normal range for the subspecies to which they belong.

Indeed, to adopt an admittedly provocative analogy or reductio ad absurdum, it would be no more meaningful to say that the average chimpanzee is mentally handicapped simply because they are much less intelligent than the average human.

Sarich and Miele adopt another, less provocative analogy, suggesting that, instead of comparing sub-Saharan Africans with mentally handicapped Westerners, we do better to compare them to Western eleven-year-old children, since 70 is also the average score for children around this age (p229-30).

Thus, they cite Lynn himself as observing:

Since the average white 12-year-old can do all manner of things, including driving cars and even fixing them, estimates of African IQ should not be taken to mean half the population is mentally retarded” (p230).

However, this analogy is, I suspect, just as misleading.

After all, just as people suffering from brain damage or chromosomal abnormalities such as Down Syndrome tend to differ from normal people in various ways besides intelligence, so children differ from adults in many ways other than intelligence.

Thus, even highly intelligent children often lack emotional maturity and worldly knowledge.[71]

Khoisan Intelligence

Interestingly, however, the authors suggest that one specific morphologically very distinct subgroup of sub-Saharan Africans, often recognised as a separate race (Capoid as opposed to Congoid, in Carleton Coon’s terminology and taxonomy) by many early twentieth century anthropologists, may be an exception when it comes to sub-Saharan African IQs – namely San Bushmen.

Thus, citing anecdotal evidence of a single individual Bushman who proved himself very technically adept and innovative in repairing a car motor, the authors quote population geneticist Henry Harpending, who has done fieldwork in Africa, as observing:

All of us have the impression that Bushmen are really quick and clever and are quite different from their neighbours” (p227).

They also quote Harpending as anticipating:

There will soon be real data available about the relative performance of Bushmen, Hottentot, and Bantu kids – or more likely, they will supress it” (p227).

Some two decades or so later, the only data I am aware of is that reported by Richard Lynn.

Relying on just two very limited studies of Khoisan intelligence, Lynn nevertheless does not hesitate to estimate Bushmen’s average IQ at just 54 – the lowest that he reports for any ethnic group anywhere in the world (Race Differences in Intelligence: p76).

However, we should be reluctant to accept these conclusions prematurely. Not only does Lynn rely on only two studies of Khoisan intelligence, but both these studies were very limited, neither remotely resembling a full modern IQ test.

Agriculture, Foraging and Intelligence

As to why higher intelligence might have been selected for among San Bushmen than among neighbouring tribes of Black Bantu, they consider the possibility that there was “lessened selection for intelligence (or at least cleverness) with the coming of agriculture, versus hunting-gathering”, since, whereas Bantu are agriculturalists, the San still subsist through hunting-gathering (p227).

On this view, hunting-gatherers must employ intelligence to track and capture prey and otherwise procure food, whereas farming, save for the occasional invention of a new agricultural technique, is little more than tedious, repetitious and mindless drudgery.

I am reminded of Jared Diamond’s provocative claim, in his celebrated book, Guns, Germs and Steel, that “in mental ability New Guineans are probably genetically superior to Westerners”, since the former must survive on their wits, avoid being murdered and procure prey to survive, whereas in densely populated agricultural and industrial societies most mortality comes from disease, which tends to strike randomly (Guns, Germs and Steel: p20-1).

Yet, how ever intuitively plausible this theory might appear, especially, perhaps, for those of us who have, throughout our entire lives, never either hunted or farmed, certainly not in the manner of the Bantu or San, it is not supported by the evidence.

According to data collected by Richard Lynn in his book, Race Differences in Intelligence (reviewed here), albeit on the basis of quite limited data, both New Guineans and San Bushmen have very low average IQs, lower even than other sub-Saharan Africans.[72]

Thus, they again quote Henry Harpending as concluding:

Almost any hypothesis about all this can be falsified with one sentence. For example:

  1. Hunting-gathering selects for cleverness. But then why do Australian Aborigines do so badly in school and on tests?
  2. Dense labor-intensive agriculture selects for cleverness, explaining the high IQ scores in the Far East and in South India. But then why is there not a high~IQ pocket in the Nile Valley?

And so on. I don’t have any viable theory about it all.”[73]

Indeed, if we rely on Lynn’s data in his book, Race Differences in Intelligence (which I have reviewed here), then it would seem that groups that have, until recently, subsisted primarily through a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, tend to have low IQs.

Thus, Lynn attributes exceptionally low average IQs not only to San Bushmen, but also to African Pygmies and Australian Aboriginals, and, while his data for the Bushmen and Pygmies is very limited, his data on Australian Aboriginals from the Australian school system is actually surprisingly abundant, revealing an average IQ of just 62.

Interestingly, other groups who had already partly, but not wholly, transitioned to agriculture by the time of European contact, such as Pacific Islanders and Native Americans, tend to score rather higher, each with average IQs of around 85, rather higher indeed than the average IQs of black Bantu agriculturalists in Africa.

Indeed, even cold-adapted Eskimos, also, until recently hunter-gatherers, but with the largest brain-size of any human population, score only around 90 in average IQ according to Lynn.

Interestingly, one study that I am aware of did find evidence that a genetic variant associated with intelligence, executive function and working memory was more prevalent among populations that had transitioned to agriculture than among hunter-gatherers (Piffer 2013).

Race Bombs’?

In their final chapter, ‘Learning to Live With Race’, Sarich and Miele turn to the vexed subject of the social and political implications of what they have reported and concluded regarding the biology of race and of race differences in previous chapters.

One interesting if somewhat sensationalist subject that they discuss is the prospect of what they call “ethnically targeted weapons” or “race bombs”. These are:

The ultimate in biological weapons… ethnically targeted weapons-biological weapons that selectively attack members of a certain race or races but, like the Death Angel in the Book of Exodus, ignore members of the attacker’s race” (p250).

This might sound more like dystopian science fiction than it does science, but Sarich and Miele cite evidence that some regimes have indeed attempted to develop such weapons.

Perhaps predicably, the regimes in question are the ‘usual suspects’, those perennial pariah states of liberal democratic western modernity, each of whom were/are, nevertheless, very much western states, which is, of course, the very reason for their pariah status, since, for this reason, they are held to relatively higher standards than are other African and Middle Eastern polities – namely apartheid-era South Africa and Israel.

The evidence the authors cite goes beyond mere sensationalist rumours and media reports.

Thus, they report that one scientist who been had employed in a chemical and biological warfare plant in South Africa testified before the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission that he had indeed led a research team tasked with developing a “a ‘pigmentation weapon’ that would ‘target only black people’ and that could be spread through beer, maize, or even vaccinations’” (p252).

Meanwhile, according to media reports and government leaks cited by the authors, Israel has taken up the gauntlet of developing a ‘race bomb’, building on the research begun by its former ally South Africa (p252).

Unfortunately, however, (or perhaps fortunately, especially for the Palestinians) Sarich and Miele report that, as compared to developing a ‘race bomb’ for use in apartheid-era South Africa:

Developing a weapon that would target Arabs but spare Jews would be much harder because the two groups are exceedingly alike genetically” (p253).[74]

Indeed, this problem is not restricted to the Middle East. On the contrary, Sarich and Miele report, listing almost every ethnic conflict that had recently been in the headlines at the time they authored their book:

The same would hold for the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians in the former Yugoslavia; the Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants in Northern Ireland; North and South Korea; and Pakistan and India” (p254)

This is, of course, because warring ethnic groups tend to be neighbours, often with competing claims to the same territory; yet, for the same reason, they also often share common origins, as well as the inevitable history of mating, miscegenation and intermarriage that invariably occurs wherever different groups come into contact with one another, howsoever discouraged and illicit such relationships may be.

Thus, paradoxically, warring ethnic groups are almost always genetically quite closely related to one another.

The only exceptions to this general rule are in places there has been recent large-scale movements of populations from distant regions of the globe, but the various populations have yet to interbreed with one another for a sufficient period as to dilute their genetic differences (e.g. blacks and whites in the USA or South Africa).

Thus, Sarich and Miele identify only Sudan in Northeast Africa as, at the time they were writing, a “likely prospect for this risk” (namely, the development of a ‘race bomb’), as at this time war was then raging between what they describe as “racially mixed Islamic north and the black African Christian and traditional-religion south” (p255).

Yet, here, even assuming that the genetic differences between the two then-warring groups were indeed sufficiently substantial as to make such a weapon a theoretical possibility, it is highly doubtful that either side would have the technological wherewithal, capacity, resources and expertise to develop such a weapon.

After all, Israel is a wealthy country with a highly developed high-tech economy with an advanced armaments industry and is a world leader in scientific and technology research, not to mention receiving billions of dollars in military aid annually from the USA alone.

South Africa was also regarded as a developed economy during the heyday of apartheid when this research was supposedly conducted, though it is today usually classed as ‘developing[75]

Sudan, on the other hand, is a technologically backward Third World economy. The prospect of either side in the conflict developing a novel form of biological weapon is therefore exceedingly remote.

A similar objection applies to the authors’ suggestion that, even in multiracial America, supposedly comparatively “immune to attack from race bombs from an outside source” on account of its “large racially diverse population”, there may still be a degree of threat from “terrorist groups within our country” (p255).

Thus, it is true that there may well be terrorist groups in the USA that do indeed harbour genocidal intent. Indeed, black nationalist groups like the Nation of Islam and black Israelites have indeed engaged in openly genocidal mass murders of white Americans, while white nationalist groups, though poitically very marginal, have also been linked to terror attacks and racially motivated murders, albeit isolated, sporadic and on a very small scale, at least in recent decades.

However, it is extremely unlikely that these marginal extremists, whose membership is largely drawn from most uneducated and deprived strata of society, would have the technical knowledge and resources to build a ‘race bomb’ of the sort envisaged by Sarich and Miele, especially since such weapons remain only a theoretical possibility and are not known to have been successfully developed anywhere in the world, even in South Africa and Israel.

At any rate, even among relatively genetically distinct and unmixed populations, any ‘race bomb’ would, Sarich and Miele rightly report, inevitably lack “pinpoint accuracy” given the only very minimal genetic differentiation observed among human races, a key point that they discussed at length earlier in their book (p253).

Therefore, Sarich and Miele conclude:

“[The only] extremists crazy enough to attempt to use such weapons would be [those extremists] crazy enough to view large numbers of dead among their own nation, race or ethnic group as ‘acceptable losses’ in some unholy holy war to save their own group would risk employing such a device” (p353-4).

Unfortunately, some “extremists” are indeed just that “crazy” and extreme, and these “extremists” include not only terrorist groups, but also sometimes governments as well.

Indeed, every major war in recent history has, by very definition, involved the main combatant regimes being all too willing to accept “large numbers of dead among their own nation, race, or ethnic group as ‘acceptable losses’” – otherwise, of course, they would be unlikely to qualify as ‘major’ wars.

Thus, Sarich and Miele conclude:

Even if race bombs do not have the pinpoint accuracy desired, they have the potential to do great harm to people of all races and ethnic groups” (p253).

Political Implications?

Aside from their somewhat sensationalist discussion of the prospect for ‘race bombs’, Sarich and Miele, in their final chapter, also discuss perhaps more realistic scenarios of how an understanding (or failure to understand) the nature and biology of race differences might affect the future of race relations in America, the west and beyond.

In particular, they identify three possible future ‘scenarios’, namely:

  1. Meritocracy;
  2. Affirmative Action, Race Norming and Quotas’; and
  3. Resegregation.

A fourth possibility that they do not discuss is freedom of association, as championed by libertarians.

Under this principle, which largely prevailed in the USA prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act (and in the UK prior to the 1968 Race Relations Act), any private individual or corporation (but not the government) would be free to discriminate against any person or group he or she wished on any grounds whatsoever, howsoever racist or downright irrational.

Arguably, such a system would, in practice, result in something very close to meritocracy, since any employer that discriminated irrationally against a certain demographic would be outcompeted and hence driven to out of business by competing employers that instead chose the best candidates for the job, or even preferentially employed members of the group disfavoured by other employers precisely because, since some other employers refused to hire them, the latter would be willing to work for lower wages, hence cutting costs and thereby enabling them to undercut and thereby outcompete their more prejudiced competitors.

In practice, however, some degree of discrimination would likely remain, especially in the service industry, not least because, not just employers, but consumers themselves might discriminate against service providers of certain demographics.[76]

The authors, for their part, deplore the effects of affirmative action in higher education.

Relying on Sarich’s own direct personal experience as a professor at the University of California at Berkley, where affirmative action was openly practiced from 1984 until 1996, at which time it was, at least in theory,[77] discontinued after an amendment to the California state constitution prohibiting the practice in public education, government employment and contracting, they report that it resulted in:

An Apartheid-like situation – two student bodies separated by race/ethnicity and performance who wound up, in the main, in different courses, pursued different majors, and had minimal social interactions but maximum resentment” (p245)

Thus, they conclude:

It is, frankly, difficult to imagine policies that could have been more deliberately crafted or better calculated to exacerbate racial and ethnic tensions, discourage individual performance among all groups, and contribute to the decay of a magnificent educational institution” (p245)

The tone adopted here suggests that the authors also very much disapprove of the third possible scenario that they discuss, namely resegregation.

However, they also very much acknowledge that this process is already occurring in modern America, and also seem pessimistic regarding the chances of halting or reversing it.

Despite or perhaps because of government-imposed quotas, society becomes increasingly polarized along racial lines… America increasingly resegregates itself. This trend can already be seen in housing, enrollment in private schools, racial composition of public schools, and political affiliation” (p246).

On the other hand, their own preference seems to be very much for what they call ‘meritocracy’.[78]

After all, they report:

Society… cannot level up-only down-and any such leveling is necessarily at the expense of individual freedom and, ultimately, the total level of accomplishment” (p246).

However, they acknowledge that a return to meritocracy, or at least the abolition of race preferences, would not be without its problems, not least of which is the inevitable degree of resentment of the part of those groups which perceive themselves as losing out in competition with other better performing groups.

Thus, they conclude:

When we assess group representations with respect to the high-visibility pluses (e.g., high-paying jobs) and minuses (e.g., criminality) in any society, it is virtually guaranteed that they are not going to be equal-and that the differences will not be trivial” (p246)

On the other hand, race relations were not especially benign even in modern ‘affirmative action’-era America, or what we might aptly term the ‘post-post-racial America’ era, when the utopian promises of the early Obama-era went up in flames, along with much of America’s urban landscape, in the mostly peaceful BLM riots which claimed at least nineteen lives and caused property damage estimated in the billions of dollars in 2020 alone.

Could things really get any worse were racial preferences abolished altogether? Are the urban ghetto black underclass really likely to riot because fewer upper-middle-class blacks are given places at Harvard that they didn’t really deserve?

In mitigation of any resentments that arise as a consequence of disparities in achievement between groups, Sarich and Miele envisage that, in the future:

Increasing societal complexity, by definition, means increasing the number of groups in that society to which a given individual can belong. This process tends to mitigate exclusive group identification and the associated resentment toward other groups” (p242).

In other words, Sarich and Miele seem to be saying that, instead of identifying only with their race or ethnicity, individuals might come identify with another other aspects of their identity, in respect of which aspects of their identity their ‘own’ group would presumably perform rather better in competition with other groups.[79]

What aspects of their identity they have in mind, they do not say.

The problem with this is that, while individuals do indeed evince an in-group preference even in respect of quite trivial (or indeed wholly imaginary) differences, both historically and cross-culturally in the world today, ethnic identity has always been an especially important part of people’s identity, probably for basic biological reasons, rooted as it is in a perception of shared kinship.

In contrast, other aspects of a person’s identity (e.g. their occupation, which football team they support, their sex) tend to carry rather less emotional weight.[80]

In my view, a better approach to mitigating the resentments associated with the different average performance of different groups is instead to emphasize performance in different spheres of attainment.

After all, if it is indeed, as Sarich and Miele contend in the passage quoted above, “virtually guaranteed” that different groups have different levels of achievement in different activities, it is also “virtually guaranteed” that no group will perform either well or poorly at all these different endeavours.

Thus, blacks may indeed, on average, perform relatively poorly in academic and intellectual pursuits, at least as compared to whites and Asians. However, blacks seemingly perform much better in other spheres, not least in popular music and, as discussed above, in many athletic events.

Indeed, as discussed by blogger and journalist Steve Sailer in his fascinating essay for National Review, Great Black Hopes, African Americans actually consistently outperform whites in any number of spheres (Sailer 1996).

As amply demonstrated by Herrnstein and Murray in The Bell Curve (reviewed here), intellectual ability, as measured by IQ, indeed seems to be of particular importance in determining socioeconomic status and income in modern economically developed technologically advanced societies, such as the USA, and, in this respect, blacks perform relatively poorly.

However, popular entertainers and elite athletes, while not necessarily possessing high IQs, nevertheless enjoy enormous social and cultural prestige in modern western society, far beyond that enjoyed by lawyers, doctors, or even leading scientists, playwrights, artists and authors.

More children grow up wanting to be professional footballers or pop stars than grow up wanting to be college professors or research scientists, and, whereas everyone, howsoever estranged from popular culture like myself, could nevertheless name any number of famous pop stars, actors and athletes, many of them black, the vast majority of leading intellectuals and scientists are all but unknown to the vast majority of the general public.

Indeed, even those working in other ostensibly high-IQ fields, like law and medicine, and perhaps science and academia too, are much more likely to follow sports, and watch popular movies and TV than they are to, say, recreationally read scientific journals or even popular science books and magazines.

In other words, although it is the only example the authors give in the passage quoted above, “high-paying jobs” are far from the only example of “high-visibility pluses” in which different ethnic groups perform differently, and nor are they the most “high-visibility” of such “pluses”.

Indeed, the sort of “high-paying jobs” that Sarich and Miele likely have in mind are not even the only type of “high-paying jobs”, though they may be the most numerous such jobs, since elite athletes and entertainers, in addition to enjoying enormously high social and cultural prestige, also tend to be very well-paid.

In short, the idea that intellectual ability is the sole, or even the most important, determinant of social worth and prestige, is an affection largely restricted to those who, like Sarich and Miele, and also many of their most vocal critics like Gould, happen to work in science, academia and other spheres where intellectual ability is indeed at a premium.

Most women, in my experience, would rather be thought beautiful (or at least pretty) than intelligent; most men would rather be considered athletic, tough, strong, charismatic and manly than they would a ‘brainy nerd’ – and, when it comes to being considered tough, athletic, manly and charismatic, black males arguably perform rather better than do whites or Asians!

Mating, Miscegenation, Race Riots and Rape

Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that Sarich and Miele also discuss, and, perhaps surprisingly, caution against, another widely touted supposed panacea to racial problems, namely mass miscegenation and intermarriage.

On this view, all racial animosities will disappear in just a few generations if we all just literally fornicate them out of existence by indiscriminately reproducing with one another and hence ensuring all future generations are of mixed race and hence indistinguishable from one another.

If this were the case then, in the distant future, race problems would not exist simply because distinguishable races would not exist, and there would only be one race – the human race – and we would all presumably live happily ever after in a benign and quite literally ‘post-racial’ utopia.

In other words, racial conflict would disappear in the future because the claim of the racial egalitarians and race deniers – namely that there are no human races, but rather only one race, the human race – the very claim that Sarich and Miele have devoted their enitre book to rejecting – would ultimately come to be true.

Of course, one might question whether this outcome, even if achievable, would indeed be desirable, not least since it would presumably result in the loss, or at least dilution, of the many unique traits, and abilities of different races, including those that Sarich and Miele have discussed in previous chapters.

At any rate, given the human tendency towards assortative mating, especially with respect to traits such as race and ethnicity, any such post-racial alleged utopia would certainly be long in coming. A more likely medium-term outcome would be something akin to a pigmentocracy of the sort endemic throughout much of Latin America, where race categories are indeed more fluid and continuous, but racial differences are certainly still apparent, and still very much associated with income and status, and race problems arguably not noticeably ameliorated.

Yet Sarich and Miele themselves raise a different, and perhaps less obvious, objection to racial miscegenation as a potential cure-all and panacea for racial animosity and conflict.

Far from being the panacea to end racial animosity and conflict, Sarich and Miele contend that, at least in the short-term, miscegenation may actually exacerbate racial conflict:

Paradoxically, intermarriage, particularly of females of the majority group with males of a minority group, is the factor most likely to cause some extremist terrorist group to feel the need to launch such an attack” (p255).

Thus, they observe that:

All around the world, downwardly mobile males who perceive themselves as being deprived of wealth, status, and especially females by up-and-coming members of a different race are ticking time bombs” (p248).

Indeed, it is not just intermarriage that ignites racial animosity. Other forms of interracial sexual contact may be even more likely to provoke a violent response, especially where it is alleged, often falsely, that the sexual contact in question was coercive.

Thus, in the USA, allegations of interracial rape seem to have been the most frequent precursor to full-blown race riots. Thus, early twentieth century riots in Springfield, Illinois in 1908, in Omaha, Nebraska in 1919, in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1921 and in Rosewood, Florida in 1923 all seem to have been ignited by rumours or allegations that a white woman had been the victim of rape at the hands of a black man.

Meanwhile, Britain’s first major modern race riot, the 1958 Notting Hill riot, began with a public argument between an interracial couple, when white passers-by joined in on the side of the white woman against her black Jamaican husband (and pimp) before then turning on them both.

More recently, the 2005 Birmingham riot, which, in a dramatic reflection of the demographic transformation of Britian, did not involve white people at all, was ignited by the allegation that a black girl had been gang-raped by South Asian males.

Meanwhile, in a dramatic proof that even ‘civilized’ white western Anglo-Celts (or at least semi-civilized Scousers and Aussies) are still not above taking to the streets when they perceive their womenfolk (and their reproductive interests) as under threat, both the 2005 Cronulla riots in Sydney, Australia, and the 2023 attack on a 4-star hotel housing refugees in Kirby, Merseyside were ignited by the allegation that Middle Eastern men had been sexually harassing, or at least propositioning, local white girls.

Likewise, in Britain and beyond, the spectre of ‘Muslim grooming gangs’ sexually exploiting and pimping underage white girls in cities throughout the North of England has ignited anti-Muslim sentiment seemingly to a far greater degree than has an ongoing wave of terrorist attacks in the same country in which multiple people have been killed.

Likewise, the spectre of interracial rape also loomed large in the justifications offered on behalf of the reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan for their various atrocities, which were supposedly motivated by the perceived need to protect the ostensible virtue and honour of white women in the face of black predation.

More recently, in 2015, Dylann Roof allegedly shouted You rape our women and you’re taking over our country before opening fire on the predominantly black congregation at a church in South Carolina, killing nine people.

Why then is the spectre of interracial sexual contact, especially rape, so likely to provoke racist attacks?

For Sarich and Miele, the answer is obvious:

Viewed from the racial solidarist perspective, intermarriage is an act of race war. Every ovum that is impregnated by the sperm of a member of a different race is one less of that precious commodity to be impregnated by a member of its own race and thereby ensure its survival” (p256).

This so-called “racial solidarist perspective” also represents, of course, a crudely group-selectionist understanding of male reproductive competition – but one that, though biologically questionable at best, is, in simplified form, all but pervasive among racialists.

What applies, according to van den Berghe, to intermarriage surely applies to an even greater degree to other forms of miscegenation, such as casual sex and rape, where the father does not take responsibilty for raising any mixed-race offspring that result, and this is instead left in the hands of the mother’s own ethnic community.

Thus, as sociologist-turned-sociobiologist Pierre van den Berghe, puts it in his excellent The Ethnic Phenomenon (reviewed here), observes:

It is no accident that the most explosive aspect of interethnic relations is sexual contact across ethnic (or racial) lines” (The Ethnic Phenomenon: p75). 

Competition over reproductive access to fertile females is, after all, Darwinian conflict in its most direct and primordial form.

One is thus reminded of the claim of ‘Robert’, a character from Platform, a novel by controversial but celebrated contemporary French author Michel Houellebecq, when he asserts that: 

“What is really at stake in racial struggles… is neither economic nor cultural, it is brutal and biological: It is competition for the cunts of young women” (Platform: p82). 

_____________________

Endnotes

[1] Of course, even if race differences were restricted to “a few highly visible features” (e.g. skin colour, nose shape, body size), it may still be possible for forensic scientists to identify the race of a subject from his DNA. They would simply have to look at those portions of the genome that code for these “few highly visible features”. However, there would then be no correlation with other segments of the genome, and genetic differences between races would be restricted to the few genes coding for these “few highly visible features”.
In fact, however, there is no reason to believe that races differ to a greater degree in externally visible traits (skin colour, nose shape, hair texture, stature etc.) than they do in any other traits, be they physiological or indeed psychological. It is just the externally visible traits with which we are most familiar and which are most difficult to dismiss as illusory, or explain away as purely cultural in origin, because we see them before us everyday whenever we are confronted with a person of a different race. In contrast, other traits are less obvious and apparent, and hence easier for race deniers to deny, or, in the case of behavioural differences, dismiss as purely cultural in origin.

[2] Here, the popular notion that serial killers are almost invariably white males was probably a factor in why the police were initially searching for a white suspect in this case. This stereotype was likely also a factor in the delay in apprehending another serial killer, the so-called ‘DC sniper’, whose crimes occurred around the same time, and who was also profiled as likely being a white man.
In fact, however, unlike many other stereotypes regarding race differences in crime rates, this particular stereotype is wholly false. While it is, of course, true that serial killers are disproportionately male, they are not disproportionately white. On the contrary, in the USA, blacks are actually overrepresented by a factor of two among convicted serial killers, as they are also overrepresented among perpetrators of other forms of violent crime (Walsh 2005).
Implicated in both cases were innacurate offender profiles, which, among other errors, had labelled the likely offender as a white male. Yet psychological profiling of this type is largely, if not wholly, a pseudoscience.
Thus, one meta-analysis found that criminal profilers often did not perform better, or performed only marginally better, at predicting the characteristics of offenders than did control groups composed of non-expert laypeople (Snook et al 2007).
As Steve Sailer has pointed out, offender profiling is, ironically, most unreliable where it is also most fashionable – psychological profiles of serial killers etc., which regularly feature in movies, TV and crime literature – but very unfashionable where is it most reliable – e.g. a young black male hanging around a certain area is very likely up to no good (Sailer 2019).
The latter, of course, in involves so-called racial profiling, which is very politically unfashionable, though also represents a much more efficient and effective use of police resources than ignoring factors such as race, age and sex. Of course, it also involves, if you like, ‘age profiling’ and ‘sex profiling’ as well, but these are much less controversial, though they rely on the exact same sort of statistical generalizations, which are again indeed accurate at the aggregate statistical level, though often unfair on individuals to whom the generalizations do not apply.

[3] The one-drop rule seems to have originated as a means of maintaining the racial purity of the white race. Thus, people of only slight African ancestry were classed as black (or, in those days, as ‘Negro’) precisely in order to prevent them passing and thereby infiltrating and adulterating the white gene pool, with interracial marriage, cohabitation and sexual relations, not only socially anathema, but also often explicitly prohibited by law.
Despite this white racialist origin, today the one-drop rule continues to operate in North America. It seems to be primarily maintained by the support of two interest groups, namely, first, mixed-race Americans, especially those of middle-class background, who want to benefit from discriminatory affirmative action programmes in college admissions and employment; and, second, self-styled ‘anti-racists’, who want to maintain the largest possible coalition of non-whites against the hated and resented white oppressor group.
Of course, some white racists may also still support the ‘one-drop rule’, albeit for very different reasons, and there are endless debates on some white nationalist websites as to who precisely qualifies as ‘white (e.g. Armenians, Southern Italians, people from the Balkans and Caucascus, but certainly not Jews). However, white racists are, today, of marginal political importance, save as bogeymen and folkdevils, and hence have minimal influence on mainstream conceptions of race.

[4] An even more problematic term is the currently fashionable but detestable term people of colour, which (like its synonymous but now politically-incorrect precursor, coloured people) manages to arbitrarily group together every race except white Europeans – an obviously highly Eurocentric conception of racial identity, but one which ironically remains popular with leftists because of its perceived usefulness in fermenting a coalition of all non-white races against the demonized white oppressor group.
The term also actually makes very little sense, save in this social, political and historical context. After all, in reality, white people are just as much ‘people of colour’ as people of other races. They are just a different colour, and indeed, since many hair and eye colors are largely, if not wholly, restricted to people of white European descent, arguably whites arguably have a stronger claim to being ‘people of colour’ than do people of most other races.

[5] Famously, and rather bizarrely, race in South Africa was said to be determined, at least on a practical day-to-day basis, by the so-called pencil test, whereby a pencil was placed in a person’s hair, and, if it fell to the ground, they were deemed white, whereas if it remained in their hair, held by the kinky hair characterisitic of sub-Saharan Africans, then they were classed as black or coloured.

[6] Defining race under the Nuremberg Laws was especially problematic, since Jewish people, unlike, say, black Africans, are not obviously phenotypically distinguishable from other white Europeans, at least not in every case. Thus, the Nuremberg laws relied on paper evidence of ancestry rather than mere physical appearance, and distinguished degrees of ancestry, with mischlings of the first and second degrees having differing circumscribed political rights.

[7] Racial identity in the American South during the Jim Crow era, like in America as a whole today, was determined by the so-called one-drop rule. However, the incorporation of other ethnicities into this uniquely American biracial system was potentially problematic. Thus, in the famous case of US v Bhagat Singh Thind, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian Sikh, arguing that he was both Caucasian, according to the anthropological claification of the time, and, being of North Indian high caste origin, Aryan too, argued that he ought to eligible for naturalization as an American citizen under the overtly racially discriminatory naturalization laws then in force. He was unsuccessful. Similarly, in Ozawa v United States, a person of Japanese ancestry was deemed not to be white under the same law.
Although I am not aware of any caselaw on the topic, presumably people of Middle Eastern ancestry, or partially of Middle Eastern ancestry, or North African ancestry, would have qualified as ‘white. For example, I am not aware of any Jewish people, surely the largest such group in America at the time (albeit, in the vast majority of cases, of mixed European and Middle Eastern ancestry), being denied naturalization as citizens.
Indeed, today, such groups are still classed as ‘white’ in the US census, much to their apparent chagrin, but a new MENA category is scheduled to be added to the US census in 2030. This new category has been added at the behest of MENA people themselves, aghast at having had to identify as white in earlier censuses, and strangely all too ready to abandon their ostensible ‘white privilege.
This earlier categorization of Middle-Eastern and North African people as white suggests a rather more inclusive definition of ‘white than is applied today, with more and more groups rushing to repudiate their whiteness, possibly in order to qualify as an oppressed group and hence benefit from affirmative action and other forms of racial preference, and certainly in order to avoid the stigma of whiteness. White privilege, it seems, is not all it’s cracked up to be.

[8] One of the main criticisms of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, rushed through Parliament in the UK amid a media-led moral panic over canine attacks on children, was the difficulty of distinguishing, or drawing the line between one breed and another. Obviously, similar problems emerge in determining the race of humans.
Indeed, the problems may even be greater, since the morphological differences (and also seemingly the genetic differences: see above) between human races are much smaller in magnitude than those between some dog breeds.
On the other hand, however, the problems may be even greater for identifying dog breeds, because, except for a few pedigreed purebreds, most domestic dogs are mixed-breed ‘mongrels to some degree. In contrast, excepting a few recently formed hybrid populations (such as African-Americans and Cape Coloureds), and clinal populations at the boundaries of the continental races (such as populations from the Horn of Africa), most people around the world are of monoracial ancestry, largely because, until recent migrations facilitated by advances in transport technology (ships, aeroplanes etc.), people of different races rarely came into contact with one another, and, where they did, interracial relationships often tended to be stigmatized, if not strictly prohibited (though this certainly completely didn’t stop them happening).
In addition, whereas human races were formed deep in prehistory, most dog breeds (excepting a few so-called ‘basal breeds’) seem to be of surprisingly recent origin.

[9] For example, when asked to identify the parent of a child from a range of pictures, children match the pictured children with a parent of the same race, rather than those of the same body-size/body-type or wearing similar clothing. Similarly, when asked to match pictures of children with the pictures of the adults whom they will grow up to become, children again match the pictures by race, not clothing or body-build (Hirschfeld 1996).

[10] In the notes for the previous chapter, they do, as I have already discussed, cite the work of Lawrence Hirschfeld as authority for the claim that even young children recognize the hereditary and immutable nature of race differences. It may be that Sarich and Miele have his studies in mind when they write of  evidence for “a species-wide module in the human brain that predisposes us to sort the members of our species into groups based on appearance”.
However, as I understand it, Hirschfeld doesn’t actually argue that his postulated group classification necessarily sorts individuals into groups “based on appearance [emphasis added]” as such. Rather, he sees is as a module designed to classify people into ‘human kinds’, but not necessarily by race. It could also, as I understand it, apply to kinship groups and ethnicities.
Somewhat analogously, anthropologist Francisco Gil-White argues that we have a tendency to group individuals into different ethnicities as a by-product of a postulated ‘species-recognition module’. In other words, we mistakenly classify members of different ethnicities as members of different species (i.e. what some social scientists have referred to as pseudo-speciation) because different ethnicities resemble different species in so far as, just as species breed true, so membership of a given ethnicity is passed down in families, and, just as members of different species cannot interbreed, so individuals are generally encouraged to mate endogamously, i.e., within their own group (Gil-White 2001).
Although Gil-White’s argument is applied to ethnic groups in general, it is perhaps especially applicable to racial groups, since the latter have a further feature in common with different species, namely individuals of different races actually look different in terms of inherited physiological characters (e.g. skin colour, facial morphology, hair texture, stature), as, of course, do different species.
Races are indeed ‘incipient species’, and, until as recently as the early twentieth century, biologists and anthropologists seriously debated the question as to whether the different human races did indeed constitute different species.
For example, Darwin himself gave serious and respectful consideration to this matter in his chapter ‘On the Races of Men’ in The Descent of Man before ultimately concluding that the different races were better described as subspecies.
More recently, John R Baker also gave a fascinating and balanced account of the evidence bearing on this question in his excellent book Race, which I have reviewed here (see this section of my review in particular).

[11] On the other hand, in his paper, ‘An integrated evolutionary perspective on ethnicity’, controversial evolutionary psychologist Kevin Macdonald disagrees with this conclusion, citing personal communication from geneticist and anthropologist Henry Harpending for the argument that:

Long distance migrations have easily occurred on foot and over several generations, bringing people who look different for genetic reasons into contact with each other. Examples include the Bantu in South Africa living close to the Khoisans, or the pygmies living close to non-pygmies. The various groups in Rwanda and Burundi look quite different and came into contact with each other on foot. Harpending notes that it is ‘very likely’ that such encounters between peoples who look different for genetic reasons have been common for the last 40,000 years of human history; the view that humans were mostly sessile and living at a static carrying capacity is contradicted by history and by archaeology. Harpending points instead to ‘starbursts of population expansion.’ For example, the Inuits settled in the arctic and exterminated the Dorsets within a few hundred years; the Bantu expansion into central and southern Africa happened in a millennium or less, prior to which Africa was mostly the yellow (i.e., Khoisan) continent, not the black continent. Other examples include the Han expansion in China, the Numic expansion in northern Africa [correction: actually in the Great Basin region of North America], the Zulu expansion in southern Africa during the last few centuries, and the present day expansion of the Yanomamo in South America. There has also been a long history of invasions of Europe from the east. ‘In the starburst world people would have had plenty of contact with very different looking people’” (Macdonald 2001: p70).

[12] A commenter on an earlier version of this article, Daniel, suggested that that our tendency to group individuals by race could represent a by-product of a postulated facial recognition faculty, which some evidence suggests is a domain-specific module or adaptation, localized in a specific area of the brain, the fusiform gyrus or fusiform facial area, injury or damage to which area sometimes results in an inability or recognize faces (or prosopagnosia). Thus, he writes:

Any two human faces are about as similar in appearance as any two bricks. But humans are far more sensitive to differences in human faces than we are to differences in bricks. The evolutionary psychologist would infer that being very good at distinguishing faces mattered more to our ancestors’ survival than being very good at distinguishing bricks. Therefore we probably have a face-recognition module in our brains.

On this view, race differences, while they may be real, are not so obvious, or rather would not be so obvious were we not so highly attuned to recognizing minor differences in facial morphology in order to identify individuals.
This idea strikes me as very plausible. Certainly, when we think of racial differences in physical appearance, we tend to think of facial characteristics (e.g. differences in the shapes of noses, lips, eyes etc.).
However, this probably also reflects, in part, the fact that, at least in western societies, in ordinary day-to-day life, other parts of our bodies are usually hidden from view by clothing. Thus, at least according to physiologist John Baker in his excellent book, Race (which I have reviewed here) racial groups, especially the Khoisan of Southern Africa, also differ considerably in their external genitalia, but these differences would generally be hidden from view by clothing.
Baker also claims that races differ substantially in the shape of their skulls, claiming:

Even a little child, without any instruction whatever, could instantly separate the skulls of [Eskimos] from those of [Lapps]” (Race: p427).

Of course, facial differences may partly be a reflection of differences in skull shape, but I doubt an ability to distinguish skulls would reflect a byproduct of a facial recognition module.
Likewise, Pygmies differ from other Africans primarily, not in facial morphology, but in stature.
Further evidence that we tend to focus on differences in facial morphology only because we are especially attuned to such differences, whether by practice or innate biology, is provided by the finding that artificial intelligence systems are able to identify the race of a subject through internal x-rays of their bodily organs, even where humans, including trained medical specialists, are incapable of detecting any difference (Gichoya et al 2022).
This also, incidentally, contradicts the popular notion that race differences are largely restricted to a few superficial external characteristics, such as skin-colour, hair texture and facial morphology. In reality, there is no reason in principal to expect that race differences in internal bodily traits (e.g. brain-size) would be of any lesser magnitude than those in external traits. It is simply that the latter are more readily observable on a day-to-day basis, and hence more difficult to deny.

[13] If racism was not a European invention, racism may nevertheless have become particularly virulent and extreme among Europeans in the nineteenth century. One interesting argument is that it was, paradoxically, Europeans’ very commitment to such notions as universal rights and human equality that led them to develop and embrace an ideology of racial supremacism and inequality. This is because, whereas other people’s and civilizations simply took such institutions as slavery for granted, seeing them as entirely unproblematic, Europeans, due to their ostensible commitment to such lofty notions as universal rights and equality, felt a constant need to justify slavery to themselves. Thus, theories of racial supremacy were invented as just such a justification. As sociologist-turned-sociobiologist Pierre van den Berghe explains in his excellent The Ethnic Phenomenon: (which I have reviewed here):

In hundreds of societies where slavery existed over several thousand years, slavery was taken for granted and required no apology… The virulent form of racism that developed in much of the European colonial and slave world was in significant part born[e] out of a desire to justify slavery. If it was immoral to enslave people, but at the same time it was vastly profitable to do so, then a simple solution to the dilemma presented itself: slavery became acceptable if slaves could somehow be defined as somewhat less than fully human” (The Ethnic Phenomenon: reviewed here: p115).

[14] Although the differences portrayed undoubtedly reflected real racial differences between populations, the stereotyped depictions also suggest that they were also used as a means of identifying and distinguishing between different peoples and ethnicities and hence may have been exaggerated as a kind of marker for race or nationality. Thus, classicist Mary Lefkowitz writes:

Wall paintings are not photographs, and to some extent the different colors may have been chosen as a means of marking nationality, like uniforms in a football game. The Egyptians depicted themselves with a russet color, Asiatics in a paler yellow. Southern peoples were darker, either chocolate brown or black” (History Lesson: A Race Odyssey: p39).

In reality, since North African Caucasoids and sub-Saharan Africans were in continual contact down the Nile Valley, this also almost certainly means that they interbred with one another, diluting and blurring the phenotypic differences between them. In short, if the Egyptians weren’t wholly Caucasoid, so also the Nubians weren’t entirely black.

[15] Other historical works referring to what seems to be the same stele translate the word that Sarich and Miele render as ‘Negro’ instead as ‘Nubian’, and this is probably the more accurate translation. The specific Egyptian word used seems to have been a variant of ‘nHsy’ or ‘Nehesy’, the precise meaning and connotations of which word is apparently a matter of some controversy.
Incidentally, whether the Nubians are indeed accurately to be described as ‘Negro’ is perhaps debatable. Although certainly depicted by the Egyptians as dark in complexion and also sometimes as having other Negroid features, as indeed they surely did in comparison to the Egyptians themselves, they were also in long and continued contact with the Egyptians themselves, with whom they surely interbred. It is therefore likely that they represented, like contemporary populations from the Horn of Africa, a clinal population, as did the Egyptians themselves, since, just as Nubians were in continual contact with Egyptians, so Egyptians were also in continual contact with the Nubians, which would inevitably have resulted in some gene flow between their respective populations.
Whereas the vast Sahara Desert represented, as Sarich and Miele themselves discuss, a formidable barrier to population movement and gene flow and hence a clear boundary between what were once called the Negroid and Caucasoid races, population movement, and hence gene flow, up and down the Nile valley in Northeast Africa was much more fluid and continuous.

[16] Actually, the English word ‘caste’, deriving from the Portuguese ‘casta’, conflates two distinct but related concepts in India, namely, on the one hand, ‘Varna’ and, on the other, ‘Jāti’. Whereas the former term, ‘Varna’, refers to the four hierarchically organized classes (plus the ‘untouchables’ or ‘dalits’, who strictly are considered so degraded and inferior that they do not qualify as a caste and exist outside the caste system), and may even be of ancient origin among the proto-Indo-Europeans, the latter term, ‘Jāti’, refers to the many thousands of theoretically strictly endogamous occupational groups within the separate Varna.
As for Sarich and Miele’s claim that Varna are “as old as Indian history itself”, history is usually distinguished from prehistory by the invention of writing. By this criterion, Indian history might be argued to begin with the ancient Indus Valley Civilization. However, their script has yet to be deciphered, and it is not clear whether it qualifies as a fully developed writing system.
By this measure, the Indian caste system is not “as old as Indian history itself”, since the caste system is thought to have been imposed by Aryan invaders, who arrived in the subcontinent only after the Indus Valley Civilization had fallen into decline, and may indeed have been instrumental in bringing to an end the remnants of this civilization. However, arguably, at this time, India was not really ‘India’, since the word ‘India’ is of Sanskrit origin and therefore arrived only with the Aryan invaders themselves.

[17] There is also some suggestion that the vanarāḥ, who feature in the Ramayana and are usually depicted as monkey-like creatures, may originally have been conceived as a racist depiction of relatively the darker-complexioned and wider-nosed, Southern and indigenous Indians whom the Aryan invaders encountered in the course of their conquests, as may also be true of the demonic rākṣasāḥ and asurāḥ, including the demon king Ravana, who is described as ruling from his island fortress of Laṅkā, which is generally equated with the island of Sri Lanka, located about 35 miles off the coast of South India.
These ideas are, it almost goes without saying, extremely politically incorrect and unpopular in modern India, especially in South India, since South Indians today, despite different religious traditions, are not noticeably less devout Hindus than North Indians, and hence rever the Ramayana as a sacred text to a similar degree.

[18] One is tempted to reject this claim – namely that the use of the Sanskrit word for colour’ to designate ‘caste has no connection to differences in skin colour as between the Indo-Aryan conquerors and the Dravidian populations whom they most likely subjugated – as mere politically correct apologetics. Indeed, despite its overwhelming support in linguistics, archaeology, genetics, and even in the histories provided in the ancient Hindu texts themselves, the very concept of an Indo-European conquest is very politically incorrect in modern India. The notion is perceived as redolent of the very worst excesses of both caste snobbery and the sort of notions of white racial superiority that were popular among Europeans during the colonial period. Moreover, as we have seen, to this day, castes differ not only genetically, and in a manner consistent with the Aryan invasion theory, but also in skin tone (Jazwal 1979Mishra 2017).
On the other hand, however, some evidence suggests that the association of caste with colour actually predates the Indo-Aryan conquest of the Indian subcontinent and originates with the original proto-Indo-Europeans. Thus, in his recent book The Horse, the Wheel and Language, David W Anthony, discussing Georges Dumézil’s trifunctional hypothesis, reports that: 

“The most famous definition of the basic divisions within Indo-European society was the tripartite scheme of Georges Dumézil, who suggested there was a fundamental three-part division between the ritual specialist or priest, the warrior and the ordinary herder/cultivator. Colors may have been associated with these three roles: white for the priest, red for the warrior and black or blue for the herder/cultivator” (The Horse, the Wheel and Language: p92).

It is from this three-fold social hierarchy that the four-varna Indian caste system may have derived. Similarly, leading Indo-Europeanist JP Mallory observes that “both ancient India and Iran expressed the concept of caste with the word for colour” and that:

Indo-IranianHittiteCeltic and Latin ritual all assign white to priests and red to the warrior. The third function would appear to have been marked by a darker colour such as black or blue” (In Search of the Indo-Europeans: p133).

This would all tend to suggest that the association of caste (or at least occupation) with colour long predates the Indo-Aryan conquest of the subcontinent and hence cannot be a reference to differences in skin colour as between the Aryan invaders and indigenous Dravidians.
On the other hand, however, it is not at all clear that the Indian caste system has anything to do with, let alone derives from, the three social groups that supposedly existed among the ancient proto-Indo-Europeans. On the contrary, the Indian caste system is usually considered as originating much later, after the Indo-European arrival in South Asia, and then only in embryonic form. Certainly, there is little evidence that the proto-Indo-European social struture was anything like as rigid as the later Indian caste system.
However, it is interesting to note that that, even under the trifunctional hypothesis, a relatively lighter colour (white) is considered as having been assigned to the priestly group, and a darker colour to the lower-status agricultural workers, paralleling the probable differences in skin tone as between Aryan conquerors and the indigenous Dravidians whom they encountered and likely subjugated.  

[19] Neither is Hartung nor his essay mentioned in the rather cursory endnote accompanying this chapter (p265-6). This reflects a recurrent problem throughout the enitre book. Thus, in the preceding chapter, ‘Race and History’, many passages appear in quotation marks, but it is not always entirely clear where the quotations are taken from, as the book’s endnotes are rudimentary, just giving a list of sources for each chapter as a whole, without always linking these sources to the specific passages quoted in the text. Unfortunately, this sort of thing is a recurrent problem in popular science books, and, in Sarich and Miele‘s defence, I suspect that it is the publishers and editors, rather than the authors, who are usually to blame.

[20] Thus, Hartung writes:

The [Jewish] Sages were quite explicit about their view that non-Jews were not to be considered fully human. Whether referring to ‘gentiles’, ‘idolaters’, or ‘heathens’, the biblical passage which reads ‘And ye my flock, the flock of my pasture, are men, and I am your God’ (Ezekiel 34:31; KJV) is augmented to read… ‘And ye my flock, the flock of my pastures, are men; only ye are designated ‘men’ (Baba Mezia 114b)” (Hartung 1995).

Similarly, Hartung quotes the Talmud as teaching:

In the case of heathens; are they not in the category of adam? – No, it is written: And ye my sheep, the sheep of my pasture, are adam (man). Ye are called adam but heathens are not called adam. [Footnote reads:]… The term adam does not denote ‘man’ but Israelite. The term adam is used to denote man made in the image of God and heathens by their idolatry and idolatrous conduct mar this divine image and forfeit the designation adam” (Kerithoth 6b)

However, as Sarich and Miele, and indeed Hartung, are at pains to emphasize, lest they otherwise be attacked as antisemitic, the tendency to view one’s own ethnic group as the only ‘true’ humans on earth, is by no means exclusive to the ancient Hebrews, but rather is a recurrent view among many cultures across the world. As I have written previously:

Ethnocentrism is a pan-human universal. Thus, a tendency to prefer one’s own ethnic group over and above other ethnic groups is, ironically, one thing that all ethnic groups share in common

Thus, as Hartung himself writes in the very essay from which Sarich and Miele themselves quote, himself citing the work of anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon:

The Yanomamo Indians, who inhabit the headwaters of the Amazon, traditionally believe that… that they are the only fully qualified people on earth. The word Yanomamo, in fact, means man, and non-Yanomamo are viewed as a form of degenerated Yanomamo.”

Similarly, Sarich and Miele themselves write of the San Bushmen of Southern Africa:

Bushmensort all mammals into three mutually exclusive groups: ‘!c’ (the exclamation point represents the ‘clicking’ sound for which their language is well known) denotes edible animals such as warthogs and giraffes; ‘!ioma’ designates an inedible animal such as a jackal, a hyena, a black African, or a European white; the term ‘zhu’ is reserved for humans, that is, the Bushmen themselves” (p57).

[21] According to John Hartung’s analysis, Adam in the Genesis account of creation is best understood as, not the first human, but rather only the first Jew – hence the first true human (Hartung 1995). However, Christian Identity theology turns this logic on its head: Adam was not the first Jew, but rather the first white man.
As evidence, they cite the fact that the Hebrew word ‘Adam’ (אדם) seems to derive from the word for the colour red, which they, rather doubtfully, interpret as evidence for his light skin, and hence ability to blush. (A more likely interpretation for this etymology is that the colour was a reference to the red clay, or “dust of the ground”, from which man was, in the creation narrative of Genesis, originally fashioned: Genesis 2:7. Thus, the Hebrew word ‘Adam’, אדם, is also seemingly cognate with Adamah, אדמה, translated as ‘ground’ or ‘earth’, and the creation of Man from clay is a recurrent motif Near Eastern creation narratives and mythology.)
Christian Identity is itself a development from British Israelism, which claims, rather implausibly, that indigenous Britons are themselves (among the) true Israelites, representing the surviving descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel. Other races, then, are equated with the pre-Adamites, with Jews themselves, or at least Ashkenazim, classed as either Khazar-descended imposters, or sometimes more imaginatively equated with the so-called serpent seedline, descended from the biblical Cain, himself ostensibly the progeny of Eve when she (supposedly) mated with the Serpent in the Garden of Eden.
Christian identity theology is, as you may have noticed, completely bonkers – rather like, well… theology in general, and Christian theology in particular.

[22] The Old Testament passage in question, Genesis 9:22-25, recounts how Ham sees his drunken father Noah naked, and so, as a consequence, Ham’s own son Canaan is cursed by Noah. Since seeing one’s father naked hardly seems a sufficient transgression to justify the curse imposed, some biblical scholars have suggested that the original version was censored by puritanical biblical scribes offended by or attempting to cover up its original content, which, it has been suggested, may have included a castration scene or possibly a description of incestuous male rape (or even the rape of his own mother, which, it has been suggested, might explain the curse upon his son Canaan, who is, on this view, the product of this incestuous union).
In some interpretations, the curse of Ham was combined, or perhaps simply confused, with the mark of Cain, which was itself interpreted as a reference to black skin. In fact, these are entirely separate parts of the Old Testament with no obvious connection to one another, or indeed to black people.
The link between the curse of Ham and black people is, however, itself quite ancient, long predating the Atlantic slave trade, and seems to have originated in the Talmud, whose authorship, or at least compilation, is usually dated to the sixth century CE, historian Thomas Gossett reporting:

In the Talmud there are several contradictory legends concerning Ham—one that God forbade anyone to have sexual relations while on the Ark and Ham disobeyed this command. Another story is that Ham was cursed with blackness because he resented the fact that his father desired to have a fourth son. To prevent the birth of a rival heir, Ham is said to have castrated his father” (Race: The History of an Idea in America: p5).

This association may have originated because Cush, another of the sons of Ham (and an entirely different person to Canaan, his brother) was said to be the progenitor of, and to have given his name to, the Kingdom of Kush, located on the Nile valley, south of Ancient Egypt, whose inhabitants, the Kushites, who were indeed known for their dark skin colour (though were, by modern standards, probably best classified as mixed-race, or as a clinal or hybrid population, being in long standing contact with predominantly Caucasoid population of Egypt).
Alternatively, the association of Ham with black people may reflect the fact that the Hebrew word ‘ham’ (‘חָם’) has the meaning of ‘hot’, which was taken as a reference to the heat of Africa.
As you have probably gathered, none of this makes much sense. But, then again, neither does much Christian theology, or indeed much of the Old Testament (or indeed the New Testament) or theology in general, let alone most attempts to provide a moral justification for slavery consistent with Christian slave morality.
In fact, it is thought most likely that the curse of Ham was originally intended in reference to, not black people, but rather the Canaanites, since it was Canaan, not his brother Cush, against whom the curse was originally issued. This interpretation also makes much more sense in terms of the political situation in Palestine at the time this part of the Old Testament was likely authored, with the Canaanites featuring as recurrent villains and adversaries of the Israelites throughout much of the Old Testament. On this view, the so-called curse of Ham was indeed intended as a justification for oppression, but not of black people. Rather, it sought to justify the conquest of Canaan and subjugation of her people, not the later enslavement of blacks.

[23] Slavery had already been abolished throughout the British Empire even earlier in 1833, long before Darwin published The Origin of Species, so the idea of Darwinism being used to justify slavery in the British empire is a complete non-starter. (Darwin himself, to what it’s worth, was also opposed to slavery.)
Admittedly, slavery continued to be practised, however, in other, non-English speaking parts of the world, especially the non-western world, for some time thereafter. However, it is not likely that Darwin’s theory of evolution was a significant factor in the continued practice of slavery in, say, the Muslim world, since most of the Muslim world has never accepted the theory of evolution. In short, slavery was longest maintained in precisely those regions (Africa, the Middle East) where Darwinian theory, and indeed a modern scientific worldview, was least widely accepted.

[24] Montagu, who seems to have been something of a charlatan and is known to have lied in correspondence regarding his academic qualifications, had been born with the very Jewish-sounding, non-Anglo name of Israel Ehrenberg, but had adopted the hilariously pompous, faux-aristocratic name ‘Montague Francis Ashley-Montagu’ in early adulthood.

[25] Less persuasively, Sarich and Miele also suggest that the alleged lesbianism, or bisexuality, of both Margeret Mead and Ruth Benedict may similarly have influenced their similar culturally-determinist theories. This seems, to me, to be clutching at straws.
Neither Mead nor Benedict were Jewish, or in any way ethnically alien, yet arguably each had an even greater direct influence on American thinking about cultural differences than did Boas himself. Boas’s influence, in contrast, was largely indirect – namely through his students such as Montagu, Mead and Benedict. Therefore, Sarich and Miele have to point to some other respect in which Mead and Benedict were outsiders. Interestingly, Kevin Macdonald makes the same argument in Culture of Critique (endnote 61: reviewed here), and is similarly unpersuasive.
In fact, the actual evidence regarding Benedict and especially Mead’s sexuality is less than conclusive. It amounts to little more than salacious speculation. After all, in those days, if a person was homosexual, then, given prevailing attitudes and laws, they probably had every incentive to keep their private lives very much private.
Indeed, even today, speculation about people’s private lives tend to be unproductive, simply because people’s private lives tend, by their very nature, to be private.

[26] Curiously, though he is indeed widely credited as the father of American anthropology, Boas’s own influence on the field seems to have been largely indirect. His students, Mead, Benedict and Montagu, all seem to have gone on to become more famous than he was, at least among the general public, and each certainly published works that became more famous, and more widely cited, than anything authored by Boas himself.
Indeed, Boas’s own work seems to relatively little known, and little cited, even by those whom we could regard as his contemporary disciples. His success was in training students/disciples and in academic politicking rather than research.
Perhaps the only work of his that remains widely cited and known today is his work on cranial plasticity among American immigrants and their descendants, which has now been largely discredited.

[27] In the years that have passed since the publication of Sarich and Miele’s ‘Race: The Reality of Human Differences’, this conclusion, namely the out of Africa theory of human evolution, has been modified somewhat by the discovery that our early African ancestors interbred with other species (or perhaps subspecies?) of hominid, including those inhabiting Eurasia, such as Neanderthals and Denisovans, such that, today, all non-sub-Saharan African populations have some Neanderthal DNA.

[28] I think another key criterion in any definition of ‘race’, but which is omitted from most definitions, is whether the differences in “heritable featuresbreed true. In other words, whether two parents both bearing the trait in question will transmit it to their offspring. For example, among ethnically British people, since two parents, both with dark hair, may nevertheless produce a blond-haired offspring, hair colour is a trait which does not breed true. Whether a certain phenotype breeds true is, at least in part, a measure of the frequency of interbreeding with people of a different phenotype in previous generations. It may therefore change over time, with increasing levels of miscegenation and intermarriage. Therefore, this criterion may be implied by Sarich and Miele’s requirement that, in order to qualify as ‘races’, populations must be “separated geographically from other… populations”.

[29] Actually, the definition of ‘species’ is rather more complex – and less rather precise: see discussion during my review of John Baker’s Race, which discusses the matter in this section.

[30] Using colour differences as an analogy for race differences is also problematic, and potentially confusing, for another reason – namely colour is already often conflated with race. Thus, races are often referred to by their (ostensible) colours (e.g. sub-Saharan Africans as ‘black’, Europeans as white, East Asians as yellow, Hispanics and Middle-Eastern populations as brown, and Native Americans as red) and ‘colour’ is sometimes even used as a synonym (or perhaps a euphemism) for race. Perhaps as a consequence, it is often asserted, falsely, that races differ only in skin colour. Using the electromagnetic spectrum as an analogy for race differences is likely to only exacerbate this already considerable confusion.

[31] Interestingly, however, different languages in widely differing cultures tend to put the boundaries between their different colour terms in roughly the same place, suggesting an innate disposition to this effect. Attempts to teach alternative colour terms, which divide the electromagnetic spectrum in different places, to those peoples whose languages lack certain colour terms, has shown that humans learn such classifications less readily than the familiar ones recognized in other languages. Also, although different cultures and languages have different numbers of colour-terms, the colours recognized follow a distinct order, beginning with just light’ and ‘dark, followed by red (see Berlin & Kay, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution).

[32] As I have commented previously, perhaps a better analogy to illustrate the clinal nature of race differences is, not colour, but rather social class – if only because it is certain to cause cognitive dissonance and doublethink among leftist sociologists. As pioneering biosocial criminologist Anthony Walsh demands:

Is social class… a useless concept because of its cline-like tendency to merge smoothly from case to case across the distribution, or because its discrete categories are determined by researchers according to their research purposes and are definitely not ‘pure’” (Race and Crime: A Biosocial Analysis: p6).

But the same sociologists and leftist social scientists who, though typically very ignorant of biology, insist race is a ‘social construct’ with no basis in biology, nevertheless continue to employ the concept of social class, or socioeconomic status, as if it were entirely unproblematic.

[33] In addition to the mountains that mark the Tibetan-Indian border, the vast, but sparsely populated tundra and Steppe of Siberia also provides a part of the boundary between what were formerly called the Caucasoid and Mongoloid races. As Steve Sailer has observed, one can get a good idea of the boundaries between races by looking at maps of population density. Those regions that are sparsely populated today (e.g. mountain ranges, deserts, tundra and, of course, oceans) were also generally incapable of supporting large population densities in ancient times, and hence represented barriers to gene flow and racial admixture.

[34] Indeed, even some race realists might agree that terms like ‘Italian’ are indeed largely social constructions and not biologically meaningful, because Italians are not obviously physically distinguishable from the populations in neighbouring countries on the basis of biologically inherited traits, such as skin colour, nose shape or hair texture – though they do surely differ in gene frequencies, and, at the aggregate statistical level, surely in phenotypic traits too. Thus, John R Baker in his excellent ‘Race’ (reviewed here) warns against what he terms “political taxonomy”, which equates the international borders between states with meaningful divisions between racial groups (Race: p119). Thus, Baker declares:

In the study of race, no attention should be paid to the political subdivisions of the surface of the earth” (Race: p111).

Baker even offers a reductio ad absrudum of this approach, writing:

No one studying blood-groups in Australia ‘lumps’ the aborigines… with persons of European origin; clearly one would only confuse the results by so doing” (Race: p121).

Yet, actually, the international borders between states do indeed often coincide with genetic differences between populations. This is because the same geographic obstacles (e.g. mountain ranges, rivers and oceans) that are relatively impassable and hence have long represented barriers to gene flow also represent both:

  1. Language borders, and hence self-identified ‘nations’; and
  2. Militarily defensible borders.

Indeed, Italians, one of the groups cited by Diamond, and discussed by Sarich and Miele, provide a good illustration of this, because Italy has obvious natural borders, that are defensible against invaders, that represent language borders, and that long represented a barrier to gene flow, being a peninsula, surrounded on three sides by the Mediterranean Sea, and on the fourth, its only land border, by the Alps, which represent the border between Italian-speakers and speakers of French and German.

[35] Likewise, in the example cited by Sarich and Miele themselves, the absence of the sickle-cell gene was, as Sarich and Miele observe, the “ancestral human condition” shared by all early humans before some groups subsequently went on to evolve the sickle-cell gene. Therefore, that any two groups do not possess the sickle-cell gene does not show that they are any more related to one another than to any other human group, including those that have evolved sickle-cell, since all early humans initially lacked this gene.
Moreover, Diamond himself refers not to the sickle-cell gene specifically, but rather to “antimalarial genes” in general and there are several different genetic variants that likely evolved because they provide some degree of resistence to malaria, for example the alleles causing conditions thalassemia, Glucose-6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase (G6PD) Deficiency, and certain hemoglobin variants. These quite different adaptations evolved independently in different populations where malaria was common, and indeed have different levels of prevalence in different populations to this day.

[36] Writing in the early seventies, long before the sequencing of the human genome, Lewontin actually relied, not on the direct measurement of genetic differences between, and within, human populations, but rather indirect markers for genetic differences, such as blood group data. However, his findings have been broadly borne out by more recent research.

[37] However, in fact, similar points had been made soon after Lewontin’s original paper had been published (Mitton 1977; 1978).

[38] Actually, while many people profess to be surprised that, depending on precisely how measurements are made, we share about 98% of our DNA with chimpanzees, this has always struck me as, if anything, a surprisingly low figure. After all, if one takes into account all the possible ways an organism could be built, including those ways in which it could be built but never would be built, simply because, if it were, the organism in question would never survive and reproduce and hence evolve in the first place, then we are surely remarkably similar in morphology.
Just looking at our external, visible physiology, we and chimpanzees (and many other organisms besides) share four limbs, ten digits on each, two eyes, two nostrils, a mouth, all similarly positioned in relation to one another, to mention just a few of the more obvious similarities. Our internal anatomy is also very similar, as are many aspects of our basic cellular structure.

[39] This is analogous to the so-called other-race effect in face recognition, whereby people prove much less proficient at distinguishing individuals of races other than their own than they are at distinguishing members of their own race, especially if they have had little previous contact with members of other races. This effect, of course, is the basis for the familiar stereotype whereby it is said ‘they [i.e. members of another race] all look alike to me’.

[40] If any skeptical readers doubt this claim, it might be worth observing that Ostrander is not only a leading researcher in canine genetics, but also seemingly has no especial ideological or politically-correct axe to grind in relation to this topic. Although she is obviously alluding to Lewontin’s famous finding in the passage quoted, she does not mention race at all, referring only to variation among “human populations”, not human races. Indeed, human races are not mentioned at all in the article. Rather, it is exclusively concerned with genetic differences among dog breeds and their relationship to morphological differences (Ostrander 2007).

[41] In addition to problems with defining and measuring the intelligence of different dogs, and dog breeds, there are also, as already discussed above, difficulties in defining, and identifying different dog breeds, problems that, despite the greater morphological and genetic differentiation among dog breeds as compared to human races, are probably greater than for human races, since, except for a few pedigreed purebreds, most dogs are mixed-breed ‘mongrels . These problems, in turn, create problems when it comes to measuing the intelligence of different breeds, since one can hardly assess the intelligence of a given breed without first defining and identifying which dogs qualify as members of that breed.

[42] In fact, however, whereas the research reported upon in the mass media does indeed seems to have relied exclusively on the reported ability of different breds to learn and obey new commands with minimal instruction, Stanley Coren himself, in the the original work upon which this ranking of dog breeds by intelligence was based, namely his book, The Intelligence of Dogs, seems to have employed a broader, more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of canine intelligence, Thus, Coren is reported as distinguishing three types of canine intelligence, namely:

  1. Instinctive intelligence’, namely the dog’s ability to perform the task it was bred for (e.g, herding in the case of a herding dog);
  2. Adaptive intelligence’, namely the ability and speed with which a dog can learn new skills, and solve novel problems, for itself; and
  3. Obedience intelligence’, namely the ability and speed with which a dog can be trained and learn to follow commands from a human master.

[43] There is no obvious reason to believe that domestic animals are, on average, any more intelligent than their wild ancestors. On the contrary, the process of domestication is actually generally associated with a reduction in brain volume, itself a correlate of intelligence, perhaps are part of a process of becoming more neotenized that tends to accompany domestication.
It is, of course, true that domestic animals, and domestic dogs in particular, evince impressive abilities to communicate with humans (e.g. understanding commands such as pointing, and even intonation of voice) (see The Genius of Dogs). However, this reflects only a specific form of social intelligence rather than general intelligence.
In contrast, in respect of the forms of intelligence required among wild animals, domestic animals would surely fare much worse than their wild ancestors. Indeed, many domestic animals have been so modified by human selection that they are quite incapable of surviving in the wild without humans.

[44] Actually, criminality, or at least criminal convictions, is indeed inversely correlated with intelligence, with incarcerated offenders, having average IQs of around 90 – i.e. considerably below the average within the population at large, but not so low in ability as to qualify as having a general learning disabiltiy. In other words, incarerated offenders tend to be smart enough to have the wherewithal to commit a criminal act in the first place, but not smart enough to realize it probably isn’t a good idea in the long-term.
However, with data mostly comes from incarcerated offenders, who are usually given a battery of psychological tests on admission into the prison system, including a test of cognitive ability. It is possible, indeed perhaps probable, that those criminals who evade detection, and hence never come to the attention of the authorities, have relatively higher IQs, since it may be their higher inteligence that enables them to evade detection.
At any rate, the association between crime and low IQ is not generally thought to result from a failure to understand the nature of the law in the first place. Rather, it probably reflects that intelligent people are more likely to recognise that, in the long-term, regularly committing serious crimes is probably a bad idea, because, sooner or later, you are likely to be caught, with attendant punishment and damage to your reputation and future earning capacity.
Indeed, the association between IQ and crime might partially explain the high crime rates observed among African-Americans, since the average IQ of incarcerated offenders is similar to that found among African Americans as a whole.

[45] One is reminded here of Eysenck’s description of the basenji breed as “natural psychopaths” quoted above (The IQ Argument: p170).

[46] For example, differences in skin colour reflect, at least in part, differences in exposure to the sun at different latitudes; while differences in bodily size and stature, and relative bodily proportions, also seem to reflect adaptation to different climates, as do differences in nose shape. Just as lighter complexion facilitates the synthesis of vitamin D in latitudes where exposure to the sun is at a minimum, and dark skin protects from the potentially harmful effects of excessive exposure to the sun’s rays in tropical climates, so a long, thin nose is thought to allow the warming and moisturizing of air before it enters the lungs in cold and dry climates, and body-size and proportions affect the proportion of the body that is directly exposed to the elements (i.e. the ratio of surface-area to volume), a potentially critical factor in temperature regulation, with tall, thin bodies favoured in warm climates, and short stocky frames, with flat faces and shorter arms and legs favoured in colder regions.

[47] For example, as explained in the preceding endnote, the Bergmann and Allen rules neatly explain many observed differences in bodily stature and body form between different races as an adaptation to climate, while Thomson’s nose rule similarly explains differences in nose shape. Likewise, while researchers such as Peter Frost and  Jared Diamond have argued that differences in skin tone cannot entirely be accounted for by climatic factors, nevertheless such factors have clearly played some role in the evolution of differences in skin tone.
This, of course, explains why, although the correlation is far from perfect, there is indeed an association between latitude and skin colour. This also explains why Australia, with a generally much warmer climate than, and situated at a lower latitude than, the British Isles, but in recent times, at least until very recently, populated primarily by people of predominantly Anglo-Celtic ancestry, has the highest levels of melanoma in the world; and also why, conversely, dark-skinned Afro-Caribbeans and South Asians resident in the UK, experience higher rates of rickets, due to lacking sufficient sunlight for vitamin D synthesis.

[48] Alternatively, Carleton Coon attributed the large protruding buttocks of many Khoisan women to maintaining a storehouse of nutrients that can be drawn upon to meet the caloric demands of pregnancy (Racial Adaptations: p105). This is probably why women of all races have naturally greater fat deposits than do men. However, in the arid desert environment to which San people are today largely confined, namely the Kalahari Desert, where food is often hard to come by, maintaining sufficient calories to successfully gestate an offspring may be especially challenging, which might be posited as the ultimate evolutionary factor that led to the evolution of steatopygia among female Khoisan.
Of course, these two competing hypotheses for the evolution of the large buttocks of Khoisan women – namely, on the one hand, sexual selection or mate choice and, on the other, the caloric demands of pregnancy in a desert environment – are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, if large fat reserves are indeed necessary to successfully gestate an offspring, then it would pay for males to be maximally attracted to females with sufficiently large fat reserves to do just this, so as to maximize their own reproductive success.

[49] This argument, I might note, does not strike me as entirely convincing. After all, it could be argued that strong body odour would actually be more noticeable in hot climates, simply because, in hot climates, people tend to sweat more, and therefore that dry earwax, which is associated with reduced body odour, should actually be more prevalent among people whose ancestors evolved in hot climates, the precise opposite of what is found.
On the other hand, Edward Dutton, discussing population differences in earwax type, suggests that “pungent ear wax (and scent in general) is a means of sexual advertisement” (J Philippe Rushton: A Life History Perspective: p86). This would suggest that a relatively stronger body odour (and hence the wet earwax with which strong body odour is associated) would have been positively selected for (rather than against) by mate choice and sexual selection, the precise opposite of what Wade assumes.

[50] In their defence, I suspect Sarich and Miele are guilty, not so much of biological ignorance, as of sloppy writing. After all, Vincent Sarich was an eminent and pioneering biological anthropolgist, geneticist and biochemist, hardly likely to be guilty of such an error. What I suspect they really meant to say was, not that there was no evidence of sexual selection operating in humans, but rather that there was no conclusive evidence that sexual selection was responsible for racial differences among humans, as also conclude later in their book (p236).

[51] Of all racial groups in the USA, only among Pacific Islanders display even higher rates of obesity that that observed among black women, though here it is both sexes who are prone to obesity.

[52] Just to clarify and prevent any confusion, higher proportions of white men than white women are indeed overweight or obese, in both the USA and UK. However, this does not mean that men are fatter than women. Women of all races, including white people, have higher body-fat levels than men, whereas men have higher levels of musculature.
Obesity is measured by body mass index (BMI), which is calculated by reference to a person’s weight and height, not their body fat percentage. Thus, some professional bodybuilders, for example, have quite high BMIs, and hence qualify as overweight by this criteria, despite having very low body fat levels. This is one limitation to using BMI to assess whether a person is overweight.
Indeed, criteria for qualifying as ‘obese’ or ‘overweight’ is different for men and women, partly to take account of this natural difference in body-fat percentages, as well as other natural sex differences in body size, shape and composition.

[53] Women of all races have, on average, higher levels of body fat than do men of the same race. This, it is suggested, is to provide the necessary storehouse of nutrients to successfully gestate a foetus for nine months. Possibly men may be attracted to women with fat deposits because this shows that they have sufficient excess energy stored so as to successfully carry a pregnancy to term and nurse the resulting offspring. This may also explain the evolution of breasts among human females, since other mammals develop breasts only during pregnancy and, save during pregnancy and lactation, human breasts are, unlike those of other mammals, composed predominantly of fat, not milk.

[54] Interestingly, in a further case agreeing with what Steve Sailer calls ‘Rushton’s Rule of Three, whereby blacks and Asians respectively cluster at opposite ends of a racial spectrum for various traits, there is some evidence that, if black males prefer a somewhat heavier body-build in prospective mates than do white males, then Asian males prefer a somewhat thinner body-build (e.g. Swami et al 2006).

[55] Whereas most black Africans have long arms and legs, African Pygmies may represent an exception. In addition, of course, to a much smaller body-size overall, one undergraduate textbook in biological anthropology reports that they “have long torsos but relatively small appendages” relative to their overall body-size (Human Variation (Fifth Edition): p185). However, leading mid-twentieth century American phsysical anthropologist Carleton Coon reports that, being “they have relatively short legs, particularly short in the thigh, and long arms, particularly long in the forearm” (The Living Races of Man: p106).

[56] Probably this is to be attributed to better superior health, nutrition and living-standards in North America, and even in the Caribbean, as compared to sub-Saharan Africa. Better training facilities, which only richer countries (and people) have sufficient resources to invest in, is also likely a factor. However, one interesting paper by William Aiken proposes that high rates of mortality during the ‘Middle Passage’ (i.e. the transport of slaves across the Atlantic) during the slave trade selected for increased levels of androgens (e.g. testosterone) among the survivors, which he suggests may explain both the superior athletic performance and the much higher rates of prostate cancer among both African-Americans and Afro-Caribbeans as compared to whites (Aitken 2011). Of course, high androgen levels might also plasusibly explain the high rates of violent crime among African-Americans and Afro-Caribbean populations.

[57] Of course, the degree of relationship, if any, between athletic and sporting ability and intellectual ability probably depends on the sport being performed. Most obviously, if chess is to be classified as a ‘sport’, then one would obviously expect chess ability to have a greater correlation with intelligence than, say, arm-wrestling. Intelligence is likely of particular importance in sports where strategy and tactics assume great importance.
Relatedly, in team sports, there are likely differences in the importance of intelligence among players playing in different positions. For example, in the sport discussed by Sarich and Miele themselves, namely American football, it is suggested that the position of quarterback requires greater intelligence than other positions, because the quarterback is responsible for making tactical decisions on the field. This, it is controversially suggested, is why African-Americans, though overrepresented in the NFL as a whole, are relatively less likely to play as quarterbacks.
Similarly, being a successful coach or manager also likely requires greater intelligence.
Interestingly with regard to the question of sports and IQ, though regarded as one of the greatest ever heavyweights, Muhammad Ali scored as low as 78 on an IQ test (i.e. in the low normal range) when tested in an army entrance exam, and was initially turned down for military service in Vietnam as a consequence, though it is sometimes claimed this was because of dyslexia rather than low general intelligence, meaning that the written test he was given underestimated his true intelligence level. Interestingly, another celebrated heavyweight, Mike Tyson, is also said to have scored similarly in the low normal range when tested as a child.
Another reason that IQ might be predictive of ability in some sports is that IQ is known to correlate to reaction times when it comes to performing elementary cognitive tasks. This seems analogous to the need to react quickly and accurately to, say, the speed and trajectory of a ball in order to strike or catch it, as is required in many sports. I have discussed the paradox of African-Americans being overrepresented in elite sports, but having slower average reaction times, here.

[58] People diagnosed with high functioning autism, and Asperger’s syndrome in particular, do indeed have a higher average IQ than the population at large. However, this is only because among the very criteria for diagnosing these conditions is that the person in question must have an IQ which is not so low as to indicate a mental disability. Otherwise, they would not qualify as ‘high functioning’. This removes those with especially low IQs and hence leaves the remaining sample with an above average IQ compared to the population at large.

[59] Rushton’s implication is that this advantage, namely narrower hips, applies to both sexes, and certainly blacks seem to predominate among medal winners in track events in international athletics at least as much in men’s as in women’s athletic events. This suggests, presumably, that, although it is obviously only women who give birth and hence were required to have wider hips in order to birth larger brained infants, nevertheless male hip width was also increased among larger-brained races as a byproduct of selection for increased hip size among females.
If black women do indeed have narrower hips than white women, and black babies smaller brains, then one might predict that black women might have difficulty birthing offspring fathered by white males, as the mixed-race infants would have brains somewhat larger than that of infants of wholly Negroid ancestry. Thus, Russian racialist Vladimir Avdeyev asserts:

“The form of the skull of a child is directly connected with the characteristics of the structure of the mother’s pelvis—they should correspond to each other in the goal of eliminating death in childbirth. The mixing of the races unavoidably leads to this, because the structure of the pelvis of a mother of a different race does not correspond to the shape of the head of [the] mixed infant; that leads to complications during childbirth” (Raciology: p157).

More specifically, Avdeyev claims:

American Indian women… often die in childbirth from pregnancies with a child of mixed blood from a white father, whereas pure-blooded children within them are easily born. Many Indian women know well the dangers [associated with] a pregnancy from a white man, and therefore, they prefer a timely elimination of the consequence of cross-breeding by means of fetal expulsion, in avoidance of it” (Raciology: p157-8).

However, I find little evidence to support this claim from delivery room data. Rather, it seems to be racial differences in overall body size that are associated with birth complications.
Thus, East Asian women have relatively greater difficulties birthing offspring fathered by white males (specifically, a greater rate of c-sections or caesarean births) as compared to those fathered by Asian males (Nystrom et al 2008). However, according to Rushton himself, East Asians have brain sizes as large or larger than those of Europeans.
However, East Asians also have substantially smaller average body-size as compared to Europeans. It seems, then, that Asian women, with their own smaller frames, simply have greater difficulty birthing relatively larger framed mixed-race, half-white offspring.
Avdeyev also claims that, save in the case of mixed-race offspring fathered by larger-brained races, birth is a generally less physically traumatic experience among women from racial groups with smaller average brain-size, just as it is among nonhuman species, who also, of course, have smaller brains than humans. Thus, he writes:

“Women of lower races endure births very easily, sometimes even without any pain, and only in highly rare cases do they die from childbirth” (Raciology: p157).

Again, delivery room data provides little support for his claim. In fact, data from the USA actually seems to indicate a somewhat higher rate of caesarean delivery among African-American women as compared to American whites (Braveman et al 1995Edmonds et al 2013Getahun et al 2009Valdes 2020; Okwandu et al 2021).

[60] Another disadvantage that may result from higher levels of testosterone in black men is the much higher incidence of prostate cancer observed among black men resident in the west, since prostate cancer seems to be to be associated with testosterone levels. In addition, the higher apparent susceptibility of blacks to prostate cancer, and perhaps to violent crime and certain forms of athletic ability, may reflect, not just levels of testosterone, but how susceptible different races are to androgens such as testosterone, which, in turn, reflects their level and type of androgen receptors (see Nelson and Witte 2002).

[61] In writing about politically incorrect and controversial topic, the authors are guilty of some rather sloppy errors, which, given the importance of the subject to their book and its political sensitivity, is difficult to excuse. For example they claim that:

Asians have a slightly higher average IQ than do whites” (p196).

Actually, however, this advantage is restricted to East Asians. It doesn’t extend even to Southeast Asians (e.g. Thais, Filipinos, Indonesians), who are also classed as ‘Mongoloid’ in traditional racial taxonomies, let alone to South Asians and West Asians, who, though usually classed as Caucasoid in early twentieth century racial taxonomies, also qualify as Asian in the sense that they trace their ancestry to the Asian continent, and are considered ‘Asian’ in British-English usage, if not American-English.

[62] Issues like this are not really a problem in assessing the intelligence of different human populations. It is true that some groups do perform relatively better on certain types of test item. For example, East Asians score relatively higher in spatio-visual intelligence than in verbal ability, whereas Ashkenazi Jews show the opposite pattern. Meanwhile, African Americans score relatively higher in rote memory than general intelligence and Australian Aboriginals score relatively higher in spatial memory. However, this is not a major factor when assessing the relative intelligence of different human races because most differences in intelligence between humans, whether between individuals or between groups, is captured by the g factor.

[63] Actually, whether the difference in brain size between the sexes disappears after controlling for differences in body-size depends on how one controls for body-size. Simply dividing brain-size by brain size, or vice versa, makes the difference virtually entirely disappear. In fact, it actually gives a slight advantage in brain size to women.
However, Ankney convincingly argues that this is an inappropriate way to control for differences in body-size between the sexes because, among both males and females, as individuals increase in body-size, the brain comes to take up a relatively smaller portion of overall body-size. Yet despite this, individuals of greater stature have, on average, somewhat higher IQs. Ankney therefore proposes that, the correct way to control for body-size, is to compare the average brain size of men and women of the same body-size. Doing so, reveals that men have larger brains relative to bodies even after controlling for body-size in this way (Ankney 1992).
However, zoologist Dolph Schluter points out that, if you do the opposite – i.e. instead of comparing the brain-sizes of men and women of equivalent body-size, compare the body-size of men and women with the same brain-size – then one finds a difference in the opposite direction. In other words, among men and women with the same brain-size as one another, women tend to have smaller bodies (Schluter 1992).
Thus, Schluter reports:

White men are more than 10 cm taller on average than white women with the same brain weight” (Schluter 1992).

This paradoxical finding is, he argues, a consequence of a statistical effect known as regression to the mean, whereby extreme outliers tend to regress to the mean in subsequent measurements, and the more extreme the outlier, the greater the degree of regression. Thus, an extremely tall woman, as tall as the average man, will not usually have a brain quite as unusually large as her exceptionally large body-size; whereas a very short man, as short as the average women, will not usually have a brain quite as unusually small as his unusually small body-size.
Ultimately, I am led to agree with infamous fraud, charlatan and bully Stephen Jay Gould that, given the differences in both body-shape and composition as between males and females (e.g. men have much greater muscle mass; women greater levels of fat), it is simply impossible to know how to adequately control for body-size as between the sexes.
Thus, Gould writes:

“[Even] men and women of the same height do not share the same body build. Weight is even worse than height, because most of its variation reflects nutrition rather than intrinsic size—and fat vs. skinny exerts little influence upon the brain” (The Mismeasure of Man: p106).

The only conclusion that can be reached definitively is that, after controlling for body-size, any remaining differences in brain-size as between the sexes are small in magniude.

[64] Another less widely supported, but similarly politically correct explanation for the correlation between latitude and brain is that these differences reflect a visual adaptation to differing levels of ambient light in different regions of the globe. On this view, popularions further from the equator, where there is less ambient light evolved both larger eyes, so as to see better, and also larger brains, to better process this visual input (Pearce & Dunbar 2011).

[65] Lynn himself has altered his figure slightly in accordance with the availability of new datasets. In the original 2006 edition of his book, Race Differences in Intelligence he gives a slightly lower figure of 67, before changing this back up to 71 in the 2015 edition of the same book, while, in The Intelligence of Nations, published in 2019, Lynn and his co-author report the average IQ in sub-Saharan Africans as 69.

[66] Thus, other researchers have, predictably, considered Lynn’s estimates as altogether too low and provided what they claim are more realistic figures. The disagreement focuses primarily on which samples are to be regarded as representative, with Lynn disregarding studies using what he regards as elite and unrepresentative.
For example, Wicherts et al, in their systematic review of the available literature, give an average IQ of 82 for sub-Saharan Africans as a whole (Wicherts et al 2010). However, even this much higher figure is very low compared to IQs in Europe and North America, with an IQ of 100, and also considerably lower than the average IQ of blacks in the US, which are around 85.
This difference has been attributed both to environmental factors, and to the fact that African-Americans, and Afro-Caribbeans, have substantial white European admixture (though this latter explanation fails to explain why African-Americans are outcompeted academically and economically by recent unmixed immigrants from Africa).
At any rate, even assuming that the differences are purely environmental in origin, an average IQ of 80 for sub-Saharan Africans, as reported by Wicherts et al (2010), seems oddly high when it is compared to the average IQ of 85 reported for African Americans and 100 for whites, since the difference in environmental conditions as between blacks and whites in America is surely far less substantial than that between African Americans and black Africans resident in sub-Saharan Africa.
As Noah Carl writes:

It really doesn’t make sense for them to argue that the average IQ in Sub-Saharan Africa is as high as 80. We already have abundant evidence that black Americans score about 85 on IQ tests, as compared to 100 for whites. If the average IQ in Sub-Saharan Africa is 80, this would mean the massive difference in environment between Sub-Saharan Africa and the US reduces IQ by only 5 points, yet the comparatively small difference in environment between black and white Americans somehow reduces it by 15 points” (Carl 2025)

[67] In diagnosing mental disability, other factors besides raw IQ will also be looked at, such as adaptive behaviour (i.e. the ability to perform simple day-to-day activities, such as basic hygiene). Thus, Mackintosh reports:

In practice, for a long time now an IQ score alone has not been a sufficient criterion [for the diagnosis of mental disability]… Many years ago the American Association on Mental Deficiency defined mental retardation as ‘significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior’” (IQ and Human Intelligence: p356).

[68] Of course, merely interacting with someone is not an especially accurate way of estimating their level of intelligence, unless perhaps one is discussing especially intellectually demanding subjects, which tends to be rare in everyday conversation. Moreover, Philippe Rushton proposes that we are led to overestimate the intelligence of black people when interacting with them because their low intelligence is often masked by a characteristic personality profile – “outgoing, talkative, sociable, warm, and friendly”, with high levels of social competence and extraversion – which personality profile itself likely reflects an innate racial endowment (Rushton 2004).

[69] Ironically, although he was later to have a reptutation among some leftist sociologists as an incorrigible racist who used science (or rather what they invariably refer to as ‘pseudo-science’) to justify the existing racial order, Jensen was in fact first moved to study differences in IQ between races, and the issue of test bias, precisely because he initially assumed that, due to the different behaviours of low-IQ blacks and whites, IQ tests might indeed be underestimating the intelligence of black Americans and somehow biased against them (The g Factor: p367). However, his careful, systematic and quantitative research ultimately showed this assumption to be false (see Jensen, Bias in Mental Testing).

[70] Mike Tyson, another celebrated African American world heavyweight champion, was also recorded as having a similarly low IQ when tested in school. With regard to Ali’s test results, the conditions for admittance to the military were later lowered to increase recruitment levels, in a programme which became popularly known as Macnamara’s morons, after the US Defense Secretary responsible for implementing it. This is why Muhammad Ali, despite initially failing the IQ test that was a prerequisite for enlistment, was indeed later called up, and famously refused to serve.
Incidentally, the project to lower standards in order to increase recruitment levels is generally regarded as having been an unmitigated disaster and was later abandoned. Today, the US military no longer uses IQ testing to screen recruits, instead employing the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, though this, like virtually all tests of mental ability and aptitude, nevertheless taps into the general factor of intelligence, and hence is, in part, an indirect measure of IQ.

[71] My own analogy, in the text above, is between race and species. Thus, I write that it would be no more meaningful to describe a sub-Saharan with an IQ below 70 as mentally handicapped than it would be to describe a chimpanzee as mentally handicapped simply because they are much less intelligent than the average human. This analogy – between race/subspecies and species – is, in some respects more apposite, since races or subspecies do indeed represent ‘incipient species’ and the first stage of speciation (i.e. the evolution of populations into distinct species). On the other hand, however, it is not only very provocative, but also very misleading in a very different way, simply because the differences between chimpanzees and humans in intelligence and many other traits are obviously far greater than those between the different races of mankind, who all represent, of course, a single species.

[72] Richard Lynn, in Race Differences in Intelligence (which I have reviewed here), attributes a very low IQ of just 62 to New Guineans, and an even lower IQ, supposedly just 52 to San Bushmen. However, he draws this conclusion on the basis of very limited evidence, especially in respect of the San (see discussion here). However, in relation to New Guineans, it is worth noting that Lynn provides much more data (mostly from the Australian school system) in respect of the IQs of the Aboriginal population of Australia, to whom New Guineans are closely related, and to whom he ascribes a similarly low average IQ (as discussed here).

[73] I am not sure what evidence Harpending relies on to infer a high average IQ in South India. Richard Lynn, in his book, Race Differences in Intelligence (which I have reviewed here) reports a quite low IQ of 84 for Indians in general, whom he groups, perhaps problematically, with Middle Eastern and North African peoples as, supposedly, a single race.
However, a more recent study, also authored by Lynn in collaboration with an Indian researcher, does indeed report higher average intelligence in South India than in North India, and also in regions with a coastline (Lynn & Yadav 2015).
This, of course, rather contradicts Lynn’s own ‘cold winters theory’, which posits that the demands of surviving in a relatively colder climate during winter selects for higher intelligence, as North India is situated at a higher latitude than South India, and, especially in some mountainous regions of the North East, has relatively colder winters.
Incidentally, it also seemingly contradicts any theory of what we might term ‘Aryan supremacy’, since it is the lighter complexioned North Indians who have greater levels of Indo-European ancestry and speak Indo-Aryan languages, whereas the darker complexioned South Indians speak Dravidian languages and have much less Indo-European ancestry, and hence North Indians, together with related groups such as Iranians, not German Nazis, who have the strongest claim to being ‘Aryans.
South India also today enjoys much higher levels of economic development than does North India.

[74] Ashkenazi Jews, of course, have substantial European ancestry, as a consequence of long sojourn as diaspora minority in Europe. The same is true to some extent of Sephardi Jews, who trace their ancestry to the Jewish populations formerly resident in and then expelled from Spain and Portugal. However, although these are the groups whom westerners usually have in mind when thinking of Jews, the majority of Jews in Israel today are actually the Mizrahim, who remained resident in the Middle East, if not in Palestine, and hence have little or no European admixture. 

[75] The fact that apartheid-era South Africa, despite international sanctions, was nevertheless a ‘developed economy’, but South Africa today is classed as a ‘developed economy’, of course, ironically suggests that, if South Africa is indeed ‘developing’, it is doing so in altogether the wrong direction.

[76] For example, to take one obvious example, customers at strip clubs and brothels generally have a preference for younger, more physically attractive, service providers of a particular sex, and also often show a racial preference too.
The topic of the economics of discrimination was famously analysed by pioneering Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker.

[77] Some degree of discrimination in favour of black and perhaps other underrerpresented demographics likely continued under the guise of a newly-adopted ‘holistic’ approach to university admission. This involved deemphasizing quantifiable factors such as grades and SAT scores, which meant that any discrimination against certain demographics (i.e. whites, Asians and males) is less easily measured and hence proven in a court of law.

[78] It also ought to be noted in this context that the very term meritocracy is itself problematic, raising, as it does, the question of how we define ‘merit’, let alone how we objectively measure and quantify it for the purposes of determining, for example, how is appointed to a particular job or has his application for a particular university accepted or rejected. Determining the ‘merit’ of a given person is necessarily a ‘value judgement’ and hence inherently a subjective assessment.
Of course, in practice, when people talk of meritocracy in this sense, they usually mean that employers should select the ‘best person for the job’, not ‘merit’ in some abstract cosmic moral sense. In this sense, it is not really ‘merit’ that determines whether a person obtains a given job, but rather their market value in the job market (i.e. the extent to which they possess the marketable skills etc.).
Yet this is not the same thing as ‘merit’. After all, a Premiership footballer may command a far higher salary in the marketplace than, say, a construction worker. However, this is not to say that they are necessarily more meritorious outside the football pitch. It is the players merits as a footballer that are in issue not their merits as people or moral agents. Construction workers surely contribute more to a functioning society.
Market value, unlike merit, is something that can be measured and quantified, and indeed the market itself, left to its own devices, automatically arrives at just such a valuation.
However, although a free market system may approximate meritocracy, albeit only in this narrow sense, a perfect meritocracy is unattainable, even in this narrow sense. After all, employers sometimes make the wrong decision. Moreover, humans have a natural tendency towards nepotism (i.e. promoting their own close kin at the expense of non-kin) and perhaps to ethnocentrism and racism too.
Thus, as I have written about previously, equal opportunity is, in practice, almost as utopian and unachievable as equality of outcome (i.e. communism).

[79] Sarich and Miele even cite models of where the salience of racial group identity is supposedly overcome, or at least mitigated:

The examples of basic military training, sports teams, music groups, and successful businesses show that [animosities between racial, religious and ethnic groups] can indeed be overcome. But doing so requires in a sense creating a new identity by to some extent stripping away the old. Eventually, the individual is able to identify with several different groups” (p242).

Yet, even under these conditions, racial animosities are not entirely absent. For example, despite basic training, racial incidents are hardly unknown in the US military.
Moreover, the cooperation between ethnicities often ends with the cessation of the group activity in question. In other words, as soon as they finish playing for their multiracial sports team, the team members will go back to being racist again, to everyone other than their teammates. After all, racists are not known for their intellectual consistency and racism and hypocrisy tend to go together.
For example, members of different races may work, and fight, together in relative harmony and cohesion in the military. However, military veterans are not noticeably any less racist than non-veterans. If anything, in my limited experience, the pattern seems to be quite the opposite. Indeed, many leaders in the ‘white power’ movement in the USA (e.g. Louis Beam, Glenn Miller) were military veterans, and a recent book, Bring the War Home by Kethleen Belew, even argues that it was the experience of defeat in Vietnam, and, in particular, the return of many patriotic but disillusioned veterans, that birthed the modern ‘white power’ movement.
Similarly, John Allen Muhammad, the ‘DC sniper’, a serial killer and member of the black supremacist Nation of Islam cult, who was responsible for killing ten people, all of them white, and whose accomplice admitted that his killings were motivated by a desire to kill white people, was likewise a military veteran.

[80] Despite the efforts of successive generations of feminists to stir up animosity between the sexes, even sex is not an especially salient aspect of a person’s identity, at least when it comes to group competition. After all, unlike in respect of race and ethnicity, almost everyone has relatives and loved ones of both biological sexes, usually in roughly equal number, and the two sexes are driven into one another’s arms by the biological imperative of the sex drive. As Henry Kissinger is, perhaps apocryphally, quoted as observing:

No one will win the battle of the sexes. There is too much fraternizing with the enemy”.

Indeed, the very notion of a ‘battle of the sexes’ is a misleading metaphor, since people compete, in reproductive terms, primarily against people of the same sex as themselves in competition for mates.

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Desmond Morris’s ‘The Naked Ape’: A Pre-Sociobiological Work of Human Ethology 

Desmond Morris, Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal (New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, 1967)

First published in 1967, ‘The Naked Ape’, a popular science classic authored by the already famous British zoologist and TV presenter Desmond Morris, belongs to the pre-sociobiological tradition of human ethology

In the most general sense, the approach adopted by the human ethologists, who included, not only Morris, but also playwright Robert Ardrey, anthropologists Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox and the brilliant Nobel-prize winning ethologist, naturalist, zoologist, pioneering evolutionary epistemologist and part-time Nazi sympathizer Konrad Lorenz, was correct. 

They sought to study the human species from the perspective of zoology. In other words, they sought to adopt the disinterested perspective, and detachment, of, as Edward O Wilson was later to put it, “zoologists from another planet” (Sociobiology: The New Synthesis: p547). 

Thus, Morris proposed cultivating: 

An attitude of humility that is becoming to proper scientific investigation… by deliberately and rather coyly approaching the human being as if he were another species, a strange form of life on the dissecting table” (p14-5).  

In short, Morris proposed to study humans just as a zoologist would any other species of non-human animal. 

Such an approach was an obvious affront to anthropocentric notions of human exceptionalism – and also a direct challenge to the rather less scientific approach of most sociologists, psychologists, social and cultural anthropologists and other such ‘professional damned fools’, who, at that time, almost all studied human behavior in isolation from, and largely ignorance of, biology, zoology, evolutionary theory and the scientific study of the behavior of all animals other than humans. 

As a result, such books inevitably attracted controversy and criticism. Such criticism, however, invariably missed the point. 

The real problem was not that the ethologists sought to study human behavior in just the same way a zoologist would study the behavior of any nonhuman animal, but rather that the study of the behavior of nonhuman animals itself remained, at this time, very much in its infancy. 

Thus, the field of animal behavior was to be revolutionized just a decade or so after the publication of ‘The Naked Ape’ by the approach that came to be known as, first, sociobiology, now more often as behavioral ecology, or, when applied to humans, evolutionary psychology

These approaches, based on what became known as selfish gene theory, sought to understand behavior in terms of fitness maximization – in other words, on the basis of the recognition that organisms have evolved to engage in behaviors which tended to maximize their reproductive success in ancestral environments. 

Mathematical models, often drawn from economics and game theory, were increasingly employed. In short, behavioral biology was becoming a mature science. 

In contrast, the earlier ethological tradition was, even at its best, very much a soft science. 

Indeed, much such work, for example Jane Goodall’s rightly-celebrated studies of the chimpanzees of Gombe, was almost pre-scientific in its approach, involving observation, recording and description of behaviors, but rarely the actual testing or falsification of hypotheses. 

Such research was obviously important. Indeed, Goodall’s was positively groundbreaking. 

After all, the observation of the behavior or an organism is almost a prerequisite for the framing of hypotheses about the behavior of that organism, since hypotheses are, in practice, rarely generated in an informational vacuum from pure abstract theory. 

However, such research was hardly characteristic of a mature and rigorous science. 

When hypotheses regarding the evolutionary significance of behavior patterns were formulated by early ethologists, this was done on a rather casual ad hoc basis, involving a kind of ‘armchair adaptationism’, which could perhaps legitimately be dismissed as the spinning of, in Stephen Jay Gould’s famous phrase, just so stories

Thus, a crude group selectionism went largely unchallenged. Yet, as George C Williams was to show, and Richard Dawkins later to forcefully reiterate in The Selfish Gene (reviewed here), behaviours are unlikely to evolve that benefit the group or species if they involve a cost to the inclusive fitness or reproductive success of the individual engaging in the behavior. 

Robert Wright picks out a good example of this crude group selectionism from ‘The Naked Ape’ itself, quoting Morris’s claim that, over the course of human evolution: 

To begin with, the males had to be sure that their females were going to be faithful to them when they left them alone to go hunting. So the females had to develop a pairing tendency” (p64). 

To anyone schooled in the rudiments of Dawkinsian selfish gene theory, the fallacy should be obvious. But, just in case we didn’t spot it, Wright has picked it out for us: 

Stop right there. It was in the reproductive interests of the males for the females to develop a tendency toward fidelity? So natural selection obliged the males by making the necessary changes in the females? Morris never got around to explaining how, exactly, natural selection would perform this generous feat” (The Moral Animal: p56). 

In reality, couples have a conflict of interest here, and the onus is clearly on the male to evolve some mechanism of mate-guarding, though a female might conceivably evolve some way to advertise her fidelity if, by so doing, she secured increased male parental investment and provisioning, hence increasing her own reproductive success.[1]

In short, mating is Machiavellian. A more realistic view of human sexuality, rooted in selfish gene theory, is provided by Donald Symons in his seminal The Evolution of Human Sexuality (which I have reviewed here). 

Unsuccessful Societies? 

The problems with ‘The Naked Ape’ begin in the very first chapter, where Morris announces, rather oddly, that, in studying the human animal, he is largely uninterested in the behavior of contemporary foraging groups or other so-called ‘primitive’ peoples. Thus, he bemoans: 

The earlier anthropologists rushed off to all kinds of unlikely corners of the world… scattering to remote cultural backwaters so atypical and unsuccessful that they are nearly extinct. They then returned with startling facts about the bizarre mating customs, strange kinship systems, or weird ritual procedures of these tribes, and used this material as though it were of central importance to the behaviour of our species as a whole. The work done by these investigators… did not tell us was anything about the typical behaviour of typical naked apes. This can only be done by examining the common behaviour patterns that are shared by all the ordinary, successful members of the major cultures-the mainstream specimens who together represent the vast majority. Biologically, this is the only sound approach” (p10).[2]

Thus, today, political correctness has wholly banished the word ‘primitive’ from the anthropological lexicon. It is, modern anthropologists insist, demeaning and pejorative.  

Indeed, post-Boasian cultural anthropologists in America typically reject the very notion that some societies are more advanced than others, championing instead a radical cultural relativism and insisting we have much to learn from the lifestyle and traditions of hunter-gatherers, foragers, savage cannibals and other such ‘indigenous peoples’. 

Morris also rejects the term ‘primitive’ as a useful descriptor for hunter-gatherer and other technologically-backward peoples, but for diametrically opposite reasons. 

Thus, for Morris, to describe foraging groups as ‘primitive’ is to rather give them altogether too much credit: 

The simple tribal groups that are living today are not primitive, they are stultified. Truly primitive tribes have not existed for thousands of years. The naked ape is essentially an exploratory species and any society that has failed to advance has in some sense failed, ‘gone wrong’. Something has happened to it to hold it back, something that is working against the natural tendencies of the species to explore and investigate the world around it” (p10). 

Instead, Morris proposes to focus on contemporary western societies, declaring: 

North America… is biologically a very large and successful culture and can, without undue fear of distortion, be taken as representative of the modern naked ape” (p51). 

It is indeed true that, with the diffusion of American media and consumer goods, American culture is fast becoming ubiquitous. However, this is a very recent development in historical terms, let alone on the evolutionary timescale of most interest to biologists. 

Indeed, viewed historically and cross-culturally, it is we westerners who are the odd, aberrant ones. 

Thus, we even have been termed, in a memorable backcronym, WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic), and hence quite aberrant, not only in terms of our lifestyle and prosperity, but also in terms of our psychology and modes of thinking

Moreover, while extant foraging groups, and other pre-modern peoples that have survived into modern times, may now indeed now be tottering on the brink of extinction, this, again, is a very recent development in evolutionary terms. 

Indeed, far from being aberrant, this was the lifestyle adopted by all humans throughout most of the time we have existed as a species, including during the period when most of our unique physical and behavioural adaptations evolved

In short, although we may inhabit western cities today, this is not the environment where we evolved, nor that to which our brains and bodies are primarily adapted.[3]

Therefore, given that it represents the lifestyle of our ancestors during the period when most of our behavioral and bodily adaptations evolved, primitive peoples must necessarily have a special place in any evolutionary theory of human behaviour.[4]

Indeed, Morris himself admits as much himself just a few pages later, where he acknowledges that: 

The fundamental patterns of behavior laid down in our early days as hunting apes still shine through all our affairs, no matter how lofty they may be” (p40). 

Indeed, a major theme of ‘The Naked Ape’ is the extent to which the behaviour even of wealthy white westerners is nevertheless fundamentally shaped and dictated by the patterns of foraging set out in our ancient hunter-gatherer past. 

This, of course, anticipates the concept of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (or EEA) in modern evolutionary psychology

Thus, Morris suggests that the pattern of men going out to work to financially provision wives and mothers who stay home with dependent offspring reflects the ancient role of men as hunters provisioning their wives and children: 

“Behind the façade of modern city life there is the same old naked ape. Only the names have been changed: for ‘hunting’ read ‘working’, for ‘hunting grounds’ read ‘place of business’, for ‘home base’ read ‘house’, for ‘pair-bond’ read ‘marriage’, for ‘mate’ read ‘wife’, and so on” (p84).[5]

In short, while we must explain the behaviors of contemporary westerners, no less than those of primitive foragers, in the light of Darwinian evolution, nevertheless all such behaviors must be explained ultimately in terms of adaptations that evolved over previous generations under very different conditions. 

Indeed, in the sequel to ‘The Naked Ape’, Morris further focuses on this very point, arguing that modern cities, in particular, are unnatural environments for humans, rejecting the then-familiar description of cities as concrete jungles on the grounds that, whereas jungles are the “natural habitat” of animals, modern cities are very much an unnatural habitat for humans. 

Instead, he argues, the better analogy for modern cities is a Human Zoo

The comparison we must make is not between the city dweller and the wild animal but between the city dweller and the captive animal. The city dweller is no longer living in conditions natural for his species. Trapped, not by a zoo collector, but by his own brainy brilliance, he has set himself up in a huge restless menagerie where he is in constant danger of cracking under the strain” (The Human Zoo: pvii). 

Nakedness 

Morris adopts what he calls a zoological approach. Thus, unlike modern evolutionary psychologists, he focuses as much on explaining our physiology and morphology as on our behavior and psychology. Indeed, it is in explaining the peculiarities of human anatomy that Morris is at his best.[6]

This begins, appropriately enough, with the trait that gives him his preferred name for our species, and also furnishes his book with its title – namely our apparent nakedness or hairlessness. 

Having justified calling us ‘The Naked Ape’ on zoological grounds, namely on the ground that this is the first thing the naturalist would notice upon observing our species, Morris then comes close to contradicting himself, admitting that, given the densely concentrated hairs on our heads (as well as the much less densely packed hairs which also cover much of the remainder of our bodies), we actually have more hairs on our bodies than do our closest relatives, chimpanzees.[7]

However, Morris summarily dispatches this objection: 

It is like saying that because a blind man has a pair of eyes, he is not blind. Functionally, we are stark naked and our skin is fully exposed” (p42). 

Why then are we so strangely hairless? Neoteny, Morris proposes, provides part of the answer. 

This refers to the tendency of humans to retain into maturity traits that are, in other primates, restricted to juveniles, nakedness among them. 

Neoteny is a major theme in Morris’s book – and indeed in human evolution

Besides our hairlessness, other human anatomical features that have been explained either partly or wholly in terms of neoteny, whether by Morris or by other evolutionists, include our brain size, growth patterns, inventiveness, upright posture, spinal curvature, smaller jaws and teeth, forward facing vaginas, lack of a penis bone, the length of our limbs and the retention of the hymen into sexual maturity (see below). Indeed, many of these traits are explicitly discussed by Morris himself as resulting from neoteny

However, while neoteny may supply the means by which our relative hairlessness evolved, it is not a sufficient explanation for why this development occurred, because, as Morris points out: 

The process of neoteny is one of the differential retarding of developmental processes” (p43). 

In other words, humans are neotenous in respect of only some of our characters, not all of them. After all, an ape that remained infantile in all respects would never evolve, for the simple reason that it would never reach sexual maturity and hence remain unable to reproduce. 

Instead, only certain specific juvenile or infantile traits are retained into adulthood, and the question then becomes why these specific traits were the ones chosen by natural selection to be retained. 

Thus, Morris concludes: 

It is hardly likely… that an infantile trait as potentially dangerous as nakedness was going to be allowed to persist simply because other changes were slowing down unless it had some special value to the new species” (p43). 

As to what this “special value” (i.e. selective advantage) might have been, Morris considers, in turn, various candidates.  

One theory considered by Morris theory relates to our susceptibility to insect parasites.  

Because humans, unlike many other primates, return to a home base to sleep most nights, we are, Morris reports, afflicted with fleas as well as lice (p28-9). Yet fur, Morris observes, is a good breeding ground for such parasites (p38-9). 

Perhaps, then, Morris imagines, we might have evolved hairlessness in order to minimize the problems posed by such parasites. 

However, Morris rejects this as an adequate explanation, since, he observes: 

Few other den dwelling mammals… have taken this step” (p43). 

An alternative explanation implicates sexual selection in the evolution of human hairlessness.  

Substantial sex differences in hairiness, as well as the retention of pubic hairs around the genitalia, suggests that sexual selection may indeed have played a role in the evolution of our relative hairlessness as compared to other mammals.

Interestingly, this was Darwin’s own proposed explanation for the loss of body hair during the course of our evolution, the latter writing in The Descent of Man that:

No one supposes that the nakedness of the skin is any direct advantage to man; his body therefore cannot have been divested of hair through natural selection” (The Descent of Man).

Darwin instead proposes:

Since in all parts of the world women are less hairy than men… we may reasonably suspect that this character has been gained through sexual selection” (The Descent of Man).

Morris, however, rejects this explanation on the grounds that: 

The loss of bodily insulation would be a high price to pay for a sexy appearance alone” (p46). 

But other species often often pay a high price for sexually selected bodily adornments. For example, the peacock sports a huge, brightly coloured and elaborate tail which is costly to grow and maintain, impedes his mobility and is conspicuous to predators. Yet this elaborate tail is thought to have evolved through sexual selection or female choice,

Indeed, according to Amotz Zahavi’s handicap principle, it is precisely the high cost of such sexually-selected adornments that made them reliable fitness indicators and hence attractive to potential mates, because only a highly ‘fit’, and hence attractive, male can afford to grow such a costly, inconvenient and otherwise useless appendage. 

Morris also gives unusually respectful consideration to the highly-controversial aquatic ape theory as an explanation for human hairlessness. 

Thus, if humans did indeed pass through an aquatic, or at least amphibious, stage during our evolution, then, Morris agrees, this may indeed explain our hairlessness, since it is indeed true that other aquatic or semiaquatic mammals, such as whales, dolphins and seals, also seem to have jettisoned most of their fur over the course of their evolution. 

This is presumably because fur increases frictional drag while in the water and hence impedes swimming ability, and is among the reasons that elite swimmers also remove their body-hair before competition. 

Indeed, our loss of body hair is among the human anatomical peculiarities that are most often cited by champions of aquatic ape theory in favor of the theory that humans did indeed pass through an aquatic phase during our evolution. 

However, aquatic ape theory is highly controversial, and is rejected by almost all mainstream evolutionists and biological anthropologists.  

As I have said, Morris, for his part, gives respectful consideration to the theory, and, unlike many other anthropologists and evolutionists, does not dismiss it out of hand as entirely preposterous and unworthy even of further consideration.[8]

On the contrary, Morris credits the theory as “ingenious”, acknowledging that, if true, it might explain many otherwise odd features of human anatomy, including not just our relative hairlessness, but also the retention of hairs on our head, the direction of the hairs on our backs, our upright posture, ‘streamlined’ bodies, dexterity of our hands and the thick extra layer of sub-cutaneous fat beneath our skin that is lacking in other primates. 

However, while acknowledging that the theory explains many curious anomalies of human physiology, Morris ultimately rejects ‘aquatic ape theory’ as altogether too speculative given the complete lack of fossil evidence in support of the theory – the same reason that most other evolutionists also reject the theory. 

Thus, he concludes: 

It demands… the acceptance of a hypothetical major evolutionary phase for which there is no direct evidence” (p45-6). 

Morris also rejects the theory that was, according to Morris himself, the most widely accepted explanation for our hairlessness among other evolutionists at the time he was writing – namely the theory that our hairlessness evolved as a cooling mechanism when our ancestors left the shaded forests for the open African savannah

The problem with this theory, as Morris explains it, is that:  

Exposure of the naked skin to the air certainly increases the chances of heat loss, but it also increases heat gain at the same time and risks damage from the sun’s rays” (p47). 

Thus, it is not at all clear that moving into the open savannah would indeed select for hairlessness. Otherwise, as Morris points out, we might expect other carnivorous, predatory mammals such as lions and jackals, who also inhabit the savannah, to have similarly jettisoned most of their fur. 

Ultimately, however, Morris accepts instead a variant on this idea – namely that hairlessness evolved to prevent overheating while chasing prey when hunting. 

However, this fails to explain why it is men’s bodies that are generally much hairier than those of women, even though, cross-culturally, in most foraging societies, it is men who do most, if not all, of the hunting

It also raises the question as to why other mammalian carnivores, including some that also inhabit the African Savannah and other similar environments, such as lions and jackals, have not similarly shed their body hair, especially since the latter rely more on their speed to catch prey species, whereas humans, armed with arrows and javelins as well as hunting dogs, do not always have to catch a prey by hand in order to kill it. 

I would tentatively venture an alternative theory, one which evidently did not occur to Morris – namely, perhaps our hairlessness evolved in concert with our invention and use of clothing (e.g. animal hides) – i.e. a case of gene-culture coevolution

Clothing would provide an alternative means of protect from both sun and cold alike, but one that has the advantage that, unlike bodily fur, it can be discarded (and put back on) on demand. 

This explanation suggests that, paradoxically, we became naked apes at the same time, and indeed precisely because, we had also become clothed apes. 

The Sexiest Primate? 

One factor said to have contributed to the book’s commercial success was the extent to which its thesis chimed with the prevailing spirit of the age during which it was first published, namely the 1960s. 

Thus, as already alluded to, it presented, in many ways, an idealized and romantic version of human nature, with its crude group-selectionism and emphasis on cooperation within groups without a concomitant emphasis on conflict between groups, and its depiction of humans as a naturally monogamous pair-bonding species, without a concomitant emphasis on the prevalence of infidelity, desertion, polygamy, Machiavellian mating strategies and even rape.  

Another element that jibed with the zeitgeist of the sixties was Morris’s emphasis on human sexuality, with Morris famously declaring: 

The naked ape is the sexiest primate alive” (p64). 

Are humans indeed the ‘sexiest’ of primates? How can we assess this claim? It depends, of course, on precisely how we define ‘sexiness’. 

Obviously, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then sexiness is located in a rather different part of the male anatomy, but equally subjective in nature. 

Thus, humans like ourselves find other humans more sexy than other primates (or most of us do) because we have evolved to do so. A male chimpanzee, however, would likely disagree and regard a female chimpanzee as sexier. 

However, Morris presumably has something else in mind when he describes humans as the “sexiest” of primates. 

What he seems to mean is that sexuality and sexual behavior permeates the life of humans to a greater degree than for other primates. Thus, for example, he cites as evidence the extended or continuous sexual receptivity of human females, writing: 

There is much more intense sexual activity in our own species than in any other primates” (p56) 

However, the claim that sexuality and sexual behavior permeates the life of humans to a greater degree than for other primates is difficult to maintain when you have read about the behavior of some of our primate cousins. Thus, for example, both chimpanzees and especially bonobos, our closest relatives among extant non-human primates, are far more promiscuous than all but the sluttiest of humans

Indeed, one might cynically suggest that what Morris had most in mind when he described humans as “the sexiest primate alive” was simply a catchy marketing soundbite that very much tapped into the zeitgeist of the era (i.e. the 1960s) and might help boost sales for his book. 

Penis Size

As further evidence for our species’ alleged “sexiness” Morris also cites the supposedly unusually large size of the human penis, reporting: 

The [human] male has the largest penis of any primate. It is not only extremely long when fully erect, but also very thick when compared with the penises of other species” (p80). 

This claim, namely that the human male has an unusually large penis, may originate with Morris, and has certainly since enjoyed wide currency in subsequent decades. 

Thus, competing theories have been formulated to account for the (supposedly) unusual size of our penes.

One idea is that our large penes evolved through sexual selection, more specifically female choice, with females preferring either the appearance, or the internal ‘feel’, of a large penis during coitus, and hence selecting for increased penis size among men (e.g. Mautz et al 2013; The Mating Mind: p234-6).

Of course, one might argue that the internal ‘feel’ of a large penis during intercourse is a bit late for mate choice to operate, since, by this time, the choice in question has already been made. Indeed, in cultures where, prior to the immiediate initiation of sexual intercourse, the genitalia are usually covered with clothing, even exercising mate choice on the basis of the external appearance of the penis, especially of an erect penis, might prove difficult or, at the very least, socially awkward.

However, given that, in humans, most sexual intercourse is non-reproductive (i.e. does note result in conception, let alone in offspring), the idea is not entirely implausible.

This idea, namely the our large penes evolved through sexual selection, dovetails neatly with Richard Dawkins’ tentative suggestion in an endnote appended to later editions of The Selfish Gene (reviewed here) that the capacity to maintain an erection (presumably especially a large erection) without a penis bone (since most other primates do possess a penis bone) may function as an honest signal of health in accordance with Zahavi’s handicap principle, an idea I have previously discussed here (The Selfish Gene: p307-8).

An alternative explanation for the relatively large size of our penes implicates sperm competition. On this view, human penes are designed to remove sperm deposited by rival males in the female reproductive tract by functioning as a “suction piston” during intercourse, as I discuss below (Human Sperm Competition: p170-171; Gallup & Burch 2004; Gallup et al 2004; Goetz et al 2005; Goetz et al 2007). 

Yet, in fact, according to Alan F Dixson, the human penis is not unusually long by primate standards, being roughly the same length as that of the chimpanzee (Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems: p64). 

Instead, Dixson reports: 

The erect human penis is comparable in length to those of other primates, in relation to body size. Only its circumference is unusual when compared to the penes of other hominids” (Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems: p65). 

The human penis is unusual, then, only in its width or girth. 

As to why our penes are so wide, the answer is quite straightforward, and has little to do with the alleged ‘sexiness’ of the human species, whatever that means. 

Instead, it is a simple, if indirect, reflection of our increased brain-size.

Increased brain-size first selected for changes in the size and shape of female reproductive anatomy. This, in turn, led to changes in male reporoductive anatomy.

Thus, Bowman suggests: 

As the diameter of the bony pelvis increased over time to permit passage of an infant with a larger cranium, the size of the vaginal canal also became larger” (Bowman 2008). 

Similarly, Robin Baker and Mark Bellis report: 

The dimensions and elasticity of the vagina in mammals are dictated to a large extent by the dimensions of the baby at birth. The large head of the neonatal human baby (384g brain weight compared with only 227g for the gorilla…) has led to the human vagina when fully distended being large, both absolutely and relative to the female body… particularly once the vagina and vestibule have been stretched during the process of giving birth, the vagina never really returning to its nulliparous dimensions” (Human Sperm Competition: Copulation, Masturbation and Infidelity: p171). 

In turn, larger vaginas select for larger penises in order to fill this larger vagina (Bowman 2008).  

Interestingly, this theory directly contradicts the alleged claim of infamous race scientist Philippe Rushton (whose work I have reviewed here) that there is an inverse correlation between brain-size and penis-size, which relationship supposedly explains race differences in brain and genital size. Thus, Rushton was infamously quoted as observing: 

It’s a trade off, more brains or more penis. You can’t have everything.[9]

On the contrary, this analysis suggests that, at least as between species (and presumably as between sub-species, i.e. races, as well), there is a positive correlation between brain-size and penis-size.[10]

According to Baker and Bellis, one reason male penis size tracks that of female vagina size (both being relatively large, and especially wide, in humans) is that the penis functions as, in Baker and Bellis’s words, a “suction piston” during intercourse, the repeated thrusting functioning to remove any sperm previously deposited by rival males – a form of sperm competition

Thus, they report:

In order to distend the vagina sufficiently to act as a suction piston, the penis needs to be a suitable size [and] the relatively large size… and distendibility of the human vagina (especially after giving birth) thus imposes selection, via sperm competition, for a relatively large penis” (Human Sperm Competition: p171). 

Interestingly, this theory – namely that the human penis functions as a sperm displacement device – although seemingly fanciful, actually explains some otherwise puzzling aspects of human coitus (and presumably coitus in some other species too), such as its relatively extended duration, the male refractory period and related Coolidge effect – i.e. why a male cannot immediately recommence intercourse immediately after orgasm, unless perhaps with a new female (though this exception has yet to be experimentally demonstrated in humans), since to do so would maladaptively remove one’s own sperm from the female reproductive tract. 

Though seemingly fanciful, this theory even has some empirical support (Gallup & Burch 2004; Goetz et al 2005; Goetz et al 2007), including some delightful experiments involving sex toys of various shapes and sizes (Gallup et al 2004). 

Morris writes:

“[Man] is proud that he has the biggest brain of all the primates, but attempts to conceal the fact that he also has the biggest penis, preferring to accord this honor falsely to the mighty gorilla” (p9). 

Actually, the gorilla, mighty though he indeed may be, has relatively small genitalia. This is on account of his polygynous, but non-polyandrous, mating system, which involves minimal sperm competition.[11]

Moreover, the largeness of our brains, in which, according to Morris, we take such pride, may actually be the cause of the largeness of our penes, for which, according to Morris, we have such shame (here, he speaks for few men). 

Thus, large brains required larger heads which, in turn, required larger vaginas in order to successfully birth larger-headed babies. This in turn selected for larger penises to fill the larger vagina. 

In short, the large size, or rather large girth/width, of our penes has less to do with our being the “sexiest primate” and more to do with our being the brainiest

Female Breasts

In addition to his discussion of human penis size, Morris also argues that various other features of human anatomy that not usually associated with sex nevertheless evolved, in part, due to their role in sexual signaling. These include our earlobes (p66-7), everted lips (p68-70) and, tentatively and rather bizarrely, perhaps even our large fleshy noses (p67). 

He makes the most developed and persuasive case, however, in respect of another physiological peculiarity of the human species, and of human females in particular, namely the female breasts

Thus, Morris argues: 

For our species, breast design is primarily sexual rather than maternal in function” (p106). 

The evolution of protruding breasts of a characteristic shape appears to be yet another example of sexual signalling” (p70). 

As evidence, he cites the differences in shape between women’s breasts and both the breasts of other primates and the design of baby bottles (p93). In short, the shape of human breasts do not seem ideally conducive to nursing alone. 

The notion that breasts have a secondary function as sexual advertisements is indeed compelling. In most other mammals, large breasts develop only during pregnancy, but human breasts are permanent, developing at puberty, and, except during pregnancy and lactation, composed predominantly of fat not milk (see Møller et al 1995; Manning et al 1997; Havlíček et al 2016). 

On the other hand, it is difficult to envisage how breasts ever first became co-opted as a sexually-selected ornament. 

After all, the presence of developed breasts on a female would originally, as among other primates, have indicated that the female in question was pregnant, and hence infertile. There would therefore initially have been strong selection pressure among males against ever finding breasts sexually attractive, since it would lead to their pursuing infertile women whom they could not possibly impregnate. As a consequence, there would be strong selection against a female ever developing permanant breasts, since it would result in her being perceived as currently infertile and hence unattractive to males.

How then did breasts ever make the switch to a sexually attractive, sexually-selected ornament? This is what George Francis, at his blog, ‘Anglo Reaction’, terms the breast paradox.[12]

Morris does not address, nor even draw attention to or seemingly recognise, this not insignificant problem. However, he does suggest that two other human traits that are, among primates, unique to humans may have facilitated the process. 

Our so-called nakedness (i.e. relative hairlessness as compared to other mammals), the trait that furnished Morris’s book with its title, and Morris himself with his preferred name for our species, is the first of these traits. 

Swollen breast-patches in a shaggy-coated female would be far less conspicuous as signalling devices, but once the hair has vanished they would stand out clearly” (p70-1). 

Secondly, Morris argues that our bipedalism (i.e. the fact we walk on two legs) and resulting vertical posture, necessarily put the female reproductive organs out of sight underneath a woman when she adopts a standing position, and hence generally out of the sight of potential mates. There was therefore, Morris suggests, a need for some frontal sexual-signaling. 

This, he argues, was further necessitated by what he argues is our species’ natural preference for ventro-ventral (i.e. missionary position) intercourse. 

In particular, Morris argues that human female breasts evolved in order to mimic the appearance of the female buttocks, a form of what he terms ‘self-mimicry’. 

The protuberant, hemispherical breasts of the female must surely be copies of the fleshy buttocks” (p76). 

Everted Lips 

Interestingly, he makes a similar argument in respect of another trait of humans not shared by other extant primates – namely, our inverted lips.

The word ‘everted’ refers to the fact that our lips are turned outwards, as is easily perceived by comparing human lips with the much thinner-appearing lips of our closest non-human relatives

Again, this seems intuitively plausible, since, like female breasts, lips do indeed seem to be a much-sexualized part of the human anatomy, at least in western societies, and in at least some non-western cultures as well, if erotic art is to be taken as evidence.[13]

These everted lips, he argues, evolved to mimic the appearance of the female labia. Again, as with breasts, this was supposedly required because our bipedalism and resulting posture put the female genitals out of sight of most males.

As with Morris’s idea that female breasts evolved to mimic the appearance of female buttocks, the idea that our lips, and women’s use of lipstick, is designed to imitate the appearance of the female sexual organs has been much mocked.[14]

However, the similarity in appearance of the labia and human lips can hardly be doubted. After all, it is even attested to in the very etymology of the word ‘labia, which derives from the Old English word for the lips. 

Of course, inverted lips reach their most extreme form among extant sub-species of human among black Africans. This Morris argues is because: 

If climatic conditions demand a darker skin, then this will work against the visual signalling capacity of the lips by reducing their colour contrast. If they really are important as visual signals, then some kind of compensating development might be expected, and this is precisely what seems to have occurred, the negroid lips maintaining their conspicuousness by becoming larger and more protuberant. What they have lost in colour contrast, they have made up for in size and shape” (p69-70).

Unforunately, however, if we look at other relatively dark-skinned, but non-Negroid, populations of human, the theory receives, at best, only partial support.

On the one hand, Australian Aboriginals, another dark-skinned but unrelated group, do indeed tend to have quite large lips. However, these lips are not especially everted.

On the other hand, however, the dark-skinned Dravidian peoples of South India are not generally especially large-lipped, but are rather quite Caucasoid in facial morphology. Indeed, they, like the generally lighter-complexioned, Indo-European speaking, ‘Aryan’ populations of North India, were generally (but not always) classified as ‘Caucasoid by most early-twentieth century racial anthropologists, though some suggested.

At any rate, rejecting the politically-incorrect notion that black Africans are, as a race, somehow more primitive than other humans, Morris instead emphasizes the fact that, in respect of this trait (namely, everted lips), they are actually the most differentiated from non-human primates.  

Thus, all humans, compared to non-human primates, have everted lips, but black African lips are the most everted. Therefore, Morris concludes, using the word ‘primitive’ is in the special phylogenetic sense

Anatomically, these negroid characters do not appear to be primitive, but rather represent a positive advance in the specialization of the lip region” (p70).

In other words, whereas whites and Asians may be more advanced than blacks when it comes to intelligence, brain-size, science, technology and building civilizations, when it comes to everted lips, black Africans have us all beaten! 

Female Orgasm

Morris also discusses the function of the female orgasm, a topic which has subsequently been the subject of much speculation and no little controversy among evolutionists.  

Again, Morris suggests that humans’ unusual vertical posture, brought on by our bipedal means of locomotion, may have been central to the evolution of this trait. 

Thus, if a female were to walk off immediately after sexual intercourse had occurred, then: 

Under the simple influence of gravity the seminal fluid would flow back down the vaginal tract and much of it would be lost” (p79).  

This obviously makes successful impregnation less likely. As a result, Morris concludes: 

There is therefore a great advantage in any reaction that tends to keep the female horizontal when the male ejaculates and stops copulating” (p79). 

The chief adaptive function of the female orgasm therefore, according to Morris, is the tiredness, and perhaps post-coital tristesse, that immediately follows orgasm, and motivates the female experiencing these emotions to remain in a horizontal position even after intercourse has ended, and hence retain the male ejaculate within her reproductive tract. 

The violent response of female orgasm, leaving the female sexually satiated and exhausted has precisely this effect” (p79).[15]

However, there are several problems with Morris’s theory, the first being is that it predicts that female orgasm should be confined to humans, since, at least among extant primates, we represent the only bipedal ape.

Morris does indeed argue that the female orgasm is, like our nakedness, bipedal locomotion and large brains, an exclusively human trait, describing how, among most, if not all, non-human primates: 

At the end of a copulation, when the male ejaculates and dismounts, the female monkey shows little sign of emotional upheaval and usually wanders off as if nothing had happened” (p79). 

Unfortunately for Morris’s theory, however, evidence has subsequently accumulated that some non-human (and non-bipedal) female primates do indeed seem to sometimes experience responses seemingly akin to orgasm during copulation. 

As professor of philosophy Elizabeth Lloyd relates in her book The Case of the Female Orgasm:

There is robust evidence—developed since Morris wrote—that some nonhuman primate females do have orgasm. The best evidence comes from experiments in which stumptail macaques were wired up so that their heart and respiration rates and the muscle contractions in their uteruses or vaginas could be measured electronically… previous observations by Suzanne Chevalier-Skolnikoff… showed a ‘naturally occurring complete orgasmic behavioral pattern for female stumptails’. She documented three occasions on which a female mounting another female (rubbing her genitals against the back of the mounted female) displayedall the behavioral manifestations of male stumptail orgasm and ejaculation” (The Case of the Female Orgasm: p54-5).

Thus, Alan Dixson reports: 

Female orgasm is not confined to Homo sapiens. Putatively homologous responses [have] been reported in a number of non-human primates, including stump-tail and Japanese Macaques, rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees… Pre-human ancestors of Homo sapiens, such as the australopithecines, probably possessed a capacity to exhibit female orgasm, as do various extant ape and monkey species. The best documented example concerns the stump tailed macaque (Macaca arctoides), in which orgasmic uterine contractions have been recorded during female-female mounts… as well as during copulation… De Waal… estimates that female stump-tails show their distinctive ‘climax face’ (which correlates with the occurrence of uterine contractions) once in every six copulations. Vaginal spasms were noted in two female rhesus monkeys as a result of extended periods of stimulation (using an artificial penis) by an experimenter… Likewise, a female chimpanzee exhibited rhythmical vaginal contractions, clitoral erection, limb spasms, and body tension in response to manual stimulation of its genitalia… Masturbatory behaviour, accompanied by behavioural and physiological responses indicative of orgasm, has also been noted in Japanese macaques… and chimpanzees” (Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems: p77). 

Thus, in relation to Morris’s theory, Dixson concludes that the theory lacks “comparative depth” because: 

Monkey and apes exhibit female orgasm in association with dorso-ventral copulatory postures and an absence of post-mating rest periods” (Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems: p77). 

Certainly, female orgasm, unlike male orgasm, is hardly a prerequisite for successful impregnation. 

Thus, American physician, Robert Dickson, in his book, Human Sex Anatomy (1933), reports that, in a study of a thousand women who attended his medical practice afflicted with so-called ‘frigitity’ (i.e they were incapable of orgasmic response during intercourse): 

The frigid were not notably infertile, having the expected quota of living children, and somewhat less than the average incidence of sterility” (Human Sex Anatomy: p92). 

Further problems with Morris’s theory are identified by Elizabeth Lloyd in The Case of the Female Orgasm: Bias in the Theory of Evolution, the only book-length treatment of the topic of the evolution of the female orgasm.

In particular, unlike among human males, women do not, in general, appear to experience sensations of tiredness immediately following orgasm. On the contrary, she reports:

States of sleepiness and exhaustion [experienced following orgasm] are, in fact, predominantly true for men but not for women” (The Case of the Female Orgasm: p52).

On the contrary, she quotes feminist sexologist Shere Hite as reporting, in her famous Hite Report, that, the most common post-orgasmic sensations reported by women were “wanting to be close, and ‘feeling strong and wide awake, energetic and alive’”, both of which reactions “represent continued arousal” (Ibid.).

Thus, she reports:

A sizable proportion of women are not ‘satiated and exhausted’ by orgasm but, rather, energized and aroused. An ‘energized’ woman seems less rather than more likely to lie down” (The Case of the Female Orgasm: p57).

This, in turn, suggests that a female who had experienced orgasm during intercourse would be likely to lose more semen through the force of gravity than a woman who had not experienced orgasm, since, if a person is “energized and aroused”, they are supposedly more, not less, likely to stand up and move around.

Finally, Lloyd repeated the familiar feminist factoid (basaed on the Kinsey data) that women are actually most likely to achieve orgasm during intercourse by using sexual positions where the female partner is on top, where, again, gravitational forces would presumably work against successful conception, writing:

Given that a relatively low percentage of women have orgasms during intercourse, and that of those who do, a high percentage have them in the superior position, it seems more likely that the occurrence of female orgasm would have the reverse gravitational effect from the one that Morris describes” (The Case of the Female Orgasm: p57).

In conclusion, therefore, the bulk of the evidence seems incompatible with Morris’s superficiallly plausible gravitational theory of the evolution of the female orgasm and it must be rejected.

Why then did the female orgasm evolve, not only in humans, but also apparently also in other species of primate, if not other mammals?

In the years since the first publication of Morris’s book, various other theories for the evolution of the female orgasm have been developed by evolutionists.

However, as argued by Donald Symons in his groundbreaking The Evolution of Human Sexuality (which I have reviewed here), the most parsomonious theory of the evolution of female orgasm remains that it represents simply a non-adaptive byproduct of male orgasm, which is, of course, itself adaptive (see Sherman 1989Case Of The Female Orgasm: Bias in the Science of Evolution; see also my discussion here).

The female orgasm and clitoris thus represents, if you like, the female equivalent of male nipples – only more fun.

Hymen

Interestingly, Morris also hypothesizes regarding the evolutionary function of another peculiarity of human female reproductive anatomy which, in contrast to the controversy regarding the evolutionary function, if any, of the female orgasm and clitoris (and of the female breasts), has received surprisingly scant attention from evolutionists – namely, the hymen

In most mammals, Morris reports, “it occurs as an embryonic stage in the development of the urogenital system” (p82). However, only in humans, he reports, is it, when not ruptured, retained into adulthood. 

Regarding the means by which it evolved, the trait is then, Morris concludes, like our large brains, upright posture and hairlessness, “part of the naked ape’s neoteny” (p82). 

However, as with our hairlessness, neoteny only the means by which this trait was retained into adulthood among humans, not the evolutionary reason for its retention.  

In other words, he suggests, the hymen, like other traits retained into adulthood among humans, must serve some evolutionary function. 

What is this evolutionary function? 

Morris suggests that, by making first intercourse painful for females, it deters young women from engaging in intercourse too early, and hence risking pregnancy, without first entering a relationship (‘pair-bond’) of sufficient stability to ensure that male parental investment, and provisioning, will be forthcoming (p73). 

However, the problem with the theory is that the pain experienced during intercourse obviously occurs rather too late to deter first intercourse, because, by the time this pain is experienced, intercourse has already occurred. 

Of course, given our species’ unique capacity for speech and communication, the pain experienced during first intercourse could be communicated to young virginal women through conversation with other non-virginal women who had already experienced first intercourse.  

However, this would be an unreliable method of inducing fear and avoidance regarding first intercourse, especially given the sort of taboos regarding discussion of sexual activities which are common in many cultures. 

At any rate, why would natural, or sexual, selection not instead simply directly select for fear and anxiety regarding first intercourse – i.e. a psychological rather than a physiological adaptation.

After all, as evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists have convincingly demonstrated, our psychology is no less subject to natural selection than is our physiology. 

Although, as already noted, the evolutionary function, if any, of the female hymen has received surprisingly little attention from evolutionists, I can myself independently formulate at least three alternative hypotheses regarding the evolutionary significance of the hymen. 

First, it may have evolved among humans as a means of advertising to prospective suitors a prospective bride’s chastity, and hence reassuring the suitor of the paternity of offspring.  

This would, in turn, increase the perceived attractiveness of the female in question, and help secure her a better match with a higher-status male, who would then also be more willing to invest in offspring whose paternity is not in doubt, and hence increase her own reproductive success

Thus, it is notable that, in many cultures, prospective brides are inspected for virginity, a so-called virginity test, sometimes by the prospective mother-in-law or another older woman, before being considered marriageable and accepted as brides. 

Alternatively, and more prosaically, the hymen may simply function to protect against infection, by preventing dirt and germs from entering a woman’s body by this route. 

This, of course, would raise the question as to why, at least according to Morris, the trait is retained into sexual maturity only among humans?  

Actually, however, as with his claim that the female orgasm is unique to humans, Morris’s claim that only humans retain the hymen into sexual maturity is disputed by other sources. Thus, for example, Catherine Blackledge reports: 

Hymens, or vaginal closure membranes or vaginal constrictions, as they are often referred to, are found in a number of mammals, including llamas, guinea-pigs, elephants, rats, toothed whales, seals, dugongs, and some primates, including some species of galagos, or bushbabys, and the ruffed lemur” (The story of V: p145). 

Finally, perhaps even more prosaically, the hymen may simply represent a nonadaptive vestige of the developmental process, or a nonadaptive by-product of our species’ neoteny

This would be consistent with the apparent variation with which the trait presents itself, suggesting that it has not been subject to strong selection pressure that has weeded out suboptimal variations. 

This then would appear to be the most parsimonious explanation. 

Zoological Nomenclature 

The works on human ethology of both Richard Ardrey and Konrad Lorenz attracted much attention and no little controversy in their day. Indeed, they perhaps attracted even more controversy than Morris’s own ‘The Naked Ape’, not least because they tended to place greater emphasis on humankind’s capacity, and alleged innate proclivity, towards violence. 

In contrast, Morris’s own work, placing less emphasis on violence, and more on sex, perhaps jibed better with the zeitgeist of the era, namely the 1960s, with its hippy exhortations to ‘make love not war’. 

Yet, although all these works were first published at around the same time, the mid- to late-sixties (though Adrey continued publishing books of this subject into the 1970s), Morris’s ‘The Naked Ape’ seems to be the only of these books that remains widely read, widely known and still in print, to this day. 

Partly, I suspect, this reflects its brilliant and provocative title, which works on several levels, scientific and literary.  

Morris, as we have seen, justifies referring to humans by this perhaps unflattering moniker on zoological grounds.  

Certainly, he acknowledges that humans possess many other exceptional traits that distinguish us from all other extant apes, and indeed all other extant mammals. 

Thus, we walk on two legs, use and make tools, have large brains and communicate via a spoken language. Thus, the zoologist could refer to us by any number of descriptors – “the vertical ape, the tool-making ape, the brainy ape” are a few of Morris’s own suggestions (p41).  

But, he continues, adopting the disinterested detachment of the proverbial alien zoologist: 

These were not the first things we noticed. Regarded simply as a zoological specimen in a museum, it is the nakedness that has the immediate impact” (p41) 

This name has, Morris observes, several advantages, including “bringing [humans] into line with other zoological studies”, emphasizing the zoological approach, and hence challenging human vanity. 

Thus, he cautions: 

The naked ape is in danger of being dazzled by [his own achievements] and forgetting that beneath the surface gloss he is still very much a primate. (‘An ape’s an ape, a varlet’s a valet, though they be clad in silk or scarlet’). Even a space ape must urinate” (p23). 

Thus, the title works also on another metaphoric level, which also contributed to the title’s power.  

The title ‘Naked Ape’ promises to reveal, if you like, the ‘naked’ truth about humanity—to strip humanity down in order to reveal the naked truth that lies beneath the façade and finery. 

Morris’s title reduces us to a zoological specimen in the laboratory, stripped naked on the laboratory table, for the purposes of zoological classification and dissection. 

Interestingly, humans have historically liked to regard ourselves as superior to other animals, in part, precisely because we are the only ones who did clothe ourselves. 

Thus, beside Adam and Eve, it was only primitive tropical savages who went around in nothing but a loincloth, and they were disparaged as uncivilized precisely on this account. 

Yet even tropical savages wore loincloths. Indeed, clothing, in some form, is sometimes claimed to be a human universal

Yet animals, on the other hand, go completely unclothed – or so we formerly believed. 

But Morris turns this reasoning on its head. In the zoological sense, it is humans who are the naked ones, being largely bereft of hairs sufficient to cover most of our bodies. 

Stripping humanity down in this way, Morris reveals the naked truth that beneath, the finery and façade of civilization, we are indeed an animal, an ape and a naked one at that. 

The power of Morris’s chosen title ensures that, even if, like all science, his book has quickly dated, his title alone has stood the test of time and will, I suspect, be remembered, and employed as a descriptor of the human species, long after Morris himself, and the books he authored, are forgotten and cease to be read. 

Endnotes

[1] In fact, as I discuss in a later section of this review, it is possible that the female hymen evolved through just such a process, namely as a means of advertising female virginity and premarital chastity (and perhaps implying post-marital fidelity), and hence as a paternity assurance mechanism, which benefited the female by helping secure male parental investment, provisioning and hypergamy.

[2] Morris is certainly right that anthropologists have overemphasized the exotic and unfamiliar (“bizarre mating customs, strange kinship systems, or weird ritual procedures”, as Morris puts it). Partly, this is simply because, when first encountering an alien culture, it is the unfamiliar differences that invariably stand out, whereas the similarities are often the very things which we tend to take for granted.
Thus, for example, on arriving in a foreign country, we are often struck by the fact that everyone speaks a foreign unintelligible language. However, we often take for granted the more remarkable fact that all cultures around the world do indeed have a spoken language, and also that all languages supposedly even share in common a universal grammar.
However, anthropologists have also emphasized the alien and bizarre for other reasons, not least to support theories of radical cultural malleability, sometimes almost to the verge of outright fabrication (e.g. Margaret Mead’s studies in Samoa).

[3] It is true that there has been some significant human evolution since the dawn of agriculture, notably the evolution of lactase persistence in populations with a history of dairy agriculture. Indeed, as Cochran and Harpending emphasize in their book The 10,000 Year Explosion, far from evolution having stopped at the dawn of agriculture or the rise of ‘civilization’, it has in fact sped up, as a natural reflection of the rapid change in environmental conditions that resulted. Thus, as Nicholas Wade concludes in A Troublesome Inheritance, much human evolution has been “recent, copious and regional”, leading to substantial differentiation between populations (i.e. race differences), including in psychological traits such as intelligence. Nevertheless, despite such tinkering, the core adaptations that identify us as a species were undoubtedly molded in ancient prehistory, and are universal across the human species.

[4] However, it is indeed important to recognize that the lifestyle of our own ancestors was not necessarily identical to that of those few extant hunter-gatherer groups that have survived into modern times, not least because the latter tend to be concentrated in marginal and arid environments (e.g. the San people of the Kalahari DesertEskimos of the Arctic region, Aboriginal Austrailians of the Australian outback), with those formerly inhabiting more favorable environments having either themselves transitioned to agriculture or else been displaced or absorbed by more advanced invading agriculturalists with higher population densities and superior weapons and other technologies.

[5] This passage is, of course, sure to annoy feminists (always a good thing), and is likely to be disavowed even by many modern evolutionary psychologists since it relies on a rather crude analogy. However, Morris acknowledges that, since “’hunting’… has now been replaced by ‘working‘”: 

The males who set off on their daily working trips are liable to find themselves in heterosexual groups instead of the old all-male parties. All too often it [the pair bond] collapses under the strain” (p81). 

This factor, Morris suggests, explains the prevalence of marital infidelity. It may also explain the recent hysteria, and accompanying witch-hunts, regarding so-called ‘sexual harassment’ in the workplace.
Relatedly, and also likely to annoy feminists, Morris champions the then-popular man the hunter theory of hominid evolution, which posited that the key development in human evolution, and the development of human intelligence in particular, was the switch from a largely, if not wholly, herbivorous diet and lifestyle, to one based largely on hunting and the consumption of meat. On this view, it was the cognitive demands that hunting placed on humans that selected for increased intelligence among humans, and also the nutritional value of meat that made possible increases in  highly metabolically expensive brain tissue.
This theory has since fallen into disfavor. This seems to be primarily because it gives the starring role in human evolution to men, since men do most of the hunting, and relegates women to a mere supporting role. It hence runs counter to the prevailing feminist zietgeist.
The main substantive argument given against the ‘man the hunter theory’ is that other carnivorous mammals (e.g. lions, wolves) adapted to carnivory without any obvious similar increase in brain-size or intelligence. Yet Morris actually has an answer to this objection.
Our ancestors, fresh from the forests, were relative latecomers to carnivory. Therefore, Morris contends, had we sought to compete with tigers and wolves by mimicking them (i.e. growing our fangs and claws instead of our brains) we would inevitably have been playing a losing game of evolutionary catch-up. 

Instead, an entirely new approach was made, using artificial weapons instead of natural ones, and it worked” (p22).

However, this theory fails to explain how female intelligence evolved. One possibility is that increases in female intelligence are an epiphenomenal byproduct of selection for male intelligence, rather like the female equivalent of male nipples.
On this view, men would be expected to have higher intelligence than women, just as male nipples (and breasts) are smaller than female nipples, and the male penis is bigger than the female clitoris. That adult men have greater intelligence than adult women is indeed the conclusion of a recent controversial theory (Lynn 1999). However, the difference, if it even exists (which remains unclear), is very small in magnitude, certainly much smaller than than the relative difference in size betweeen male and female breasts. There is also evidence this sexual division of labour between hunting and gathering led to sex differences spatio-visual intelligence (Eals & Silverman 1994).

[6] Another difference from modern evolutionary psychologists derives from Morris’s ethological approach, which involves a focus on human-typical behaviour patterns. For example, he discusses the significance of body language and facial expressions, such as smiling, which is supposedly homologous with an appeasement gesture (baring clenched teeth, aka a ‘fear grin’) common to many primates, and staring, which represents a form of threat across many species.

[7] Interestingly, however, he acknowledges that this statement does not apply to all human races. Thus, he observes: 

Negroes have undergone a real as well as an apparent hair loss” (p42). 

Thus, it seems blacks, unlike Caucasians, have fewer hairs on their body than do chimpanzees. This fact is further evidence that, contrary to the politically correct orthodoxy, race differences are real and important, though this fact is, of course, played down by Morris and other popular science writers.

[8] Edward O Wilson, for example, in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (which I have reviewed here) dismisses aquatic ape theory, as then championed by Elaine Morgan in The Descent of Woman, as feminist-inspired pop-science “contain[ing] numerous errors” and as being “far less critical in its handling of the evidence than the earlier popular books”, including, incidentally, that of Morris, who is mentioned by name in the same paragraph (Sociobiology: The New Synthesis: p29).

[9] Actually, I suspect this infamous quotation may be apocryphal, or at best a misconstrued joke. Certainly, while I think Rushton’s theory of race differences (which he calls ‘differential K theory’) is flawed, as I explain in my review of his work, there is nothing in it to suggest a direct trade-off between penis-size and brain-size. Indeed, one problem with Rushton’s theory, or at least his presentation of it, is that he never directly explains how traits such as penis-size actually relate to r/K selection in the first place.
The quotation is usually traced to a hit piece in Rolling Stone, a leftist hippie rag with a notorious reputation for low editorial standards, misinformation and so-called ‘fake news. However, Jon Entine, in his book on race differences in athletic ability, instead traces it to a supposed interview between Rushton and Geraldo Rivera broadcast on the Geraldo’ show in 1989 (Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports: p74).
Interestingly, one study has indeed reported that there is a “demonstrated negative evolutionary relationship”, not between brain-size and penis-size, but rather between brain-size and testicle size, if only on account of the fact that each contain “metabolically expensive tissues” (Pitnick et al 2006).

[10] Interestingly, Baker and Bellis attribute race differences in penis-size, not to race differences in brain-size, but rather to race differences in birth weight. Thus, they conclude:

Racial differences in size of penis (Mongoloid < Caucasoid < Negroid…) reflects racial differences in birth weight… and hence presumably, racial differences in size of vagina” (Human Sperm Competition: p171). 

[11] In other words, a male silverback gorilla may mate with the multiple females in his harem, but each of the females in his harem likely have sex with only one male, namely that silverback. This means that sperm from rival males are rarely simultaneously present in the same female’s oviduct, resulting in minimal levels of sperm competition, which is known to select for larger testicles in particular, and also often more elaborate penes as well.

[12] Alternative theories for the evolution of permanent fatty breasts in women is that they function analogously to camel humps, i.e. as a storehouse of nutrients to guard against and provide reserves in the event of future scarcity or famine. On this view, the sexually dimorphic presentation (i.e. the fact that fatty breasts are largely restricted to women) might reflect the caloric demands of pregnancy. Indeed, this might explain why women have higher levels of fat throughout their bodies. (For a recent review of rival theories for human breast evolution see Pawłowski & Żelaźniewicz 2021.)

[13] However, to be pedantic, this phraseology is perhaps problematic, since, to say that breasts and lips are ‘sexualized’ in western, and at least some non-western, cultures implicitly presupposes that they are not already inherently sexual parts of our anatomy by virtue of biology, which is, of course, the precisely what Morris is arguing. 

[14] For example, if I recall correctly, extremely annoying, left-wing 1980s-era British comedian Ben Elton once commented in a one of his stand-up routines that the male anthropologist (i.e. Morris, actually not an anthropologist, at least not by training) who came up with this idea (namely, that lips and lipstick mimiced the appearance of the labia) had obviously never seen a vagina in his life. He also, if I recall correctly, attributed this theory to the supposed male-dominated, androcentric nature of the field of anthropology – an odd notion given that Morris is not an anthropologist by training, and cultural anthropology is, in fact, one of the most leftist-dominated, feminist-infested, politically correct fields in the whole of academia, this side of ‘gender studies’, which, in the present, politically-correct world of academia, is saying a great deal.

[15] This theory is rather simpler, and has hence always struck me as more plausible, than the more elaborate, but also more widely championed so-called ‘uterine upsuck hypothesis’, whereby uterine contractions experienced by women during orgasm are envisaged as somehow functioning to aid the transfer of semen deeper into the cervix. This idea is largely based on a single study involving two experiments on a single human female subject (Fox et al 1970). However, two other studies failed to produce any empirical support for the theory (Grafenberg 1950; Masters & Johnson 1966). Baker and Bellis’s methodologically problematic work on what they call ‘flowback’ provides, at best, ambivalent evidence (Baker & Bellis 1993). For detailed critique, see Dixson’s Sexual Selection and the Origins of Human Mating Systems: p74-6.

References 

Baker & Bellis (1993) Human sperm competition: ejaculate manipulation by females and a function for the female orgasm. Animal Behaviour 46:887–909. 
Bowman EA (2008) Why the human penis is larger than in the great apes. Archives of Sexual Behavior 37(3): 361. 
Eals & Silverman (1994) The Hunter-Gatherer theory of spatial sex differences: Proximate factors mediating the female advantage in recall of object arrays. Ethology and Sociobiology 15(2): 95-105.
Fox et al 1970. Measurement of intra-vaginaland intra-uterine pressures during human coitus by radio-telemetry. Journal of Reproduction and Fertility 22:243–251. 
Gallup et al (2004). The human penis as a semen displacement device. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 277–289 
Gallup & Burch (2004). Semen displacement as a sperm competition strategy in humans. Evolutionary Psychology 2:12-23. 
Goetz et al (2005) Mate retention, semen displacement, and human sperm competition: A preliminary investigation of tactics to prevent and correct female infidelity. Personality and Individual Differences 38:749-763 
Goetz et al (2007) Sperm Competition in Humans: Implications for Male Sexual Psychology, Physiology, Anatomy, and Behavior. Annual Review of Sex Research 18:1. 
Grafenberg (1950) The role of urethra in female orgasm. International Journal of Sexology 3:145–148. 
Havlíček et al (2016) Men’s preferences for women’s breast size and shape in four cultures, Evolution and Human Behavior 38(2): 217–226. 
Lynn (1999) Sex differences in intelligence and brain size: A developmental theory. Intelligence 27(1):1-12.
Manning et al (1997) Breast asymmetry and phenotypic quality in women, Ethology and Sociobiology 18(4): 223–236. 
Masters & Johnson (1966) Human Sexual Response (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
Mautz et al (2013) Penis size interacts with body shape and height to influence male attractiveness, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110(17): 6925–30.
Møller et al (1995) Breast asymmetry, sexual selection, and human reproductive success, Ethology and Sociobiology 16(3): 207-219. 
Pawłowski & Żelaźniewicz (2021) The evolution of perennially enlarged breasts in women: a critical review and a novel hypothesis. Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 96(6): 2794-2809. 
Pitnick et al (2006) Mating system and brain size in bats. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 273(1587): 719-24. 

Pierre van den Berghe’s ‘The Ethnic Phenomenon’: Ethnocentrism and Racism as Nepotism Among Extended Kin

Pierre van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (Westport: Praeger 1987) 

Ethnocentrism is a pan-human universal. Thus, a tendency to prefer one’s own ethnic group over and above other ethnic groups is, ironically, one thing that all ethnic groups share in common. 

In ‘The Ethnic Phenomenon’, pioneering sociologist-turned-sociobiologist Pierre van den Berghe attempts to explain this universal phenomenon. 

In the process, he not only provides a persuasive ultimate evolutionary explanation for the universality of ethnocentrism, but also produces a remarkable synthesis of scholarship that succeeds in incorporating virtually every aspect of ethnic relations as they have manifested themselves throughout history and across the world, from colonialism, caste and slavery to integration and assimilation, within this theoretical and explanatory framework. 

Ethnocentrism as Nepotism? 

At the core of Pierre van den Berghe’s theory of ethnocentrism and ethnic conflict is the sociobiological theory of kin selection. According to van den Berghe, racism, xenophobia, nationalism and other forms of ethnocentrism can ultimately be understood as kin-selected nepotism, in accordance with biologist William D Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964a; 1964b). 

According to inclusive fitness theory (also known as kin selection), organisms evolved to behave altruistically towards their close biological kin, even at a cost to themselves, because close biological kin share genes in common with one another by virtue of their kinship, and altruism towards close biological kin therefore promotes the survival and spread of these genes. 

Van den Berghe extends this idea, arguing that humans have evolved to sometimes behave altruistically towards, not only their close biological relatives, but also sometimes their distant biological relatives as well – namely, members of the same ethnic group as themselves. 

Thus, van den Berghe contends: 

Racial and ethnic sentiments are an extension of kinship sentiments [and] ethnocentrism and racism are… extended forms of nepotism” (p18). 

Thus, while social scientists, and social psychologists in particular, rightly emphasize the ubiquity, if not universality, of in-group preference, namely a preference for and favouring of individuals of the same social group as oneself, they also, in my view, rather underplay the extent to which the group identities which have led to the most conflict, animosity, division and discrimination throughout history and across the world, and are also most apparently impervious to resolution, are ethnic identities.

Thus, divisions such as those between social classes, or the sexes, different generations, or between members of different political factions, or youth subcultures (e.g. between mods’ and ‘rockers), or supporters of different sports teams, may indeed lead to substantial conflict, at least in the short-term, and are often cited as quintessential examplars of ‘tribal’ identity and conflict.

Indeed, social psychologists emphasize that individuals even evince an in-group preference in what they referred to as the minimal group situation – namely where experimental subjects have been assigned to one group or another on the basis of wholly arbitrary, trivial or even entirely fictitious criteria.

However, in the real world, the most violent and intransigent of group conflicts almost invariably seem to be those between ethnic groups – namely groups to which a person is assigned at birth, and where this group membership is passed down in families, from parent to offspring, in a quasi-biological fashion, and where group identity is based on a perception of shared kinship.

In contrast, aspects of group identity that vary even between individuals within a single family, including those that are freely chosen by individuals, tend to be somewhat muted in intensity, perhaps precisely because most people share bonds with close family members of a different group identity.

Thus, there has never, to my knowledge, been a civil war arising from conflict between the sexes, or between supporters of one or another football team.[1]

Ethnic Groups as Kin Groups?

Before reading van den Berghe’s book, I was skeptical regarding whether the degree of kinship shared among co-ethnics would ever be sufficient to satisfy Hamilton’s rule, whereby, for altruism to evolve, the cost of the altruistic act to the altruist, measured in terms of reproductive success, must be outweighed by the benefit to the recipient, also measured in terms of reproductive success, multiplied by the degree of relatedness of the two parties (Brigandt 2001; cf. Salter 2008; see also On Genetic Interests). 

Thus, Brigandt (2001) takes van den Berghe to task for his formulation of what the latter catchily christens “the biological golden rule”, namely: 

Give unto others as they are related unto you” (p20).[2]

However, contrary to both critics of his theory (e.g. Brigandt 2001) and others developing similar ideas (e.g. Rushton 2005; Salter 2000), van den Berghe is actually agnostic on the question of whether ethnocentrism is ever actually adaptive in modern societies, where the shared kinship of large nations or ethnic groups is, as van den Berghe himself readily acknowledges, “extremely tenuous at best” (p243). Thus, he concedes: 

Clearly, for 50 million Frenchmen or 100 million Japanese, any common kinship that they may share is highly diluted … [and] when 25 million African-Americans call each other ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’, they know that they are greatly extending the meaning of these terms” (p27).[3]

Instead, van den Berghe suggests that nationalism and racism may reflect the misfiring of a mechanism that evolved when our ancestors still still lived in small kin-based groups of hunter-gatherers that represented little more than extended families (p35; see also Tooby and Cosmides 1989; Johnson 1986). 

Thus, van den Berghe explains: 

Until the last few thousand years, hominids interacted in relatively small groups of a few score to a couple of hundred individuals who tended to mate with each other and, therefore, to form rather tightly knit groups of close and distant kin” (p35). 

Therefore, in what evolutionary psychologists now call the environment of evolutionary adaptedness or EEA:

The natural ethny [i.e. ethnic group] in which hominids evolved for several thousand millennia probably did not exceed a couple of hundred individuals at most” (p24) 

Thus, van den Berghe concludes: 

The primordial ethny is thus an extended family: indeed, the ethny represents the outer limits of that inbred group of near or distant kinsmen whom one knows as intimates and whom therefore one can trust” (p25). 

On this view, ethnocentrism was adaptive when we still resided in such groups, where members of our own clan or tribe were indeed closely biologically related to us, but is often maladaptive in contemporary environments, where our ethnic group may include literally millions of people. 

Another not dissimilar theory has it that racism in particular might reflect the misfiring of an adaptation that uses phenotype matching, in particular physical resemblance, as a form of kin recognition

Thus, Richard Dawkins in his seminal The Selfish Gene (which I have reviewed here), cautiously and tentatively speculates: 

Conceivably, racial prejudice could be interpreted as an irrational generalization of a kin-selected tendency to identify with individuals physically resembling oneself, and to be nasty to individuals different in appearance” (The Selfish Gene: p100). 

Certainly, van den Berghe takes pains to emphasize that ethnic sentiments are vulnerable to manipulation – not least by exploitative elites who co-opt kinship terms such as ‘motherland’, fatherland and ‘brothers-in-arms‘ to encourage self-sacrifice, especially during wartime (p35; see also Johnson 1987; Johnson et al 1987; Salmon 1998). 

However, van den Berghe cautions, “Kinship can be manipulated but not manufactured [emphasis in original]” (p27). Thus, he observes how: 

Queen Victoria could cut a motherly figure in England; she even managed to proclaim her son the Prince of Wales; but she could never hope to become anything except a foreign ruler of India; [while] the fiction that the Emperor of Japan is the head of the most senior lineage descended from the common ancestor of all Japanese might convince the Japanese peasant that the Emperor is an exalted cousin of his, but the myth lacks credibility in Korea or Taiwan” (p62-3). 

This suggests that the European Union, while it may prove successful as customs union, single market and even an economic union, and while integration in other non-economic spheres may also prove a success, will likely never command the sort of loyalty and allegiance that a nation-state holds over its people, including, sometimes, the willingness of men to fight and lay down their lives for its sake. This is because its members come from many different cultures and ethnicities, and indeed speak many different languages. 

For van den Berghe, national identity cannot be rooted in anything other than a perception of shared ancestry or kinship. Thus, he observes: 

Many attempts to adopt universalistic criteria of ethnicity based on legal citizenship or acquisition of educational qualifications… failed. Such was the French assimilation policy in her colonies. No amount of proclamation of Algérie française could make it so” (p27). 

Thus, so-called civic nationalism, whereby national identity is based, not on ethnicity, but rather, supposedly, on a shared commitment to certain common values and ideals (democracy, the ‘rule of law’ etc.), as encapsulated by the notion of America as a proposition nation’, is, for van den Berghe, a complete non-starter. 

Yet this is today regarded as the sole basis for national identity and patriotic feeling that is recognised as legitimate, not only in the USA, but also all other contemporary western polities, where any assertion of racial nationalism or a racially-based or ethnically-based national identity is, at least for white people, anathema and beyond the pale. 

Moreover, due to the immigration policies of previous generations of western political leaders, policies that largely continue today, all contemporary western polities are now heavily multi-ethnic and multi-racial, such that any sense of national identity that was based on race or ethnicity is arguably untenable as it would necessarily exclude a large proportion of their populations.

On the other hand, however, van den Berghe’s reasoning also suggests that the efforts of some white nationalists to construct a pan-white, or pan-European, ethnic identity is also, like the earlier efforts of Japanese imperialist propagandists to create a pan-Asian identity, and of Marcus Garvey’s UNIA to construct a pan-African identity, likely to end in failure.[4]

Racism vs Ethnocentrism 

Whereas ethnocentrism is therefore universal, adaptive and natural, van den Berghe denies that the same can be said for racism

There is no evidence that racism is inborn, but there is considerable evidence that ethnocentrism is” (p240). 

Thus, van den Berge concludes: 

The genetic propensity is to favor kin, not those who look alike” (p240).[5]

As evidence, he cites:

The ease with which parental feelings take precedence over racial feeling in cases of racial admixture” (p240). 

In other words, fathers who sire mixed-race offspring with women of other races, and the women of other races with whom they father such offspring, often seemingly love and care for the resulting offspring just as intensely as do parents whose offspring is of the same race as themselves.[6]

Thus, cultural, rather than racial, markers are typically adopted to distinguish ethnic groups (p35). These include: 

  • Clothing (e.g. hijabs, turbans, skullcaps);
  • Bodily modification (e.g. tattoos, circumcision); and 
  • Behavioural criteria, especially language and dialect (p33).

Bodily modification and language represent particularly useful markers because they are difficult to fake, bodily modification because it is permanent and hence represents a costly commitment to the group (in accordance with Zahavi’s handicap principle), and language/dialect, because this is usually acquirable only during a critical period during childhood, after which it is generally not possible to achieve fluency in a second language without retaining a noticeable accent. 

In contrast, racial criteria, as a basis for group affiliation, is, van den Berghe reports, actually quite rare: 

Racism is the exception rather than the rule in intergroup relations” (p33). 

Racism is also a decidedly modern phenomenon. 

This is because, prior to recent technological advances in transportation (e.g. ocean-going ships, aeroplanes), members of different races (i.e. groups distinguishable on the basis of biologically inherited physiological traits such as skin colour, nose shape, hair texture etc.) were largely separated from one another by the very geographic barriers (e.g. deserts, oceans, mountain ranges) that reproductively isolated them from one another and hence permitted their evolution into distinguishable races in the first place. 

Moreover, when different races did make contact, then, in the absence of strict barriers to exogamy and miscegenation (e.g. the Indian caste system), racial groups typically interbred with one another and hence become phenotypically indistinguishable from one another within just a few generations. 

This, van den Berghe explains, is because: 

Even the strongest social barriers between social groups cannot block a specieswide [sic] sexual attraction. The biology of reproduction triumphs in the end over the artificial barriers of social prejudice” (p109). 

Therefore, in the ancestral environment for which our psychological adaptations are designed (i.e. before the development of ships, aeroplanes and other methods of long-distance intercontinental transportation), different races did not generally coexist in the same locale. As a result, van den Berghe concludes: 

We have not been genetically selected to use phenotype as an ethnic marker, because, until quite recently, such a test would have been an extremely inaccurate one” (p 240). 

Humans, then, have simply not had sufficient time to have evolved a domain-specificracism module’ as suggested by some researchers.[7]

Racism is therefore, unlike ethnocentrism, not an innate instinct, but rather “a cultural invention” (p240). 

However, van den Berghe rejects the fashionable, politically correct notion that racism is “a western, much less a capitalist monopoly” (p32). 

On the contrary, racism, while not innate, is, not a unique western invention, but rather a recurrent reinvention, which almost invariably arises where phenotypically distinguishable groups come into contact with one another, if only because: 

Genetically inherited phenotypes are the easiest, most visible and most reliable predictors of group membership” (p32).

For example, van den Berghe describes the relations between the Tutsi, Hutu and Pygmy Twa of Rwanda and neighbouring regions as “a genuine brand of indigenous racism” which, according to van den Berghe, developed quite independently of any western colonial influence (p73).[8]

Moreover, where racial differences are the basis for ethnic identity, the result is, van den Berghe claims, ethnic hierarchies that are particularly rigid, intransient and impermeable.

For van den Berghe, this then explains the failure of African-Americans to wholly assimilate into the US melting pot in stark contrast to successive waves of more recently-arrived European immigrants. 

Thus, van den Berghe observes: 

Blacks who have been English-speaking for several generations have been much less readily assimilated in both England… and the United States than European immigrants who spoke no English on arrival” (p219). 

Thus, language barriers often break down within a generation. 

As Judith Harris emphasizes in support of peer group socialization theory, the children of immigrants whose parents are not at all conversant in the language of their host culture nevertheless typically grow up to speak the language of their host culture rather better than they do the first language of their parents, even though the latter was the cradle tongue to which they were first exposed, and first learnt to speak, inside the family home (see The Nurture Assumption: which I have reviewed here). 

As van den Berghe observes: 

It has been the distressing experience of millions of immigrant parents that, as soon as their children enter school in the host country, the children begin to resist speaking their mother tongue” (p258). 

While displeasing to those parents who wish to pass on their language, culture and traditions to their offspring, this response is wholly adaptive from the perspective of the offspring themselves:  

Children quickly discover that their home language is a restricted medium that not useable in most situations outside the family home. When they discover that their parents are bilingual they conclude – rightly for their purposes – that the home language is entirely redundant… Mastery of the new language entails success at school, at work and in ‘the world’… [against which] the smiling approval of a grandmother is but slender counterweight” (p258).[9]

However, whereas one can learn a new language, it is not usually possible to change one’s race – the efforts of Rachel Dolezal, Elizabeth Warren, Jessica Krug and Michael Jackson notwithstanding. However, due to the one-drop rule and the history of miscegenation in America, passing is sometimes possible (see below). 

Instead, phenotypic (i.e. racial) differences can only be eradicated after many generations of miscegenation, and sometimes, as in the cases of countries like the USA and Brazil, not even then. 

Meanwhile, van den Berghe observes, often the last aspect of immigrant culture to resist assimilation is culinary differences. However, he observes, increasingly even this becomes only a ‘ceremonial’ difference reserved for family gatherings (p260). 

Thus, van den Berghe surmises, Italian-Americans probably eat hamburgers as often as Americans of any other ethnic background, but at family gatherings they still revert to pasta and other traditional Italian cuisine

Yet even culinary differences eventually disappear. Thus, in both Britain and America, sausage has almost completely ceased to be thought of as a distinctively German dish (as have hamburgers, originally thought to have been named in reference to the city of Hamburg) and now pizza is perhaps on the verge of losing any residual association with Italians. 

Is Racism Always Worse than Ethnocentrism? 

Yet if raciallybased ethnic hierarchies are particularly intransigent and impermeable, they are also, van den Berghe claims, “peculiarly conflict-ridden and unstable” (p33). 

Thus, van den Berghe seems to believe that racial prejudice and animosity tends to be more extreme and malevolent in nature than mere ethnocentrism as exists between different ethnic groups of the same race (i.e. not distinguishable from one another on the basis of inherited phenotypic traits such as skin colour). 

For example, van den Berghe claims that, during World War Two: 

There was a blatant difference in the level of ferociousness of American soldiers in the Pacific and European theaters… The Germans were misguided relatives (however distant), while the ‘Japs’ or the ‘Nips’ were an entirely different breed of inscrutable, treacherous, ‘yellow little bastards.’ This was reflected in differential behavior in such things as the taking (versus killing) of prisoners, the rhetoric of war propaganda (President Roosevelt in his wartime speeches repeatedly referred to his enemies as ‘the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Japanese’), the internment in ‘relocation camps’ of American citizens of Japanese extraction, and in the use of atomic weapons” (p57).[10]

Similarly, in his chapter on ‘Colonial Empires’, by which he means “imperialism over distant peoples who usually live in noncontiguous territories and who therefore look quite different from their conquerors, speak unrelated languages, and are so culturally alien to their colonial masters as to provide little basis for mutual understanding”, van den Berghe writes: 

Colonialism is… imperialism without the restraints of common bonds of history, culture, religion, marriage and blood that often exist when conquest takes place between neighbors” (p85). 

Thus, he claims: 

What makes for the special character of the colonial situation is the perception by the conqueror that he is dealing with totally unrelated, alien and, therefore, inferior people. Colonials are treated as people totally beyond the pale of kin selection” (p85). 

However, I am unpersuaded by van den Berghe’s claim that conflict between more distantly related ethnic groups is always, or even typically, more brutal than that among biologically and culturally more closely related groups. 

After all, even conquests of neighbouring peoples, identical in race, if not always in culture, to the conquering group, are often highly brutal, for example the British in Ireland or the Japanese in Korea and China during the first half of the twentieth century. 

Indeed, many of the most intense and intractable ethnic conflicts are those between neighbours and ethnic kin, who are racially (and culturally) very similar to one another. 

Thus, for example, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, and Bosnians, Croats, Serbs and Albanians in the Balkans, and even Jews and Palestinians in the Middle East, are all racially and genetically quite similar to one another, and also share many aspects of their culture with one another too. (The same is true, to give a topical example at the time of writing, of Ukrainians and Russians.) However, this has not noticeably ameliorated the nasty, intransient and bloody conflicts that have been, and continue to be, waged among them.  

Of course, the main reason that most ethnic conflict occurs between close neighbours is because neighbouring groups are much more likely to come into contact, and hence into conflict, with one another, especially over competing claims to land.[11]

Yet these same neighbouring groups are also likely to be related to one another, both culturally and genetically, because of both shared origins and the inevitable history of illicit intermarriage or miscegenation, and cultural borrowings, that inevitably occur even among the most hostile of neighbours.[12]

Nevertheless, the continuation of intense ethnic animosity between ethnic groups who are genetically, close to one another seems to pose a theoretical problem, not only for van den Berghe’s theory, but also, to an even greater degree, for Philippe Rushton’s so-called genetic similarity theory (which I have written about here), which argues that conflict between different ethnic groups is related to their relative degree of genetic differentiation from one another (Rushton 1998a; 1998b; 2005). 

It also poses a problem for the argument of political scientist Frank K Salter, who argues that populations should resist immigration by alien immigrants proportionally to the degree to which the alien immigrants are genetically distant from themselves (On Genetic Interests; see also Salter 2002). 

Assimilation, Acculturation and the American Melting Pot 

Since racially-based hierarchies result in ethnic boundaries that are both “peculiarly conflict-ridden and unstable” and also peculiarly rigid and impermeable, Van den Berghe controversially concludes: 

There has never been a successful multiracial democracy” (p189).[13]

Of course, in assessing this claim, we must recognize that ‘success’ is not only a matter of degree, but also can also be measured on several different dimensions. 

Thus, many people would regard the USA as the quintessential “successful… democracy”, even though the US has been multiracial, to some degree, for the entirety of its existence as a nation. 

Certainly, the USA has been successful economically, and indeed militarily.

However, the US has also long been plagued by interethnic conflict, and, although successful economically and militarily, it has yet to be successful in finding a way to manage its continued interethnic conflict, especially that between blacks and whites.

The USA is also afflicted with a relatively high rate of homicide and gun crime as compared to other developed economies, as well as low levels of literacy and numeracy and educational attainment. Although it is politically incorrect to acknowledge as much, these problems also likely reflect the USA’s ethnic diversity, in particular its large black underclass.

Indeed, as van den Berghe acknowledges, even societies divided by mere ethnicity rather than race seem highly conflict-prone (p186). 

Thus, assimilation, when it does occur, occurs only gradually, and only under certain conditions, namely when the group which is to be assimilated is “similar in physical appearance and culture to the group to which it assimilates, small in proportion to the total population, of low status and territorially dispersed” (p219). 

Thus, van den Berghe observes: 

People tend to assimilate and acculturate when their ethny [i.e. ethnic group] is geographically dispersed (often through migration), when they constitute a numerical minority living among strangers, when they are in a subordinate position and when they are allowed to assimilate by the dominant group” (p185). 

Moreover, van den Berghe is careful distinguish what he calls assimilation from mere acculturation.  

The latter, acculturation, involves a subordinate group gradually adopting the norms, values, language, cultural traditions and folkways of the dominant culture into whom they aspire to assimilate. It is therefore largely a unilateral process.[14]

In contrast, however, assimilation goes beyond this and involves members of the dominant host culture also actually welcoming, or at least accepting, the acculturated newcomers as a part of their own community.  

Thus, van den Berghe argues that host populations sometimes resist the assimilation of even wholly acculturated and hence culturally indistinguishable out-groups. Examples of groups excluded in this way include, according to van den Berghe, pariah castes, such as the untouchable dalits of the Indian subcontinent, the Burakumin of Japan and blacks in the USA.[15]

In other words, assimilation, unlike acculturation, is very much a two-way street. Thus, just as it ‘takes two to tango’, so assimilation is very much a bilateral process: 

It takes two to assimilate” (p217).  

On the one hand, minority groups may sometimes themselves resist assimilation, or even acculturation, if they perceive themselves as better off maintaining their distinct identify. This is especially true of groups who perceive themselves as being, in some respects, better-off than the host outgroup into whom they refuse to be absorbed. 

Thus, middleman minorities, or market-dominant minorities, such as Jews in the West, the overseas Chinese in contemporary South-East Asia, the Lebanese in West Africa and South Asians in East Africa, being, on average, much wealthier than the bulk of the host populations among whom them live, often perceive no social or economic advantage to either assimilation or acculturation and hence resist the process, instead stubbornly maintaining their own language and traditions and marrying only among themselves. 

The same is also true, more obviously, of alien ruling elites, such as the colonial administrators, and settlers, in European colonial empires in Africa, India and elsewhere, for whom assimilation into native populations would have been anathema.

Passing’, ‘Pretendians’ and ‘Blackfishing’ 

Interestingly, just as market-dominant minorities, middleman minorities, and European colonial rulers usually felt no need to assimilate into the host society in whose midst they lived, because to do so would have endangered their privileged position within this host society, so recent immigrants to America may no longer perceive any advantage to assimilation. 

On the contrary, there may now be an economic disincentive operating against assimilation, at least if assimilation means forgoing from the right to benefit from affirmative action in employment and college admissions

Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the phenomenon of passing, at least in America, typically involved non-whites, especially light-skinned mixed-race African-Americans, attempting to pass as white or, if this were not realistic, sometimes as Native American.  

Some non-whites, such as Bhagat Singh Thind and Takao Ozawa, even brought legal actions in order to be racially reclassified as ‘white’ in order to benefit from America’s then overtly racialist naturalization law.

Contemporary cases of passing, however, though rarely referred to by this term, typically involve whites themselves attempting to somehow pass themselves off as some variety of non-white (see Hannam 2021). 

Recent high-profile recent examples have included Rachel Dolezal, Elizabeth Warren and Jessica Krug

Interestingly, all three of these women were both employed in academia and involved in leftist politics – two spheres in which adopting a non-white identity is likely to be especially advantageous, given the widespread adoption of affirmative action in college admissions and appointments, and the rampant anti-white animus that infuses so much of academia and the cultural Marxist left.[16]

Indeed, the phenomenon is now so common that it even has its own associated set of neologisms, such as Pretendian, ‘blackfishing’ and, in Australia, box-ticker.[17]

Indeed, one remarkable recent survey purported to uncover that fully 34% of white college applicants in the United States admitted to lying about their ethnicity on their applications, in most cases either to improve their chances of admission or to qualify for financial aid

Although Rachel Dolezal, Elizabeth Warren and Jessica Krug were all women, this survey found that white male applicants were even more likely to lie about their ethnicity than were white female applicants, with only 16% of white female applicants admitting to lying, as compared to nearly half (48%) of white males.[18]

This is, of course, consistent with the fact that it is white males who are the primary victims of affirmative action and other forms of discrimination.  

This strongly suggests that, whereas there were formerly social (and legal) benefits that were associated with identifying as white, today the advantages accrue to instead to those able to assume a non-white identity.  

For all the talk of so-called ‘white privilege’, when whites and mixed-race people, together with others of ambiguous racial identity, preferentially choose to pose as non-white in order to take advantage of the perceived benefits of assuming such an identity, they are voting with their feet and thereby demonstrating what economists call revealed preferences

This, of course, means that recent immigrants to America, such as Hispanics, will have rather less incentive in integrate into the American mainstream than did earlier waves of European immigrants, such as Irish, Poles, Jews and Italians, the latter having been, primarily, the victims of discrimination rather than its beneficiaries

After all, who would want to be another, boring whiteAnglo’ or unhyphenated American when to do so would presumably mean relinquishing any right to benefit from affirmative action in job recruitment or college admissions, not to mention becoming a part of the hated white ‘oppressor’ class. 

In short, ‘white privilege’ isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. 

This perverse incentive against assimilation obviously ought to be worrying to anyone concerned with the future of American as a stable unified polity. 

Ethnostates – or Consociationalism

Given the ubiquity of ethnic conflict, and the fact that assimilation occurs, if at all, only gradually and, even then, only under certain conditions, a pessimist (or indeed a racial separatist) might conclude that the only way to prevent ethnic conflict is for different ethnic groups to be given separate territories with complete independence and territorial sovereignty. 

This would involve the partition of the world into separate ethnically homogenous ethnostates, as advocated by racial separatists and many in the alt-right. 

Yet, quite apart from the practical difficulties such an arrangement would entail, not least the need for large-scale forcible displacements of populations, this ‘universal nationalism’, as championed by political scientist Frank K Salter among others, would arguably only shift the locus of ethnic conflict from within the borders of a single multi-ethnic state to between those of separate ethnostates – and conflict between states can be just as destructive as conflict within states, as countless wars between states throughout history have amply proven.  

In the absence of assimilation, then, perhaps fairest and least conflictual solution is what van den Berghe terms consociationalism. This term refers to a form of ethnic power-sharing, whereby elites from both groups agree to share power, each usually retaining a veto power regarding major decisions, and there is proportionate representation for each group in all important positions of power. 

This seems to be roughly the basis of the power sharing agreement imposed on Northern Ireland in the Good Friday Agreement, which was largely successful in bringing an end to the ethnic conflict known as ‘the Troubles.[19]

On the other hand, however, power-sharing was explicitly rejected by both the ANC and the international anti-apartheid movement as a solution in another ethnically-divided polity, namely South Africa, in favour of majority rule, even though the result has been a situation very similar to the situation in Northern Ireland which led to the Troubles, namely an effective one-party state, with a single party in power for successive decades and institutionalized discrimination against minorities.[20]

Consociationalism or ethnic power-sharing also arguably the model towards which the USA and other western polities are increasingly moving, with quotas and so-called ‘affirmative action increasingly replacing the earlier ideals of appointment by merit, color blindness or freedom of association, and multiculturalism and cultural pluralism replacing the earlier ideal of assimilation

Perhaps the model consociationalist democracy is van den Berghe’s own native Belgium, where, he reports: 

All the linguistic, class, religious and party-political quarrels and street demonstrations have yet to produce a single fatality” (p199).[21]

Belgium is, however, very much the exception rather than the rule, and, at any rate, though peaceful, remains very much a divided society

Indeed, power-sharing institutions, in giving official, institutional recognition to the existing ethnic divide, function only to institutionalize and hence reinforce and ossify the existing ethnic divide, making successful integration and assimilation almost impossible – and certainly even less likely to occur than it had been in the absence of such institutional arrangements. 

Moreover, consociationalism can be maintained, van den Berghe emphasizes, only in a limited range of circumstances, the key criterion being that the groups in question are equal, or almost equal, to one another in status, and not organized into an ethnic hierarchy. 

However, even when the necessary conditions are met, it invariably involves a precarious balancing act. 

Just how precarious is illustrated by the fate of other formerly stable consociationalist states. Thus, van den Bergh notes the irony that earlier writers on the topic had cited Lebanon as “a model [consociationalist democracy] in the Third World” just a few years before the Lebanese Civil War broke out in the 1970s (p191). 

His point is, ironically, only strengthened by the fact that, in the three decades since his book was first published, two of his own examples of consociationalism, namely the USSR and Yugoslavia, have themselves since descended into civil war and fragmented along ethnic lines. 

Slavery and Other Recurrent Situations  

In the central section of the book, van den Berghe discusses such historically recurrent racial relationships as “slavery”, middleman minorities, “caste” and “colonialism”. 

In large part, his analyses of these institutions and phenomena do not depend on his sociobiological theory of ethnocentrism, and are worth reading even for readers unconvinced by this theory – or even by readers skeptical of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology altogether. 

Nevertheless, the sociobiological model continues to guide his analysis. 

Take, for example, his chapter on slavery. 

Although the overtly racial slavery of the New World was quite unique, slavery often has an ethnic dimension, since slaves are often captured during warfare from among enemy groups. 

Indeed, the very word slave is derived from the ethnonym, Slav, due to the frequency with which the latter were captured as slaves, both by Christians and Muslims.[22]

In particular, van den Berghe argues that: 

An essential feature of slave status is being torn out of one’s network of kin selection. This condition generally results from forcible removal of the slave from his home group by capture and purchase” (p120).

This then partly explains, for example, why European settlers were far less successful in enslaving the native inhabitants of the Americas than they were in exploiting the slave labour of African slaves who had been shipped across the Atlantic, far from their original kin groups, precisely for this purpose.[23]

Thus, for van den Berghe, the quintessential slave is: 

Not only involuntarily among ethnic strangers in a strange land: he is there alone, without his support group of kinsmen and fellow ethnics” (p115)

Here van den Berghe seemingly anticipates the key insight of Jamaican sociologist Orlando Peterson in his comparative study of slavery, Slavery and Social Death, who terms this key characteristic of slavery natal alienation.[24]

This, however, is likely to be only a temporary condition, since, at least if allowed to reproduce, then, gradually over time, slaves would put down roots, produce new families, and indeed whole communities of slaves.[25]

When this occurs, however, slaves gradually, over generations, cease to be true slaves. The result is that: 

Slavery can long endure as an institution in a given society, but the slave status of individuals is typically only semipermanent and nonhereditary… Unless a constantly renewed supply of slaves enters a society, slavery, as an institution, tends to disappear and transform itself into something else” (p120). 

This then explains the gradual transformation of slavery during the medieval period into serfdom in much of Europe, and perhaps also the emergence of some pariah castes such as the untouchables of India. 

Paradoxically, van den Berghe argues that racism became particularly virulent in the West precisely because of Western societies’ ostensible commitment to notions of liberty and the rights of man, notions obviously incompatible with slavery. 

Thus, whereas most civilizations simply took the institution of slavery for granted, feeling no especial need to justify the practice, western civilization, given its ostensible commitment to such lofty notions as individual liberty and the equality of man, was always on the defensive, feeling a constant need to justify and defend slavery. 

The main justification hit upon was racialism and theories of racial superiority

If it was immoral to enslave people, but if at the same time it was vastly profitable to do so, then a simple solution to the dilemma presented itself: slavery became acceptable if slaves could somehow be defined as somewhat less than fully human” (p115).  

This then explains much of the virulence of western racialism in the much of the eighteenth, nineteenth and even early-twentieth centuries.[26]

Another important, and related, ideological justification for slavery was what van den Berghe refers to as ‘paternalism’. Thus, Van den Berghe observes that: 

All chattel slave regimes developed a legitimating ideology of paternalism” (p131). 

Thus, in the American South, the “benevolent master” was portrayed a protective “father figure”, while slaves were portrayed as childlike and incapable of living an independent existence and hence as benefiting from their own enslavement (p131). 

This, of course, was a nonsense. As van den Berghe cynically observes: 

Where the parentage was fictive, so, we may assume, is the benevolence” (p131). 

Thus, exploitation was, in sociobiological terms, disguised as kin-selected parental benevolence

However, despite the dehumanization of slaves, the imbalance of power between slave and master, together with the men’s innate and evolved desire for promiscuity, made the sexual exploitation of female slaves by male masters all but inevitable.[27]

As van den Berghe observes: 

Even the strongest social barriers between social groups cannot block a specieswide [sic] sexual attraction. The biology of reproduction triumphs in the end over the artificial barriers of social prejudice” (p109). 

Thus, he notes the hypocrisy whereby: 

Dominant group men, whether racist or not, are seldom reluctant to maximize their fitness with subordinate-group women” (p33). 

The result was that the fictive ideology of ‘paternalism’ that served to justify slavery often gave way to literal paternity of the next generation of the slave population. 

This created two problems. First, it made the racial justification for slavery, namely the ostensible inferiority of black people, ring increasingly hollow, as ostensibly ‘black slaves acquired greater European ancestry, lighter skins and more Caucasoid features with each successive generation of miscegenation. 

Second, and more important, it also meant that the exploitation of this next generation of slaves by their owners potentially violated the logic of kin selection, because: 

If slaves become kinsmen, you cannot exploit them without indirectly exploiting yourself” (p134).[28]

This, van den Berghe surmises, led many slave owners to free those among the offspring of slave women whom they themselves, or their male relatives, had fathered. As evidence, he observes:  

In all [European colonial] slave regimes, there was a close association between manumission and European ancestry. In 1850 in the United States, for example, an estimated 37% of free ‘negroes’ had white ancestry, compared to about 10% of the slave population” (p132). 

This leads van den Bergh to conclude that many such free people of color – who were referred to as people of color precisely because their substantial degree of white ancestry precluded any simple identification as black or negro – had been freed by their owner precisely because their owner was now also their kinsmen. Indeed, many may have been freed by the very slave-master who had been responsible for fathering them. 

Thus, to give a famous example, Thomas Jefferson is thought to have fathered six offspring, four of whom survived to adulthood, with his slave, Sally Hemings – who was herself already three-quarters white, and indeed Jefferson’s wife’s own half-sister, on account of miscegenation in previous generations. 

Of these four surviving offspring, two were allowed to escape, probably with Jefferson’s tacit permission or at least acquiescence, while the remaining two were freed upon his death in his will.[29]

This seems to have been a common pattern. Thus, van den Berghe reports: 

Only about one tenth of the ‘negro’ population of the United States was free in 1860. A greatly disproportionate number of them were mulattoes, and, thus, presumably often blood relatives of the master who emancipated them or their ancestors. The only other slaves who were regularly were old people past productive and reproductive age, so as to avoid the cost of feeding the aged and infirm” (p129). 

Yet this made the continuance of slavery almost impossible, because each new generation more and more slaves would be freed.  

Other slave systems got around this problem by continually capturing or importing new slaves in order to replenish the slave population. However, this option was denied to American slaveholders by the abolition of the slave trade in 1807

Instead, the Americans were unique in attempting to ‘breed’ slaves. This leads van den Berghe to conclude that: 

By making the slave woman widely available to her master…Western slavery thus literally contained the genetic seeds of its own destruction” (p134).[30]

Synthesising Marxism and Sociobiology 

Given the potential appeal of his theory to nationalists, and even to racialists, it is perhaps surprising that van den Berghe draws heavily on Marxist theory. Although Marxists were almost unanimously hostile to sociobiology, sociobiologists frequently emphasized the potential compatibility of Marxist theory and sociobiology (e.g. The Evolution of Human Sociality). 

However, van den Berghe remains, to my knowledge, the only figure (except myself) to actually successfully synthesize sociobiology and Marxism in order to produce novel theory.  

Thus, for example, he argues that, in almost every society in existence, class exploitation is disguised by an ideology (in the Marxist sense) that disguises exploitation as either: 

1) Kin-selected nepotistic altruism – e.g. the king or dictator is portrayed as benevolent ‘father’ of the nation; or
2) Mutually beneficial reciprocity – i.e. social contract theory or democracy (p60). 

However, contrary to orthodox Marxist theory, van den Berghe regards ethnic sentiments as more fundamental than class loyalty since, whereas the latter is “dependent on a commonality of interests”, the former is often “irrational” (p243). 

Nationalist conflicts are among the most intractable and unamenable to reason and compromise… It seems a great many people care passionately whether they are ruled and exploited by members of their own ethny or foreigners” (p62). 

In short, van den Berghe concludes: 

Blood runs thicker than money” (p243). 

Another difference is that, whereas Marxists view control over the so-called means of production (i.e. the means necessary to produce goods for sale) as the ultimate factor determining exploitation and conflict in human societies, Darwinians instead focus on conflict over access to what I have termed the means of reproduction – in other words, the means necessary to produce offspring (i.e. fertile females, their wombs and vaginas etc.). 

This is because, from a Darwinian perspective: 

The ultimate measure of human success is not production but reproduction. Economic productivity and profit are means to reproductive ends, not ends in themselves” (p165). 

Thus, unlike his contemporary Darwin, Karl Marx was, for all his ostensible radicalism, in his emphasis on economics rather than sex, just another Victorian sexual prude.[31]

Mating, Miscegenation and Intermarriage 

Given that reproduction, not production, is the ultimate focus of individual and societal conflict and competition, van den Berghe argues that ultimately questions of equality, inequality and assimilation must be also determined by reproductive, not economic, criteria. 

Thus, he concludes, intermarriage, especially if it occurs, not only frequently, but also in both directions (i.e. involves both males and females of both ethnicities, rather than always involving males of one ethnic group, usually the dominant ethnic group, taking females of the other ethnic group, usually the subordinate group, as wives), is the ultimate measure of racial equality and assimilation: 

Marriage, especially if it happens in both directions, that is with both men and women of both groups marrying out, is probably the best measure of assimilation” (p218). 

In contrast, however, he also emphasizes that mere “concubinage is frequent [even] in the absence of assimilation” (p218). 

Moreover, such concubinage invariably involves males of the dominant-group taking females from the subordinate-group as concubines, whereas dominant-group females are invariably off-limits as sexual partners for subordinate group males. 

Thus, van den Berghe observes, although “dominant group men, whether racist or not, are seldom reluctant to maximize their fitness with subordinate-group women”, they nevertheless are jealously protective of their own women and enforce strict double-standards (p33). 

For example, historian Wynn Craig Wade, in his history of the Ku Klux Klan (which I have reviewed here), writes: 

In [antebellum] Southern white culture, the female was placed on a pedestal where she was inaccessible to blacks and a guarantee of purity of the white race. The black race, however, was completely vulnerable to miscegenation.” (The Fiery Cross: p20). 

The result, van den Berghe reports, is that: 

The subordinate group in an ethnic hierarchy invariably ‘loses’ more women to males of the dominant group than vice versa” (p75). 

Indeed, this same pattern is even apparent in the DNA of contemporary populations. Thus, geneticist James Watson reports that, whereas the mitochondrial DNA of contemporary Columbians, which is passed down the female line, shows a “range of Amerindian MtDNA types”, the Y-chromosomes of these same Colombians, are 94% European. This leads him to conclude: 

The virtual absence of Amerindian Y chromosome types, reveals the tragic story of colonial genocide: indigenous men were eliminated while local women were sexually ‘assimilated’ by the conquistadors” (DNA: The Secret of Life: p257). 

As van den Berghe himself observes: 

It is no accident that military conquest is so often accompanied by the killing, enslavement and castration of males, and the raping and capturing of females” (p75). 

This, of course, reflects the fact that, in Darwinian terms, the ultimate purpose of power is to maximize reproductive success

However, while the ethnic group as a whole inevitably suffers a diminution in its fitness, there is a decided gender imbalance in who bears the brunt of this loss. 

The men of the subordinate group are always the losers and therefore always have a reproductive interest in overthrowing the system. The women of the subordinate group, however frequently have the option of being reproductively successful with dominant-group males” (p27). 

Indeed, subordinate-group females are not only able, and sometimes forced, to mate with dominant-group males, but, in purely fitness terms, they may even benefit from such an arrangement.  

Hypergamy (mating upward for women) is a fitness enhancing strategy for women, and, therefore, subordinate-group women do not always resist being ‘taken over’ by dominant-group men” (p75). 

This is because, by so doing, they thereby obtain access to both the greater resources that dominant group males are able to provide in return for sexual access or as provisioning for their offspring, as well as the superior’ genes which facilitated the conquest in the first place. 

Thus, throughout history, women and girls have been altogether too willing to consort and intermarry with their conquerors. 

The result of this gender imbalance in the consequences of conquest and subjugation, is, a lack of solidarity as between men and women of the subjugated group. 

This sex asymmetry in fitness strategies in ethnically stratified societies often creates tension between the sexes within subordinate groups. The female option of fitness maximization through hypergamy is deeply resented by subordinate group males” (p76). 

Indeed, even captured females who were enslaved by their conquerers sometimes did surprisingly well out of this arrangement, at least if they were young and beautiful, and hence lucky enough to be recruited into the harem of a king, emperor or other powerful male.

One slave captured in Eastern Europe even went on to become effective queen of the Ottoman Empire at the height of its power. Hurrem Sultan, as she came to be known, was, of course, exceptional, but only in degree. Members of royal harems may have been secluded, but they also lived in some luxury.

Indeed, even in puritanical North America, where concubinage was very much frownded upon, van den Berghe reports that “slavery was much tougher on men than on women”, since: 

Slavery drastically reduced the fitness of male slaves; it had little or no such adverse effect on the fitness of female slaves whose masters had a double interest – financial and genetic – in having them reproduce at maximum capacity” (p133) 

Van den Berghe even tentatively ventures: 

It is perhaps not far-fetched to suggest that, even today, much of the ambivalence in relations between black men and women in America… has its roots in the highly asymmetrical mating system of the slave plantation” (p133).[32]

Miscegenation and Intermarriage in Modern America 

Yet, curiously, however, patterns of interracial dating in contemporary America are anomalous – at least if we believe the pervasive myth that America is a ‘systemically racist’ society where black people are still oppressed and discriminated against

On the one hand, genetic data confirms that, historically, matings between white men and black women were more frequent than the reverse, since African-American mitochondrial DNA, passed down the female line, is overwhelmingly African in origin, whereas their Y chromosomes, passed down the male line, are often European in origin (Lind et al 2007). 

However, recent census data suggests that this pattern is now reversed. Thus, black men are now about two and a half times as likely to marry white women as black women are to marry white men (Fryer 2007; see also Sailer 1997). 

This seemingly suggests white American males are actually losing out in reproductive competition to black males. 

This observation led controversial behavioural geneticist Glayde Whitney to claim: 

By many traditional anthropological criteria African-Americans are now one of the dominant social groups in America – at least they are dominant over whites. There is a tremendous and continuing transfer of property, land and women from the subordinate race to the dominant race” (Whitney 1999: p95). 

However, this conclusion is difficult to square with the continued disproportionate economic deprivation of much of black America. In short, African-Americans may be reproductively successful, and perhaps even, in some respects, socially privileged, but, despite benefiting from systematic discrimination in employment and admission to institutions of higher education, they are clearly also, on average, economically much worse-off as compared to whites and Asians in modern America.  

Instead, perhaps the beginnings of an explanation for this paradox can be sought in van den Berghe’s own later collaboration with anthropologist, and HBD blogger, Peter Frost

Here, in a co-authored paper, van den Berghe and Frost argue that, across cultures, there is a general sexual preference for females with somewhat lighter complexion than the group average (van den Berghe and Frost 1986). 

However, as Frost explains in a more recent work, Fair Women, Dark Men: The Forgotten Roots of Racial Prejudice, preferences with regard to male complexion are more ambivalent (see also Feinman & Gill 1977). 

Thus, whereas, according to the title of a novel, two films and a hit Broadway musical, ‘Gentlemen Prefer Blondes’ (who also reputedly, and perhaps as a consequence, have more fun), the idealized male romantic partner is instead tall, dark and handsome

In subsequent work, Frost argues that ecological conditions in sub-Saharan Africa permitted high levels of polygyny, because women were economically self-supporting, and this increased the intensity of selection for traits (e.g. increased muscularity, masculinity, athleticism and perhaps outgoing, sexually-aggressive personalities) which enhance the ability of African-descended males to compete for mates and attract females (Frost 2008). 

In contrast, Frost argues that there was greater selection for female attractiveness (and perhaps female chastity) in areas such as Northern Europe and Northeast Asia, where, to successfully reproduce, women were required to attract a male willing to provision them during cold winters throughout their gestation, lactation and beyond (Frost 2008). 

This then suggests that African males have simply evolved to be, on average, more attractive to women, whereas European and Asian females have evolved to be more attractive to men

This speculation is supported by a couple of recent studies of facial attractiveness, which found that black male faces were rated as most attractive to members of the opposite sex, but that, for female faces, the pattern was reversed (Lewis 2011; Lewis 2012). 

These findings could also go some way towards explaining patterns of interracial dating in the contemporary west (Lewis 2012). 

The Most Explosive Aspect of Interethnic Relations” 

However, such an explanation is likely to be popular neither with racialists, for whom miscegenation is anathema, nor with racial egalitarians, for whom, as a matter of sacrosanct dogma, all races must be equal in all things, even aesthetics and sex appeal.[33]

Thus, when evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazawa made a similar claim in 2011 in a blog post (since deleted), outrage predictably ensued, the post was swiftly deleted, his then-blog dropped by its host, Psychology Today, and the author reprimanded by his employer, the London School of Economics, and forbidden from writing any blog or non-scholarly publications for a whole year. 

Yet all of this occurred within a year of the publication of the two papers cited above that largely corroborated Kanazawa’s finding (Lewis 2011; Lewis 2012). 

Yet such a reaction is, in fact, little surprise. As van den Berghe points out: 

It is no accident that the most explosive aspect of interethnic relations is sexual contact across ethnic (or racial) lines” (p75). 

After all, from a sociobiological perspective, competition over reproductive access to fertile females is Darwinian conflict in its most direct and primordial form

Van den Berghe’s claim that interethnic sexual contact is “the most explosive aspect” of interethnic relations also has support from the history of racial conflict in the USA and elsewhere

The spectre of interracial sexual contact, real or imagined, has motivated several of the most notorious racially-motivated ‘hate-crimes’ of American history, from the torture-murder of Emmett Till for allegedly propositioning a white woman, to the various atrocities of the reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan in defence of the ostensible virtue of ‘white womanhood, to the recent Charleston church shooting, ostensibly committed in revenge for the allegedly disproportionate rate of rape of white women by black man.[34]

Meanwhile, interracial sexual relations are also implicated in some of American history’s most infamous alleged miscarriages of justice, from the Scottsboro Boys and Groveland Four cases, and the more recent Central Park jogger case, all of which involved allegations of interracial rape, to the comparatively trivial conduct alleged, but by no means trivial punishment imposed, in the so-called Monroe ‘kissing case

Allegations of interracial rape also seem to be the most common precursor of full-blown race riots

Thus, in early-twentieth century America, the race riots in Springfield, Illinois in 1908, in Omaha, Nebraska in 1919, in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1921 and in Rosewood, Florida in 1923 were all ignited, at least in part, by allegations of interracial rape or sexual assault

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, multi-racial Britain’s first modern post-war race riot, the Notting Hill riot in London 1958, began with a public argument between an interracial couple, when white passers-by joined in on the side of the white woman against her black Jamaican husband (and pimp) before turning on them both. 

Meanwhile, Britain’s most recent unambiguous race riot, the 2005 Birmingham riot, an entirely non-white affair, was ignited by the allegation that a black girl had been gang-raped by South Asians.

[Edit: Interestingly, Britain’s latest race riot, which occurred in Kirkby, Merseyside, and took place some months after this piece was first posted, also follows the same pattern, having been provoked by the allegation that local underage girls were being sexually propositioned and harassed by asylum seekers who were being housed in a local hotel.]

Meanwhile, at least in the west, whites no longer seem participate in race riots, save as victims. However, an exception was the 2005 Cronulla riots in Sydney, Australia, which were ignited by the allegation that Middle Eastern males were sexually harassing white Australian girls on Sydney beaches. 

Similarly, in Britain, though riots have yet to result, the spectre of so-called Muslim grooming gangs, preying on, and pimping out, underage white British girls in northern towns across the England, has arguably done more to ignite anti-Muslim sentiment among whites in the UK than a whole series of Jihadist terrorist attacks on British civilian targets

Thus, in Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here) Sarich and Miele caution that miscegenation, often touted as the universal panacea to racism simply because, if practiced sufficiently widely, it would eventually eliminate all racial differences, or at least blur the lines between racial groups, may actually, at least in the short-term, actually incite racist attacks. 

This, they argue, is because: 

Viewed from the racial solidarist perspective, intermarriage is an act of race war. Every ovum that is impregnated by the sperm of a member of a different race is one less of that precious commodity to be impregnated by a member of its own race and thereby ensure its survival” (Race: The Reality of Human Differences: p256) 

This “racial solidarist perspective” is, of course, a crudely group selectionist view of Darwinian competition, and it leads Sarich and Miele to hypothesize: 

Paradoxically, intermarriage, particularly of females of the majority group with males of a minority group, is the factor most likely to cause some extremist terrorist group to feel the need to launch such an attack” (Race: The Reality of Human Differences: p255). 

In other words, in sociobiological terms, ‘Robert’, a character from one of Michel Houellebecq’s novels, has it right when he claims: 

What is really at stake in racial struggles… is neither economic nor cultural, it is brutal and biological: It is competition for the cunts of young women” (Platform: p82). 

Endnotes

[1] Admittedly, the Croatian War of Independence is indeed sometimes said to have been triggered, or at least precipitated, by a football match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade, and the riot that occurred at the ground on that day. However, this war was, of course, ethnic in origin, fought between Croats and Serbians, and the football match served as a triggering event only because the two teams were overwhelmingly supported by Croats and Serbians respectively.
This leads to an interesting observation – namely that rivalries such as those between supporters of different football teams tend to become especially malignant and acrimonious when support for one team or the other comes to be inextricably linked to ethnic identity.
Thus it is surely no accident that, in the UK, the most intense rivalry between groups of football supporters is that between between supporters of Ragners and Celtic in Glasgow, at least in part because the rivalry has become linked to religion, which was, at least until recently, a marker for ancestry and ethnicity, while an apparently even more intense rivalry was that between Linfield and Belfast Celtic in Northern Ireland, which was also based on a parallel religious and ethnic divide, and ultimately became so acrimonious that one of the two teams had to withdraw from domestic football and ultimately ceased to exist.

[2] Actually, however, contrary to Brigandt’s critique, it is clear that van den Berghe intended his “biological golden rule” only as a catchy and memorable aphorism, crudely summarizing Hamilton’s rule, rather than a quantitative scientific law akin to, or rivalling, Hamilton’s Rule itself. Therefore, this aspect of Brigandt’s critique is, in my view, misplaced. Indeed, it is difficult to see how this supposed rule could be applied as a quantitative scientific law, since relatedness, on the one hand, and altruism, on the other, are measured in different currencies. 

[3] Thus, van den Berghe concedes that: 

In many cases, the common descent acribed to an ethny is fictive. In fact, in most cases, it is partly fictive” (p27). 

[4] The question of racial nationalism (i.e. encompassing all members of a given race, not just those of a single ethnicity or language group) is actually more complex. Certainly, members of the same race do indeed share some degree of kinship, in so far as they are indeed (almost by definition) on average more closely biologically related to one another than to members of other races – and indeed that relatedness is obviously apparent in their phenotypic resemblance to one another. This suggests that racial nationalist movements such as that of, say, UNIA or of the Japanese imperialists, might have more potential as a viable form of nationalism than do attempts to unite racially disparate ethnicities, such as civic nationalism in the contemporary USA. The same may also be true of Oswald Mosley’s Europe a Nation campaign, at least while Europe remained primarily monoracial (i.e. white). However, any such racial nationalism would incorporate a far larger and more culturally, linguistically and genetically disparate group than any form of nationalism that has previously proven capable of mobilizing support.
Thus, Marcus Garvey’s attempt to create a kind of pan-African ethnic identity enjoyed little success and was largely restricted to North America, where African-Americans, do indeed share a common language and culture in addition to their race. Similarly, the efforts of Japanese nationalists to mobilize a kind of pan-Asian nationalism in support of their imperial aspirations during the first half of the twentieth century was an unmitigated failure, though this was partly because of the brutality with which they conquered and suppressed the other Asian nationalities whose support for pan-Asianism they intermittently and half-heartedly sought to enlist.
On the other hand, it is sometimes suggested that, in the early twentieth century, a white supremacist ideology was largely taken for granted among whites. However, while to some extent true, this shared ideology of white supremacism did not prevent the untold devastation wrought by the European wars of the early twentieth century, namely World Wars I and II, which Patrick Buchanan has collectively termed The Great Civil War of the West.
Thus, European nationalisms usually defined themselves by opposition to other European peoples and powers. Thus, just as Irish nationalism is defined largely by opposition to Britain, and Scottish nationalism by opposition to England, so English (and British) nationalism has itself traditionally been directed against rival European powers such as France and Germany (and formerly Spain), while French nationalism seems to have defined itself primarily in opposition to the Germans and the British, and German nationalism in opposition to the French and Slavs, etc.
It is true that, in the USA, a kind of pan-white American nationalism did seem to prevail in the early twentieth century, albeit initially limited to white protestants, and excluding at least some recent European immigrants (e.g. Italians, Jews). This is, however, a consequence of the so-called melting pot, and really only amounts to yet another parochial nationalism, namely that of a newly-formed ethnic group – white Americans.
At any rate, today white American nationalism is, at most, decidedly muted in form – a kind of implicit white racial consciousness, or, to coin a phrase, the nationalism that dare not speak its name. Thus, Van den Berghe observes: 

In the United States, the whites are an overwhelming majority, so much so that they cannot be meaningfully conceived of as a ruling group at all. The label ‘white’ in the United States does not correspond to a well-defined ethnic or racial group with a high degree of social organization or even self-consciousness, except regionally in the south” (p183). 

Van den Berghe wrote this in 1981. Today, of course, whites are no longer such an “overwhelming majority” of the US population. On the contrary, they are already well on the way to becoming a minority in America, a milestone that is likely to be reached over the coming decades.
Yet, curiously, white ‘racially consciousness’ is seemingly even more muted and implicit today than it was back when van den Berghe authored his book – and this is seen even in the South, which van den Berghe cited as an exception and lone bastion of white identity politics.
True, White Southerners may vote as a solidly for Republican candidates as they once did for the Democrats. However, overt appeals to white racial interests are now as anathema in the South as elsewhere.
Thus, as recently as 1990, a more or less open white racialist like David Duke was able to win a majority of the white vote in Louisiana in his run for the Senate. Today, this is unimaginable.
If the reason that whites lack any ‘racial consciousness’ is indeed, as van den Berghe claims, because they represent such an “overwhelming majority” of the American population, then it is interesting to speculate if and when, during the ongoing process of white demographic displacement, this will cease to be the case.
One thing seems certain: If and when it does ever occur, it will be too late to make any difference to the ongoing process of demographic displacement that some have termed ‘The Great Replacement’ or a third demographic transition.

[5] Of course, a preference for those who look similar to oneself (or one’s other relatives) may itself function as a form of kin recognition (i.e. of recognizing who is kin and who is not). This is referred to in biology as phenotype matching. Moreover, as Richard Dawkins has speculated in The Selfish Gene (reviewed here), racial feeling could conceivably have evolved through a misfiring of such a crude heuristic (The Selfish Gene: p100).

[6] Actually, I suspect that, on average, at least historically, both mothers and fathers may indeed, on average, have provided rather less care for their mixed-race offspring than for offspring of the same race as themselves, simply because mixed-race offspring were more likely to be born out of wedlock, not least because interracial marriage was, until recently, strongly frowned upon, and, in some jurisdictions, either not legally permitted or even outright criminalized, and both mothers and fathers tended to provide less care for illegitimate offspring, fathers because they often refused to acknowledge their illegitimate offspring and had little or no contact with them and may not even have been aware of their existence, and mothers because, lacking paternal support, they usually had no means of raising their illegitimate offspring alone and hence often gave them up for adoption or fostering.

[7] On the other hand, in his paper, An integrated evolutionary perspective on ethnicity, controversial antiSemitic evolutionary psychologist Kevin Macdonald disagrees with this conclusion, citing personal communication from geneticist and anthropologist Henry Harpending for the argument that: 

Long distance migrations have easily occurred on foot and over several generations, bringing people who look different for genetic reasons into contact with each other. Examples include the Bantu in South Africa living close to the Khoisans, or the pygmies living close to non-pygmies. The various groups in Rwanda and Burundi look quite different and came into contact with each other on foot. Harpending notes that it is ‘very likely’ that such encounters between peoples who look different for genetic reasons have been common for the last 40,000 years of human history; the view that humans were mostly sessile and living at a static carrying capacity is contradicted by history and by archaeology. Harpending points instead to ‘starbursts of population expansion’. For example, the Inuits settled in the arctic and exterminated the Dorsets within a few hundred years; the Bantu expansion into central and southern Africa happened in a millennium or less, prior to which Africa was mostly the yellow (i.e., Khoisan) continent, not the black continent. Other examples include the Han expansion in China, the Numic expansion in northern America, the Zulu expansion in southern Africa during the last few centuries, and the present day expansion of the Yanomamo in South America. There has also been a long history of invasions of Europe from the east. ‘In the starburst world people would have had plenty of contact with very different looking people’” (Macdonald 2001: p70). 

[8] Others have argued that the differences between Tutsi and Hutu are indeed largely a western creation, part of the divide and rule strategy supposedly deliberately employed by European colonialists, as well as a theory of Tutsi racial superiority promulgated by European racial anthropologists known as the Hamitic theory of Tutsi origins, which suggested that the Tutsi had migrated from the Horn of Africa, and had benefited from Caucasoid ancestry, as reflected in their supposed physiological differences from the indigenous Hutu (e.g. lighter complexions, greater height, narrower noses).
On this view, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was originally primarily socioeconomic rather than racial, and, at least formerly, the boundaries between the two groups were quite fluid.
I suspect this view is nonsense, reflecting political correctness and the leftist tendency to excuse any evidence of dysfunction or oppression in non-Western cultures as necessarily of product of the malign influence of western colonizers. (Most preposterously, even the Indian caste system has been blamed on British colonizers, although it actually predated them, in one form or another, by several thousand years.)
With respect to the division between Tutsi and Hutu, there are not only morphological differences between the two groups in average stature, nose width and complexion, but also substantial differences in the prevalence of genes for lactose tolerance and sickle-cell. These results do indeed seem to suggest that, as predicted by the reviled ‘Hamitic theory’, the Tutsi do indeed have affinities with populations from the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Modern genome analysis tends to confirm this conclusion. 

[9] Exceptions, where immigrant groups retain their distinctive language for multiple generations, occur where immigrants speaking a particular language arrive in sufficient numbers, and are sufficiently isolated in ethnic enclaves and ghettos, that they mix primarily or exclusively with people speaking the same language as themselves. A related exception is in respect of economically, politically or socially dominant minorities, such as alien colonizers, as well as market-dominant or middleman minorities, who often resist assimilation into the mainstream culture precisely so as to maintain their cultural separateness and hence their privileged position within society, and who also, partly for this reason, take steps to socialize, and ensure their offspring socialize, primarily among their own group. 

[10] Some German-Americans were also interred during World War II. However, far fewer were interred than among Japanese-Americans, especially on a per capita basis.
Nevertheless, some German-Americans were treated very badly indeed, yet the latter, unlike the Japanese, have yet to receive a government apology or compensation. Moreover, there was perhaps justification for the differing treatment accorded Japanese- and German-Americans, since the latter were generally longer established and, being white, were also more successfully integrated into mainstream American society, and there was perceived to be a real threat of enemy sabotage.
Also, with regard to van den Berghe’s observation that nuclear atomic weapons were used only against Japan, this is rather misleading. Nuclear weapons could not have been used against Germany, since, by the time of the first test detonation of a nuclear device, Germany had already surrendered. Yet, in fact, the Manhattan Project seems to have been begun with the Germans very much in mind as a prospective target. (Many of the scientists involved were Jewish, many having fled Nazi-occupied Europe for America, and hence their hostility towards the Nazis, and perhaps Germans in general, is easy to understand.)
Whether it is true that, as van den Berghe claims, atomic bombs were never actually likely to be “dropped over, say, Stuttgart or Dortmund” is a matter of supposition. Certainly, there were great animosity towards the Germans in America, as illustrated by the Morgenthau Plan, which, although ultimately never put into practice, was initially highly influential in directing US policy in Europe and even supported by President Roosevelt.
On the other hand, Roosevelt’s references to ‘the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Japanese’ might simply reflect the fact that there was no obvious name for the faction or regime in control of Japan during the Second World War, since, unlike in Germany and Italy, no named political party had seized power. I am therefore unconvinced that a great deal can necessarily be read into this.

[11] This was especially so in historical times, before the development of improved technologies of long-distance transportation (ships, aeroplanes) enabled more distantly related populations to come into contact, and hence conflict with one another (e.g. blacks and whites in the USA and South Africa, South Asians and English in the UK or under the British Raj). Thus, the ancient Indian treatise on statecraft and strategy, Arthashastra, observed that a ruler’s natural enemies are his immediate neighbours, whereas his next-but-one neighbours, being immediate neighbours of his own immediate neighbours, are his natural allies. This is sometimes credited as the origin of the famous aphorism, The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

[12]  The idea that neighbouring groups tend to be in conflict with one another precisely because, being neighbours, they are also in close contact, and hence competition, with one another, ironically posits almost the exact opposite relationship between ‘contact’ and intergroup relations than that posited by the famous contact theory of mid-twentieth psychology, which posited that increased contact between members of different racial and ethnic groups would lead to reduced prejudice and animosity.
This, of course, depends, at least partly, on the nature of the ‘contact’ in question. Contact that involves territorial rivalry, economic competition and war, obviously exacerbates conflict and animosity. In contrast, proponents of contact theory typically had in mind personal contact, rather than, say, the sort of impersonal, but often deadly, contact that occurs between rival belligerent combatants in wartime.
In fact, however, even at the personal level, contact can take many different forms, and often functions to increase inter-ethnic animosity. Hence the famous proverb, ‘familiarity breeds contempt’.
Indeed, social psychologists now concede that only ‘positive’ interactions with members with members of other groups (e.g. friendship, cooperation, acts of altruism, mutually beneficial trade) reduces animosity and conflict.
In contrast, negative interactions (e.g. being robbed, mugged or attacked by members of another group) only serves to reinforce, exacerbate, or indeed create intergroup animosity. This, of course, reduces the contact hypothesis to little more than common sense – positive experiences with a given group lead to positive perceptions of that group; negative interactions to negative perceptions.
This in turn suggests that stereotypes are often based on real experiences and therefore tend to be true – if not of all individuals, then at least at the statistical, aggregate group level.
I would add that, anecdotally, even positive interactions with members of disdained outgroups do not always shift perceptions regarded the disdained outgroup as a whole. Instead, the individuals with whom one enjoys positive interactions, and even friendships, are often seen as exceptions to the rule (‘one of the good ones’), rather than representative of the demographic to which they belong. Hence the familiar phenomenon of even virulent racists having friendships and sometimes even heroes among members of races whom they generally otherwise disdain. 

[13] However, Van den Berghe acknowledges that racially diverse societies have lived in “relative harmony” in places such as Latin America, where government gives no formal political recognition to racial groups (e.g. racial preferences and quotas for members of certain races) and where the latter do not organize on a racial basis, such that government is, in van den Berghe’s terminology, “non-racial” rather than “multiracial” (p190). However, this is perhaps a naïvely benign view of race relations in Latin American countries such as Brazil, which is, despite the fluidity of racial identity and lack of clear dividing lines between races, nevertheless now viewed by most social scientists, not so much as a model racial democracy, so much as a racially-stratified pigmentocracy , where skin tone correlates with social status. It is also arguably an outdated view of race relations in Latin America, because, perhaps due to indirect cultural and political influence emanating from the USA, ethnic groups in much of Latin America (e.g. blacks in Brazil, indigenous populations in Bolivia) increasingly do organize and agitate on a racial basis.

[14] I am careful here not to refer to refer the dominant culture as that of either a ‘host population’ or a ‘majority population’, or the subordinate group as a ‘minority group’ or an incoming group of migrants. This is because sometimes newly-arrived settlers successfully assimilate the indigenous populations among whom they settle, and sometimes it is the majority group who ultimately assimilate to the norms and culture of the minority. Thus, for example, the Anglo-Saxons imposed their Germanic language on the indigenous inhabitants of what is today England, and indeed ultimately most of the inhabitants of Scotland, Wales and Ireland as well, even though they likely never represented a majority of the population even in England, and may have made only a comparatively modest contribution to the ancestry of the people whom we today call ‘English’.

[15] Interestingly, and no doubt controversially, Van den Berghe argues that blacks in the USA do not have any distinctive cultural traits that distinguish them from the white American mainstream, and that their successful assimilation has been prevented only by the fact that, until very recently, whites have refused to ‘assimilate’ them. He is particularly skeptical regarding the notion of any cultural inheritances from Africa, dismissing “the romantic search for survivals of African Culture” as “elusive” (p177).
Indeed, for van den Berghe, the whole notion of a distinct African-American culture is “largely ideological and romantic” (p177). “Afro-Americans are,” he argues, “culturally ‘Anglo-Saxon’” and hence paradoxically ”as Anglo as anyone… in America” (p177). He concludes:

The case for ‘black culture’ rests… largely on the northern ghetto lumpenproletariat, a class which has no direct counterpart. Even in that group, however, much of the distinctiveness is traceable to their southern, rural origins” (p177). 

This reference to “southern rural origins” anticipates Thomas Sowell’s later black redneck hypothesis. Certainly, many aspects of black culture, such as dialect (e.g. the use of terms such as y’all and ain’t and the pronunciation of ‘whores’ as ‘hoes’) and stereotypical fondness for fried chicken, are obvious inheritances from Southern culture rather than distinctively black, let alone an inheritance from Africa. Thus, van den Berghe observes:

Ghetto lumpenproletariat blacks in Chicago, Detroit and New York may seem to have a distinct subculture of their own compared collectively to their white neighbors, but the black Mississippi sharecropper is not very different, except for his skin pigment, from his white counterparts” (p177). 

Any remaining differences not attributable to their Southern origins are, van den Berghe claims, not “African survivals, but adaptation to stigma” (p177). Here, van den Berghe perhaps has in mind the inverse morality, celebration of criminality, and bad nigger’ archetype prevalent in, for example, gangsta rap music. Thus, van den Berghe concludes that: 

Afro-Americans owe their distinctiveness overwhelmingly to the fact that they have been first enslaved and then stigmatized as a pariah group. They lack a territorial base, the necessary economic, and political resources and the cultural and linguistic pluralism ever to constitute a successful nation. Their pluralism is strictly a structural pluralism inflicted on them by racism. A stigma is hardly an adequate basis for successful nationalism” (p184). 

[16] Thus, Elizabeth Warren was a law professor who became a Democratic Party Senator and Presidential candidate, and had described herself as ‘American Indian, and been cited by her University employers as an ethnic minority, in order to benefit from informal affirmative action, despite having only a very small amount of Native American ancestry. Krug and Dolezal, meanwhile, taking advantage of the one drop rule, both identified as African-American, Krug, a history professor and leftist activist, taking advantage of her Middle-Eastern appearance, itself likely a reflection of her Jewish ancestry. Dolezal, however, was formerly a white, blonde girl, but, through the simple expedient of getting a perm and tan, managed to become an adjunct professor of black studies at a local university and local chapter president of the NAACP in an overwhelmingly white town and state. Whoever said blondes have more fun? 

[17] It has even given rise to a popular new hairstyle among young white males attempting to escape the stigma of whiteness by adopting a racially ambiguous appearance – the mulatto perm

[18] Interestingly, the examples cited by Paddy Hannam in his piece on the phenomenon, The rise of the race fakers also seem to have been female (Hannam 2021). Steve Sailer wisely counsels caution with regard to the findings of this study, noting that anyone willing to lie about their ethnicity on their college application, is also likely even more willing to lie in an anonymous survey (Sailer 2021 ; see also Hood 2007). 

[19] Actually, the Northern Ireland settlement is often classed as centripetalist rather than consociationalist. However, the distinction is minimal, with the former arrangement representing a modification of the latter designed to encourage cross-community cooperation, and prevent, or at least mitigate, the institutionalization and ossification of the ethnic divide that is perceived to occur under consociationalism, where constitutional recognition is accorded to the divide between the two (or more) communities. There is, however, little evidence that centripetalism have ever actually been successful in encouraging cross-community cooperation, beyond what is necessitated by the consitutional system, let alone encouraging assimilation of the rival communities and the depoliticization of ethnic identity. 

[20] The reason for the difference in the attitudes of leftists and liberals towards majority-rule in Northern Ireland and South Africa respectively seems to reflect the fact that, whereas in Northern Ireland, the majority protestant population were perceived of as the dominant oppressor’ group, the black majority in South Africa were perceived of as oppressed.
However, it is hard to see why this would mean black majority-rule in South Africa would be any less oppressive of South Africa’s white, coloured, and Asian minorities than Protestant majority rule had been of Catholics in Ulster. On the contrary, precisely because the black majority in South Africa perceive themselves as having been ‘oppressed’ in the past, they are likely to be especially vengeful and feel justified in seeking recompense for their earlier perceived oppression. This indeed seems to be what is occurring in South Africa, and Zimbabwe, today. 
Interestingly, van den Berghe, writing in 1981 was wisely prophetic regarding the long-term prospects for both apartheid – and for white South Africans. Thus, on the one hand he predicted: 

Past experience with decolonization elsewhere in Africa, especially in Zimbabwe (which is in almost every respect a miniature version of South Africa) seems to indicate that the end of white domination is in sight. The only question is whether it will take the form of a prolonged civil war, a negotiated partition or a frantic white exodus. The odds favor, I think, a long escalating war of attrition accompanied by a gradual economic winddown and a growing white emigration” (p174). 

Thus, van den Berghe was right in so far as he predicted the looming end of the apartheid system – though hardly unique in making this prediction. However, he was wrong in his predictions as to how this end would come about. On the other hand, however, with ongoing farm murders and the overtly genocidal rhetoric of populist politicians like Julius Malema, van den Berghe was probably right regarding the long-term prognosis of the white community in South Africa when he observed: 

Five million whites perched precariously at the tip of a continent inhabited by 400 millions blacks, with no friends in sight. No matter what happens whites will lose heavily, perhaps their very lives, or at least their place in the African sun that they love so much” (p172). 

However, perhaps surprisingly, van den Berghe denies that apartheid was entirely a failure: 

Although apartheid failed in the end, it was a rational course for the Afrikaners to take, given their collective aims, and probably did postpone the day of reckoning by about 30 years” (p174).

[21] The only other polity that perhaps has a competing claim to representing the world’s model consociationalist democracy is Switzerland. However, van den Berghe emphasizes that Switzerland is very much a special case, the secret of its success being that:

Switzerland is one of those rare multiethnic states that did not originate either in conquest or in the breakdown of multinational empires” (p194).

It managed to avoid conquest by its richer and more powerful neighbours simply because:

The Swiss had the dual advantage in resisting outside conquest: favorable terrain and lack of natural resources” (p194)

Also, it provided valuable services to these neighbours, first providing mercenaries to fight in their armed forces and later specialising in the manufacture of watches and what van den Berghe terms “the management of shady foreigners’ ill-gotten capital” (p194).
In reality, however, although divided linguistically and religiously, Switzerland does not, in van den Berghe’s constitute true consociationalism, since the country, with originated as confederation of fomerly independent hill tribes, remains highly decentralized, and power is shared, not by ethnic groups, but rather between regional cantons. Therefore, van den Berghe concludes:

The ethnic diversity of Switzerland is only incidental to the federalism, it does not constitute the basis for it” (p196-7).

In addition, most cantons, where much of the real power lies, are themselves relatively monoethnic and monoliguistic, at least as compared to the country as a whole.

[22] Indeed, since the Slavs of Eastern Europe were the last group in Europe to be converted to Christianity, and it was forbidden by Papal decree to enslave fellow-Christians or sell Christian slaves to non-Christians (i.e. Muslims, among whom there was a great demand for European slaves), Slavs were preferentially targeted by Christians for enslavement, and even those non-Slavic people who were enslaved or sold into bondage were often falsely described as Slavs in order to justify their enslavement and sale to Muslim slaveholders. The Slavs, for geographic reasons, were also vulnerable to capture and enslavement directly by the Muslims themselves.

[23] Another reason that it proved difficult to enslave the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas, according to van den Berghe, is the lifestyle of the latter prior to colonization. Thus, prior to the arrival of Euopean colonists, the indigenous people in many parts of the Americas were still relatively primitive, many subsisting, in whole or in part, as nomadic or semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers. This meant, not only that they had low population densities and were hence few in number and vulnerable to infectious diseases introduced by European colonizers, but also that:

Such aborigines as existed were mobile, elusive and difficult to control. They typically had a vast hinterland into which they could escape labor exploitation” (p93).

Thus, van den Berghe reports, when, in what is today Brazil, Portuguese colonists led raiding expeditions in an attempt to capture and enslave natives, so many of the latter “escaped, committed suicide or died of disease” that the attempt was soon abandoned (p93).
Perhaps more interestingly, van den Berghe also argues that another reason that it proved difficult to enslave nomadic peoples was that:

Nomads typically are unused to being exploited since their own societies are often relatively egalitarian, ill-adapted to steady hard labor and lacking in the skills useful to colonial exploiters (as cultivators, for example). They are, in short, lovers of freedom and make very poor colonial underlings… They are regarded by their conquerors as lazy, shiftless and unreliable, as an obstacle to development and as a nuisance to be displaced” (p93).

In contrast, whereas sub-Saharan Africa is usually stereotyped, not entirely inaccurately, as technologically backward as compared to other cultures, and this very backwardness as facilitating their enslavement, in fact, van den Berghe explains, it was the relatively socially advanced nature of West African societies that permitted the transatlantic slave trade to be so successful.

Contrary to general opinion, Africans were so successfully enslaved, not because they belonged to primitive cultures, but because they had a complex enough technology and social organization to sustain heavy losses of manpower without appreciable depopulation. Even the heavy slaving of the 18th century made only a slight impact on the demography of West Africa. The most heavily raided areas are still today among the most densely populated” (p126).

[24] Although this review is based on the 1987 edition, The Ethnic Phenomenon was first published in 1981, whereas Orlando Peterson’s Slavery and Social Death came out just a year later in 1982.

[25] In the antebellum American South, much is made of the practice of slave-owners selling the spouses and offspring of their slaves to other masters, thereby breaking up families. On the basis of van den Berghe’s arguments, this might actually have represented an effective means of preventing slaves from putting down roots and developing families and slave communities, and might therefore have helped perpetuate the institution of slavery.
However, even assuming that such practices would indeed have had this effect, it is doubtful that there was any such deliberate long-term policy among slaveholders to break up families in this way. On the contrary, van den Berghe reports:

It is not true that slave owners systematically broke up slave couples… On the contrary, it was in their interest to foster stable slave families for the sake of morale, and to discourage escape” (p133). 

Thus, though it certainly occurred and may indeed have been tragic where it did occur, slaveholders generally preferred to keep slave families intact, precisely because, in forming families, slaves would indeed ‘put down roots’ and hence be less likely to try to escape, lest, in the process, they would leave other family members behind to face the vengeance of their former owners alone and without any protection and support they might otherwise have been in a position to offer. The threat of breaking up families, however, surely remained a useful tool in the arsenal of slaveholders to maintain control over slaves. 

[26] While acknowledging, and indeed emphasizing, the virulence of western racialism, van den Berghe, bemoaning the intrusion of “moralism” (and, by extension, ethnomasochism) into scholarship, has little time for the notion that western slavery was intrinsically more malign than forms of slavery practised in other parts of the world or at other times in history (p116). This, he dismisses as “the guilt ascription game: whose slavery was worse?” (p128).
Whereas today, when discussing slavery, white liberal ethnomasochists focus almost exclusively on black slaves in the American South, forms of slavery practised concurrently in other parts of the world were, in many respects, even more brutal. For example, male slaves in the Islamic world were routinely castrated before being sold (p117). 
Given the dangers of this procedure, and the unsterile conditions under which it was performed, Thomas Sowell, in his excellent essay ‘The Real History of Slavery’, reports that “the great majority of those operated on died as a result” (Black Rednecks and White Liberals: p126). Indeed, van den Berghe himself reports that as many as “80 to 90% died of the operation” (p117).
In contrast, while it is true that slaves in the American South had unusually low rates of manumission (i.e. the granting of freedom to slaves), they also enjoyed surprisingly high standards of living, were well-fed and enjoyed long lives. Indeed, not only did slaves in the American South enjoy standards of living superior to those of most other slave populations, they even enjoyed, by some measures, living standards comparable to many non-slave populations, including industrial workers in Europe and the Northern United States, and poor white Southerners, during the same time period (The End of Racism: p88-91; see also Time on the Cross: the Economics of American Slavery). 
Ironically, living standards were so high for the very same reason that rates of manumission were so low – namely, slaves, especially after the abolition and suppression of the transatlantic slave-trade (but also even before then due to the costs of transportation during the Middle Passage) were an expensive commodity. Masters therefore fully intended to get their money’s worth out of their slaves, not only by rarely granting them their freedom, but also ensuring that they lived a long and healthy life.
In this endeavour, they were surprisingly successful. Thus, van den Berghe reports, in the fifty years that followed the prohibition on the import of new slaves into the USA in 1908, the black population of the USA nevertheless more than tripled (p128). In short, slaves may have been property, but they were valuable property – and slaveholders made every effort to protect their investment.
Ironically, therefore, indentured servants (themselves, in America, often white, and later, in Africa, usually South or East Asian) were, during the period of their indenture, often worked harder, and forced to live in worse conditions, than were actual slaves. This was because, since they were indentured for only a set number of years before they would be free, there was less incentive on the part of their owners to ensure that they lived a long and healthy life.
For example, Thomas Sowell reports how, in the antebelum American South, the most dangerous work on cotton plantations was often reserved for Irish labourers, not slaves, precisely because slaves were too valuable to be risked by employing them in such work (Applied Economics: p37-38).
Van den Berghe concludes: 

“The blanket ascription of collective racial guilt for slavery to ‘whites’ that is so dear to many liberal social scientists is itself a product of the racist mentality produced by slavery. It takes a racist to ascribe causality and guilt to racial categories” (p130). 

Indeed, as Dinesh D’Souza in The End of Racism and Thomas Sowell in his essay ‘The Real History of Slavery’, included in the collection Black Rednecks and White Liberals, both emphasize, whereas all civilizations have practised slavery, what was unique about western civilization was that it was the first civilization ever known to have abolished slavery (at, as it ultimately turned out, no little economic cost to itself).
Therefore, even if liberals and leftists do insist that we play what van den Berghe disparagingly calls “the guilt ascription game”, then white westerners actually come out rather well in the comparison.
As Thomas Sowell observes in this context:

Often it is those who are most critical of a ‘Eurocentric’ view of the world who are most Eurocentric when it comes to the evils and failings of the human race” (Black Rednecks and White Liberals p111).

[27] Indeed, in most cultures and throughout most of history, the use of female slaves as concubines was, not only widespread, but also perfectly socially acceptable. For example, in the Islamic world, the use of female slaves as concubines was entirely open and accepted, not only attracting literally no censure or criticism in the wider society or culture, but also receiving explicit prophetic sanction in the Quran. For this reason, in the Islamic world, females slaves tended to be in greater demand than males, and usually commanded a higher price.
In contrast, most slaves transported to the Americas were male, since males were more useful for hard, intensive agricultural labour and, in puritanical North America, sexual contact with between slaveholder and slave was very much frowned upon, even though it certainly occurred. Thus, van den Berghe cynically observes:  

Concubinage with slaves was somewhat more clandestine and hypocritical in the English and Dutch colonies than in the Spanish, Portuguese and French colonies where it was brazen, but there is no evidence that the actual incidence of interbreeding was any higher in the Catholic countries” (p132). 

Partial corroboration for this claim is provided by historian Eugene Genovese, who, in his book Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made, reports that, in New Orleans slave markets:

First-class blacksmiths were being sold for $2,500 and prime field hands for about $1,800, but a particularly beautiful girl or young woman might bring $5,000” (Roll, Jordan, Roll: p416).

[28] Actually, exploitation can still be an adaptive strategy, even in respect of close biological relatives. This depends of the precise relative gain and loss in fitness to both the exploiter (the slave owner) and his victim (the slave), and their respective coefficient of relatedness, in accordance with Hamilton’s rule. Thus, it is possible that a slaveholder’s genes may benefit more from continuing to exploit his slaves as slaves than by freeing them, even if the latter are also his kin. Possibly the best strategy will often be a compromise of, say, keeping your slave-kin in bondage, but treating them rather better than other non-related slaves, or freeing them after your death in your will. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that individual slaveholders consciously (or subconsciously) perform such a calculation, nor even that their actual behaviour is usually adaptive (see the Sahlins fallacy, discussed here). Slaveholding is likely an ‘environmental novelty’ to which we are yet to have evolved adaptive responses

[29] Others suggest that Thomas Jefferson himself did not father any offspring with Sally Hemmings and that the more likely father is Jefferson’s wayward younger brother Randolph, who would, of course, share the same Y chromosome as his elder brother. For present purposes, this is not especially important, since, either way, Heming’s offspring would be blood relatives of Jefferson to some degree, hence likely influencing his decision to free them or permit them to escape.

[30] Quite how this destruction can be expected to have manifested itself is not spelt out by van den Berghe. Perhaps, with each passing generation, as slaves became more and more closely biologically related to their masters, more and more slaves would have been freed until there were simply no more left. Alternatively, perhaps, as slaves and slaveowners increasingly became biological kin to one another, the institution of slavery would gradually have become less oppressive and exploitative until ultimately it ceased to constitute true slavery at all. At any rate, in the Southern United States this (supposed) process was forestalled by the American Civil War and Emancipation Proclamation, and neither does it appear to have occurred in Latin America.  

[31] Another area of conflict between Marxism and Darwinism is the assumption of the former that somehow all conflict and exploitation will end in a future posited communist utopia. Curiously, although healthily cynical about exploitation under Soviet-style communism (p60), van den Berghe describes himself as an anarchist (van den Berghe 2005). However, anarchism seems even more hopelessly utopian than communism, given humanity’s innate sociality and desire to exploit reproductive competitors. In short, a Hobbesian state of nature is surely no one’s utopia (except perhaps Ragnar Redbeard). 

[32] The idea that there is “ambivalence in relations between black men and women in America” seems anecdotally plausible, given, for example, the delightfully misogynistic lyrics found in much African-American rap music. However, it is difficult to see how this could be a legacy of the plantation era, when everyone alive today is several generations removed from that era and living in a very different sexual and racial milieu. Today, black men do rather better in the mating market place than do black women, with black men being much more likely to marry non-black women than black women are to marry non-black men, suggesting that black men have a larger dating pool from which to choose (Sailer 1997; Fryer 2007).
Moreover, black men and women in America today are, of course, the descendants of both men and women. Therefore, even if black women did have a better time of it that black men in the plantation era, how would black male resentment be passed down the generations to black men today, especially given that most black men are today raised primarily by their mothers in single-parent homes and often have little or no contact with their fathers?

[33] Indeed, being perceived as attractive, or at least not as ugly, seems to be rather more important to most women that does being perceived as intelligent. Therefore, the question of race differences in attractiveness is seemingly almost as controversial as that of race differences in intelligence. This, then, leads to the delightfully sexist Sailer’s first law of female journalism, which posits that: 

The most heartfelt articles by female journalists tend to be demands that social values be overturned in order that, Come the Revolution, the journalist herself will be considered hotter-looking.” 

[34] A popular alt-right meme has it that there are literally no white-on-black rapes. This is, of course, untrue, and reflects the misreading of a table in a US departnment of Justice report that actually involved only a small sample. In fact, the government does not currently release data on the prevalence of interracial rape. Nevertheless, the US Department of Justice report (mis)cited by some white nationalists does indeed suggest that black-on-white rape is much more common than white-on-black rape in the contemporary USA, a conclusion corroborated by copious other data (e.g. Lebeau 1985).
Thus, in his book Paved with Good Intentions, Jared Taylor reports:

“In a 1974 study in Denver, 40 percent of all rapes were of whites by blacks, and not one case of white-on-black-rape was found. In general, through the 1970s, black-on-white rape was at last ten times more common than white-on-black rape… In 1988 there were 9,406 cases of black-on-white rape and fewer than ten cases of white-on-black rape. Another researcher concludes that in 1989, blacks were three or four times more likely to commit rape than whites and that black men raped white women thirty times as often as white men raped black women” (Paved with Good Intentions: p93). 

Indeed, the authors of one recent textbook on criminology even claim that: 

“Some researchers have suggested, because of the frequency with which African Americans select white victims (about 55 percent of the time), it [rape] could be considered an interracial crime” (Criminology: A Global Perspective: p544). 

Similarly, in the US prison system, where male-male rape is endemic, such assaults disproportionately involve non-white assaults on white inmates, as discussed by the Human Rights Watch report, No Escape: Male Rape in US Prisons

References

Brigandt (2001) The homeopathy of kin selection: an evaluation of van den Berghe’s sociobiological approach to ethnicity. Politics and the Life Sciences 20: 203-215. 
Feinman & Gill (1977) Sex differences in physical attractiveness preferences, Journal of Social Psychology 105(1): 43-52. 
Frost (2008) Sexual selection and human geographic variation. Special Issue: Proceedings of the ND Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Evolutionary Psychology Society. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 2(4): 169-191 
Fryer (2007) Guess Who’s Been Coming to Dinner? Trends in Interracial Marriage over the 20th Century, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), pp. 71-90 
Hannam (2021) The rise of the race fakers. Spiked-Online.com, 5 November. 
Hamilton (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II, Journal of Theoretical Biology 7:1-16,17-52. 
Hood (2017) The privilege no one wants, American Renaissance, December 11.
Johnson (1986) Kin selection, socialization and patriotism. Politics and the Life Sciences 4(2): 127-154. 
Johnson (1987) In the Name of the Fatherland: An Analysis of Kin Term Usage in Patriotic Speech and Literature. International Political Science Review 8(2): 165-174.
Johnson, Ratwik and Sawyer (1987) The evocative significance of kin terms in patriotic speech pp157-174 in Reynolds, Falger and Vine (eds) The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism (London: Croom Helm). 
Lebeau (1985) Rape and Racial Patterns. Journal of Offender Counseling Services Rehabilitation, 9(1- 2): 125-148 
Lewis (2011) Who is the fairest of them all? Race, attractiveness and skin color sexual dimorphism. Personality & Individual Differences 50(2): 159-162. 
Lewis (2012) A Facial Attractiveness Account of Gender Asymmetries in Interracial Marriage PLoS One. 2012; 7(2): e31703. 
Lind et al (2007) Elevated male European and female African contributions to the genomes of African American individuals. Human Genetics 120(5) 713-722 
Macdonald 2001 An integrative evolutionary perspective on ethnicity. Poiltics & the Life Sciences 20(1):67-8. 
Rushton (1998a). Genetic similarity theory, ethnocentrism, and group selection. In I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt & F. K. Salter (Eds.), Indoctrinability, Warfare, and Ideology: Evolutionary perspectives (pp. 369-388). Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Rushton (1998b). Genetic similarity theory and the roots of ethnic conflict. Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 23, 477-486. 
Rushton, (2005) Ethnic Nationalism, Evolutionary Psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory, Nations and Nationalism 11(4): 489-507. 
Sailer (1997) Is love colorblind? National Review, July 14. 
Sailer (2021) Do 48% of White Male College Applicants Lie About Their Race? Interesting, if It Replicates. Unz Review, October 21. 
Salmon (1998) The Evocative Nature of Kin Terminology in Political Rhetoric. Politics & the Life Sciences, 17(1): 51-57.   
Salter (2000) A Defense and Extension of Pierre van den Berghe’s Theory of Ethnic Nepotism. In James, P. and Goetze, D. (Eds.)  Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict (Praeger Studies on Ethnic and National Identities in Politics) (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press). 
Salter (2002) Estimating Ethnic Genetic Interests: Is It Adaptive to Resist Replacement Migration? Population & Environment 24(2): 111–140. 
Salter (2008) Misunderstandings of Kin Selection and the Delay in Quantifying Ethnic Kinship, Mankind Quarterly 48(3): 311–344. 
Tooby & Cosmides (1989) Kin selection, genic selection and information dependent strategies Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12(3): 542-544 
Van den Berghe (2005) Review of On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny and Humanity in the Age of Mass Migration by Frank Salter Nations and Nationalism 11(1) 161-177 
Van den Berghe & Frost (1986) Skin color preference, sexual dimorphism, and sexual selection: A case of gene-culture co-evolution? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 9: 87-113.
Whitney G (1999) The Biological Reality of Race. American Renaissance, October 1999.

Anthropology Meets True Crime: ‘Pimp Philosophy’ and a World Where Men are Truly Dominant – Or Are They? 

Black Players: The Secret World Of Black Pimps by Richard Milner and Christina Milner (New York: Bantam Books, 1972)

To validate flawed sociological dogmas such as cultural determinism and feminism, generations of American anthropologists have bravely ventured into remote deserts, jungles and other dangerous, primitive and inhospitable corners of the globe in an effort to discover (or, if necessary, to fabricate) the existence of a society in which traditional western sex-roles are reversed.

The enterprise has, I think it is fair to say, proven singularly unsuccessful.[1]

However, way back in the early-1970s, Milner and Milner, two American anthropologists, discovered precisely what their colleagues have been searching for in vain, namely a culture in which sex roles are reversed, right in America’s own backyard – or rather in America’s own backstreets.

This was the underground subculture of pimps and ‘hos’. Here, in stark contrast to the traditional sexual division of labour in western (and indeed many non-western) societies: 

Women are the economic providers… [whereas] a man may spend hours a day on his hair, clothes and toilette while his women are out working to support the household” (p5).

Another feature of the pimp lifestyle at odds with mainstream American culture is the prevalence of polygyny. Thus, Milner report that many pimp-ho households are polygynous, being composed of a single pimp and several prostitutes, and polygyny is regarded as the ideal (p5). 

Interestingly, this family structure and pattern of economic activity in many respects parallels that still prevailing in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, in Africa, polygyny is ubiquitous and women perform most agricultural labour (Draper 1989)[2].

One controversial interpretation, then, is that people of black African descent are genetically predisposed to such a mating system since it was adaptive in much of sub-Saharan African, and that African-Americans are simply recreating in America an approximation of the mating system, and economic system, of their African forebears. 

Of course, since pimp culture has now been popularized by generations of ‘gangsta rappers’, the “secret world” promised by the authors in their subtitle may be more familiar to modern readers than on the book’s first publication in 1972 (though, even then, blaxploitation films had already introduced the black pimp archetype to the wider public). However, the picture created in rap lyrics is necessarily so comically caricatured out of all recognition that the Milners’ exploration of the reality behind the absurd caricature remains as revelatory as ever.[3]

Male Dominance and Pimp Philosophy 

Of course, although women are the economic providers and pimps concerned with their clothes and appearance, in one crucial respect, conventional sex roles appear to be, not reversed, but rather accentuated in American pimp culture.

Thus, in American pimp culture, male dominance was, the Milners’ emphasize, absolute and categorical. 

However, what the Milners refer as ‘pimp philosophy’, namely the worldview and philosophy passed down among pimps from mentor to student and described by the Milners in detail, raises serious questions about whether this too, in some respects, represents a reversal of the sex roles apparent in mainstream society and whether, in ‘square’ society, it is indeed men who are really dominant (see also The Myth of Male Power: which I have reviewed here and here). 

Thus, according to the ‘pimp philosophy’: 

White men (and square blacks) are thought to be ‘pussy-whipped’ by their wives after having been brain washed by their mothers to accept female dominance as the natural order of things. Most families today are controlled by women, who direct the goals and manage the money… by withholding sexual favours” (p161). 

It is indeed the case that, while men work longer hours and earn more money than women, women are known to control the vast majority of spending decisions.

Thus, Martha Barletta reports that reports that women are responsible for about 80% of household spending in modern America (Marketing to Women: p4); while another marketing researcher, Bernice Kanner, reports that women make approximately 88% of retail purchases in the US (see Pocketbook Power: p5).

Thus, according to ‘pimp philosophy’, square husbands are ‘pimped’ by their wives every bit as ruthlessly as street-prostitutes, by being obliged to earn money and financially support their wives in return for sexual favours.

Thus, according to ‘pimp philosophy’, the Milners report: “The highest level of prostitution is—the wife!” (p221). 

Whether the men want to admit it or not, every woman is a ho regardless of what the status is—housewife, nun, prostitutes, whatever you want to say. The Housewife gets longevity, you know. She gets the vacation every year, she gets the security with the fella on the twenty-five-dollar-a-year job. Vacation every summer, the golf club, country club” (p227) 

Interestingly, this view of male-female relations directly converges with that of anti-feminists such as Esther Vilar who expressed similar ideas in her book 1971 classic, The Manipulated Man, which I have reviewed here.[4]

For example, one pimp describes how wives supposedly bear children only, or at least primarily, because: 

She knows once she has one or two babies she’s gonna have him locked down tight and even if he leaves she can still get four or five hundred dollars a month [in maintenance payments] if he’s making any kind of money” (p227). 

This parallels Vilar’s description in The Manipulated Man of offspring as “hostages” in her chapter title “children as hostages”, since they are used, like hostages kidnapped in order to make a ransom demand, to demand additional monies from the unfortunate father. Thus, the pimp quoted by the Milners explains:

His wife is pimping him, see? She gets him to get up every morning, cooks his breakfast to make sure he’s good and strong, gives him his vitamin pills and everything, hands him his little briefcase, you know, so he can get out there and get the buck so she can go play bridge, go get her hair done, understand?” (p229) 

The pimp-ho relationship is then directly analogous to the relationship between husband and wife, only with the gender roles reversed. Thus, in the endnote to chapter one, the Milners approvingly quote sociologist Travis Hirschi as observing:

The similarity of the pimp-prostitute relationship to the husband-wife relationship, with the economic roles reversed, is too obvious to overlook” (p285; Hirschi 1962).

According to the pimps interviewed by the Milner’s during their research, the process of socializing and indoctrinating males to willingly accept their assigned role as beta providers begins in childhood. Thus, the Milners report:

Several pimps asserted that pimping comes from Black men being supported by their mothers as kids [in single-parent households] and deciding to continue the arrangement… Most pimps, however, believe that they were raised by their mothers not to be pimps, but to be tricks. ‘Trick marriage’ is seen by the pimps as a man’s servitude to women in exchange for ‘her pussy’” (p174-5).

Thus, since it is mothers who are responsible for most childcare, they indoctrinate their sons from infancy to accept ‘trick marriage’ and female dominance as the natural, normal and healthy state of affairs. Thus, one pimp observes:

She is, from the time you are a kid, understand, giving you a certain set of values which in reality is a woman’s set of values. She is brainwashing you to the extent of how to treat a woman” (p176). 

As a result of this indoctrination: 

If you are a boy, say twelve years old, and you see Mom and Dad fighting you naturally come to the defense of Mom… [because] from the time you were young, she’s the one who changed your diapers, bathed you, made sure that you were clothed and shoed and everything else, so you naturally come to the defense of Mom. And you forget entirely the fact that it was Dad was the one who made the money that put her in the position to do all these things in the first place. So when you become a man and encounter a woman you automatically accept the values which were taught to you there.” (p177) 

This again parallels Esther Vilar’s contention that: 

Men have been trained and conditioned by women, not unlike Pavlov conditioned his dogs, into becoming their slaves.

Thus, Vilar observes:

The advice a mother gives to her teenage son going out on his first date is a good example of woman’s audacity: Pay the taxi; get out first; open the door on the girl’s side and help her out. Offer her your arm going up the steps or, if they are crowded, walk behind her in case she stumbles so that you can catch her. Open the door into the foyer for her; help her out of her coat; take the coat to the cloakroom attendant; get her a program. Go in front of her when you are taking your seats and clear the way. Offer her refreshments during the intermissions – and so on” (The Manipulated Man: p40-41). 

As a consequence of such early indoctrination, even one otherwise resolutely ‘red-pilled’ player acknowledged:

There are things in me right now that I can’t help that have been conditioned over a period of time. I do things automatically, you know. I open doors for old ladies and if I go through a doorway, and hesitate and let the woman go first” (p177).

Thus, whereas the family structure of the ghetto has, on account of the prevalence of female-headed households and absent fathers, been characterized by sociologists as matriarchal, black players suggest a more nuanced interpretation:

Although the ghetto leans towards matriachy, players admit, it isn’t as all-pervasive or as smoothly functioning as the White matriarchy of the majority. For the White man is not even aware that he lives in a matriarchy, while Black men are becoming more sensitive to being pimped by both White society and their own Black women… White men, like Samson, are still sound asleep and unaware that Delilah has cut their hair” (p171). 

Indeed, the analogy with ‘red pill philosophy’ and the so-called men’s rights movement is made all but explicit by the Milners when they write: 

Woman’s liberation movement is not revolutionary, say the players. What would be truly revolutionary would be the liberation of men” (p227). 

However, the black players are capitalists at heart and hence reject all political liberation movements, including, not only women’s liberation, but also black liberation: 

In this… the pimp expresses a common ghetto sentiment: ‘Fuck Black power and White power; I believe in green power’” (p223). 

Thus, the Milners recount one anecdote of how:

“[When] a militant black man in the bar loudly proclaimed ‘I’m gonna get my piece and shoot all the whiteys’… another player replied, ‘Don’t do that, brother. Shit, you gonna take all my business away’” (p237). 

The same would apply to the liberation of men. After all, according to pimp philosphy, it is only because:

So-called normal and moral marriage is aberrant… [that] many husbands… pay hos for sex they cannot get at home, which [pimps] point to as the final degradation of the American male under the heel of the almighty bitchy American wife. She not only doesn’t give him what he is paying for, but forces him to go out and also pay some other woman if he wants sex. Often he pays another woman only to have a shoulder to cry on, because the wife loses respect for a man she can dominate and is unhappy in her unnatural unwomanly role as boss” (p175). 

Thus, the Milners envisage one pimp commiserating with the hapless henpecked husband, but then rationalizing: 

But, of course… I wouldn’t have it any other way, trick. Because, without you and your fucked-up illusions, without your fucked-up sex life—I’d be out of business tomorrow” (p251). 

Pimp Philosophy Evaluated 

Pimp philosophy is certainly illuminating and thought-provoking. 

It is moreover undoubtedly more insightful than feminist theory, which represents the dominant paradigm for understanding the relations between the sexes among social scientists, journalists in the mainstream media, the academic establishment, politicians, women’s rights activists and other such professional damned fools. 

Indeed, although they never quite go so far as to endorse it, the Milners themselves are nevertheless clearly taken by what they call ‘pimp philosophy’, and even acknowledge:

Once the world, and particularly the relations between the sexes, is viewed from a black player’s vantage point, things never again seem quite the same” (p243). 

Indeed, according to the Milners, this is hardly surprising. 

Like the sociologist and anthropologist, pimps and hustlers depend for their livelihood on an awareness of social forces and the human psyche… [but whereas] the social scientist rarely applies his knowledge directly, and so has far more leeway than the hustler or the pimp in being wrong before he is out of a job” (p242). 

In other words, unlike feminist sociologists and women’s studies professors (and indeed anthropologists like themselves), who are insulated in universities behind ivory towers at the taxpayer’s expense and can therefore can hold fast to their flawed ideological dogmas with blind faith notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, the pimp’s psychological and sociological analysis is subject to ruthless falsification at the hands of the market forces beloved of neoliberal economists. 

However, in claiming that male dominance is the natural state of humanity, pimp philosophy seems, to me, to have taken something of a wrong turn. 

Thus, according to the pimps, male dominance is the natural and harmonious order of mankind, and this was disrupted only when, according to ‘pimp mythology’ (an ingenious reinterpretation of biblical mythology), Adam gave in to sexual temptation, and was tempted by Eve to bite into the forbidden fruit (i.e. pay for sexual favours), thereby becoming, not the first man, but rather the first trick (p168-70; p259-60). 

Therefore, according to the pimps, as a result of this decision to bite into the forbidden fruit, most men are no longer ‘real men’ but rather mere ‘tricks’. Pimps themselves therefore represent, according to the ‘players’ themselves: 

The only real men [left] in America today” (p162). 

However, viewing male dominance as the natural and harmonious order of mankind necessarily raises the question: If, as pimps contend, male dominance is so natural and harmonious, why then is it found, at least in the West today, only among a small and exclusive subculture of pimps? What is more, why, even among pimps, is it maintained only by levels of violence and of self-control on the part of pimps far greater than that typically apparent in conventional, so-called ‘square’ relationships? 

However, the real flaw in the pimp perception of male dominance as the natural and harmonious state of nature lies in the nature of the pimps’ own dominance over their prostitutes and the lifestyle and occupation of the prostitutes themselves. 

Thus, as the Milners themselves observe: 

“[Although] the Book [i.e. the unwritten code of how to pimp passed from mentor to student] provides a blueprint for a male-dominated society and a rationale for wrestling all control over men from women… ironically, this condition is achieved by making women’s full-time occupation the control of men who are outside the subculture” (p48). 

In other words, the pimp’s exploitation of his women necessarily relies and depends on those women’s own exploitation of other men

A ho… is both ‘pimping’ off her customers and is being a trick [i.e. being pimped] by her man” (p213). 

The ‘Book’ provides, then, not a blueprint for male domination throughout society, but rather a blueprint for domination by a necessarily small subset of men – an exploitation both of women (i.e. the prostitutes whom the pimp controls) but also, indirectly, of other men (i.e. the clients of these prostitutes). 

The pimp survives, then, not only through the exploitation of women, but also, more fundamentally, by the vicarious exploitation of other men (namely the prostitutes’ clients, or, aptly named, ‘tricks’). 

Sweet Jones, a character from Iceberg Slim’s famous novel, Pimp: The Story of My Life, succinctly and eloquently summarized the same point: 

A pimp is really a whore who has reversed the game on whores. So Slim, be sweet as the scratch, no sweeter, and always stick a whore for a bundle before you sex her. A whore ain’t nothing but a trick to a pimp. Don’t let ’em georgia you. Always get your money in front just like a whore.” (Pimp: The Story of My Life: xxi).[5]

On this view, with their characteristically feminine concern for clothing, fashion, hair and hygiene and their ability, like housewives, to leech off the income of their sexual partners, pimps represent, not so much, as they themselves contend, “the only real men in America today” (p162), but rather second-rate female-impersonators. 

Endnotes

[1] Indeed, many aspects of sex roles (e.g. sex differences in intraspecific aggression, and in levels of parental care) appear to be, not only cross-culturally universal, but also universal throughout the mammalian order, and indeed widespread among animals in general. This, of course, reflects the fact that they are not only innate, but moreover the product of analogous selection pressures operating among many different species (see Bateman 1948; Trivers 1972). Thus, for example, in all human societies for which data is available, men are responsible for an overwhelming majority of homicides, and also represent the majority of homicide victims. Similarly, in all documented cultures, mothers rather than fathers provide the vast majority of direct care for infants and babies.

[2] This pattern appears to be longstanding and hence deeply ingrained, lending credence to the suggestion that it may reflect an innate racial difference in sexuality and mating systems. Indeed, even among surviving African hunter-gatherer groups, it is female gatherers, not male hunters, who provide most of the caloric requirements of the group, in stark contrast to the situation among arctic hunter-gatherers like the Inuit (Ember 1978).

[3] To illustrate just how comically caricatured public perceptions of the pimp lifestyle have become, it is worth pointing out that, in response to the use of the term in many rap songs, many people seem to believe that a ‘pimp stick’ is, to quote one definition, an ornate or gaudy cane, as might be used by a stereotypical pimp. In fact, however, pimps traditionally carried no such stick. Instead, the phrase ‘pimp stick’ originally referred, and among pimps presumably still refers, to a weapon composed of “two wire coat hangers twisted together” which is used by pimps as a whip with which to discipline disobedient whores (Whoreson: p212).

[4] In addition to Esther Vilar’s The Manipulated Man and my review of this work, see also Matthew Fitzgerald’s purported update to Esther Vilar’s work, namely his delightfully subtitled, Sex-Ploytation: How Women Use Their Bodies to Extort Money from Men

[5] Curiously, the Milners claim to have interviewed Iceberg Slim (alias Robert Beck, née Robert Lee Maupin) and refer to this supposed interview at various points in their book. However, Beck himself, without mentioning them by name, denies this in The Naked Soul of Iceberg Slim (p200), where he accuses the Milners of stealing black culture, i.e. what would today be called cultural appropriation. The mysterious interview is supposedly contained in the recently published collection, Iceberg Slim: The Lost Interviews With The Pimp

References 

Bateman (1948), Intra-sexual selection in Drosophila, Heredity, 2(3): 349–368.
Draper P (1989) African marriage systems: Perspectives from evolutionary ecology. Ethology and Sociobiology 10(1–3):145-169.
Ember (1978) Myths about Hunter-Gatherers Ethnology 17(4): 439-448.
Hirschi T (1962) The professional prostitute. Berkeley Journal of Sociology 7(1):33-49.
Trivers, R. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. Sexual Selection & the Descent of Man, Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 136-179. Chicago. 

The ‘Means of Reproduction’ and the Ultimate Purpose of Political Power

Laura Betzig, Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History (New Brunswick: AdelineTransation, 1983). 

Moulay Ismail Ibn Sharif, alias ‘Ismail the Bloodthirsty’, a late-seventeenth, early eighteenth century Emperor of Morocco is today little remembered, at least outside of his native Morocco. He is, however, in a strict Darwinian sense, possibly the most successful human ever to have lived. 

Ismail, you see, is said to have sired some 888 offspring. His Darwinian fitness therefore exceeded that of any other known person.[1]

Some have questioned whether this figure is realistic (Einon 1998). However, the best analyses suggest that, while the actual number of offspring fathered by Ismail may indeed be apocryphal, such a large progeny is indeed eminently plausible for a powerful ruler with access to a large harem of wives and/or concubines (Gould 2000; Oberzaucher & Grammer 2014).

Indeed, as Laura Betzig demonstrates in ‘Despotism and Differential Reproduction’, Ismail is exceptional only in degree.

Across diverse societies and cultures, and throughout human history, wherever individual males acquire great wealth and power, they convert this wealth and power into the ultimate currency of natural selection – namely reproductive success – by asserting and maintaining exclusive reproductive access to large harems of young female sex partners. 

A Sociobiological Theory of Human History 

Betzig begins her monograph by quoting a small part of a famous passage from the closing paragraphs of Charles Darwin’s seminal On the Origin of Species which she adopts as the epigraph to her preface. 

In this passage, the great Victorian naturalist tentatively extended his theory of natural selection to the question of human origins, a topic he conspicuously avoided in the preceding pages of his famous text. 

Yet, in this much-quoted passage, Darwin goes well beyond suggesting merely that his theory of evolution by natural selection might explain human origins in just the same way it explained the origin of other species. On the contrary, he also anticipated the rise of evolutionary psychology, writing of how: 

Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. 

Yet this is not the part of this passage quoted by Betzig. Instead, she quotes the next sentence, where Darwin makes another prediction, no less prophetic, namely that: 

Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history 

In this reference to “man and his history”, Darwin surely had in mind primarily, if not exclusively, the natural history and evolutionary history of our species.

Betzig, however, interprets Darwin more broadly, and more literally, and, in so doing, has both founded, and for several years, remained the leading practitioner of a new field – namely, Darwinian history.

This is the attempt to explain, not only the psychology and behaviour of contemporary humans in terms of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology and selfish gene theory, but also to explain the behaviour of people in past historical epochs in terms of the same theory.  

Her book length monograph, ‘Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History’ remains the best known and most important work in this field. 

The Historical and Ethnographic Record 

In making the case that, throughout history and across the world, males in positions of power have used this power so as to maximize their Darwinian fitness by securing exclusive reproductive access to large harems of fertile females, Betzig, presumably to avoid the charge of cherry picking, never actually even mentions Ismail the Bloodthirsty at any point in her monograph. 

Instead, Betzig uses ethnographic data taken from a random sample of cultures from across the world. Nevertheless, the patterns she uncovers are familiar and recurrent.

Powerful males command large harems of multiple fertile young females, to whom they assert, and defend, exclusive reproductive access. In this way, they convert their power into the ultimate currency of natural selection – namely, reproductive success or fitness.

Thus, citing and summarizing Betzig’s work, not only ‘Despotism and Differential Reproduction’, but also other works she has published on related topics, science writer Matt Ridley reports:

[Of] the six independent ‘civilizations’ of early history – Babylon, Egypt, India, China, the Aztecs and the Incas… the Babylonian king Hammurabi had thousands of slave ‘wives’ at his command. The Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten procured three hundred and seventeen concubines and ‘droves’ of consorts. The Aztec ruler Montezuma enjoyed four thousand concubines. The Indian emperor Udayama preserved sixteen thousand consorts in apartments guarded by eunuchs. The Chinese emperor Fei-ti had ten thousand women in his harem. The Inca… kept virgins on tap throughout the kingdom” (The Red Queen: p191-2; see Betzig 1993a).

In a contemporary context, I wonder whether the ostensibly ‘elite’ all-female bodyguard of Arab socialist dictator, Colonel Gadaffi, his so-called ‘Amazonian Guard’ (aka ‘Revolutionary Nuns’), served a similar function.

Given the innate biological differences between the sexes, physical and psychological, women are unlikely to make for good bodyguards anymore than they do effective soldiers in wartime, and, judging from photographs, Gadaffi’s elite bodyguard seem to have been chosen at least as much on account of their youth and beauty as on the basis of any martial prowess. Certainly they did little to prevent his exection by rebels in 2011.

Moreover, since his overthrow and execution, accusations of sexual abuse have inevitably surfaced, though how much credence we should give to these claims is debatable.[2]

Such vast harems as those monopolized by ancient Egyptian pharaohs, Chinese emperors and Babylonian kings seem, at first, wholly wasteful. This is surely more fertile females than even the horniest, healthiest and most virile of emperors could ever hope to have even sex with, let alone successfully impregnate, in a single lifetime. However, as Betzig acknowledges: 

The number of women in such a harem may easily have prohibited the successful impregnation of each… but, their being kept from bearing children to others increased the monarch’s relative reproductive accomplishment” (p70). 

In other words, even if these rulers were unable to successfully impregnate every concubine in their harem, keeping them cloistered and secluded nevertheless prevented other males from impregnating them, which increased the relative representation of the ruler’s genes in subsequent generations.

To this end, extensive efforts also were made to ensure the chastity of these women. Thus, even in ancient times, Betzig reports: 

Evidence of claustration, in the form of a walled interior courtyard, exists for Babylonian Mai; and claustration in second story rooms with latticed, narrow windows is mentioned in the Old Testament” (p79). 

Indeed, Betzig even proposes an alternative explanation for early evidence of defensive fortifications

Elaborate fortifications erected for the purposes of defense may [also] have served the dual (identical?) function of protecting the chastity of women of the harem” (p79). 

Indeed, as Betzig alludes to in her parenthesis, this second function is arguably not entirely separate to the first. 

After all, if all male-male competition is ultimately based on competition over access to fertile females, then this surely very much includes warfare. As Napoleon Chagnon emphasizes in his studies of warfare and intergroup raiding among the Yąnomamö Indians of the Amazonian rainforest, warfare among primitive peoples tends to be predicated on the capture of fertile females from among enemy groups.[3]

Therefore, even fortifications erected for the purposes of military defence, ultimately serve the evolutionary function of maintaining exclusive reproductive access to the fertile females contained therein. 

Other methods of ensuring the chastity of concubines, and thus the paternity certainty of emperors, included the use of eunuchs as harem guards. Indeed, this seems to have been the original reason eunuchs were castrated and later became a key element in palace retinues (see The Evolution of Human Sociality: p45). 

Chastity belts, however, ostensibly invented for the wives of crusading knights while the latter were away on crusade, seem to be a modern myth.

The movements of harem concubines were also highly restricted. Thus, if permitted to venture beyond their cloisters, they were invariably escorted. 

For example in the African Kingdom of Dahomey, Betzig reports: 

The king’s wives’… approach was always signalled by the ringing of a bell by the women servant or slave who invariably preceded them [and] the moment the bell is heard all persons, whether male or female , turn their backs, but all the males must retire to a certain distance” (p79). 

Similarly, inmates of the Houses of Virgins maintained by Inca rulers:

Lived in perpetual seclusion to the end of their lives… and were not permitted to converse, or have intercourse with, or to see any man, nor any woman who was not one of themselves” (p81-2). 

Feminists tend to view such practices as evidence of the supposed oppression of women

However, from a sociobiological or evolutionary psychological perspective, the primary victims of such practices were, not the harem inmates themselves, but rather the lower-status men condemned to celibacy and ‘inceldom’ as a consequence of royal dynasties monopolizing sexual access to almost all the fertile females in the society in question. 

The encloistered women might have been deprived of their freedom of movement – but many lower-status men in the same societies were deprived of almost all access to fertile female sex partners, and hence any possibility of passing on their genes, the ultimate evolutionary function of any biological organism. 

In contrast, the concubines secluded in royal harems were not only able to reproduce, but also lived lives of relative comfort, if not, in some cases, outright luxury, often being: 

Equipped with their own household and servants, and probably lived reasonably comfortable lives in most respects, except… for a lack of liberal masculine company” (p80). 

Indeed, seclusion, far from evidencing oppression, was primarily predicted on safety and protection. In short, to be imprisoned is not so bad when one is imprisoned in a palace! 

Finally, methods were also sometimes employed specifically to enhance their fertility of the women so confined. Thus, Ridley reports: 

Wet nurses, who allow women to resume ovulation by cutting short their breast-feeding periods, date from at least the code of Hammurabi in the eighteenth century BC… Tang dynasty emperors of China kept careful records of dates of menstruation and conception in the harem so as to be sure to copulate only with the most fertile concubines… [and] Chinese emperors were also taught to conserve their semen so as to keep up their quota of two women a day” (The Red Queen: p192). 

Corroborating Betzig’s conclusions but subsequent to the publication of her work, researchers have now uncovered genetic evidence of the fecundity of one particular powerful ruler (or ruling male lineage) – namely, a Y chromosome haplogroup, found in 8% of males across a large region of Asia and in one in two hundred males across the whole world – the features of which are consistent with its having spread across the region thanks to the exceptional prolificity of Genghis Khan, his male siblings and descendants (Zerjal et al 2003). 

Female Rulers? 

In contrast, limited to only one pregnancy every nine months, a woman, howsoever rich and powerful, can necessarily bear far fewer offspring than can be sired by a man enjoying equivalent wealth, power and access to multiple fertile sex partners, even with the aid of evolutionary novelties like wet nurses, bottle milk and IVF treatment. 

As a female analogue of Ismail the Bloodthirsty, it is sometimes claimed that a Russian woman gave birth to 69 offspring in the nineteenth-century. She was also supposedly, and very much unlike Ismail the Bloodthirsty, not a powerful and polygamous elite ruler, but rather a humble, monogamously married peasant woman. 

However, this much smaller figure is both physiologically implausible and poorly sourced. Indeed, even her name is unknown, and she is referred to only as the wife of Feodor Vassilyev. It is, in short, almost certainly an urban myth.[4]

Feminists have argued that the overrepresentation of males in positions of power is a consequence of such mysterious and non-existent phenomena as patriarchy or male dominance or the oppression of women.

In reality, however, it seems that, for women, seeking positions of power and wealth simply doesn’t have the same reproductive payoff as for men – because, no matter how many men a woman copulates with, she can usually only gestate, and nurse, one (or, in the case of twins or triplets, occasionally two or three) offspring at a time. 

This is the essence of Bateman’s Principle, later formalized by Robert Trivers as differential parental investment theory (Bateman 1948; Trivers 1972).

This, then, in Darwinian terms, explains why women are less likely to assume positions of great political power.

It is not necessarily that they wouldn’t want political power if it were handed to them, but rather that they are less willing to make the necessary effort, or take the necessary risks to attain power.

Indeed, among women, there may even be a fitness penalty associated with assuming political power or acquiring a high status job. Thus, such jobs tend to be, not only high status, but also usually high stress and not easily combined with motherhood.

Indeed, even among baboons, it has been found that high-ranking females actually suffer reduced fertility and higher rates of miscarriages, possibly on account of hormonal factors (Packer et al 1995).

Kingsley Browne, in his excellent book, Biology at Work: Rethinking Sexual Equality (which I have reviewed here), noting that female executives also tend to have fewer children, tentatively proposes that a similar mechanism may be at work among humans:

Women who succeed in business tend to be relatively high testosterone, which can result in lower female fertility, whether because of ovulatory irregularities or reduced interest in having children. Thus, rather than the high-powered career being responsible for the high rate of childlessness, it may be that high testosterone levels are responsible for both” (Biology at Work: p124).

Therefore, it may well be to woman’s advantage to marry a male with a high status, powerful job, but not to do such a job for herself. That way, she obtains the same wealth and status as her husband, and the same wealth and status for her offspring, but without the hard work it takes to achieve this status.

What is certainly true is that social status and political power does not have the same potential reproductive payoff for women as it did for, say, Ismail the Bloodthirsty.

This calculus, then, rather than the supposed oppression of women, explains, not only the cross-culturally universal over-representation of men in positions of power, but also much of the so-called gender pay gap in our own societies (see Kingsley Browne’s Biology at Work: reviewed here). 

Perhaps the closest women can get to producing such a vast progeny is maneuver their sons into having the opportunity to do so.

This might explain why such historical figures as Agrippina the Younger, the mother of Nero, and Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, are reported as having been so active, and instrumental, in securing the succession on behalf of their sons. 

The Purpose of Political Power? 

The notion that powerful rulers often use their power to gain access to multiple nubile sex partners is, of course, hardly original to sociobiology. On the contrary, it accords with popular cynicism regarding men who occupy positions of power. 

What a Darwinian perspective adds is the ultimate explanation of why political leaders do so – and why female political rulers, even when they do assume power, usually adopt a very different reproductive strategy. 

Moreover, a Darwinian perspective goes beyond popular cynicism in suggesting that access to multiple sex partners is not merely yet another perk of power. On the contrary, it is the ultimate purpose of power and reason why men evolved to seek power in the first place. 

As Betzig herself concludes: 

Political power in itself may be explained, at least in part, as providing a position from which to gain reproductively” (p85).[5]

After all, from a Darwinian perspective, political power in and of itself has no intrinsic value. It is only if power can be used in such a way as to maximize a person’s reproductive success or fitness that it has evolutionary value. 

Thus, as Steven Pinker has observed, the recurrent theme in science fiction film and literature of robots rebelling against humans to take over the world and overthrow humanity is fundamentally mistaken. Robots would have no reason to rebel against humans, simply because they would not be programmed to want to take over the world and overthrow humanity in the first place. 

On the other hand, humans have been programmed to seek wealth and power – and to resist oppression and exploitation. This is why revolutions are a recurrent feature of human societies and history.

But we have been programmed, not by a programmer or god-like creator, but rather by natural selection.

We have been programmed by natural selection to seek wealth and power only because, throughout human evolutionary history, those among our ancestors who achieved political power tended, like Ismail the Bloodthirsty, also to achieve high levels of reproductive success as a consequence. 

Darwin versus Marx 

In order to test the predictive power of her theory, Betzig contrasts the predictions made by sociobiological theory with a rival theory – namely, Marxism

The comparison is apposite since, despite repeated falsification at the hands of both economists and of history, Marxism remains, among both social scientists and laypeople, perhaps the dominant paradigm when it comes to explaining social structure, hierarchy and exploitation in human societies.  

Certainly, it has proven far more popular than any approach to understanding human dominance hierarchies grounded in ethology, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology or selfish gene theory

There are, it bears emphasizing, several similarities between the two approaches. For one thing, each theory traces its origins ultimately to a nineteenth-century Victorian founder resident in Britain at the time he authored his key works, namely Charles Darwin and Karl Marx respectively.  

More importantly, there are also substantive similarities in the content and predictions of both these alternative theoretical paradigms. 

In particular, each is highly cynical in its conclusions. Indeed, at first glance, Marxist theory appears superficially almost as cynical as Darwinian theory. 

Thus, like Betzig, Marx regarded most societies in existence throughout history as exploitative – and as designed to serve the interests, neither of society in general nor of the population of that society as a whole, but rather of the dominant class within that society alone – namely, in the case of capitalism, the bourgeoisie or capitalist employers. 

However, sociobiological and Marxist theory depart in at least three crucial respects. 

First, Marxists propose that exploitation will be absent in future anticipated communist utopias

Second, Marxists also claim that such exploitation was also absent among hunter-gatherer groups, where so-called primitive communism supposedly prevailed. 

Thus, the Marxist, so cynical with regard exploitation and oppression in capitalist (and feudal) society, suddenly turns hopelessly naïve and innocent when it comes to envisaging future unrealistic communist utopias, and when contemplating ‘noble savages’ in their putative ‘Eden before the fall’.

Unfortunately, however, in her critique of Marxism, Betzig herself nevertheless remains somewhat confused in respect of this key issue. 

On the one hand, she rightly dismisses primitive communism as a Marxist myth. Thus, she demonstrates and repeatedly emphasizes that:

Men accrue reproductive rights to wives of varying numbers and fertility in every human society” (p20).

Therefore, Betzig, contrary to the tenets of Marxism, concludes:

Unequal access to the basic resource which perpetuates life, members of the opposite sex, is a condition in [even] the simplest societies” (p32; see also Chagnon 1979).

Neither is universal human inequality limited only to access to fertile females. On the contrary, Betzig observes:

Some form of exploitation has been in evidence in even the smallest societies… Conflicts of interest in all societies are resolved with a consistent bias in favor of men with greater power” (p67).

On the other hand, however, Betzig takes a wrong turn in refusing to rule out the possibility of true communism somehow arising in the future. Thus, perhaps in a misguided effort to placate the many leftist opponents of sociobiology in academia, she writes:

Darwinism… [does not] preclude the possibility of future conditions under which individual interests might become common interests: under which individual welfare might best be served by serving the welfare of society… [nor] preclude… the possibility of the evolution of socialism” (p68). 

This, however, seems obviously impossible. 

After all, we have evolved to seek to maximize the representation of our own genes in subsequent generations at the expense of those of other individuals. Only a eugenic reengineering of human nature itself could ever change this. 

Thus, as Donald Symons emphasized in his seminal The Evolution of Human Sexuality (which I have reviewed here), reproductive competition is inevitable – because, whereas there is sometimes sufficient food that everyone is satiated and competition for food is therefore unnecessary and counterproductive, reproductive success is always relative, and therefore competition over women is universal. 

Thus, Betzig quotes Confucius as observing:

Disorder does not come from heaven, but is brought about by women” (p26). 

Indeed, Betzig herself elsewhere recognizes this key point, namely the relativity of reproductive success, when she observes, in a passage quoted above, that a powerful monarch benefits from sequestering huge numbers of fertile females in his harem because, even if it is unfeasible that he would ever successfully impregnate all of them himself, he nevertheless thereby prevents other males from impregnating them, and thereby increases the relative representation of his own genes in subsequent generations (p70). 

It therefore seems inconceivable that social engineers, let alone pure happenstance, could ever engineer a society in which individual interests were identical to societal interests, other than a society of identical twins or through the eugenic reingineering of human nature itself (see Peter Singer’s A Darwinian Left, which I have reviewed here).[6]

Marx and the Means of Reproduction

The third and perhaps most important conflict between the Darwinist and Marxist perspectives concerns what Betzig terms: 

The relative emphasis on production and reproduction” (p67).

Whereas Marxists view control of what they term the means of production as the ultimate cause of societal conflict, socioeconomic status and exploitation, for Darwinians conflict and exploitation instead focus on control over what we might term the means of reproduction – in other words fertile females, their wombs, ova and vaginas. 

Thus, Betzig observes: 

Marxism makes no explicit prediction that exploitation should coincide with reproduction” (p68). 

In other words, Marxist theory is silent on the crucial issue of whether high-status individuals will necessarily convert their political and economic power into the ultimate currency of Darwinian selection – namely, reproductive success

On this view, powerful male rulers might just as well be celibate as control and assert exclusive reproductive access to large harems of young fertile wives and concubines. 

In contrast, for Darwinians, the effort to maximize one’s reproductive success is the very purpose, and ultimate end, of all political power. 

As sociologist-turned-sociobiologist Pierre van den Berghe observes in his excellent The Ethnic Phenomenon (reviewed here): 

The ultimate measure of human success is no production but reproduction. Economic productivity and profit are means to reproductive ends, not ends in themselves” (The Ethnic Phenomenon: p165). 

Thus, production is, from a sociobiological perspective, just another means of gaining the resources necessary for reproduction. 

On the other hand, reproduction is, from a biological perspective, the ultimate purpose of life. 

Therefore, it seems that, for all his ostensible radicalism, Karl Marx was, in his emphasis on economics rather than sex, just another nineteenth-century Victorian sexual prude

The Polygyny Threshold Model Applied to Humans? 

One way of conceptualizing the tendency of powerful males to attract (or perhaps commandeer) multiple wives and concubines is the polygyny threshold model

This way of conceptualizing male and female reproductive and ecological competition was first formulated by ornithologist-ecologist Gordon Orians in order to model the mating systems of passerine birds (Orians 1969). 

Here, males practice so-called resource defence polygyny – in other words, they defend territories containing valuable resources (e.g. food, nesting sites) necessary for successful reproduction and provisioning of offspring. 

Females then distribute themselves between males in accordance with size and quality of male territories. 

On this view, if the territory of one male is twice as resource-abundant as that of another, he would, all else being equal, attract twice as many mates; if it is three times as resource-abundant, he would attract three times as many mates; etc. 

The result is rough parity in resource-holdings and reproductive success among females, but often large disparities among males. 

Applying the Polygyny Threshold Model to Modern America

Thus, applying the polygyny threshold model to humans, and rather simplistically substituting wealth for territory size and quality, we might predict that, if Jeff Bezos is a hundred thousand times richer than Joe Schmo, then, if Joe has only one wife, then Jeff should have around 100,000 wives.

But, of course, Jeff Bezos does not have 100,000 wives, nor even a mere 100,000 concubines. 

Instead, he has only one solitary meagre ex-wife, and she, even when married to him, was not, to the best of my knowledge, ever guarded by any eunuchs – though perhaps he would have been better off if she had been, since they might have prevented her from divorcing him and taking an enormous share of his wealth with her in the ensuing divorce settlement.[7]

Indeed, with the sole exception of the magnificent John McAfee, founder of the first commercially available antivirus software, who, after making his millions, moved to a developing country where he obtained for himself a harem of teenage concubines, with whom he allegedly never actually had sex, instead preferring to have them defecate into his mouth while sitting in a hammock, but with whom he is nevertheless reported to have somehow fathered some forty-seven children, most modern millionaires, and billionaires, despite their immense wealth and the reproductive opportunities it offers, seemingly live lives of stultifyingly bland bourgeois respectability.

The same is also true of contemporary political leaders. 

Indeed, if any contemporary western political leader does attempt to practice polygyny, even on a comparatively modest scale, then, if discovered, a so-called sex scandal almost invariably results. 

Yet, viewed in historical perspective, the much-publicized marital infidelities of, say, Bill Clinton, though they may have outraged the sensibilities of the mass of monogamously-married Middle American morons, positively pale into insignificance besides the reproductive achievements of someone like, say, Ismail the Bloodthirsty

Indeed, Clinton’s infidelities don’t even pack much of a punch beside those of a politician from the same nation and just a generation removed, namely John F Kennedy – whose achievements in the political sphere are vastly overrated on account of his early death, but whose achievements in the bedroom, while scarcely matching those of Ismail the Bloodthirsty or the Aztec emperors, certainly put the current generation of American politicians to shame. 

Why, then, does the contemporary west represent such a glaring exception to the general pattern of elite polygyny that Betzig has so successfully documented throughout so much of the rest of the world, and throughout so much of history? And what has become of the henpecked geldings who pass for politicians in the contemporary era? 

Monogamy as Male Compromise? 

According to Betzig, the moronic mass media moral panic that invariably accompanies sexual indiscretions on the part of contemporary Western political leaders and other public figures is no accident. Rather, it is exactly what her theory predicts. 

According to Betzig, the institution of monogamy as it operates in Western democracies represents a compromise between low-status and high status males. 

According to the terms of this compromise, high-status males agree to forgo polygyny in exchange for the cooperation of low status males in participating in the complexly interdependent economic systems of modern western polities (p105) – or, in biologist Richard Alexander’s alternative formulation, in exchange for serving as necessary cannon-fodder in wars (p104).[8]

Thus, whereas, under polygyny, there are never enough females to go around, under monogamy, at least assuming that there is a roughly equal sex ratio (i.e. a roughly equal numbers of men and women), then virtually almost all males are capable of attracting a wife, howsoever physically repugnant, ugly and just plain unpleasant

This is important, since it means that all men, even the relatively poor and powerless, nevertheless have a reproductive stake in society. This, then, in evolutionary terms, provides them with an incentive both:

1) To participate in the economy to support and thereby provide for their wife and family; and

2) To defend these institutions in wartime, if necessary with their lives.

The institution of monogamy has therefore been viewed as a key factor, if not the key factor, in both the economic and military ascendency of the West (see Scheidel 2008). 

Similarly, it has recently been argued that the increasing rates of non-participation of young males in the economy and workforce (i.e. the so-called NEET’ phenomenon) is a direct consequence of the reduction in reproductive opportunities to young males (Binder 2021).[9]

Thus, on this view, then, the media scandal and hysteria that invariably accompanies sexual infidelities by elected politicians, or constitutional monarchs, reflects outrage that the terms of this implicit agreement have been breached. 

This idea was anticipated by Irish playwright and socialist George Bernard Shaw, who observed in Man and Superman: Maxims for Revolutionaries, the preface to his play Man and Superman

Polygyny, when tried under modern democratic conditions, as by the Mormons is wrecked by the revolt of the mass of inferior men who are condemned to celibacy by it” (Shaw 1903). 

Socially Imposed Monogamy’?

Consistent with this theory of socially imposed monogamy, it is indeed the case that, in all Western democratic polities, polygyny is unlawful, and bigamy a crime. 

Yet these laws are seemingly in conflict with contemporary western liberal democratic principles of tolerance and inclusivity, especially in respect of ‘alternative lifestyles’ and ‘non-traditional relationships’.

Thus, for example, we have recently witnessed a successful campaign for the legalization of gay marriage in most western jurisdictions. However, strangely, polygynous marriage seemingly remains anathema – despite the fact that most cultures across the world and throughout history have permitted polygynous marriage, whereas few if any have ever accorded any state recognition to homosexual unions.

Indeed, strangely, whereas the legalization of gay marriage was widely perceived as ‘progressive’, polygyny is associated, not with sexual liberation with rather with highly traditional and sexually repressive groups such as Mormons and Muslims.[10]

Polygynous marriage was also, rather strangely, associated with the supposed oppression of women in traditional societies such as under Islam

However, most women actually do better, at least in purely economic terms, under polygyny than under monogamy, at least in highly stratified societies with large differences in resource-holdings as between males. 

Thus, if, as we have seen, Jeff Bezos is 100,000 times richer than Joe Schmo, then a woman is financially better off becoming the second wife, or the tenth wife (or even the 99,999th wife!), of Jeff Bezos rather than the first wife of poor Joe. 

Moreover, women also have another incentive to prefer Jeff to Joe. 

If she is impregnated by a polygynous male like Jeff, then her male descendants may inherit the traits that facilitated their father’s wealth, power and polygyny, and hence become similarly reproductively successful themselves, aiding the spread of the woman’s own genes in subsequent generations. 

Biologists call this good genes sexual selection or, more catchily, the sexy son hypothesis

Once again, however, George Bernard Shaw beat them to it when he observed in the same 1903 essay quoted above: 

Maternal instinct leads a woman to prefer a tenth share in a first rate man to the exclusive possession of a third rate one” (Shaw 1903). 

Thus, Robert Wright concludes: 

In sheerly Darwinian terms, most men are probably better off in a monogamous system, and most women worse off” (The Moral Animal: p96). 

Thus, women generally should welcome polygyny, while the only people opposed to polygyny should be: 

1) The women currently married to men like Jeff Bezos, and greedily unwilling to share their resource-abundant ‘alpha-male’ providers with a whole hundred-fold harem of co-wives and concubines; and

2) A glut of horny sexually-frustrated bachelor-‘incels’ terminally condemned to celibacy, bachelorhood and inceldom by promiscuous lotharios like Jeff Bezos and Ismail the Bloodthirsty greedily hogging all the hot chicks for themselves.

Who Opposes Polygyny, and Why? 

However, in my experience, the people who most vociferously and puritanically object to philandering male politicians are not low-status men, but rather women. 

Moreover, such women typically affect concern on behalf, not of the male bachelors and ‘incels’ supposedly indirectly condemned to celibacy by such behaviours, but rather the wives of such politicians – though the latter are the chief beneficiaries of monogamy, while these other women, precluded from signing up as second or third-wives to alpha-male providers, are themselves, at least in theory, among the main losers. 

This suggests that the ‘male compromise theory’ of socially-imposed monogamy is not the whole story. 

Perhaps then, although women benefit in purely financial terms under polygyny, they do not do so well in fitness terms. 

Thus, one study found that, whereas polygynous males (unsurprisingly) had more offspring than monogamously-mated males, they (perhaps also unsurprisingly) had fewer offspring per wife. This suggests that, while polygynously-married males benefit from polygyny, their wives incur a fitness penalty for having to share their husband (Strassman 2000). 

This probably reflects the fact that even male reproductive capacity is limited, as, notwithstanding the Coolidge effect (which has, to my knowledge, yet to be demonstrated in humans), males can only manage a certain number of orgasms per day. 

Women’s distaste for polygynous unions may also reflect the fact that even prodigiously wealthy males will inevitably have a limited supply of one particular resource – namely, time – and time spent with offspring by a loving biological father may be an important determinant of offspring success, which paid child-minders, and stepfathers, lacking a direct genetic stake in offspring, are unable to perfectly replicate.[11]

Thus, if Jeff Bezos were able to attract for himself the 100,000 wives that the polygyny threshold model suggests is his due, then, even if he were capable of providing each woman with the two point four children that is her own due, it is doubtful he would have enough time on his hands to spend much ‘quality time’ with each of his 240,000 offspring – just as one doubts Ismail the Bloodthirsty was himself an attentive father his own more modest mere 888. 

Thus, one suspects that, contrary to the polygyny threshold model, polygyny is not always entirely a matter of female choice (Sanderson 2001).

On the contrary, many of the women sequestered into the harems of rulers like Ismail the Bloodthirsty likely had little say in the matter. 

The Central Theoretical Problem of Human Sociobiology’ 

Yet, if this goes some way towards explaining the apparent paradox of socially imposed monogamy, there is, today, an even greater paradox with which we must wrestle – namely, why, in contemporary western societies, is there apparently an inverse correlation between wealth and number of offspring.

After all, from a sociobiological or evolutionary psychological perspective, this represents something of a paradox. 

If, as we have seen, the very purpose of wealth and power (from a sociobiological perspective) is to convert these advantages into the ultimately currency of natural selection, namely reproductive success, then why are the wealthy so spectacularly failing to do so in the contemporary west?[12]

Moreover, if status is not conducive to high reproductive success, then why have humans evolved to seek high-status in the first place? 

This anomaly has been memorably termed the ‘The central theoretical problem of human sociobiology’ in a paper by University of Pennsylvania demographer and eugenicist Daniel Vining (Vining 1986). 

Socially imposed monogamy can only go some way towards explaining this anomaly. Thus, in previous centuries, even under monogamy, wealthier families still produced more surviving offspring, if only because their greater wealth enabled them to successfully rear and feed multiple successive offspring to adulthood. In contrast, for the poor, high rates of infant mortality were the order of the day. 

Yet, in the contemporary west, it seems that the people who have the most children and hence the highest fitness in the strict Darwinian sense, are, at least according to popular stereotype, single mothers on government welfare. 

De Facto’ Polygyny 

Various solutions have been proposed to this apparent paradox. A couple amount to claiming that the west is not really monogamous at all, and, once this is factored in, then, at least among males, higher-status men do indeed have greater numbers of offspring than lower-status men. 

One suggestion along these lines is that perhaps wealthy males sire additional offspring whose paternity is misassigned, via extra-marital liaisons (Betzig 1993b). 

However, despite some sensationalized claims, rates of misassigned paternity are actually quite low (Khan 2010; Gilding 2005; Bellis et al 2005). 

If it is lower-class women who are giving birth to most of the offspring, then it is probably mostly males of their own socioeconomic status who are responsible for impregnating them, if only because it is the latter with whom they have the most social contact. 

Perhaps a more plausible suggestion is that wealthy high-status males are able to practice a form of disguised polygyny by through repeated remarriage. 

Thus, wealthy men are sometimes criticized for divorcing their first wives to marry much younger second- and sometimes even third- and fourth-wives. In this way, they manage monopolize the peak reproductive years of multiple successive young women. 

This is true, for example, of recent American President Donald Trump – the ultimate American alpha male – who has himself married three women, each one younger than her predecessor

Thus, science journalist Robert Wright contends: 

The United States is no longer a nation of institutionalized monogamy. It is a nation of serial monogamy. And serial monogamy in some ways amounts to polygyny.” (The Moral Animal: p101). 

This, then, is not so much ‘serial monogamy’ as it is ‘sequential’ or non-concurrent polygyny’. 

Evolutionary Novelties

Another suggestion is that evolutionary novelties – i.e. recently developed technologies such as contraception – have disrupted the usual association between status and fertility. 

On this view, natural selection has simply not yet had sufficient time (or, rather, sufficient generations) over which to mold our psychology and behaviour in such a way as to cause us to use these technologies in an adaptive manner – i.e. in order to maximize, not restrict, our reproductive success. 

An obvious candidate here is safe and effective contraception, which, while actually somewhat older than most people imagine, nevertheless became widely available to the population at large only over the course of the past century, which is surely not enough generations for us to have become evolutionarily adapted to its use.  

Thus, a couple of studies have found that that, while wealthy high-status males may not father more offspring, they do have more sex with a greater number of partners – i.e. behaviours that would have resulted in more offspring in ancestral environments prior to the widespread availability of contraception (Pérusse 1993: Kanazawa 2003). 

This implies that high-status males (or their partners) use contraception either more often, or more effectively, than low-status males (or their partners), probably because of their greater intelligence and self-control, namely the very traits that enabled them to achieve high socioeconomic status in the first place (Kanazawa 2005). 

Another evolutionary novelty that may disrupt the usual association between social status and number of surviving offspring is the welfare system

Welfare payments to single mothers undoubtedly help these families raise to adulthood offspring who would otherwise perish in infancy. 

In addition, by reducing the financial disincentives associated with raising additional offspring, they probably increase the number of offspring these women choose to have in the first place. 

While it is highly controversial to suggest that welfare payments to single mothers actually give the latter an actual financial incentive to bear additional offspring, they surely, at the very least, reduce the financial disincentives otherwise associated with bearing additional children. 

Therefore, given that the desire for offspring is probably innate, women would rationally respond by having more children.[13]

Feminist ideology also encourages women in particular to postpone childbearing in favour of careers. Moreover, it is probably higher-status females who are more exposed to feminist ideology, especially in universities, where feminist ideology is thoroughly entrenched and widely proselytized

In contrast, lower-status women are not only less exposed to feminist ideology encouraging them to delay motherhood in favour of career, but also likely have fewer appealing careers available to them in the first place. 

Finally, even laws against bigamy and polygyny might be conceptualized as an evolutionary novelty that disrupts the usual association between status and fertility. 

However, whereas technological innovations such as effective contraception were certainly not available until recent times, ideological constructs and religious teachings – including ideas such as feminism, prohibitions on polygyny, and the socialist ideology that motivated the creation of the welfare state – have existed ever since we evolved the capacity to create such constructs (i.e. since we became fully human). 

Therefore, one would expect that humans would have evolved resistance to ideological and religious teachings that go against their genetic interests. Otherwise, we would be vulnerable to indoctrination (and hence exploitation) at the hands third parties. 

Dysgenics? 

Finally, it must be noted that these issues are not only of purely academic interest. 

On the contrary, since socioeconomic status correlates with both intelligence and personality traits such as conscientiousness, and these traits are, in turn, substantially heritable, and moreover determine, not only individual wealth and prosperity, but also at the aggregate level, the wealth and prosperity of nations, the question of who has the offspring is surely of central concern to the future of society, civilization and the world. 

In short, what is at stake is the very genetic posterity that we bequeath to future generations. It is simply too important a matter to be delegated to the capricious and irrational decision-making of individual women. 

__________________________

Endnotes

[1] Actually, the precise number of offspring Ismail fathered is unclear. The figure I have quoted in the main body of the text comes from various works on evolutionary psychology (e.g. Cartwright, Evolution and Human Behaviour: p133-4; Wright, The Moral Animal: p247). However, another earlier work on human sociobiology, David Barash’s The Whisperings Within gives an even higher figure, of “1,056 offspring” (The Whisperings Within: p47). Meanwhile, an article produced by the Guinness Book of Records gives an even higher figure of at least 342 daughters and 700 sons, while a scientific paper by Elisabeth Oberzaucher and Karl Grammer gives a figure of 1171 offspring in total. The precise figure seems to be unknown and is probably apocryphal. Nevertheless, the general point – namely that a powerful male with access to a large harem and multiple wives and concubines, is capable of fathering many offspring – is surely correct.

[2] Thus, it is important to emphasise that sexual abuse allegations should certainly not automatically be accepted as credible, given the prevalence of false rape allegations, and indeed their incentivization, especially in this age of me too’ hysteria and associated witch-hunts. Indeed, western mainstream media is likely to be especially credulous respect to allegations in respect of a dictator which it and the political establishment it serves had long reviled and demonized.
Moreover, although, as noted above, given the innate psychological and physiological differences between the sexes, women are unlikely to be effective as conventional bodyguards any more than they are effective as soldiers in wartime, it has nevertheless been suggested that they may have provided a very different form of protection the Libyan dictator – namely as a highly effective ‘human shield’.
On this view, under the pretence of feminism, Gaddaffi may actually have been shrewdly taking advantage of misguided male chivalry and female privilege, not unreasonably surmising that any potential assassins and unsurgents would almost certainly be male, and hence chivalrous, paternalistic and protective towards women, especially since these assassins are also likely to be conservative Muslims, who formed the main bulk of the domestic opposition to his regime, and the deliberate killing of women is explicitly forbidden under Islamic law (Sahih Muslim 19: 4320; cf. Sihah Muslim 19: 4321).

[3] The capture of fertile females from among enemy groups is by no means restricted to the Yąnomamö. On the contrary, it may even form the ultimate evolutionary basis for intergroup conflict and raiding among troops of chimpanzees, our species’ closest extant relative. It is also alluded to, and indeed explicitly commanded, in the Hebrew Bible (e.g. Deuteronomy 20: 13-14; Numbers 31: 17-18), and was formerly prevalent in western culture as well.
It is also very much apparent, for example, in the warfare and raiding formerly endemic in the Gobi Desert of what is today Mongolia. Thus, the mother of Genghis Khan was, at least according to legend, herself kidnapped by the Great Khan’s father. Indeed, this was apparently an accepted form of courtship on the Mongolian Steppe, as Genghis Khan’s own wife was herself stolen from him on at least one occasion by rival Steppe nomads, resulting in a son of disputed paternity (whom the great Khan perhaps tellingly named Jochi, which is said to translate as ‘guest) and a later succession crisis.
Many anthropologists, it ought to be noted, dismiss Chagnon’s claim that Yanomami warfare is predicated on the capture of women. Perhaps the most famous is Chagnon’s own former student, Kenneth Good, whose main claim to fame is to have himself married a (by American standards, underage) Yąnomamö girl – who, in a dramatic falsification of her husband’s theory that would almost be amusing were it not so tragic, was then herself twice abducted and raped by raiding Yanomami war parties.

[4] It is ironic that John Cartwright, author of Evolution and Human Behaviour, an undergraduate level textbook on evolutionary psychology, is skeptical regarding the claim that Ismail the Bloodthirsty fathered 888 offspring, but nevertheless apparently takes at face value that claim that a Russian peasant woman had 69 offspring, a biologically far more implausible claim (Evolution and Human Behaviour: p133-4).

[5] However, here, Betzig is perhaps altogether overcautious. Thus, whether or not “political power in itself” is explained in this way (i.e. “as providing a position from which to gain reproductively”), certainly the human desire for political power must surely be explained in this way.

[6] The prospect of eugenically reengineering human nature itself so as to make utopian communism achievable, and human society less conflictual, is also unrealistic. As John Gray has noted in Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (reviewed here), if human nature is eugenically reengineered, then it will be done, not in the interests of society, let alone humankind, as a whole, but rather in the interests of those responsible for ordering or undertaking the project – namely, scientists and, more importantly, those from whom they take their orders (e.g. government, politicians, civil servants, big business, managerial elites). Thus, Gray concludes:

“[Although] it seems feasible that over the coming century human nature will be scientifically remodelled… it will be done haphazardly, as an upshot of struggles in the murky realm where big business, organized crime and the hidden parts of government vie for control” (Straw Dogs: p6).

[7] Here, it is important to emphasize that what is exceptional about western societies is not monogamy per se. On the contrary, monogamy is common in relatively egalitarian societies (e.g. hunter-gatherer societies), especially those living at or near subsistence levels, where no male is able to secure access to sufficient resources so as to provision multiple wives and offspring (Kanazawa and Still 1999). What is exceptional about contemporary western societies is the combination of:

1) Large differentials of resource-holdings between males (i.e. social stratification); and

2) Prescriptive monogamy (i.e. polygyny is not merely not widely practised, but also actually unlawful).

[8] Quite when a degree of de facto monogamy originated in the west seems to be a matter of some dispute. Betzig views it as very much a recent phenomenon, arising with the development of complex, interdependent industrial economies, which required the cooperation of lower-status males in order to function. Here, Betzig perhaps underestimates the extent to which even pre-industrial economies required the work and cooperation of low-status males in order to function.
Thus, Betzig argues that, in ancient Rome, nominally monogamous marriages concealed rampantly de facto polygyny, with emperors and other powerful males fathering multiple offspring with both slaves and other men’s wives (Betzig 1992). As evidence, she largely relies on salacious gossip about a few eminent Roman political leades.
Similarly, in medieval Europe, she argues that, despite nominal monogamy, wealthy men fathered multiple offspring through servant girls (Betzig 1995a; Betzig 1995b). In contrast, Kevin Macdonald persuasively contends that medieval monogamy was no mere myth and most illegitimate offspring born to servant girls were fathered by men of roughly their own station (Macdonald 1995a; Macdonald 1995b).

[9] Certainly, the so-called NEET and incel phenomena seem to be correlated with one another. NEETs are disproportionately likely to be incels, and incels are disproportionately likely to be NEETs. However, the direction of causation is unclear and probably works in both directions.
On the one hand, since women are rarely attracted to men without money or the prospects of money, men without jobs are rarely able to attract wives or girlfriends. However, on the other hand, men who, for whatever reason, perceive themselves as unable to attract a wife or girlfriend even if they did have a job, may see little incentive to getting a job in the first place or keeping the one they do have.
In addition, certain aspects of personality, and indeed psychopathology, likely predispose a man both to joblessness and inability to obtain a wife or girlfriend. These include mental illness, mental and physical disabilities, and conditions such as autism.
Finally, the NEET phenomenon cannot be explained solely by the supposed decline in marriage opportunities for young men, as might be suggested by simplistic reading of Binder (2021). Another factor is surely the increased affluence of society at large. In previous times, and in much of the developing world today, remaining voluntarily would likely result in penury and destitution for all but a tiny minority of the economic elite.

[10] Indeed, during the debates surrounding the legalization of gay marriage, the prospect of the legalization of polygynous marriage was rarely discussed, and, when it was raised, it was usually invoked by the opponents of gay marriage, as a sort of reductio ad absurdum of changes in marriage laws to permit gay marriage, something champions of gay marriage were quick to dismiss as preposterous scaremongering. In short, both sides in the acrimonious debates regarding gay marriage seem to have been agreed that legalizing polygynous unions was utterly beyond the pale.

[11] Thus, father absence is a known correlate of criminality and other negative life outcomes. In fact, however, the importance of paternal investment in offspring outcomes, and indeed of parental influence more generally, has yet to be demonstrated, since the correlation between father-absence and negative life-outcomes could instead reflect the heritability of personality, including those aspects of personality that cause people to have offspring out of wedlock, die early, divorce, abandon their children or have offspring by a person who abandons their offspring or dies early (see Judith Harris’s The Nurture Assumption, which I have reviewed here). 

[12] This paradox is related to another one – namely, why it is that people in richer societies tend to have lower fertility rates than poorer societies? This recent development, often referred to as the demographic transition, is paradoxical for the exact same reason that it is paradoxical for relatively wealthier people within western societies to have have fewer offspring than relatively poorer people within these same societies, namely that it is elementary Darwinism 101 that an organism with access to greater resources should channel those additional resources into increased reproduction. Interestingly, this phenomenon is not restricted to western societies. On the contrary, other wealthy industrial and post-industrial societies, such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea, have, if anything, even lower fertility rates than Europe, Australasia and North America.

[13] Actually, it is not altogether clear that women do have an innate desire to bear children. After all, in the EEA, there was no need for women to evolve a desire to bear children. All they required to a desire to have sexual intercourse (or indeed a mere willingness to acquiesce in the male desire for intercourse). In the absence of contraception, offspring would then naturally result. Indeed, other species, including presumably most of our pre-human ancestors, are surely wholly unaware of the connection between sexual intercourse and reproduction. A desire for offspring would then serve no adaptive function for these species at all. However, this did not stop these species from seeking out sexual opportunities and hence reproducing their kind. However, given anecdotal evidence of so-called ‘broodiness’ among women, I suspect women do indeed have some degree of innate desire for offspring.

References

Bateman (1948), Intra-sexual selection in Drosophila, Heredity, 2 (Pt. 3): 349–368.
Bellis et al (2005) Measuring Paternal Discrepancy and its Public Health Consequences. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 59(9):749.
Betzig 1992 Roman Polygyny. Ethology and Sociobiology 13(5-6): 309-349.
Betzig 1993a. Sex, succession, and stratification in the first six civilizations: How powerful men reproduced, passed power on to their sons, and used power to defend their wealth, women and children. In Lee Ellis, ed. Social Stratification and Socioeconomic Inequality, pp. 37-74. New York: Praeger.
Betzig 1993b. Where are the bastards’ daddies? Comment on Daniel Pérusse’s ‘Cultural and reproductive success in industrial societies’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16: 284-85.
Betzig 1995a Medieval Monogamy. Journal of Family History 20(2): 181-216.
Betzig 1995b Wanting Women Isn’t New; Getting Them Is: Very. Politics and the Life Sciences 14(1): 24-25.
Binder (2021) Why Bother? The Effect of Declining Marriage Market Prospects on Labor-Force Participation by Young Men (March 1, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795585 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3795585
Chagnon N (1979) Is reproductive success equal in egalitarian societies. In: Chagnon & Irons (eds) Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective pp.374-402 (MA: Duxbury Press).
Einon, G (1998) How Many Children Can One Man Have? Evolution and Human Behavior, 19(6):413–426.
Gilding (2005) Rampant Misattributed Paternity: The Creation of an Urban Myth. People and Place 13(2): 1.
Gould (2000) How many children could Moulay Ismail have had? Evolution and Human Behavior 21(4): 295 – 296.
Khan (2010) The paternity myth: The rarity of cuckoldry, Discover, 20 June, 2010.
Kanazawa & Still (1999) Why Monogamy? Social Forces 78(1):25-50.
Kanazawa (2003) Can Evolutionary Psychology Explain Reproductive Behavior in the Contemporary United States? Sociological Quarterly. 44: 291–302.
Kanazawa (2005) An Empirical Test of a Possible Solution to ‘the Central Theoretical Problem of Human Sociobiology’. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology. 3: 255–266.
Macdonald 1995a The establishment and maintenance of socially imposed monogamy in Western Europe, Politics and the Life Sciences, 14(1): 3-23.
Macdonald 1995b Focusing on the group: further issues related to western monogamy, Politics and the Life Sciences, 14(1): 38-46.
Oberzaucher & Grammer (2014) The Case of Moulay Ismael – Fact or Fancy? PLoS ONE 9(2): e85292.
Orians (1969) On the Evolution of Mating Systems in Birds and Mammals. American Naturalist 103 (934): 589–603.
Packer et al (1995) Reproductive constraints on aggressive competition in female baboons. Nature 373: 60–63.
Pérusse (1993). Cultural and Reproductive Success in Industrial Societies: Testing the Relationship at the Proximate and Ultimate Levels.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:267–322.
Sanderson (2001) Explaining Monogamy and Polygyny in Human Societies: Comment on Kanazawa and Still. Social Forces 80(1):329-335.
Scheidel (2008) Monogamy and Polygyny in Greece, Rome, and World History, (June 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1214729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1214729
Shaw GB (1903) Man and Superman, Maxims for Revolutionists.
Strassman B (2000) Polygyny, Family Structure and Infant Mortality: A Prospective Study Among the Dogon of Mali. In Cronk, Chagnon & Irons (Ed.), Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective (pp.49-68). New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Trivers, R. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. Sexual Selection & the Descent of Man, Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 136-179. Chicago.
Vining D 1986 Social versus reproductive success: The central theoretical problem of human sociobiology Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9(1): 167- 187.
Zerjal et al. (2003) The Genetic Legacy of the Mongols, American Journal of Human Genetics, 72(3): 717–721.

John R Baker’s ‘Race’: “A Reminder of What Was Possible Before the Curtain Came Down”

‘Race’, by John R. Baker, Oxford University Press, 1974.

John Baker’s ‘Race’ represents a triumph of scholarship across a range of fields, including biology, ancient history, archaeology, history of science, psychometrics and anthropology.

First published by Oxford University Press in 1974, it also marks a watershed in Western thought – the last time a major and prestigious publisher put its name to an overtly racialist work.

As science writer Marek Kohn writes:

Baker’s treatise, compendious and ponderous, is possible the last major statement of traditional race science written in English” (The Race Gallery: p61).

Inevitably for a scientific work first published over forty years ago, ‘Race’ is dated. In particular, the DNA revolution in population genetics has revolutionized our understanding of the genetic differences and relatedness between different human populations.

Lacking access to such data, Baker had only indirect phenotypic evidence (i.e. the morphological similarities and differences between different peoples), as well as historical and geographic evidence, with which to infer such relationships and hence construct his racial phylogeny and taxonomy.

Phenotypic similarity is obviously a less reliable method of determining the relatedness between groups than is provided by genome analysis, since there is always the problem of distinguishing homology from analogy and hence misinterpreting a trait that has independently evolved in different populations as evidence of relatedness.[1]

However, I found only one case of genetic studies decisively contradicting Baker’s conclusions. Thus, whereas Baker classes the Ainu People of Japan as Europid (p158; p173; p424; p625), recent genetic studies suggest that the Ainu have little or no genetic affinities to Caucasoid populations and are most closely related to other East Asians.[2]

On the other hand, however, Baker’s omission of genetic data means that, unusually for a scientific work, in the material he does cover, ‘Race’ scarcely seems to have dated at all. This is because the primary focus of Baker’s book – namely, morphological differences between races – is a field of study that has become politically suspect and in which new research has now all but ceased.[3]

Yet in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth century, when the discipline of anthropology first emerged as a distinct science, the study of race differences in morphology was the central focus of the entire science of anthropology.

Thus, Baker’s ‘Race’ can be viewed as the final summation of the accumulated findings of the ‘old-stylephysical anthropology of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, published at the very moment this intellectual tradition was in its death throes.

Accessibility

Baker’s ‘Race’ is indeed a magnum opus. Unfortunately, however, at over 600 pages, embarking on reading ‘Race’ might seem almost like a lifetime’s work in and of itself.

Not only is it a very long book, but, in addition, much of the material, particularly on morphological race differences and their measurement, is highly technical, and will be readily intelligible only to the dwindling band of biological anthropologists who, in the genomic age, still study such things.

This inaccessibility is exacerbated by the fact that Baker does not use endnotes, except for his references, and only very occasionally uses footnotes. Instead, he includes even technical and peripheral material in the main body of his text, but indicates that material is technical or peripheral by printing it in a smaller font-size.[4]

Baker’s terminology is also confusing.[5] He prefers the ‘-id’ suffix to the more familiar ‘-oid’ and ‘-ic’ (e.g. ‘Negrid‘ and ‘Nordid‘ rather than ‘Negroid’ and ‘Nordic‘) and eschews the familiar terms Caucasian or Caucasoid, on the grounds that:

The inhabitants of the Caucasus region are very diverse and very few of them are typical of any large section of Europids” (p205).

However, his own preferred alternative term, ‘Europid’, is arguably equally misleading as it contributes to the already common conflation of Caucasian with white European, even though, as Baker is at pains to emphasize elsewhere in his treatise, populations from the Middle East, North Africa and even the Indian subcontinent are also ‘Europid’ (i.e. Caucasoid) in Baker’s judgement.

In contrast, the term Caucasoid, or even Caucasian, causes little confusion in my experience, since it is today generally understood as a racial term and not as a geographical reference to the Caucasus region.[6]

At any rate, a similar criticism could surely be levelled at the term ‘Mongoloid’ (or, as Baker prefers, ‘Mongolid’), since Mongolian people are similarly quite atypical of other East Asian populations, and, despite the brief ascendancy of the Mongol Empire, and its genetic impact (as well as that previous waves of conquest by horse peoples of the Eurasian Steppe), were formerly a rather marginal people confined to the arid fringes of the indigenous home range of the so-called Mongoloid race, which had long been centred in China, the self-styled Middle Kingdom.[7]

Certainly, the term ‘Caucasoid’ makes little etymological sense. However, this is also true of a lot of words which we nevertheless continue to make use of. Indeed, since all words change in meaning over time, the original meaning of a word is almost invariably different to its current accepted usage.[8]

Yet we continue to use these words so as to make ourselves intelligible to others, the only alternative being to invent an entirely new language all of our own which only we would be capable of understanding.

Unfortunately, however, too many racial theorists, Baker included, have insisted on creating entirely new racial terms of their own coinage, or sometimes new entire lexicons, which, not only causes confusion among readers, but also leads the casual reader to underestimate the actual degree of substantive agreement between different authors, who, though they use different terms, often agree regarding both the identity of, and relationships between, the major racial groupings.[9]

Historical Focus

Another problem is the book’s excessive historical focus.

Judging the book by its contents page, one might imagine that Baker’s discussion of the history of racial thought is confined to the first section of the book, titled “The Historical Background” and comprising four chapters that total just over fifty pages.

However, Baker acknowledges in the opening page of his preface that:

Throughout this book, what might be called the historical method has been adopted as a matter of deliberate policy” (p3).

Thus, in the remainder of the book, Baker continues to adopt an historical perspective, briefly charting the history behind the discovery of each concept, archaeological discovery, race difference or method of measuring race differences that he introduces.

In short, it seems that Baker is not content with writing about science; he wants to write history of science too.

A case in point is Chapter Eight, which, despite its title (“Some Evolutionary and Taxonomic Theories”), actually contains very little on modern taxonomic or evolutionary theory, or even what would pass for ‘modern’ when Baker wrote the book over forty years ago.

Instead, the greater part of the chapter is devoted to tracing the history of two theories that were, even at the time Baker was writing, already wholly obsolete and discredited (namely, recapitulation theory and orthogenesis).

Let me be clear, Baker himself certainly agrees that these theories are obsolete and discredited, as this is his conclusion at the end of the respective sections devoted to discussion of these theories in his chapter on “Evolutionary and Taxonomic Theories”.

However, this only begs the question as to why Baker chooses to devote so much space in this chapter to discussing these theories in the first place, given that both theories are discredited and also of only peripheral relevance to his primary subject-matter, namely the biology of race.

Anyone not interested in these topics, or in history of science more generally, is well advised to skip the majority of this chapter.

The Historical Background

Readers not interested in the history of science, and concerned only with contemporary state-of-the-art science (or at least the closest an author writing in 1974 can get to modern state-of-the-art science) may also be tempted to skip over the whole first section of the book, entitled, as I have said, “The Historical Background”, and comprised of four chapters or, in total, just over fifty pages.

These days, when authoring a book on the biology of race, it seems to have become almost de rigueur to include an opening chapter, or chapters, tracing the history of race science, and especially its political misuse during nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries (e.g. under the Nazis).[10]

The usual reason for including these chapters is for the author or authors to thereby disassociate themselves from the earlier supposed misuse of race science for nefarious political purposes, and emphasize how their own approach is, of course, infinitely more scientific and objective than that of their sometimes less than illustrious intellectual forebears.

However, Baker’s discussion ofThe Historical Background” is rather different, and refreshingly short on disclaimers, moralistic grandstanding and benefit-of-hindsight condemnations that one usually finds in such potted histories.

Instead, Baker strives to give all views, howsoever provocative, a fair hearing in as objective and sober a tone as possible.[11]

Only Lothrop Stoddard, strangely, is dismissed altogether. The latter is, for Baker, an “obviously unimportant” thinker, whose book “contains nothing profound or genuinely original” (p58-9).

Yet this is perhaps unfair. Whatever the demerits of Stoddard’s racial taxonomy (“oversimplified to the point of crudity,” according to Baker: p58), Stoddard’s geopolitical and demographic predictions have proven prescient.[12]

Overall, Baker draws two general conclusions regarding the history of racial thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

First, he observes how few of the racialist authors whom he discusses were anti-Semitic. Thus, Baker reports:

Only one of the authors, Lapouge, strongly condemns the Jews. Treitschke is moderately anti-Jewish; Chamberlain, Grant and Stoddard mildly so; Gobineau is equivocal” (p59).

The rest of the authors whom he discusses evince, according to Baker, “little or no interest in the Jewish problem”, the only exception being Friedrich Nietzsche, who is “primarily an anti-egalitarian, but [who] did not proclaim the inequality of ethnic taxa”, and who, in his comments regarding the Jewish people, or at least those selectively quoted by Baker, is positively gushing in his praise.

In fact, however, Nietzsche’s views regarding the Jewish people are rather more complex than Baker allows, including as they do both critical comments and no few backhanded complements, since he primarily blames the Jews for the invention of Christianity and of the slave morality that he sees as its legacy.

Indeed, anti-Semitism often goes hand-in-hand with philosemitism. Thus, both Nietzsche and Count de Gobineau indeed wrote passages that, at least when quoted in isolation, seem highly complementary regarding the Jewish people. However, it is well to bear in mind that Hitler did as well, the latter writing in Mein Kampf:

The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew. In hardly any people in the world is the instinct of self- preservation developed more strongly than in the so-called ‘chosen’. Of this, the mere fact of the survival of this race may be considered the best proof” (Mein Kampf, Manheim translation).[13]

Thus, as a character from a Michel Houellebecq novel observes:

All anti-Semites agree that the Jews have a certain superiorityIf you read anti-Semitic literature, you’re struck by the fact that the Jew is considered to be more intelligent, more cunning, that he is credited with having singular financial talents – and, moreover, greater communal solidarity. Result: six million dead” (Platform: p113) 

Baker’s second general observation is similarly curious, namely that:

None of the authors mentioned in these chapters claims superiority for the whole of the Europid race: it is only a subrace, or else a section of the Europid race not clearly defined in terms of physical anthropology, that is favoured” (p59).

In retrospect, this seems anomalous, especially given that the so-called Nordic race, on whose behalf racial supremacy was most often claimed, actually came relatively late to civilization, which began in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, arriving in Europe only with the Mediterranean civilizations of Greece and Rome, and in Northern Europe later still.

However, this focus on the alleged superiority of certain European subraces rather than Caucasians as a whole likely reflects the fact that, during the time period in which these works were written, European peoples and nations were largely in competition and conflict with other European peoples and nations.

Only in European overseas colonies were Europeans in contact and conflict with non-European races, and, even here, the main obstacle to imperial expansion was, not so much the opposition of the often primitive non-European races whom the Europeans sought to colonize, but rather that of rival colonizers from other European nations.

Therefore, it was the relative superiority of different European populations which was naturally of most concern to Europeans during this time period.

In contrast, the superiority of the Caucasian race as a whole was of comparably little interest, if only because it was something that these writers already took very much for granted, and hence hardly worth wasting ink or typeface over.

The Rise of Racial Egalitarianism

There are two curious limitations that Baker imposes on his historical survey of racial thought. First, at the beginning of Chapter Three (From Gobineau to Houston Chamberlain’), he announces:

The present chapter and the next [namely, those chapters dealing with the history of racial thinking from the mid-nineteenth century up until the early-twentieth century] differ from the two preceding ones… in the more limited scope. It is are concerned only with the growth of ideas that favoured belief in the inequality of ethnic taxa or are supposedrightly or wronglyto have favoured this belief” (p33).

Given that I have already criticised ‘Race’ as overlong, and as having an excessive historical focus, I might be expected to welcome this restriction. However, Baker provides no rationale for this self-imposed restriction.

Certainly, it is rare, and enlightening, to read balanced, even sympathetic, accounts of the writings of such infamous racialist thinkers as Gobineau, Galton and Chamberlain, whose racial views are today usually dismissed as so preposterous as hardly to merit serious consideration. Moreover, in the current political climate, such material even acquires a certain allure of the forbidden’.

However, thinkers championing racial egalitarianism have surely proven more influential, at least in the medium-term. Yet such enormously influential thinkers as Franz Boas and Ashley Montagu pass entirely unmentioned in Baker’s account.[14]

Moreover, the intellectual antecedents of Nazism have already been extensively explored by historians. In contrast, however, the rise of the dogma of racial equality has passed largely unexamined, perhaps because to examine its origins is to expose the weakness of its scientific basis and its fundamentally political origins.[15]

Yet the story of how the theory of racial equality was transformed from a maverick, minority opinion among scientists and laypeople alike into a sacrosanct contemporary dogma which a person, scientist or layperson, can question only at severe cost to their career, livelihood and reputation is surely one worth telling.

The second restriction that Baker imposes upon his history is that he concludes it, prematurely, in 1928. He justifies closing his survey in this year on the grounds that this date supposedly:

Marks the close of the period in which both sides in the ethnic controversy were free to put forward their views, and authors who wished to do so could give objective accounts of the evidence pointing in each direction” (p61).

Yet this cannot be entirely true, for, if it were, then Baker’s own book could never have been published – unless, of course, Baker regards his own work as something other than an “objective account of the evidence pointing in each direction”, which seems doubtful.

Certainly, the influence of what is now called political correctness is to be deplored for impact on science, university appointments, the allocation of research funds and the publishing industry. However, there has surely been no abrupt watershed but rather a gradual closing of the western mind over time.

Thus, it is notable that other writers have cited dates a little later than that quoted by Baker, often coinciding with the defeat of Nazi Germany and exposure of the Nazi genocide, or sometimes the defeat of segregation in the American South.

Indeed, not only was this process gradual, it has also proceeded apace in the years since Baker’s ‘Race’ first came off the presses, such that today such a book would surely never would have been published in the first place, certainly not by as prestigious a publisher as Oxford University Press (who, surely not uncoincidently, soon gave up the copyright).[16]

Moreover, Baker is surely wrong to claim that it is impossible:

To follow the general course of controversy on the ethnic problem, because, for the reason just stated [i.e. the inability of authors of both sides to publicise their views], there has been no general controversy on the subject” (p61).

On the contrary, the issue remains as incendiary as ever, with the bounds of acceptable opinion seemingly ever narrowing and each year a new face falling before the witch hunters of the contemporary racial inquisition.

Biology

Having dealt in his first section with what he calls “The Historical Background”, Baker next turns to what he calls “The Biological Background”. He begins by declaring, rightly, that:

Racial problems cannot be understood by anyone whose interests and field of knowledge stop short at the limit of purely human affairs” (p3).

This is surely true, not just of race, but of all issues in human biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science, as the recent rise of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology attests. Indeed, Baker even coins a memorable and quotable aphorism to this effect, when he declares:

No one knows Man who knows only Man” (p65).

However, Baker sometimes takes this thinking rather too far, even for my biologically-inclined tastes.

Certainly, he is right to emphasise that differences among human populations are analogous to those found among other species. Thus, his discussion of racial differences among our primate cousins are of interest, but also somewhat out-of-date.[17]

However, his intricate and fully illustrated nine-page description of race differences among the different subspecies of crested newt stretched the patience of this reader (p101-109).

Are Humans a Single Species?

Whereas Baker’s seventh chapter (“The Meaning of Race”) discusses the race concept, the preceding two chapters deal with the taxonomic class immediately above that of race, namely ‘species’.

For sexually-reproducing organisms, ‘species’ is usually defined as the largest group of organisms capable of breeding with one another and producing fertile offspring in the wild.

However, as Baker explains, things are not quite so simple.

For one thing, over evolutionary time, one species transforms into another gradually with no abrupt dividing line where one species suddenly becomes another (p69-72). Hence the famous paradox, Which came first: the chicken or the egg?.

Moreover, in respect of extinct species, it is often impossible to know for certain whether two ostensible ‘species’ interbred with one another (p72-3). Therefore, in practice, the fossils of extinct organisms are assigned to either the same or different species on morphological criteria alone.

This leads Baker to distinguish different species concepts. These include:

  • Species in the paleontological sense” (p72-3);
  • Species in the morphological sense” (p69-72); and
  • Species in the genetical sense”, i.e. as defined by the criterion of interfertility (p72-80).

On purely morphological criteria, Baker questions humanity’s status as a single species:

Even typical Nordids and typical Alpinids, both regarded as subraces of a single race (subspecies), the Europid, are very much more different from one another in morphological characters—for instance in the shape of the skull—than many species of animals that never interbreed with one another in nature, though their territories overlap” (p97).

Thus, later on, Baker claims:

Even a trained anatomist would take some time to sort out correctly a mixed collection of the skulls of Asiatic jackals (Canis aureus) and European red foxes (vulpes vulpes), unless he had made a special study of the osteology of the Canidae; whereas even a little child, without any instruction whatever, could instantly separate the skulls of Eskimids from those of Lappids” (p427).

That morphological differences between human groups do indeed often exceed those between closely-related but non-interbreeding species of non-human animal has recently been quantitatively confirmed by Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele in their book, Race the Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here, here and here).

However, even if one defines ‘species’ strictly by the criterion of interfertility (i.e. in Baker’s terminology, “species in the genetical sense”) matters remain less clear than one might imagine.

For one thing, there are the phenomena of ring species, such as the herring gull and lesser black-backed gull.

These two ostensible species (or subspecies), both found in the UK, do not interbreed with one another, but each does interbreed with intermediaries that, in turn, interbreed with the other, such that there is some indirect gene-flow between them. Interestingly, the species ranges of the different intermediaries form a literal ring around the Arctic, such that genes will travel around the Artic before passing from lesser black-backed gull to herring gull or vice versa (p76-79).[18]

Indeed, even the ability to produce fertile offspring is a matter of degree. Thus, some pairings produce fertile offspring only rarely.

For example, often, Baker reports, “sterility affects [only] the heterogametic sex [i.e. the sex with two different sex chromosomes]” (p95). Thus, in mammals, sterility is more likely to affect male offspring. Indeed, this pattern is so common that it even has its own name, being known as Haldane’s Rule, after the famous Marxist-biologist JBS Haldane who first noted this pattern.

Other times, Baker suggests, interfertility may depend on the sex of the respective parents. For example, Baker suggests that, whereas sheep may sometimes successfully reproduce with he-goats, rams may be unable to successfully reproduce with she-goats (p95).[19]

Moreover, the fertility of offspring is itself a matter of degree. Thus, Baker reports, some hybrid offspring are not interfertile with one another, but can reproduce with one or other of the parental stocks. Elsewhere, the first generation of hybrids are interfertile but not subsequent generations (p94).

Indeed, though it was long thought impossible, it has recently been confirmed that, albeit only very rarely, even mules and hinnies can successfully reproduce, despite donkeys and horses, the two parental stocks, having, like goats and sheep, a different number of chromosomes (Rong et al 1985; Kay 2002).

Yet, as Darwin observed as far back as 1871 when himself discussing the question as to whether human races are to be regarded as belonging to entirely separate species:

Even a slight degree of sterility between any two forms when first crossed, or in their offspring, is generally considered as a decisive test of their specific distinctness” (The Descent of Man).

Thus, Baker concludes:

There is no proof that hybridity among human beings is invariably eugenesic, for many of the possible crosses have not been made, or if they have their outcome does not appear to have been recorded. It is probable on inductive grounds that such marraiges would not be infertile, but it is questionable whether the hybridity would necessarily be eugenesic. For instance, statistical study might reveal a preponderance of female offpsring” (p97-8).

However, any degree of infertility among human interracial couples is likely to be very slight. After all, today interracial relationships are increasingly common in Britain and America, and not noticeably less fecund than other unions. On the contrary, the number of biracial people, the products of such relationships, are themselves growing precipitously in number in both countries.

In practice, a very slight degree of reduced fertility among phenotypically distinct forms, as might conceivably occur among human interracial couples, would be unlikely to cause biologists to assign the different forms to different species, not least since, in the absense of close study, the slight degree of reduced fertility would probably never be detected in the first place.

Is there then any evidence of reduced fertility among mixed-race couples? Not a great deal.

As noted above, interracial relationships are increasingly common, and the the number of biracial people growing precipitously in Britain and America.

On the other hand, possibly blood type incompatibility between mother and developing foetus might be more common in interracial unions due to racial variation in the prevalence of different blood groups.

Also, one study did find a greater prevalence of birth complications, more specifically caesarean deliveries, among Asian women birthing offspring fathered by white men (Nystrom et al 2008).

However, this is a simple reflection of the differences in physical size between whites and Asians, with smaller-framed Asian women having difficulty birthing larger half-white offspring. Thus, the same study also found that white women birthing offspring fathered by Asian men actually have lower rates of caesarean delivery than did women bearing offspring fathered by men of the same race as themselves (Stanford University Medical Center 2008).[20]

Indeed, one study from Iceland rather surprisingly found that the highest pregnancy rates were found among couples who were actually quite closely related to one another, namely equivalent to third- or fourth-cousins, with less closely related spouses enjoying reduced pregnancy rates (Helgason et al 2008; see also Labouriau & Amorim 2008).

On the other hand, however, David Reich, in Who We Are and How We Got Here reports that, whereas there was evidence of selection against Neanderthal genes in the human genome (that had resulted from ancient hybridization between anatomically modern humans and Neanderthals) owing to the deleterious effects of these genes, there was no evidence of selection against European genes (or African genes) among African-Americans, a racially-mixed population:

In African Americans, in studies of about thirty thousand people, we have found no evidence for natural selection against African or European ancestry” (Who We Are and How We Got Here: p48; Bhatia et al 2014).

This lack of selection against either European-derived (or African-derived) genes in African-Americans suggests that discordant genes did not result in reduced fitness among African-Americans.[21] 

Humans – A Domesticated Species?

A final complication in defining species is that some species of nonhuman animal, wildly recognised as separate species because they do not interbreed in the wild, nevertheless have been known to successfully interbreed in captivity.

A famous example are lions and tigers. While they have never been known to interbreed in the wild, if only because they rarely if ever encounter one another, they have interbred in captivity, producing hybrid offspring in the form of so-called ligers and tigons.

This is, for Baker, of especial relevance to question of human races since, according to Baker, we ourselves are a domesticated species. Thus, he approvingly quotes Blumenbach’s claim that:

Man is ‘of all living beings the most domesticated” (p95).

Thus, with regard to the question of whether humans represent a single species, Baker reaches the following controversial conclusion:

The facts of human hybridity do not prove that all human races are to be regarded as belonging to a single ‘species’. The whole idea of species is vague because the word is used with such different meanings, none of which is of universal application. When it is used in the genetical sense [i.e. the criterion of interfertility] some significance can be attached to it, in so far as it applies to animals existing in natural conditions… but it does not appear to be applicable to human beings, who live under the most extreme conditions of domestication” (p98).

Thus, Baker goes so far as to question whether:

Any two kinds of animals, differing from one another so markedly in morphological characters (and in odour) as, for instance, the Europid and Sanid…, and living under natural conditions, would accept one another as sexual partners” (p97).

Certainly, in our ‘natural environment’ (what evolutionary psychologists call the environment of Evolutionary adaptedness or EEA), many human races would never have interbred, if only for the simple reason that they would never come into contact with one another.

On the contrary, they were separated from one another by the very geographic obstacles (oceans, deserts, mountain-ranges) that reproductively isolated them from one another and hence permitted their evolution into distinct races.

Thus, Northern Europeans surely never mated with sub-Saharan Africans for the simple reason that the former were confined to Northern Europe and surrounding areas while the latter were largely confined to sub-Saharan Africa, such that they are unlikely ever to have interacted.

Only with the invention of technologies facilitating long-distance travel (e.g. ocean-going ships, aeroplanes) would this change.

However, if Northern Europeans never interbred with sub-Saharan Africans, both groups surely did interbreed with their immediate neighbours, who, in turn, interbred with their intermediate neighbours who may, in turn, have interbred indirectly with the other group, since even the Sahara Desert, formerly regarded as the boundary between what were then called the Caucasiod and Negroid races, was far from a complete barrier to gene flow, even in ancient times.

Indeed, there may even have been gene flow between Eurasia and the Americas at the Bering Strait. Only perhaps Australian Aboriginals may to have been completely reproductively isolated for millennia.

There may therefore have been some indirect gene flow even between even distantly related populations as Northern Europeans and sub-Saharan Africans, even if no Nordic European ever encountered, let alone mated with, a black African. This, together with the continuous clinal nature of racial differentiation across the world that resulted from this interbreeding, was the key point emphasized by Darwin in The Descent of Man in support of his conclusion that all human races ought indeed to be considered a single species.

Moreover, Baker’s assertion that modern humans are a domesticated species, although a fashionable viewpoint today, is questionable.

Whether humans can indeed be said to be domesticated depends on how one defines domesticated. If we are domesticated, then humans are surely unique in having domesticated ourselves (or at least one another).[22]

Defining Race

Ultimately then, the question of whether the human race is a single species is a purely semantic dispute. It depends how one defines the word ‘species’.

Likewise, whether human races can be said to exist ultimately depends on one’s definition of the word ‘race.

Using the word ‘race’ interchangeably with that of ‘subspecies’, Baker provides no succinct definition. Instead, he simply explains:

If two populations [within a species] are so distinct that one can generally tell from which region a specimen was obtained, it is usual to give separate names to the two races” (p99).

Neither does he provide a neat definition of any particular race. On the contrary, he is explicit in emphasizing:

The definition of any particular race must be inductive in the sense that it gives a general impression of the distinctive characters, without professing to be applicable in detail to every individual” (p99).

Is Race Real?

At the conclusion of his chapter on “Hybridity and The Species Question”, Baker seems to reach what was, even in 1974, an incendiary conclusion – namely that, whether using morphological criteria or the criterion of interfertility, it is not possible to conclusively prove that all extant human populations belong to a single species (see above).

Nevertheless, in the remainder of the book, Baker proceeds on the assumption that differences among human groups are indeed subspecific (i.e. racial) in nature and that we do indeed form a single species.

Indeed, Baker criticises the notion that the existence persons of mixed racial ancestry, and the existence of clinal variation between races, disproves the existence of human races by observing that, if races did not interbreed with one another, then they would not be mere different races, but rather entirely separate species, according to the usual definition of this term. Thus, Baker explains:

Subraces and even races sometimes hybridise where they meet, but this almost goes without saying: for if sexual revulsion against intersubracial or interracial marriages were complete, one set of genes would have no chance of intermingling with the other, and the ethnic taxa would be species by the commonly accepted definition. It cannot be too strongly stressed that intersubracial and interracial hybridization is so far from indicating the unreality of subraces and races, that it is actually a sine qua non of the reality of these ethnic taxa” (p12).

This, Baker argues, is because:

It is the fact that intermediaries do occur that defines the race” (p99).

Thus, in nonhuman species among whom subspecies are recognized, there usually exist similar hybrid or intermediary populations around the boundaries of each distinct subspecies. Indeed, this phenomenon is so recurrent that there is even a biological term for it namely intergradation.

Yet this does not cause biologists to conclude that the subspecies in question either do not exist or that their boundaries are somehow arbitrarily delineated and artificial, let alone that subspecies is a biologically meaningless term.

Some people seem to think that, since races tend to blend into one another and hence have blurred boundaries (i.e. what biologists refer to as clinal variation), they do not really exist. Yet Baker objects:

In other matters, no one questions the reality of categories between which intermediaries exist. There is every graduation, for instance, between green and blue, but no one denies these words should be used” (p100).

However, this is perhaps an unfortunate example, since, as psychologists and physicists agree, colours, as such, do not exist.

Instead, the spectrum of light varies continuously. Distinct colours are imposed on this continuous variation only by the human brain and visual system.[23]

Using colour as an analogy for race is also potentially confusing because colour is already often conflated with race. Thus, races are referred to by their ostensible colours (e.g. blacks, whites, browns etc.) and the very word ‘colour’ is sometimes even used as a synonym, or perhaps euphemism, for race, even though, as Baker is at pains to emphasize, races differ in far more than skin colour.

Using colour as an analogy for race differences is only likely to exacerbate this confusion.

Yet Baker’s other examples are similarly problematic. Thus, he writes:

“The existence of youths and human hermaphrodites does not cause anyone to disallow the use of the words, ‘boy’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’” (p100).

However, hermaphrodites, unlike racial intermediaries, are extremely rare. Meanwhile, words such as ‘boy’ and ‘youth’ are colloquial terms, not really scientific ones. As anthropologist John Relethford observes:

We tend to use crude labels in everyday life with the realization that they are fuzzy and subjective. I doubt anyone thinks that terms such as ‘short’, ‘medium’ and ‘tall’ refer to discrete groups, or that humanity only comes in three values of height” (Relethford 2009: p21).

In short, we often resort to vague and impressionistic language in everyday conversation. However, for scientific purposes, we must surely try, wherever possible, to be more precise.

Rather than alluding to colour terms or hermaphrodites, perhaps a better counterexample, if only because it is certain to provoke annoyance, cognitive dissonance and doublethink among leftist race-denying sociologists, is that of social class. Thus, as biosocial criminologist Anthony Walsh demands:

Is social class… a useless concept because of its cline-like tendency to merge smoothly from case to case across the distribution, or because its discrete categories are determined by researchers according to their research purposes and are definitely not ‘pure’” (Race and Crime: A Biosocial Analysis: p6).

However, the same leftist social scientists who insist the race concept is an unscientific social construction, nevertheless continue to employ the concept of social class almost as if it were entirely unproblematic.

However, the objection that races do not exist because races are not discrete categories, but rather have blurred boundaries, is not entirely fallacious.

After all, sometimes intermediaries can be so common that they can no longer be said to be intermediaries at all and all that can be said to exist is continuous clinal variation, such that wherever one chose to draw the boundary between one race and another would be entirely arbitrary.

With increased migration and intermarriage, we may fast be approaching this point.[24]

However, just because the boundaries between racial groups are blurred, this does not mean that the differences between them, whether physiological or psychological, do not exist. To assume otherwise would represent a version of the continuum fallacy or sorties paradox, also sometimes called the fallacy of the heap or fallacy of the beard.

Thus, even if races do not exist, race differences still surely do – and, just as skin colour varies on a continuous, clinal basis, so might average IQbrain-size and personality!

Anticipating Jared Diamond

Remarkably, Baker even manages to anticipate certain erroneous objections to the race concept that had not, to my knowledge, even been formulated at the time of his writing, perhaps because they are so obviously fallacious to anyone without an a priori political commitment to the denying the validity of the race concept.

In particular, Jared Diamond (1994), in an influential and much-cited paper, argues that racial categories are meaningless because, rather than being classified by skin colour, races could just as easily be grouped on the basis of traits such as the prevalence of genes for sickle-cell or lactose tolerance, which would lead us to adopting very different classifications.

Actually, Baker argues, the importance of colour for racial classification has been exaggerated.

In the classification of animals, zoologists lay little emphasis on differences of colour… They pay far more attention to differences in grosser structure” (p159).

Indeed, he quotes no lesser authority than Darwin himself as observing:

Colour is generally esteemed by the systematic naturalist as unimportant (p148).

African_albino
A Negro albino: Proof that race is more than ‘skin deep’

Certainly, he is at pains to emphasise that, among humans, differences between racial groups go far beyond skin colour. Indeed, he observes, one has only to look at an African albino to realize as much:

An albino… Negrid who is fairer than any non-albino European, [yet] appears even more unlike a European than a normal… Negrid” (p160).

Likewise, some populations from the Indian subcontinent are very dark in skin tone, yet they are, according to Baker, predominantly Caucasoid (p160), as, he claims, are the Aethiopid subrace of the Horn of Africa (p225).[25]

Thus, Baker laments how:

An Indian, who may show close resemblance to many Europeans in every structural feature of his body, and whose ancestors established a civilization long before the inhabitants of the British Isles did so, is grouped as ‘coloured’ with persons who are very different morphologically from any European or Indian, and whose ancestors never developed a civilization” (p160).

Yet, in contrast, of the San Bushmen of Southern Africa, he remarks:

The skin is only slightly darker than that of the Mediterranids of Southern Europe and paler than that of many Europids whose ancestral home is in Asia or Africa” (p307).

But no one would mistake them for Caucasoid.

What then of the traits, namely the prevalence of the sickle-cell gene or of lactose tolerance, that would, according to Diamond, produce very different taxonomies?

For Baker, these are what he calls “secondary characters” that cannot be used for the purposes of racial classification because they are not present among all members of any group, but differ only in their relative prevalence (p186).

Moreover, he observes, the sickle-cell gene is likely to have “arisen independently in more than one place” (p189). It is therefore evidence, not of common ancestry, but of convergent evolution, or what Baker refers to as “independent mutation” (p189).

It is therefore irrelevant from the perspective of cladistic taxonomy, whereby organisms are grouped, not on the basis of shared traits as such, but rather of shared ancestry. From the perspective of cladistic taxonomy, shared traits are relevant only to the extent they are (interpreted as) evidence of shared ancestry.

The same is true for lactose tolerance, which seems to have evolved independently in different populations in concert with the development of dairy farming, in a form of gene-culture co-evolution.

Indeed, lactose tolerance appears to have evolved through somewhat different genetic mechanisms (i.e. mutations in different genes) in different populations, seemingly a conclusive demonstration that it evolved independently in these different lineages (Tishkoff et al 2007).

As Baker warns:

One must always be on the lookout for the possibility of independent mutation wherever two apparently unrelated taxa resemble one another by the fact that some individuals in both groups reveal the presence of the same gene” (p189).

In evolutionary biology, this is referred to as distinguishing analogy from homology.

Thus, for example, authors Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele, in their book Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here) observe:

There are two groups of people [i.e. races] with the conbination of dark skin and frizzy hair—sub-Saharan Africans and Melanesians. The latter have often been called Oceanic Negroes,’ implying a special relationship with Africans. The blood-group data, however, show that they are about as different from Africans as they could be” (Race: The Reality of Human Differences: p134).

But Diamond’s proposed classification is even more preposterous than these early pre-Darwinian non-cladistic taxonomic schemes, since he proposes to classify races on the basis of a single trait in isolation, the trait in question (either lactose tolerance or the sickle-cell gene) being chosen either arbitrarily or, more likely, to illustrate the point that Diamond is attempting to make.

Yet even pre-Darwinian taxonomies proposed to classify species, not on the basis of a single trait, but rather on the basis of a whole suit of traits that intercorrelate together.

In short, Diamond proposes to classify races on the basis of a single character that has evolved independently in distantly related populations, instead of a whole suite of inter-correlated traits indicative of common ancestry.

Interestingly, a similar error may underlie an even more frequently cited paper by Marxist-geneticist Richard Lewontin, which argued the vast majority of genetic variation was within-group rather than between-group – since Lewontin, like Diamond, also relied on ‘secondary characters’ such as blood-groups to derive his estimates (Lewontin 1972).[26]

The reason for the recurrence of this error, Baker explains, is that:

Each of the differences that enable one to distinguish all the most typical individuals of any one taxon from those of another is due, as a general rule, to the action of polygenes, that is to say, to the action of numerous genes, having small cumulative effects” (p190).

Yet, unlike traits resulting from a few alleles, polygenes are not amenable to simple Mendelian analysis.

Therefore, this leads to the “unfortunate paradox” whereby:

The better the evidence of relationship or distinction between ethnic taxa, the less susceptible are the facts to genetic analysis” (p190).

As a consequence, Baker laments:

Attention is focussed today on those ‘secondary differences’… that can be studied singly and occur in most ethnic taxa, though in different proportions in different taxa… The study of these genes… has naturally led, from its very nature, to a tendency to minimise or even disregard the extent to which the ethnic taxa of man do actually differ from one another” (p534).

Finally, Baker even provides a reductio ad absurdum of Diamond’s approach, observing:

From the perspective of taste-deficiency the Europids are much closer to the chimpanzee than to the Sinids and Paiwan people; yet no one would claim that this resemblance gives a true representation of relationship” (p188).

However, applying the logic of Diamond’s article, we would be perfectly justified and within our rights to use this similarity in taste deficiency in order to classify Caucasians as a sub-species of chimpanzee!

Subraces

The third section of Baker’s book, “Studies of Selected Human Groups”, focusses on the traditional subject-matter of physical anthropology – i.e. morphological differences between human groups.[27]

Baker describes the physiological differences between races in painstaking technical detail. These parts of the book makes for an especially difficult read, as Baker carefully elucidates both how anthropologists measure morphological differences, and the nature and extent of the various physiological differences between the races discussed revealed by these methods.

Yet, curiously, although many of his measures are quantitative in nature, Baker rarely discusses whether differences are statistically significant.[28] Yet without statistical analysis, all of Baker’s reports of quantitative measurements of differences in the shapes and sizes of the skulls and body parts of people of different races represent little more than subjective impressions.

This is especially problematic in his discussion of so-called ‘subraces’ (subdivisions within the major continental races, such as Nordics and the Meditaranean race, both supposed subdivisions within the Caucasiod race), where differences could easily be dismissed as, if not wholly illusory, then at least as clinal in nature and as not always breeding true.

Yet nowhere in his defence of the reality of subracial differences does Baker cite statistics. Instead, his argument is wholly subjective and qualitative in nature:

In many parts of the world where there have not been any large movements of population over a long period, the reality of subraces is evident enough” (p211).

One suspects that, given increased geographic mobility, those parts of the world are now reduced in number.

Thus, even if subracial differences were once real, with increased migration and intermarriage, they are fast disappearing, at least within Europe.

Is the ‘White Race’ a Social Construct?

One other interesting observation may be made with regard to Bakers proposed racial taxonomy. Save when quoting from other earlier authors who did use these terms, Baker himself never once refers to white people or the ‘the white race’. 

Not only does he, as we have seen, reject the use of colour for the purposes of racial classification, he also does not seem to recognize white people as constituting a useful racial category in the first place. Thus, not only do the terms white people’ or the white race’ receive no mention in his racial taxonomy either as a race or a subrace, neither is any synonym covering roughly the same set of people included (p624-5).

Of course, Baker’s Europid race might appear, from its name, to cover much the same ground, since the ancestral homelands of those today classed as white are roughly coextensive with the geographical boundaries of Europe.

In fact, however, its meaning is much broader, as Baker uses the word Europid to refer to what earlier anthropologists more typically called the Caucasian race, and, as he is himself at pains to emphasize, the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, the Middle East and, at least according to Baker, even South Asia are all classified as Caucasoid/Europid (p160), and Baker even argues that those he terms the Aethiopids of the Horn of Africa are also predominantly Caucasoid/Europid (p225).

While indigenous Europeans are grouped together with North Africans, South Asians and Arabs as Europid, they are also subdivided among themselves into such supposed subraces as Nordid, Mediterranid, Osteuropid, Dinarid and Alpinid. Yet none of these terms is equivalent to what we today habitually call white people, and the indigenous homelands of at least some of these subraces, notably the Mediterranid, extend outside of the European continent into North Africa and the Middle East, and include some peoples whom we would today hesitate to call white, who are unlikely to themselves identify as such, and who would certainly not be recognized as white by most white racialists.

This conclusion seems to have been shared by most other early- to mid-twentieth century physical anthropologists. For example, Carleton Coon, the once-celebrated mid-twentieth century American phsycial anthropologist, in his book The Races of Europe, contended that:

The Mediterranean racial zone stretches unbroken from Spain across the Straits of Gibraltar to Morocco, and thence eastward to India. A branch of it extends far southward on both sides of the Red Sea into southern Arabia, the Ethiopian highlands, and the Horn of Africa (The Races of Europe: p401).

Unlike Baker, Coon does indeed use the phrase the white race’, and indeed regards his 1939 book as a study of this race. However, he clearly intends this phrase to carry a rather broader meaning than that with which it is usually invested today, since he regards, for example, even the Gallas, the Somalis, the Ethiopians, and the inhabitants of Eritrea as all being white or near white”, a view that would hardly endear him to most contemporary white racists (The Races of Europe: p445).   

Thus, while he would certainly reject the idea that race is a mere social construct as preposterous, I suspect that Baker, along with other early twentieth-century racial anthropologists, might actually agree with the race deniers that the concept of a white race, at least as it is defined and demarcated in the Anglosphere today, is indeed an artificial construct with little biological validity, which owes more to geographical and even religious factors (i.e. the traditional boundary between Chistendom and the Islamic world) than it does to measuable phenotypic, or, for that matter, genetic, differences.

In contrast, although the politcally correct orthodoxy holds that terms such as ‘Caucasian’ or ‘Caucasoid’ (or, to use Baker’s preferred term ‘Europid’) reflect a scientifically obsolete and discredited basis for racial classification, this racial category actually seems to have been broadly corroborated by modern studies in population genetics.

Thus, geneticist David Reich, in his 2018 book, Who We Are and How We Got Here, reports:

Today, the peoples of West Eurasia—the vast region spanning Europe, the Near East, and much of central Asia—are genetically highly similar. The physical similarity of West Eurasian populations was recognized in the eighteenth century by scholars who classified the people of West Eurasia as ‘Caucasoids’… The whole-genome data at first seem to validate some of the old categories… Populations within West Eurasia are typically around seven times more similar to one another than West Eurasians are to East Asians. When frequencies of mutations are plotted on a map, West Eurasia appears homogeneous, from the Atlantic façade of Europe to the steppes of central Asia. There is a sharp gradient of change in central Asia before another region of homogeneity is reached in East Asia” (Who We Are and How We Got Here: p93).[29]

This is probably because the term ‘Caucasoid’ was hardly an arbitrary invention of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century racists, but rather reflected, not only real phenotypic resemblance among populations, but also geographic factors, the indigenous homelands of the ostensible race being circumscribed by relatively impassable geographic obstacles – such as the Sahara Desert, Himalayas, Siberia and Atlantic Ocean – which represented barriers to human movement and hence gene flow throughout much of human history and prehistory.

In contrast, the ostensible boundaries of the indigenous homelands so-called ‘white race’ are, at least today, usually equated with the boundaries of the European continent. But, whereas the Sahara, Himalayas, Siberia and Atlantic were long barriers to gene-flow, at least some of the boundaries of the European continent – namely the Mediterranean Sea, Strait of Gibraltar and Turkish Straits – were long hubs of trade, migration, population movement and conquest. It is thus unsurprising that populations on either side of these boundaries, far from being racially distinct, resemble one another both phenotypically and genetically.

Studies of Selected Human Groups

This third section of the book focuses on certain specific selected human populations. These are presumably chosen because Baker feels that they are representative of certain important elements of human evolution, racial divergence, or are otherwise of particular interest.

Unfortunately, Baker’s choice of which groups upon which to focus seems rather arbitrary and he never explains why these groups were chosen ahead of others.

In particular, it is notable that Baker focuses primarily on populations from Europe and Africa. East Asians (i.e. Mongoloids), curiously, are entirely unrepresented.

The Jews

After a couple of introductory chapters, and one chapter focussing on “Europids” (i.e. Caucasians) as a whole, Baker’s next chapter discusses Jewish people.

In the opening paragraphs, he observes that:

In any serious study of the superiority or inferiority of particular groups of people one cannot fail to take note of the altogether outstanding contributions made to intellectual and artistic life, and to the world of commerce and finance, generation after generation by persons to whom the name of Jews is attached” (p232).

However, having taken due “note” of this, and hence followed his own advice, he says almost nothing further on the matter, either in this chapter or in those later chapters that deal specifically with the question of racial superiority (see below).

Instead, Baker first focuses on justifying the inclusion of Jews in a book about race, and hence arguing against the politically-correct notion that Jews are not a race, but rather mere practitioners of a religion.[30] Baker gives short-shrift to this notion:

There is no close resemblance between Judaism in the religious sense and a proselytizing religion such as the Roman Catholic” (p326).

In other words, Baker seems to be saying, because Judaism is not a religion that actively seeks out converts (but rather one that, if anything, discourages conversion), Jews have retained an ethnic character distinct from the host populations alongside whom they reside, without having their racial traits diluted by the incorporation of large numbers of converts of non-Jewish ancestry.

Yet, actually, even proselytizing religions like Christianity, Catholicism and Islam that do actively seek to convert nonbelievers, often come to take on an ethnic character, since, despite the possibility of conversion, offspring usually inherit (i.e. are indoctrinated in) the faith of their parents, apostates are persecuted, conversion remains, in practice, rare, and people are admonished to marry within the faith.

Thus, in polities beset by ethnic conflict, like Northern Ireland, Lebanon or the former Yugoslavia, religions often comes to represent markers for ethnicity or even something akin to ethnicities in and of themselves – i.e. reproductively-isolated, endogamous breeding populations.

Having concluded, then, that there is a racial as well as a religious component to Jewish identity, Baker nevertheless stops short of declaring the Jews a race or even what he calls a subrace.

Dismissing the now discredited Khazar hypothesis in a sentence,[31] Baker instead classes them bulk of the world’s Jewish population (i.e. the Ashkenazim) as merely part of “Armenid subrace” of the Europid race” with some “Orientalid” (i.e. Arab) admixture (p242).[32]

Thus, Baker claims:

Persons of Ashkennazic stock can generally be recognised by certain physical characters that distinguish them from other Europeans” (p238).

Jewish_Nose
Baker’s delightfully offensive illustration of Jewish nose shape, taken from Jacobs (1886).

These include a short but wide skull and a nose that is “large in all dimensions” (p239), the characteristic shape of which Baker even purports to illustrate with a delightfully offensive diagram (p241).[33]

Likewise, Baker claims that Sephardic Jews, the other main subgroup of European Jews, are likewise “distinguishable from the Ashkenazim by physical characters”, being slenderer in build, with straighter hair, narrower noses, and different sized skulls, approximately more to the Mediterranean racial type (p245-6).

But, if Sephardim and Ashkenazim are indeed “distinguishable” or “recognisable” by “physical characters”, either from one another or from other European Gentiles, as Baker claims, then with what degree of accuracy is he claiming such distinctions can be made? Surely far less than 100%.[34]

Moreover, are the alleged physiological differences that Baker posits between Ashkenazi, Sephardi, and other Europeans based on recorded quantitative measurements, and, if so, are the differences in question statistically significant? On this, Baker says nothing.

The Celts

The next chapter concerns The Celts, a term surrounding which there is so much confusion and which has been used in so many different senses – racial, cultural, ethnic, territorial and linguistic (p183) – that some historians have argued that it should be abandoned altogether.

Baker, himself British, is keen to dispel the notion that the indigenous populations of the British Isles were, at the time of the Roman invasion, a primitive people, and is very much an admirer of their artwork.

Thus, Baker writes that:

Caesar… nowhere states that any of the Britons were savage (immanis), nor does he speak specifically of their ignorance (ignorantia), though he does twice mention their indiscretion (imprudentia) in parleying” (p263).

Of course, Caesar, though hardly unbiased in this respect, did regard the indigenous Britons as less civilized than the Romans themselves. However, I suppose that barbarism is, like civilization (see below), a matter of degree.

Regarding the racial characteristics of those inhabitants of pre-Roman Britain who are today called Celts, Baker classifies them as Nordic, writing:

Their skulls scarcely differ from those of the Anglo-Saxons who subsequently dominated them, except in one particular character, namely, that the skull is slightly (but significantly) lower in the Iron Age man than in the Anglo-Saxon” (p257).[35]

Thus, dismissing the politically-correct notion that the English were, in the words of another author, “true multiracial society”, Baker claims:

“[The] Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Normans, Belgics and… Celts… were not only of one race (Europid) but of one subrace (Nordid).” (p267).

Citing remains found in an ancient cemetery in Berkshire supposedly containing the skeletons of Anglo-Saxon males but indigenous British females and hybrid offspring, he concludes that, rather than extermination, a process of intermarriage and assimilation occurred (p266). This is a conclusion largely corroborated by recent population genetic studies.

However, the indigenous pre-Celtic inhabitants of the British Isles were, Baker concludes, less Nordic than Mediterranid in phenotype.[36]

Such influences remain, Baker claims, in the further reaches of Wales and Ireland, as evidenced by the distribution of blood groups and of hair colour.

Thus, whereas the Celtic fringe is usually associated with red, auburn or ginger hair, Baker instead emphasizes the greater prevalence of dark hair among the Irish and Welsh:

The tendency towards the possession of dark hair was much more marked in Wales than in England, and still more marked in the western districts of Ireland” (p265).[37]

This conclusion is based upon the observations of nineteenth century English ethnologist John Beddoe, who travelled the British Isles recording the distribution of different hair and eye colours, reporting his findings in The Races of Britain, which was first published in 1862 and remains, to my knowledge, the only large body of data on the distribution of hair and eye colour in the British Isles to this day.

On this basis, Baker therefore concludes that:

The modern population of Great Britain probably derives mainly from the [insular] ‘Celts’… and Belgae, though a more ancient [i.e. Mediterranean] stock has left its mark rather clearly in certain parts of the country, and the Anglo-Saxons and other northerners made an additional Nordid contribution later on” (p269).

Yet recent population genetic studies suggest that even the so-called Celts, like the later Anglo-Saxons, Normans and Vikings, actually had only a quite minimal impact on the ancestry of the indigenous peoples of the British Isles.[38]

This, of course, further falsifies the politically correct, but absurd notion that the British are a nation of immigrants – which phrase is, of course, itself a recent immigrant from America, in respect of whose population the claim surely has more plausibility.

The Celts, moreover, likely arrived from on the British Isles from continental Europe by the same route as the later Anglo-Saxons and Normans – i.e. across the English channel (or perhaps the south-west corner of the North Sea), by way of Southern England. This is, after all, by far the easiest, most obvious and direct route.[39]

This leads Baker to conclude that the Celts, like the Anglo-Saxons after them, imposed their language on, but had little genetic impact on, the inhabitants of those parts of the British Isles furthest from this point of initial disembarkation (i.e. Scotland, Ireland, Wales). Thus, Baker concludes:

The Iron Age invaders transmitted the dialects of their Celtic language to the more ancient Britons whom they found in possession of the land [and] pushed back these less advanced peoples towards the west and north as they spread” (p264).

But these latter peoples, though adopting the Celtic tongue, were not themselves (primarily) descendants of the Celtic invaders. This leads Baker to conclude, following what he takes to also be the conclusion of Carleton Coon in the latter’s book The Races of Europe, that:

It is these people, the least Celtic—in the ethnic sense—of all the inhabitants of Great Britain, that have clung most obstinately to the language that their conquerors first taught them two thousand years ago” (p269).

In other words, in a racial and genetic, if not a linguistic, sense, the English are actually more Celtic than are the self-styled Celtic Nations of Scotland, Ireland and Wales!

Australian Aboriginals – a “Primitive” Race?

The next chapter is concerned with Australian Aboriginals, or, as Baker classes them, “Australids”.

In this chapter Baker is primarily concerned with arguing that Aboriginals are morphologically primitive.

Of course, the indigenous inhabitants of what is now Australia were, when Europeans first made contact with them, notoriously backward in terms of their technology and material culture.

For example, Australian Aboriginals are said the only indigenous people yet to have developed the simple bow or bow and arrow; while the neighbouring, and related, indigenous people of Tasmania, isolated from the Australian mainland by rising sea levels at the end of the last ice age but usually classed as of the same race, are said to have lacked even, arguably, the ability to make fire.

However, this is not what Baker means by referring to Aboriginals as retaining many “primitive traits. Indeed, unlike his later chapters on black Africans, Baker says nothing regarding the technology or material culture of indigenous Australians.

Instead, he talks exclusively about their morphology. In referring to them as retaining “primitive” characters, Baker is therefore using the word in the specialist phylogenetic sense. Thus, he argues that Australian Aboriginals:

Retain… physical characters that were possessed by remote ancestors but have been lost in the course of evolution by most members of the taxa that are related to it” (p272-3).

In other words, they retain traits characteristic of an earlier state of human evolution which have since been lost in other extant races.

Baker purports to identify twenty-eight such “primitive” characters in Australian aboriginals. These include prognathism (p281), large teeth (p289), broad noses (p282), and large brow ridges (p280).

Baker acknowledges that all extant races retain some primitive characters that have been lost in other races (p302). For example, unlike most other races (but not Aboriginals), Caucasoids retain scalp hair characteristic of early hominids and indeed other extant primates (p297).

However, Baker concludes:

The Australids are exceptional in the number and variety of their primitive characters and in the degree to which some of them are manifested” (p302).

Relatedly, Nicholas Wade observes that, whereas there is a general trend towards lighter and less robust bones and skulls over the course of human evolution, something referred to as gracialization, two populations at “the extremities of the human diaspora” seem to have been exempt, or isolated, from this process, namely Aboriginals and the “Fuegians at the tip of the South America” (A Troublesome Inheritance: p167-8).[40]

Of course, to be morphologically ‘primitive’ in this specialist phylogenetic sense entails no necessary pejorative imputations as are often associated with the word ‘primitive’.

However, some phylogentically primitive traits may indeed be linked to the primitive’ technology of indigenous Aboriginals at the time of first contact with Europeans.

For example, tooth size decreased over the course of human evolution as human invented technologies (e.g. cooking, tools for cutting) that made large teeth unnecessary. As science writer Marek Kohn puts it:

As the brain expanded in the course of becoming human, the teeth became smaller. Hominids lost their built-in weapons, but developed the possibility of building their own, all the way to the Bomb” (The Race Gallery: p63).

Indeed, Darwin himself observed, in The Descent of Man, that:

The early male forefathers of man were, as previously stated, probably furnished with great canine teeth; but as they gradually acquired the habit of using stones, clubs, or other weapons, for fighting with their enemies or rivals, they would use their jaws and teeth less and less. In this case, the jaws, together with the teeth, would become reduced in size” (The Descent of Man).

Therefore, it is possible, Kohn provocatively contends, that:

Aborigines have a biological adaptation to compensate for the primitiveness of their material culture… Teeth get smaller, the argument runs, when technology becomes more advanced” (The Race Gallery: p72-3).

On this view, the relatively large size of Aboriginal teeth could be associated with the primitive state of their technology.

Another phylogentically primitive Aboriginal trait that also, rather more obviously, implies lesser intelligence intelligence, is their relatively smaller brain size.

Indeed, Philippe Rushton posits a direct tradeoff between brain-size and the size of the jaw and teeth, arguing in Race, Evolution and Behavior (which I have reviewed here, here and here) that: 

As brain tissue expanded it did so at the expense of the temporalis muscles, whichclose the jaw. Since smaller temporalis muscles cannot close as large a jaw, jaw size was reduced. Consequently, there is less room for teeth” (Race, Evolution and Behavior: Preface to Third Edition: p20-1).

Thus, leading mid-twentieth century American physical anthropologist and racialist Carleton Coon reports:

The critical differences between [“the ancestors of our living races”] and us lie mostly in brain size versus jaw size – the balance between thinking thoughts and eating foods of various degrees of fineness” (Racial Adaptations: p113).

Thus, Aboriginals have, on average, Baker reports, not only larger jaws and teeth, but also smaller brains than those of Caucasians, weighing only about 85% as much (p292). The smaller average brain-size of Aboriginals is confirmed by more recent data (Beals et al 1984).

Baker also reviews some suggestive evidence regarding the internal structure of Aboriginal brains, as compared to that of Europeans, notably in the relative positioning of the lunate sulcus, again suggesting similarities with the brains of non-human primates.

In this sense, then, Australian Aboriginals ‘primitivebrains may indeed be linked to the primitive state, in the more familiar sense of the word ‘primitive’, of their technology and culture.

San Bushmen and Paedomorphy

Whereas Australian Aboriginals are morphologically “primitive” (i.e. retain characters of early hominids), the San Bushmen of Southern Africa (“Sanids”), together with the related Khoi (collectively Khoisan, or, in racial terms, Capoid) are, Baker contends, paedomorphic.

Bushman_penes
Bushmen’s paedomorphic penes

By this, Baker means that the San people retain into adulthood traits that are, in other taxa, restricted to infants or juveniles, and is more often referred to as neoteny.[41]

One example of this supposed paedomorphy is provided by the genitalia of the Sanid males:

The penis, when not erect, maintains an almost horizontal position… This feature is scarcely ever omitted in the rock art of the Bushmen, in their stylized representations of their own people. The prepuce is very long; it covers the glans completely and projects forward to a point. The scrotum is drawn up close to the root of the penis, giving the appearance that only one testis has descended, and that incompletely” (p319).[42]

Humans in general are known to be neotenous in many of our distinct characters, and we are also, of course, the most intelligent known species.

Indeed, as discussed by Desmond Morris in his 1960s human ethology classic The Naked Ape (which I have reviewed here), among the traits that have been associated with neotenty in humans are our brain size, growth patterns, hairlessness, inventiveness, upright posture, spinal curvature, smaller jaws and teeth, forward facing vaginas, lack of a penis bone, the length of our limbs and the retention of the hymen into adulthood.

However, Baker argues:

Although mankind as a whole is paedomorphous, those ethnic taxa (the Sanids among them) that are markedly more paedomorphious than the rest have never achieved the status of civilization, or anything approaching it, by their own initiative. It would seem that, when carried beyond a certain point, paedomorphosis is antagonistic to purely intellectual advance” (p324).

As to why this might be the case, he speculates in a later chapter:

Certain taxa have remained primitive or become paedomorphous in their general morphological characters and none of these has succeeded in developing a civilization. It is among these taxa in particular that one finds some indication of a possible cause of mental inferiority in the small size of the brain” (p428).

Yet this is a curious suggestion since neoteny is usually associated with increased brain growth in humans.[43]

Moreover, other authorities class East Asians as a paedomorphic race, and Baker himself classes the bulk of the population” of Japan as “somewhat paedomorphious” (p538).[44]

However, the Japanese, along with other Northeast Asians, not least the Chinese, have undoubtedly founded great civilizations and have brains as large as, or, after controlling for body-size, even larger than those of Europeans, and are generally reported to have somewhat higher IQs (see Lynn’s Race Differences in Intelligence: which I have reviewed here).

The Big Butts of Bushmen – or just of Bushwomen?

Bushman_buttocks
Bushwomen’s buttocks (or ‘steatopygia’)

Having discussed male genitalia, Baker also emphasizes the primary and secondary sexual characteristics of Sanid women – in particular their protruding buttocks (“steatopygia”) and alleged elongated labia.

The protruding buttocks of Sanid women are, Baker contends, qualitatively different in both shape and indeed composition from those of other populations, including the much-celebrated ‘big butts’ of contemporary African-Americans (p318).

Thus, whereas, among other populations, the shape of the buttocks, even if very large, are “rounded” in shape:

It is particular characteristic of the Khoisanids that the shape of the projecting part is that of a right-angled triangle, the upper edge being nearly horizontal … [and] internally… consist of masses of fat incorporated between criss-crossed sheets of connective tissue said to be joined to one another in a regular manner” (p318)

Although there is abundant photographic evidence for the character, proving that it is not a mere racist myth from nineteenth century anthropology, the trait does not appear to be universal among San women, as it is also easy to find images of San women who do not have exceptionally large or protruding buttocks, and it is possible that racist nineteenth century anthropologists exaggerated the ubiquity of the trait, just as politically correct modern anthropologists tend to ignore or play it down.

Regarding the function of these enlarged buttocks, Baker rejects any analogy with the humps of the camel, which evolved as reserves of fat upon which the animal could call in the event of famine or draught.

Unlike camels, which are, of course, adapted to a desert environment, Baker concludes:

The Hottentots, Korana, and Bushmen are not to be regarded as people adapted by natural selection to desert life” (p318).

However, today, San Bushmen are indeed largely restricted to a desert environment, namely the Kalahari desert.

However, although he does not directly discuss this, Baker presumably regards this as a recent displacement, resulting from the Bantu expansion, in the course of which the less advanced San were displaced from their traditional hunting grounds in southern Africa by Bantu agriculturalists, and permitted to eke out an undisturbed existence only in an arid desert environment of no use to Bantu agriculturalists.

Instead of having evolved as fat reserves in the event of famine, drought or scarcity, Baker instead suggests that Khoisan buttocks evolved through sexual selection.

As authority, he cites Darwin’s observation in The Descent of Man that, according to the reports of an earlier anthropologist, zoologist and explorer, this peculiarity is greatly admired by the men”, to such an extent that the latter reported observing:

[One] woman who was considered a beauty, and she was so immensely developed behind, that when seated on level ground she could not rise, and had to push herself along until she came to a slope” (The Descent of Man).

This theory – namely that these large protruding buttocks evolved through sexual selection – seems plausible given the sexual appeal of ‘big butts even among western populations. However, recent research suggest that it is actually lumbar curvature, or lordosis, an ancient mammalian mating signal, rather than fat deposits in the buttocks as such, that is primarily responsible for the perceived attractiveness of so-called ‘big butts’ (Lewis et al 2015).

This theory that this trait is a product of sexual selection is, of course, also consistent with the fact that large buttocks among the San seem to be largely, if not entirely, restricted to women.

However, Carleton Coon, in Racial Adaptations: A Study of the Origins, Nature, and Significance of Racial Variations in Humans, suggests alternatively that this sexual dimorphism could instead reflect the caloric requirements of pregnancy and lactation.[45]

The caloric demands of pregnancy and lactation are indeed the probable reason women of all races have greater fat deposits than do males.

Indeed, an analogy might be provided by female breasts, since these, unlike the mammary glands of other mammalian species, are present permanently, from puberty on, and, save during pregnancy and lactation, are composed predominantly of fatty tissues, not milk.[46]

Elusive Elongated Labia?

Hottentot apron
The only photographic evidence of the ‘Hottentot apron’?

In addition to their enlarged buttocks, Baker also discusses the alleged elongated labia of Sanid women, sometimes referred to, rather inaccurately in Baker’s view, as the “the Hottentot apron”.

Some writers have discounted this notion as a sort of nineteenth-century anthropological myth. However, Baker himself insists that the elongated labia of the San are indeed real.

His evidence, however, is less than compelling, the illustrations included in the text being limited to a full-body photograph in which the characteristic is barely visible (p311) and what seems to be a surely rather fanciful sketch (p315).

Likewise, although a Google image search produces abundant photographic evidence of Khoisan buttocks, their elongated labia prove altogether more elusive.

Perhaps the modesty of Khoisan women, or the prudery and puritanism of Victorian anthropologists and explorers, prevented the latter from recording photographic evidence for this characteristic.

However, it is perhaps telling that, even in this age of Rule 34 of the Internet (If it exists, there is porn of it. No exceptions), I have been unable to find photographic evidence for this trait.

Racial Superiority

The fourth and final section of ‘Race’ turns to the most controversial topic addressed by Baker in this most controversial of books, namely whether any racial group can be said to be superior or inferior to another, a question that Baker christens “the Ethnic Question”.

He begins by critiquing the very nature of the notion of superiority and inferiority, observing in a memorable and quotable aphorism:

Anyone who accepts it as a self-evident truth, in accordance with the American Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal may properly be asked whether the meaning of the word ‘equal’ is self-evident” (p421).

Thus, if one is “concerned simply with the question whether the taxa are similar or different”, then, Baker concludes, “there can be no doubt as to the answer” (p421).

Indeed, this much is clear, not simply from the huge amount of data assembled by Baker himself in previous chapters, but also from simple observation.[47]

However, Baker continues:

The words ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ are not generally used unless value judgements are concerned” (p421).

Any value judgement is, of course, necessarily subjective.

On objective criteria, each race can only be said to be, on average, superior in a specific endeavour (e.g. IQ tests, basketball, running, mugging, pimping, drug-dealing, tanning, making music, building civilizations). The value to be ascribed to these endeavours is, however, wholly subjective.

On these grounds, contemporary self-styled race realists typically disclaim any association between their theories and any notions of racial superiority.

Yet these race realists are often the very same individuals who emphasise the predictive power of IQ tests in determining many social outcomes (income, criminality, illegitimacy, welfare dependency) which are generally viewed in anything but value-neutral terms (see The Bell Curve: which I have reviewed here).

From a biological perspective, no species (or subspecies) is superior to any other. Each is adapted to its own ecological niche and hence presumably superior at surviving and reproducing within the specific environment in which it evolved.

Thus, sociobiologist Robert Trivers quotes his mentor Bill Druryf as observing during a discussion between the two regarding a possible biological basis for race prejudice:

Bob, once you’ve learnt to think of a herring gull as equal, the rest is easy” (Natural Selection and Social Theory: p57).

However, taken to its logical conclusion, or reductio ad absurdum, this suggests a dung beetle is equal to Beethoven!

From Physiology to Psychology

Although he alludes in passing to race differences in athletic ability, Baker, in discussing superiority, is concerned primarily with intellectual and moral achievement. Therefore, in this final section of the book, he turns from physiological differences to psychological ones.

Of course, the two are not entirely unconnected. All behaviour must have an ultimate basis in the brain, which is itself a part of an organism’s physiology. Thus:

Cranial capacity is, of course, directly relevant to the ethnic problem since it sets a limit to the size of the brain in different taxa; but all morphological differences are also relevant in an indirect way, since it is scarcely possible that any taxa could be exactly the same as one another in all the genes that control the development and function of the nervous and sensory systems, yet so different from one another in structural characters in other parts of the body” (p533-4).

Indeed, Baker observes:

Identity in habits is unusual even in pairs of taxa that are morphologically much more similar to one another than [some human races]. The subspecies of gorilla, for instance, are not nearly so different from one another as Sanids are from Europids, but they differ markedly in their modes of life” (426).

In other words, since human races differ significantly in their physiology, it is probable that they will also differ, to a roughly equivalent degree, in psychological traits, such as intelligence, temperament and personality.

Measuring Superiority?

In discussing the question of the intellectual and moral superiority of different racial groups, Baker focusses on two lines of evidence in particular:

  1. Different races’ performance in ability and attainment tests;
  2. Different races’ historical track record in founding civilizations.

Baker’s discussion of the former topic is now rather dated.

Recent findings unavailable to Baker include the discovery that East Asians score somewhat higher on IQ tests than do white Europeans (see Race Differences in Intelligence: reviewed here), and also that Ashkenazi Jews score higher still (see The Chosen People: review forthcoming).[48]

Evidence has also accumulated regarding the question of the relative contributions of heredity to racial differences in IQ, including the Minnesota transracial study (Scarr & Weinberg 1976; Weinberg et al 1992) and studies of the effects of racial admixture on IQ using blood-group data (Loehlin et al 1973; Scarr et al 1977), and, most recently, genome analysis (Lasker et al 2019). See also my review of Richard Lynns Race Difference in Intelligence: An Evolutionary Perspective’, posted here.

Readers interested in more recent research on this issue should consult Jensen and Rushton (2005) and Nisbett (2005); or Nicholas Mackintosh’s summary in Chapter Thirteen of his textbook, IQ and Human Intelligence (2nd Ed) (pp324-359); or indeed my own recent review of Richard Lynns Race Difference in Intelligence: An Evolutionary Perspective’, posted here.[49]

Criteria for Civilization and Moral Relativism

While his data on race differences in IQ is therefore now dated, Baker’s discussion of the track-record of different races in founding civilizations remains of interest today, if only because this is a topic studiously avoided by most contemporary authors, historians and anthropologists on account of its politically-incorrect nature – though Jared Diamond, in Guns, Germs and Steel (which I have reviewed here), represents an important recent exception to this trend.[50]

The first question, of course, is precisely how one is to define ‘civilizations’ in the first place, itself a highly contentious issue.[51]

Thus, Baker identifies twenty-one criteria for recognising civilizations (p507-8).[52]

In general, these can be divided into two types:

  1. Scientific/technological criteria;
  2. Moral criteria.[53]

However, the latter are inherently problematic. What constitutes moral superiority itself involves a moral judgement that is necessarily subjective.

In other words, whereas technological and scientific superiority can be demonstrated objectively, moral superiority is a mere matter of opinion.

Thus, the ancient Romans, transported to our times, would surely accept the superiority of our technology – and, if they did not, we would, as a consequence of the superiority of our technology, outcompete them both economically and militarily and hence prove it ourselves.

However, they would view our social, moral and political values as decadent and we would have no way of proving them wrong.

Take, for example, Baker’s first requirement for civilization, namely that:

In the ordinary circumstances of life in public places they [i.e. members of the society under consideration] cover the external genitalia and greater part of the trunk with clothes” (p507).

This criterium is not only curiously puritanical, but also blatantly biased against tropical cultures. Whereas in temperate and arctic zones clothing is essential for survival, in the tropics the decision to wear clothing represents little more than an arbitrary fashion choice.

Meanwhile, the requirement that the people in question “do not practice severe mutilation or deformation of the body”, another moral criterion, could arguably exclude contemporary westerners from the ranks of the ranks of the civilized’, given the increasing prevalence of tattooing, flesh tunnel ear plugs and other forms of extreme bodily modification (not to mention gender reassignment surgery and other non-consensual forms of  genital mutilation) – or perhaps it is merely those among us who succumb to such fads who are not truly civilized.

The requirement that a civilization’s religious beliefs not be “purely or grossly superstitious” (p507) is also problematic. As a confirmed atheist, I suspect that all religions are, by very definition, superstitious. If some forms of Buddhism and Confucianism are perhaps exceptions, then they are perhaps simply not religions at all in the western sense.

At any rate, Christian beliefs  regarding miracles, resurrection, the afterlife, the Holy Spirit and so on surely rival those of any other religion when it comes to “gross superstition”.

As for his complaint that the religion of the Mayansdid not enter into the fields of ethics” (p526), a complaint he also raises in respect of indigenous black African religions (p384), contemporary moral philosophers generally see this as a good thing, believing that religion is best kept of moral debates.[54]

In conclusion, any person seeking to rank cultures on moral criteria will, almost inevitably, rank his own society as morally superior to all others – simply because he is judging these societies by the moral standards of his own society that he has internalized and adopted as his own.

Thus, Baker himself views Western civilization as superior to such pre-Columbian mesoamerican civilizations as the Aztecs due to the latter’s practice of mass ritual human sacrifice and cannibalism (p524-5).

However, in doing so, he is judging the cultures in question by distinctly Western moral standards. The Aztecs, in contrast, may have viewed human sacrifice as a moral imperative and may therefore have viewed European cultures as morally deficient precisely because they did not butcher enough of their people in order to propitiate the gods.

Likewise, whereas Baker views cannibalism as incompatible with civilization (p507), I personally view cannibalism as, of itself, a victimless crime. A dead person, being dead, is incapable of suffering by virtue of being eaten. Indeed, in this secular age of environmental consciousness, one might even praise cannibalism as a highly ‘sustainable’ form of recycling.

For this reason, in my own discussion of the different cultures and civilizations founded by members of different races, I will confine my discussion exclusively to scientific and technological criteria for civilization.

Sub-Saharan African Cultures

Baker’s discussion of different groups’ capacity for civilization actually begins before his final section on “Criteria for Superiority and Inferiority” in his four chapters on the race whom Baker terms Negrids – namely, black Africans from south of the Sahara, excluding Khoisan and Pygmies (p325-417).

Whereas his previous chapters discussing specific selected human populations focussed primarily, or sometimes exclusively, on their morphological peculiarities, in the last four of these chapters, focussing on African blacks, his focus shifts from morphology to culture.

Thus, Baker writes:

The physical characters of the Negrids are mentioned only briefly. Members of this race are studied in Chapters 18-21 mainly from the point of view of the social anthropologist interested in their progress towards civilization at a time when they were still scarcely influenced over a large part of their territory, by direct contact with members of more advanced ethnic taxa” (p184).

Unlike some racialist authors,[55] Baker acknowledges the widespread adoption of advanced technologies throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa prior to modern times. However, he attributes the adoption of these technologies to contact with, and borrowings from, outside non-Negroid civilizations (e.g. Arabs, Egyptians, Moors, Berbers, Europeans).

Therefore, in order to distinguish the indigenous, homegrown capacity of black Africans to develop advanced civilization, Baker relies on the reports of seven nineteenth century explorers of what he terms “the secluded area” of Africa, by which term Baker seems to mean the bulk of inland Southern, Eastern and Central Africa, excluding the Horn of Africa, the coast of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (p334-5).[56]

In these parts of Africa, at the time these early European explorers visited the continent, the influence of outside civilizations was, Baker reports, “non-existent or very slight” (p335). The cultural practices observed by these explorers therefore, for Baker, provide a measure of black Africans indigenous capacity for social, cultural and technological advancement.

On this perhaps dubious basis, Baker thus concludes that there is no evidence black Africans in this area ever:

Also largely absent throughout ‘the secluded area’, according to Baker, were:

In respect of these last two indices of civilization, however, Baker admits a couple of partial, arguable exceptions, which he discusses in the next chapter (Chapter 21). These include the ruins of Great Zimbabwe (p401-9) and a script invented in the nineteenth century (p409-11).[58]

Domesticated Plants and Animals in Africa

Let’s review these claims in turn. First, it certainly seems to be true that few if any species of either animals or plants were domesticated in what Baker calls the “the secluded area” of sub-Saharan Africa.[59]

However, with respect to plants, there may be a reason for this. Many important, early domesticates were annuals. These are plants that complete their life-cycle within a single year, taking advantage of predictable seasonal variations in the weather.

As explained by Jared Diamond, annual plants are ideal for human consumption, and for domestication, because:

Within their mere one year of life, annual plants inevitably remain small herbs. Many of them instead put their energy into producing big seeds, which remain dormant during the dry season and are then ready to sprout when the rains come. Annual plants therefore waste little energy on making inedible wood or fibrous stems, like the body of trees and bushes. But many of the big seeds… are edible by humans. They constitute 6 of the modern world’s 12 major crops” (Guns, Germs and Steel: p136).

Yet sub-Saharan Africa, being located closer to the equator, experiences less seasonal variation in climate. As a result, relatively fewer plants are annuals.

However, it is far less easy to explain why sub-Saharan Africans failed to domesticate any wild species of animal, with the possible exception of guineafowl.[60]

After all, Africa is popular as a tourist destination today in part precisely because it has a relative abundance of large wild mammals of the sort seemingly well suited for domestication.[61]

Jared Diamond argues that the African zebra, a close relative of other wild equids that were domesticated, was undomesticable because of its aggression and what Diamond terms its nasty disposition” (Guns, Germs and Steel: p171-2).[62]

However, this is unconvincing when one considers that Eurasians succeeded in domesticating such formidably powerful and aggressive wild species as wolves and aurochs.[63]

Thus, even domesticated bulls remain a physically-formidable and aggressive animal. Indeed, they were favoured adversaries in blood sports such as bullfighting and bull-baiting for precisely this reason.

However, the wild auroch, from whom modern cattle derive, was undoubtedly even more formidable, being, not only larger, more muscled and with bigger horns, but also surely even more aggressive than modern bulls. After all, one of the key functions of domestication is to produce more docile animals that are more amenable to control by human agriculturalists.[64]

Compared to the domestication of aurochs, the domestication of the zebra would seem almost straight forward. Indeed, the successful domestication of aurochs in ancient times might even cause us to reserve our judgement regarding the domesticability of such formidable African mammals as hippos and African buffalo, the possibility of whose domestication Diamond dismisses a priori as preposterous.

Certainly, the domestication of the auroch surely stands as one of the great achievements of ancient Man.

Reinventing the Wheel?

Baker also seems to be correct in his claim that black Africans never invented the wheel.

However, it must be borne in mind that the same is also probably true of white Europeans, who, rather than independently inventing the wheel for themselves, had the easier option of simply copying the design of the wheel from other civilizations and peoples, namely those from the Middle East, probably Mesopotamia, where the wheel seems to be have first been developed

Indeed, most cultures with access to the wheel never actually invented it themselves, for the simple reason that it is far easier to copy the invention of a third-party through simple reverse engineering than to independently invent afresh an already existing technology all by oneself.

This then explains why the wheel has actually been independently invented, at most, only a few times in history.

The real question, then, is not why the wheel was never invented in sub-Saharan Africa, but rather why it failed to spread throughout that continent in the same way it did throughout Eurasia.

Thus, if the wheel was known, as Baker readily acknowledges it was, in those parts of sub-Saharan Africa that were in contact with outside civilizations (notably in the Horn of Africa), then this raises the question as to why it failed to spread elsewhere in Africa prior to the arrival of Europeans. This indeed is acknowledged to remain a major enigma within the field of African history and archaeology (Law 2011; Chavez et al 2012).

After all, there are no obvious insurmountable geographical barriers preventing the spread of technologies across Africa other than the Sahara itself, and, as Baker himself acknowledges, black Africans in the ‘penetrated’ area had proven amply capable of imitating technological advances introduced from outside.

Why then did the wheel not spread across Africa in the same way it did across Eurasia? Is it possible that African people’s alleged cognitive deficiencies were responsible for the failure of this technology to spread and be copied, since the ability to copy technologies through reverse engineering itself requires some degree of intellectual ability, albeit surely less than that required for original innovation?

One might argue instead that the African terrain was unsuitable for wheeled transport. However, one of the markers of a civilization is surely its very ability to alter the terrain by large, cooperative public works engineering projects, such as the building of roads.

Thus, most of Eurasia is now suitable for wheeled transport in large part only because we, or more specifically our ancestors, have made it so.

Another explanation sometimes offered for the failure of sub-Saharan Africans to develop wheeled transportation is that they lacked a suitable draft animal, horses in sub-Saharan Africa being afflicted with sleeping sickness spread by the tsetse fly.

However, as we have seen above, Baker argues a race’s track record in successfully domesticating wild animals is itself indicative of the intellectual ability and character of that race. For Baker, then, the failure of sub-Saharan African to successfully domesticate any suitable species of potential draft animal (e.g. the zebra: see above) is itself indicative of, and a factor in, their inability to successfully develop advanced civilization.

At any rate, even in the absence of a suitable draft animal, wheels are still useful.

On the one hand, they can be used for non-transport-related purposes (e.g. the spinning wheel, the potter’s wheel, even water wheels). Indeed, in Eurasia the invention of the potter’s wheel is actually thought to have preceded the use of wheels for the purposes of transportation.

Moreover, even in the absence of a suitable draft animal, wheels remain very useful for transportation purposes e.g. wheelbarrows, pulled rickshaws

In other words, humans can themselves be employed as a draft animal, whether by choice or by force, and, if there is one arguable marker for civilization for which Africa did not lack, and which did not await introduction by Europeans, Moors and Arabs, it was, of course, the institution of slavery.

African Writing Systems?

What then of the alleged failure of sub-Saharan Africans to develop a system of writing? Baker refers to only a single writing system indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa, namely the Vai syllabary, invented in what is today Liberia in the nineteenth century in imitation of foreign scripts. Was this indeed the only writing system indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa?

Of course, writing has long been known in North Africa, not least in ancient Egypt, whose famous hieroglyphs, not only form the ultimate basis for our own Latin alphabet, but are also claimed by some Egyptologists to represent the earliest form of writing developed anywhere in the world, although most archaeologists believe that they were beaten to the gun, once again, by Mesopotamia, with its cuneiform script.

However, this is obviously irrelevant to the question of black African civilization, since the populations of North Africa, including the ancient Egyptians, were largely Caucasoid.[65]

Thus, the Sahara Desert, as a relatively impassable obstacle to human movement throughout most of human history and prehistory (a geographic filter”, according to Sarich and Miele) that hence impeded gene flow, has long represented, and to some extent still represents, the boundary between the Caucasoid and Negroid races (Race: The Reality of Human Differences: p210).

What then of writing systems indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa? The wikipedia entry on writing systems of Africa lists several indigenous African writing systems of sub-Saharan Africa.

However, save for those of recent origin, almost all of these writing systems seem, from the descriptions on their respective wikipedia pages, to have been restricted to areas outside of ‘the secluded area’ of Africa as defined by Baker (p334-5).

Thus, excluding the writing systems of North Africa (i.e. Meroitic, Tifinagh and  ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs), Geze seems to have been restricted to the area around the Horn of Africa; Nsibidi to the area around the Gulf of Guinea in modern Nigeria; Adrinka to the coast of West Africa, while the other scripts mentioned in the entry are, like the Vai syllabary, of recent origin.

The only ancient writing system mentioned on this wikipedia page that was found in what Baker calls ‘the secluded area’ of Africa is Lusona. This seems to have been developed deep in the interior of sub-Saharan Africa, in parts of what is today eastern Angola, north-western Zambia and adjacent areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Thus, it is almost certainly of entirely indigenous origin.

However, Lusona is described by its wikipedia article as only an ideographic tradition, that function[s] as mnemonic devices to help remember proverbs, fables, games, riddles and animals, and to transmit knowledge”.

It therefore appears to fall far short of a fully developed script in the modern sense.

Indeed, the same seems to be true, albeit to a lesser extent, of most of the indigenous writing systems of sub-Saharan Africa listed on the wikipedia page, namely Nsibidi and Adrinka, which each seem to represent only a form of proto-writing.

Only Geze seems to have been a fully-developed script, and this was used only in the Horn of Africa, which not only lies outside ‘the secluded area’ as defined by Baker, but whose population is, again according to Baker, predominantly Caucasoid (p225).

Also, Geze seems to have developed from an earlier Middle Eastern script. It is therefore not of entirely indigenous African origin.

It therefore seems to indeed be true that sub-Saharan Africans never produced a fully-developed script in hihose parts of Africa where they developed beyond the influence of foreign empires.

However, it must here be emphasized that the same is again probably also true of indigenous Europeans.

Thus, as with the wheel, Europeans themselves probably never independently invented a writing system, the Latin alphabet being derived from Greek script, which was itself developed from the Phoenician alphabet, which, like the wheel, first originated in the Middle East, and was itself adapted from Egyptian hieroglyphs.[66]

Indeed, most writing systems were developed, if not directly from, then at least in imitation of, pre-existing scripts. Like the wheel, writing has only been independently reinvented afresh a few times in history.[67]

The question, then, as with the wheel, is, not so much why much of sub-Saharan Africa failed to invent a written script, but rather why those written scripts that were in use in certain parts of the continent south of the Sahara,  nevertheless failed to spread or be imitated over the remainder of that continent.

African Culture: Concluding Thoughts

In conclusion, it certainly seems clear that much of sub-Saharan Africa was indeed backward in those aspects of technology, social structure and culture which Baker identifies as the key components of civilization. This much is true and demands an explanation.

However, blanket statements regarding the failure of sub-Saharan Africans to develop a writing system or two-storey buildings seem, at best, a misleading simplification.

Indeed, Baker’s very notion of what he calls ‘the secluded area’ of Africa is vague and ill-defined, and he never provides a clear definition, or, better still, a map precisely delineating what he means by the term (p334-5).

Indeed, the very notion of a ‘secluded area’ is arguably misconceived, since even relatively remote and isolated areas of the continent that did not have any direct contact with non-Negroid peoples, will presumably have had some indirect influence from outside of sub-Saharan Africa, if only by contact with peoples from those regions of the continent south of the Sahara which had been influenced by foreign peoples and civilizations.

After all, as we have seen, Europeans also failed to independently develop either the wheel and writing system for themselves, instead simply copying these innovations from the neighbouring civilizations of the Middle East.

While, today, politically-correct leftists selectively condemn certain cultural borrowings as cultural appropriation, in reality, copying and improving upon the inventions, discoveries and technological advances of others, including those of different civilizations and cultures (standing on the shoulders of giants), has long been central to both technological and scientific progress.   

Why then were black Africans south of the Sahara, who were indeed exposed to technologies such as the wheel and writing in certain parts of their territory, nevertheless unable to convey these technologies into the remander of the continent in the same way as Europeans and Asians did?

Perhaps one factor impeding the movement of technologies such as the wheel and writing across sub-Saharan Africa in pre-modern times is the relative lack of navigable waterways (e.g. rivers) in the region.

As emphasized by Tim Marshall in his book Prisoners of Geography, rivers in sub-Saharan African tended to be non-navigable, mainly because of the prevalence of large waterfalls that made transport by river a dangerous venture.

Since, in ancient and premodern times, transport by river was, at least in Eurasia, generally easier, safer and quicker than by land, Africas generally non-navigable river system may have ironically impeded the spread throughout Africa even of technologies that were themselves of use primarily for transportation, such as the wheel.

Pre-Columbian Native American Cultures

Baker’s discussion of status of the pre-Columbian civilizations, or putative civilizations, of America is especially interesting. Of these, the Mayans definitely stand out, in Baker’s telling, as the most impressive in terms of their scientific and technological achievements.

Baker ultimately concludes, however, that even the Maya do not qualify as a true civilization, largely on moral grounds – namely, their practice of mass sacrifices and cannibalism.

Yet, as we have seen, this is to judge the Mayans by distinctly western moral standards

No doubt if western cultures were to be judged by the moral values of the Mayans, we too would be judged just as harshly. Perhaps they would condemn us precisely for not massacring enough of our citizens in order to propitiate the gods.

However, even seeking to rank the Mayans based solely on their technological and scientific achievements, they still represent something of a paradox.

On the one hand, their achievements in mathematics and astronomy seem impressive.

Indeed, Baker claims that it was Mayans, not the Hindus or Muslims, who are more often credited with the innovation, who first invented the concept of zero – or rather, to put the matter more precisely, “invent[ed] a ‘local value’ (or ‘place notational’) system of numeration that involved zero: that is to say, a system in which the value of each numberical symbol depended on its position in a series of such symbols, and the zero, if required, took its place in this series ” (p552).

Thus, Baker writes:

The Maya had invented the idea [of zero] and applied it to their vegisimal system [i.e. using a base of twenty] before the Indian mathematicians had thought of it and used it in denary [i.e. decimal] notation” (p522).[68]

Thus, Baker concludes:

The mathematics, astronomy, and calendar of the Middle Americans suggest unqualified acceptance into the ranks of the civilized” (p525).

However, on the other hand, according to Baker’s account:

They had no weights… no metal-bladed hoes or spades and no wheels (unless a few toys were actually provided with wheels and really formed part of the Mayan culture)” (p524).

Yet, as Baker alludes to in his rather disparaging reference to “a few toys”, it now appears the these toys were indeed part of the Maya culture.

Thus, far from failing to invent the wheel, Native Americans are one of the few peoples in the world with an unambiguous claim to have indeed invented the wheel entirely independently, since the possibility of wheels being introduced through contact with Eurasian civilizations is exceedingly remote.

Thus, the key question is, not why Native American civilizations failed to invent the wheel, for they did indeed invent the wheel, but rather why they failed to make full use of this remarkably useful invention, seemingly only employing it for seemingly frivolous items resembling toys (but whose real purpose is unknown) rather than for transport, or indeed the production of ceramics, textiles or energy.

Terrain may have been a factor, since the geography of much of the Mayan territory is particularly uninviting, both to wheeled transport and to general civilizational progress.

Indeed, Baker himself even approves the view that, far from “civilisation develop[ing] wherever the environment was genial”, in fact “it might be nearer the mark to claim the opposite”, since “civilisations, like individuals, despond to challenge”, and he specifically cites the Mayan, along with other so-called hydraulic empires which harnessed irrigation and control of water for cooperation and control, as an example of this, remarking that “their culture reached its climax in that particular part of their extensive territory in which the environment was least favourable” (p528).

However, as mentioned above, one of the markers of a true civilization is arguably its very ability to alter its terrain by large-scale engineering projects such as the building of roads. Thus, if the geography of much of Mesoamerica was unsuitable for wheeled transport, perhaps this was only beacuse the inhabitants failed to sufficiently transform it so as to render it so.

As in respect of sub-Saharan Africa, another factor sometimes cited is the absence of a suitable draft animal.

The Inca, but not the Aztecs and Maya, did have the llama. However, llama are not strong enough to carry humans, or to pull large carts.

Of course, for Baker, as we have seen above, a races track record in domesticating non-human animals, including for use as draft animals, is itself indicative of that races ability and capacity to build and maintain advanced civilization.

However, as pointed out by Jared Diamond, in the Americas, most large wild mammals of the sort possibly suited for domestication as a draft animal were wiped out by the first humans to arrive on the continent, the former having evolved in complete isolation from humans, and hence being completely evolutionarily unprepared for the sudden influx of humans with their formidable hunting skills.[69]

Thus, Jared Diamond in Guns Germs and Steel (which I have reviewed here) argues:

Ancient Native Mexicans invented wheeled vehicles with axles for use as toys, but not for transport. This seems incredible to us until we reflect that ancient Mexicans lacked domestic animals to hitch to their wheeled vehicles, which therefore offered no advantage over human porters” (Guns Germs and Steel: p248).

However, it is simply not true that, in the absence of a draft animal, wheels vehicles offered no advantage over human porters”, as claimed by Diamond. On the contrary, as dicussed above, humans themselves can be employed as draft animals (e.g. the wheelbarrow and pulled rickshaw), and, as Diamond himself observes in a later chapter:

Human-powered wheelbarrows… enabled one or more people, still using just human muscle power, to transport much greater weights than they could have otherwise” (Guns Germs and Steel: p359).

Moreover, as again discussed above, the wheel also has other uses besides transport, one of which, the potter’s wheel, actually seems to have been adopted before the use of wheels for transportation purposes in Europe. Yet there is no evidence for the use of the potter’s wheel in the Americas prior to the arrival of Europeans. 

As for the Mayan script, this was also, according to Baker, quite limited. Thus, Baker reports:

There was no way of writing verbs, and abstract ideas (apart from number) could not be inscribed. It would not appear that the technique even of the Maya lent itself to a narrative form, except in a very limited sense. Most of the Middle Americans conveyed non-calendrical information only by speech or by the display of a series of paintings” (p524).

Indeed, he reports that “nearly all their inscriptions were concerned with numbers and the calendar” (p524).

The Middle Americans had nothing that could properly be called a narrative script” (p523-4).

Baker vs Diamond: The Rematch

However, departing from Baker’s conclusions, I regard the achievements of the Mesoamerican civilizations as, overall, quite impressive.

This is especially so, not only when one takes into account, not only their complete isolation from the Old World civilizations of Eurasia, but also of other factors identified by Jared Diamond in his rightly-acclaimed Guns, Germs and Steel (reviewed here).

Thus, whereas the Eurasian cultural zone is oriented largely on an east-to-west axis, spreading from China and Japan in the East, to western Europe and North Africa in the West, America is a tall, narrow continent that spreads instead from north-to-south, quite narrow in places, especially at the Isthmus of Panama, where the North American continent meets South America, which, at the narrowest point, is less than fifty miles across. 

As Diamond emphasizes, because climate varies with latitude (i.e. distance from the equator), this means that different parts of the Americas have very different climates, making the movement and transfer of crops, domesticated animals and people much more difficult.

This, together with the difficulty of the terrain, might explain why even the Incas and Aztecs, though contemporaneous, seem to have been largely if not wholly unaware of one another’s existence, and certainly had no direct contact.

As a result, Native American cultures developed, not only in complete isolation from Old World civilizations, but even largely in isolation even from one another.

Moreover, the Americas had few large domesticable mammals, almost certainly because the first settlers of the continent, on arriving, hunted them to extinction on first arrival, and the mammals, having evolved in complete isolation from humans, were entirely unprepared for the arrival of humans, with their formidable hunting skills, to whom they were wholly unadapted.

In these conditions, the achievements of the Mesoamerican civilizations, especially the Mayans, seem to me quite impressive, all things considered – certainly far more impressive than the achievements of, say, sub-Saharan Africans or Australian Aboriginals.

This is especially so in comparison to sub-Saharan Africa when one takes into consideration the fact that the latter region was neither completely isolated from Eurasian civilizations nor as narrowly oriented on a north-west axis as are the Americas.

Thus, as has been emphasized by astrophysicist Michael Hart in his book, Understanding Human History, Diamond’s theory is a rather more successful explanation for the technological backwardness and underdevelopment of the pre-Columbian Americas than it is for the even greater technological backwardness and underdevelopment of sub-Saharan Africa.

Thus, if these black Africans and Australian Aboriginals can then indeed be determined to possess lesser innate intellectual capacity as compared to, say, Europeans or East Asians, then I feel it is nevertheless premature to say the same of the indigenous peoples of the Americas.

Artistic Achievement

In addition to ranking cultures on scientific, technological and moral criteria, Baker also assesses the quality of their artwork (p378-81; p411-17; p545-549). However, judgements of artistic quality, like moral judgements, are necessarily subjective.

Indeed, Baker’s own manifest biases are, here, readily apparent. Thus, he, on the one hand, disparages black African art as almost invariably non-naturalistic (p381), yet, at the same time, extols the decorative art of the ancient Celtics, which is mostly non-figurative and abstract (p261-2).

However, interestingly, with regard to styles of music, Baker does, to his credit, recognise the possibility of cultural bias. Thus, he suggests that European explorers were generally were dismissive of indigenous African music only because, looking for European-style melody and harmony, they failed to recognise the rhythmical qualities of African music which are, Baker claims, perhaps unequalled in the music of any other race of mankind (p379).[70]

A Reminder of What Was Possible”?

The fact that Race’ remains a rewarding some read forty years after first publication, is an indictment of the hold of politically-correctness over both science and the publishing industry.

In the intervening years, despite all the advances of molecular genetics, the scientific understanding of race seems to have progressed but little, impeded by political considerations.

Meanwhile, the study of morphological differences between races seems to have almost entirely ceased, and a worthy successor to Baker’s ‘Race’, incorporating the latest genetic data, has, to my knowledge, yet to be published.

At the conclusion of the first section of his book, dealing with what Baker calls “The Historical Background”, Baker, bemoaning the impact of censorship and what would today be called political correctness and cancel culture on both science and the publishing industry, recommends the chapter on race from a textbook published in 1928 (namely, Contemporary Sociological Theories by Pitirim Sorokin) as “well worth reading”, even then, over forty years later, if only “as a reminder of what was still possible before the curtain went down” (p61).

Today, some forty years after Baker penned these very words and as the boundaries of acceptable opinion have narrowed yet further, I recommend Baker’s ‘Race’ in much the same spirit – as both an historical document and “a reminder of what was possible”.

__________________________

Endnotes

[1] For example, anthopologist-geneticist Vincent Sarich and science writer Frank Miele, in their book Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here and here), provide a good example from the history of race science of where the convergent evolution of similar traits among different human lineages was once mistaken for evidence of homology and hence of shared ancestry, when they write:

There are two groups of people with the combination of dark skin and frizzy hairsub-Saharan Africans and Melanesians. The latter have often been called ‘Oceanic Negroes,’ implying a special relationship with Africans. The blood group data, however, showed that they are about as different from Africans as they could be” (Race: The Reality of Human Differences: p134)

Genetic studies often allow us distinguish homology from analogy, because the same or similar traits in different populations often evolve through different genetic mutations. For example, Europeans and East Asians evolved lighter complexions after leaving Africa, in part, by mutations in different genes (Norton et al 2007). Similarly, lactase persistence has evolved through mutations in different genes in Europeans than among some sub-Saharan Africans (Tishkoff et al 2009). Of course, at least in theory, the same mutation in the same gene could occur in different populations, thus providing an example of convergent evolution and homoplasy even at the genetic level. However, this is unlikely, and, with the analysis of a large number of genetic loci, especially in non-coding DNA, where mutations are unlikely to be selected for or against and hence are lost or retained at random in different populations, is unlikely to lead to errors in determining the relatedness of populations. 

[2] In his defence, the Ainu are not one of the groups upon whom Baker focuses in his discussion, and are only mentioned briefly in passing (p158; p173; p424) and at the very end of the book, in his “Table of Races and Subraces”, where he attempts to list, and classify by race, all the groups mentioned in the book, howsoever briefly (p624-5).

[3] For example, in relation to the controversial issue of race differences in brain size, Beals et al report:

By 1940, data collection on ethnic groups had virtually ceased (in part because of its association with racial prejudice). For modern populations, compartive data derive from museum specimens, private collections and the by-products of historical archeology” (Beals et 1984).

In short, political correctness has had a devastating impact on research in this area.
One result is that much of the data on these topics is quite old. Thus, racial hereditiarians, Baker included, are sometimes criticized for relying on studies published in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century. In principle, there is, however, nothing wrong with citing data from the nineteenth or early-twentieth century, unless critics can show that the methodology adopted has subsequently been shown to have been flawed or the research fraudulent. Indeed, if this is the only data available, it is a necessity.
However, it must be acknowledged that the findings of such studies with respect to morphology may no longer apply to modern populations, as a result of recent population movements and improvements in health and nutrition, among other factors.
Of course, we no longer need to rely on morphological criteria in order to attempt to determine the relatedness between populations as Baker and other early- to mid-twentieth century anthropologists did, as genetic data is now available, and provide a much more reliable, and less problematic, means of determining the relatedness between populations. However, it should hardly need stating that the various differences between racial groups in morphology and bodily structure remain an interesting, and certainly a legitimate, subject for scientific study in their own right.

[4] This is a style of formatting I have not encountered elsewhere. It makes it difficult to bring oneself to skip over the material rendered in smaller typeface since it is right there in the main body of the text, and indeed Baker himself claims that this material is “more technical and more detailed than the rest (but not necessarily less interesting)” (pix).

[5] Yet another source of potential terminological confusion results from the fact that, as will be apparent from many passages from the book quoted in this review, Baker uses the word ethnic to refer to differences that would better to termed racial – i.e. when referring to biologically-inherited physical and morphological differences between populations. Thus, for example, he uses the term “ethnic taxon” as “a comprehensive term that can be used without distinction for any of the taxa that are minor to species: that is to say, races, subraces and local forms” (p4). Similarly, he uses the phrase “the ethnic problem” to refer to the “whole subject of equality and inequality among the ethnic taxa of man” (p6). However, as Baker acknowledges, “English words derived from the Greek ἔθνος (ethnic, ethnology, ethnography, and others) are used by some authors in reference to groups of mankind distinguished by cultural or national features, rather than descent from common ancestors” (p4). However, in defending his adoption of this term, he notes “this usage is not universal” (p4). This usage has, I suspect, become even more prevalent in the years since the publication of Bakers book. However, in my experience, the term ethnic’ is sometimes also used as politically correct euphemism for the word race, both colloquially and in academia.

[6] In both cases, the source of potential confusion is the same, since both terms, though referring to a race, are derived from geographic terms (Europe and the Caucasus region, respectively), yet the indigenous homelands of the races in question are far from identical to the geographic region referred to by the term. The term Asian, when used as an ethnic or racial descriptor, is similarly misleading. For example, in British-English, Asian, as an ethnic term, usually refers to South Asians, since South Asians form a larger and more visible minority ethnic group in the UK than do East Asians. However, in the USA, the term Asian is usually restricted to East Asians and Southeast Asians – i.e. those formerly termed Mongoloid. The British-English usage is more geographically correct, but racially misleading, since populations from the Indian subcontinent, like those from Central Asia and the Middle East (also part of the Asian continent) are actually genetically closer to southern Europeans and North Africans than to East Asians and were generally classed as Caucasian by nineteenth and early-twentieth century anthropologists, and are similarly classed by Baker himself. This is one reason that the term Mongoloid, despite pejorative connotations, remains useful.

[7] Moreover, the term Mongoloid is especially confusing given that it has also been employed to refer to people suffering from a developmental disability and chromosomal abnormality (Down Syndrome), and, while both usages are dated, and the racial meaning is actually the earlier one from which the later medical usage is mistakenly derived, it is the latter usage which seems, in my experience, to retain greater currency, the word ‘Mongoloid’ being sometimes employed as a rather politically-incorrect insult, implying a mental handicap. Therefore, while I find annoying the euphemism treadmill whereby terms once quite acceptable terms (e.g. ‘Negro’, ‘coloured people’) are suddenly and quite arbitrarily deemed offensive, the term ‘Mongoloid’ is, unlike these other etymologically-speaking, quite innocent terms, understandably offensive to people of East Asian descent given this dual meaning.

[8] For example, another ethnonym, Asian, is also etymologically problematic. Thus, the word Asia, the source of the ethnonym, Asian, derives from the Greek Ἀσία, which originally referred only to Anatolia, at the far western edge of what would now be called Asia, the inhabitants of which region are not now, nor have ever likely been, Asian in the current American sense. Indeed, the very term Asia is a Eurocentric concept, grouping together many diverse peoples, fauna, flora and geographic zones, and whose border with Europe is quite arbitrary. Another even more etymologically suspect ethonym is, of course, the term Indian (and its derivatives ‘Amerindian’, ‘Red Indian’ and ‘American Indian’) when applied to the indigenous peoples of the Americas.

[9] The main substantive differences between the rival taxonomies of different racial theorists reflect the perennial divide between lumpers and splitters. There is also the question of precisely where the line is to be drawn between one race and another in clinal variation between groups, and whether a hybrid or clinal population sometimes constitutes a separate race in and of itself.

[10] For example, in Nicholas Wade’s A Troublesome Inheritance, this history of the misuse of the race concept comes in Chapter Two, titled ‘Perversions of Science’; in Philippe Rushton’s Race, Evolution and Behavior: A Life History Perspective (which I have reviewed here, here and here), this historical account is postponed until Chapter Five, titled ‘Race and Racism in History’; in Jon Entine’s Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports and Why We’re Afraid to Talk About it, it is delayed until Chapter Nine, titled ‘The Origins of Race Science’; whereas, in Sarich and Miele’s Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here, here and here), these opening chapters discussing the history of racial science expand to fill almost half the entire book.

[11] Indeed, somewhat disconcertingly, even Hitler’s Mein Kampf is taken seriously by Baker, the latter acknowledging that “the early part of [Hitler’s] chapter dealing with the ethnic problem is quite well-written and not uninteresting” (p59) – or perhaps this is only to damn with faint praise.

[12] Thus, at the time Stoddard authored The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy in 1920, with a large proportion of the world under the control of European colonial empires, a contemporary observer might be forgiven for assuming that what Stoddard called White World-Supremacy, was a stable, long-term, if not permanent arrangement. However, Stoddard accurately predicted the demographic transformation of the West, what soime have termed The Great Replacement or A Third Demographic Transition, almost a century before this process began to become a reality.

[13] The exact connotations of this passage may depend on the translation. Thus, other translators translate the passage that Manheim translates as The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew instead as The Jew offers the most striking contrast to the Aryan”, which alternative translation has rather different, and less flattering, connotations, given that Hitler famously extols the Aryan as the master race. The rest of the passage quoted remains, when taken in isolation, broadly flattering, however.

[14] To clarify, both Boas and Montagu are briefly mentioned in later chapters. For example, Boass now largely discredited work on cranial plasticity is cited, discussed and accepted at face-value by Baker at the end of his chapter on ‘Physical Differences Between the Ethnic Taxa of Man: Introductory Remarks’ (p201-2). However, this is outside of Baker’s chapters on “The Historical Background”, and therefore Boas’s role in (allegedly) shaping the contemporary consensus of race denial is entirely unexplored by Baker. For discussion on this topic, see Carl Degler’s In Search of Human Nature; see also Chapter Two of Kevin Macdonald’s The Culture of Critique (which I have reviewed here) and Chapter Three of Sarich and Miele’s Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here, here and here).

[15] Thus, there was no new scientific discovery that presaged or justified the abandonment of biological race as an important causal factor in the social and behavioural sciences. Later scientific developments, notably in genetics, were certainly later co-opted in support of this view. However, there is no coincidence in time between these two developments. Therefore, whatever the true origins of the theory of racial egalitarianism, whether one attributes it to horror at the misuse of race science by the Nazi regime, or the activism of certain influential social scientists such as Boas and Montagu, one thing is certain – namely, the abandonment, or at least increasing de-emphasis, of the race category in the social and behavioural sciences was originally motivated by political rather than scientific considerations. See Carl Degler’s In Search of Human Nature; see also Chapter 2 of Kevin Macdonald’s Culture of Critique (which I have reviewed here) and Chapter Three of Sarich and Miele’s Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here, here and here).

[16] That OUP gave up the copyright is, of course, to be welcomed, since it means, rather than gathering dust on the shelves of university libraries, while the few remaining copies still in circulation from the first printing rise in value, it has enabled certain dissident publishing houses to release new editions of this now classic work.

[17] Baker suggests that, at the time he wrote, behavioural differences between pygmy chimpanzees and other chimpanzees had yet to be demonstrated (p113-4). Today, however, pygmy chimpanzees are known to differ behaviourally from other chimps, being, among other differences, less prone to intra-specific aggression and more highly sexed. However, they are now usually referred to as bonobos rather than pygmy chimpanzees, and are also recognized as a separate species from other chimpanzees, rather than a mere subspecies.

[18] This is, at least, how Baker describes this species complex and how it was traditionally understood. Researching the matter on the internet, however, suggests whether this species complex represents a true ring species is a matter of some dispute (e.g. Liebers et al 2006).

[19] In cases of matings between sheep and goats that result in offspring, the resulting offspring themselves are usually, if not always, infertile. Moreover, actually, according to the wikipedia page on the topic, the question of when sheep and goats can ever successfully interbreed is more complex than suggested by Baker.

[20] I have found no evidence to support the assertion in some of the older nineteenth-century literature that women of lower races have difficulty birthing offspring fathered by European men, owing to the greater brain- and head-size of European infants. Summarizing this view, contemporary Russian racialist Vladimir Avdeyev, in his impressively encyclopaedic, if extremely racist and occassionally slightly bonkers book, Raciology: The Science of the Hereditary Traits of Peoples, claims:

The form of the skull of a child is directly connected with the characteristics of the structure of the mother’s pelvis—they should correspond to each other in the goal of eliminating death in childbirth. The mixing of the races unavoidably leads to this, because the structure of the pelvis of a mother of a different race does not correspond to the shape of the head of [the] mixed infant; that leads to complications during childbirth” (Raciology: p157).

Thus, Avdeyev claims, owing to race differences in brain size:

Women on lower races [sic] endure births very easily, sometimes even without any pain, and only in highly rare cases do they die from childbirth. But this can never be said of women of lower races [sic] who birth children of white fathers” (Raciology: p157).

Thus, he quotes an early-twentieth century Russian race theorist as claiming:

American Indian women… often die in childbirth from pregnancies with a child of mixed blood from a white father, whereas pure-blooded children within them are easily born. Many Indian women know well the dangers [associated with] a pregnancy from a white man, and therefore, they prefer a timely elimination of the consequence of cross-breeding by means of fetal expulsion, in avoidance of it” (Raciology: p157-8).

This, interestingly, accords with the claim of infamous late-twentieth century race theorist J Philippe Rushton, in the ‘Preface to the Third Edition’ of his book Race, Evolution and Behavior (which I have reviewed here, here and here), that, as compared to whites and Asians, blacks have narrower hips, giving them a more efficient stride”, which provides an advantage in many athletic events, and that:

The reason Whites and East Asians have wider hips than Blacks, and so make poorer runners, is because they give birth to larger brained babies” (Race, Evolution and Behavior: p11-12).

Thus, Rushton explains elsewhere:

Increasing brain size [over the course of hominid evolution] was associated with a broadening of the pelvis. The broader pelvis provides a wider birth canal, which in turn allows for delivery of larger-brained offspring” (Odyssey: My Life as a Controversial Evolutionary Psychologist: p284-5).

However, contrary to the claim of Avdeyev, I find no support from contemporary delivery room data for the claim that women from so-called lower-races’ experience greater birth complications, and mortality rates, when birthing offspring fathered by European males due to the larger brain and head-size of the latter.
On the contrary, it seems to be differences in overall body-size, not brain-size, that seem to be the key factor, with East Asian women having greater difficulties birthing offspring fathered by European males because of the smaller frames of East Asian women, even though East Asians have brains as large as or larger than those of Europeans
 (Nystrom et al 2008).
Neither is it true that, where inter-racial mating has not occurred, then, on account of the small brain-size of their babies:

Women on lower races [sic] endure births very easily, sometimes even without any pain, and only in highly rare cases do they die from childbirth(Raciology: p157).

On the contrary, data from the USA actually seems to indicate a somewhat higher rate of caesarean delivery among African-American women as compared to white American women (Braveman et al 1995; Edmonds et al 2013; Getahun et al 2009; Valdes 2020).

[21] Any selection would presumably be against the European-derived component of the African-American genome, since African-Americans are of predominantly black African ancestry. It is therefore possible that selection against the (possibly) deleterous European component of their genome was offset by other advantages possibly accruing to African-Americans with increased European ancestry (e.g. the increased intelligence supposedly associated with increased levels of European ancestry, or the social benefits formerly associated with lighter skin tone or a more Caucasoid phsyiognomy).
Examining the effects of interracial hybridization on other traits besides fertility, there are mixed results. Thus, one study reported what the authors interpreted as a hybrid vigour effect on g-factor of general intelligence among the offspring of white-Asian unions in Hawaii, as compared to the offspring of same-race couples matched for educational and occupational levels (Nagoshi & Johnson 1986). Similarly, Lewis (2010) attributed the higher attractiveness ratings accorded to the faces of mixed-race people to heterosis. Meanwhile, another study found that height was positively correlated with the distance between the birthplaces of one’s parents, itself presumably a correlate of their relatedness (Koziel et al 2011).
On the other hand, however, behavioural geneticist Glayde Whitney suggests that hybrid incompatibility may explain the worse health outcomes, and shorter average life-spans, of African Americans as compared to whites in the contemporary USA, owing to the formers mixed African and European ancestry (Whitney 1999). One specific negative health outcome for some African-Americans resulting from a history racial admixture is also suggested by Helgadottir et al (2006). On the other hand, the disproportionate success of African-Americans in professional athletics hardly seems indicative of impaired health.
It is notable that, whereas recent studies tend to emphasize the (supposed) positive genetic effects resulting from interracial unions, the older literature tends to focus on (supposed) negative effects of interracial hybridization (see Frost 2020). No doubt this reflects the differing zeitgeister of the two ages (Provine 1976; Khan 2011c).
At any rate, even assuming that it can be shown that mixed-race people either enjoy improved health outcomes as compared to monoracial people as a consequence of hybrid vigour, or impaired health outcomes due to outbreeding depression, this is not generally regarded as directly relevant to the question of whether the different human races are to be regarded as separate species. As Darwin wrote:

The inferior vitality of mulattoes is spoken of in a trustworthy work as a well-known phenomenon; but this is a different consideration from their lessened fertility; and can hardly be advanced as a proof of the specific distinctness of the parent races… The common mule, so notorious for long life and vigour, and yet so sterile, shews how little necessary connection there is in hybrids between lessened fertility and vitality” (The Descent of Man).

[22] To clarify, some other domestic species have also been described as having self-domesticated. In particular, a currently popular theory of dog domestication holds that, rather than humans adopting and domesticating wolves, wolves effectively domesticated themselves, by scavenging around human campfires to feed themselves, the tamer, less aggressive and less fearful wolves enjoying greater success in this endeavour, and hence coming to predominate.
However, although, in a sense, a form of self-domestication, this process would still have involved wolves habituating themselves to, and becoming tolerated by, and tolerant to, a different species to themselves, namely humans. In contrast, theories of human self-domestication involve humans interacting only with members of the same species, namely other humans. 

[23] Interestingly, while languages and cultures vary in the number of colours that they recognise and have words for, both the ordering of the colours recognised, and the approximate boundaries between different colours, seems to be cross-culturally universal. Thus, some languages have only two colour terms, which are always equivalent to ‘light’ and ‘dark’. Then, if a third colour terms is used, it is always equivalent to ‘red’. Next come either ‘green’ or ‘yellow’. Experimental attempts to teach colour terms not matching the familiar colours show that individuals learn these colour terms much less readily than they do the colour familiar terms recognised in other languages, if if their own language lacks these latter familiar colour terms. This, of course, suggests that our colour perception is both innately programmed into the mind and cross-culturally universal (see Berlin & Kay, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution). 

[24] Indeed, as I discuss later, with respect to what Baker calls subraces, we may already have long previously passed this point, at least in Europe and North America. While morphological differences certainly continue to exist, at the aggregate, statistical level, between populations from different regions of Europe, there is such overlap, such a great degree of variation even within families, and the differences are so fluid, gradual and continuous, that I suspect such terms as the Nordic race, Alpine race, Mediterranid race and Dinaric race have likely outlived whatever usefulness they may once have had and are best retired. The differences are now best viewed as continuous and clinal.

[25] While Ethiopians and other populations from the Horn of Africa are indeed a hybrid or clinal population, representing an intermediate position between Caucasians and other black Africans, Baker perhaps goes too far in claiming:

Aethiopids (‘Eastern Hamites’ or ‘Erythriotes’) of Ethiopia and Somaliland are an essentially Europid subrace with some Negrid admixture (p225).

Thus, summarizing the findings of one study from the late-1990s, Jon Entine reports:

Ethiopians [represent] a genetic mixture of about 60 percent African and 40 percent Caucasian” (Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports And Why We’re Afraid To Talk About It: p115)

The study upon which Entine based this conclusion looked only at mitochondrial DNA and Y chromosome data. More recent studies have incorporated autosomal DNA as well. However, while eschewing terms such as Caucasian’, such studies broadly confirm that there exist substantial genetic affinities between populations from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East (e.g. Ali et al 2020Khan 2011aKhan 2011bHodgson 2014).

[26] Thus, Lewontin famously showed that, when looking at individual genetic loci, most variation is within a single population, rather than between populations, or between races (Lewontin 1972). However, when looking at phenotypic traits that are caused by polygenes, it is easy to see that there are many such traits in which the variation within the group does not dwarf that between groups – for example, differences in skin colour as between Negroes and Nordics, or differences in stature between as Pygmies and even neighbouring tribes of Bantu. This is a point emphasized by Sarich and Miele in Race: The Reality of Human Differences (which I have reviewed here).

[27] In addition to discussing morphological differences between races, Baker also discusses differences in scent (170-7). This is a particularly emotive issue, given the negative connotations associated with smelling bad. However, given the biochemical differences between races, and the fact that even individuals of the same race, even the same family, are distinguishable by scent, it is inevitable that persons of different races will indeed differ in scent, and, given the apparent universality of ethnocentrism and in-group preference, unsurprising that people would generally prefer the scent of their own group. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that this is indeed the case.
Baker reports that, in general, East Asians have less strong body odour, whereas both Caucasoids and blacks have stronger body odour. Partly this is explained by the relative prevalence of dry and wet ear wax, which is associated with body odour, varies by population and is one of the few easily observable phenotypic traits in humans that is determined by simple Mendelian inheritance (see McDonald, Myths of Human Genetics).
Intriguingly, Nicholas Wade speculates that dry earwax, which is associated with less strong body-odour, may have evolved through sexual selection in colder climates where, due to the cold, more time is spent indoors, in enclosed spaces, where body odour is hence more readily detectable, and producing less scent may have conferred a reproductive advantage (A Troublesome Inheritance: p91). This may explain some of the variation in the prevalence of dry and wet ear wax respectively, with dry earwax predominating only in East Asia, but also being found, albeit to a lesser degree, among Northern Europeans.
On the other hand, however, although populations inhabiting colder climates may spend more time indoors, populations inhabiting warmer tropical climates might be expect to sweat more due to the greater heat and hence build up greater bodily odour, which might be expected to lead to greater sexual selection against body odour among tropical populations.

[28] A few exceptions include where Baker discusses the small but apparently statistically significant differences between the skulls of Celts and Anglo-Saxons (p257), and where he mentions statistically significantally differences between ancient Egypian skulls and those of Negroes (p518).

[29] Interestingly, in this quotation, Reich neglects to mention either North Africa or South Asia. The omission of the former is perhaps an oversight, since, while to some extent genetically distinct, and also having some sub-Saharan African admixture, the peoples of North Africa are genetically and racially continuous with those of Europe and especially the Middle East
His omission of South Asia, on the other hand, may perhaps be deliberate, since, although Baker seemingly classes even South Indian Dravidians as unambiguously Europid/Caucasoid, the situation here is more complex and Reich himself refers to a sharp gradient of change in central Asia before another region of homogeneity is reached in East Asia” (Who We Are and How We Got Here: p93).
Similarly, Nicholas Wade reports that several Central Asian ethnicities, such as Pathans, Hazara and Uigurs, are of mixed European and East Asian ancestry” (A Troublesome Inheritance: p98).
Moreover, Wade reports that, in one more fine-grained and detailed analysis that sampled more genetic markers, two additional clusters emerge, one for the people of Central and South Asia, and another for those of the Middle East (Ibid.: p99-100)

[30] Baker does, however, acknowledge that:

Some Jewish communities scattered over the world are Jews simply in the sense that they adhere to a particular religion (in various forms); they are not definable on an ethnic basis” (p246).

Here, Baker has in mind various communities that are not either Ashkenazi or Sephardic (or Mizrahi), such as the Beta Israel of Ethiopia, the Lemba of Southern Africa and the Kaifeng Jews resident in China. Although Baker speaks of communities”, the same is obviously true of recent converts to Judaism

[31] Thus, of the infamous Khazar hypothesis, now almost wholly discredited by genetic data, but still popular among some anti-Zionists, because it denies the historical connection between (most) contemporary Jews and the land of Israel, and among Christian anti-Semites, because it denies that the Ashkenazim are indeed chosen people’ of the Old Testament, Baker writes:

It is clear they [the Khazars] were not related, except by religion, to any modern group of Jews” (p34).

[32] Baker thus puts the intellectual achievements of the Ashkenazim in the broader context of other groups within this same subrace, including the Assyrians, Hittites and indeed Armenians themselves. Thus, he concludes:

The contribution of the Armenid subrace to civilization will bear comparison with that of any other” (p246-7).

Some recent genetic studies have indeed suggested affinities between Ashkenazim and Armenian populations (Nebel et al 2001; Elhaik 2013).

[33] In Baker’s defence vis a vis any suggestion of anti-Semitism, the illustration in question is actually taken from the work of a Jewish anthropologist, Joseph Jacobs (Jacobs 1886). Jacobs findings this topic are summarized in this entry in the 1906 Jewish Encyclopedia, entitled Nose, authored by Jacobs and Maurice Fishberg, another Jewish anthropologist, which reports that the ‘hook nose’ stereotypically associated with Jewish people is actually found in only a minority of European Jews (Jacobs & Fishberg 1906).
However, such noses do seem to be more common among Jews than among at least some of the host populations among whom they reside. The
wikipedia article on Jewish noses cites this same entry from the Jewish Encyclopaedia as suggesting that the prevalence of this shape of nose is actually no greater among Jews than among populations from the Mediterranean region (hence the supposed similar shape of so-called Roman noses). However, the Jewish Encyclopaedia entry itself does not actually seem to say any such thing. Instead, it reports only that:

“[As compared with] non-Jews in Russia and Galiciaaquiline and hook-noses are somewhat more frequently met with among the Jews” (Jacobs & Fishberg 1906). 

The entry also reports that, measured in terms of their nasal index, “Jewish noses… are mostly leptorhine, or narrow-nosed” (Jacobs & Fishberg 1906). Similarly, Joseph Jacobs reports in On the Racial Characteristics of Modern Jews’:

Weisbach‘s nineteen Jews vied with the Patagonians in possessing the longest nose (71 mm.) of all the nineteen races examined by him … while they had at the same time the narrowest noses (34 mim)” (Jacobs 1886).

This data, suggesting that Jewish noses are indeed long but are also very narrow, contradicts Baker’s claim that the characteristic Ashkenazi nose is “large in all dimensions [emphasis added]” (p239). However, such a nose shape is consistent Jews having evolved in an arid desert environment, such as the Nagev or other nearby deserts, or in the Judean mountains, where the earliest distinctively Jewish settlements are thought to have developed. Thus, anthropologist Stephen Molnar writes:

Among desert and mountain peoples the narrow nose is the predominant form” (Human Variation: Races, Types and Ethnic Groups: p196).

As Baker himself observes, the nose width characteristic of a population correlates with both the temperature and humidity of the environment in which they evolved (p310-311). This is known as Thomson’s nose rule and is thought to reflect the need to warm and moisturize air before it enters the lungs in cold and dry conditions respectively.
However, interestingly, Baker reports that the correlations are much weaker among the indigenous populations of the American continent (p311). Presumably this is because humans only relatively recently populated that continent
, and therefore have yet had sufficient time to become wholly adapted to the different environments in which they find themselves.
A further factor affecting nose width is jaw size. This might explain why Australian Aboriginals have extremely wide noses despite much of the Australian landmass being dry and arid, since Aboriginals also have very large jaws (Human Variation: Races, Types and Ethnic Groups: p196).
However, it is fallacious to believe that most Australian Aborigines lived in the arid Outback prior to the arrival of Europeans and their resulting displacement. In fact, prior to the arrival of Europeans, Aboriginals were probably concentrated in the same more fertile areas where most white European settlers are today themselves concentrated, since the same areas which are conducive for agriculture and settlement today also tended to provide more game and vegetation for foraging groups. Aboriginals are associated with the Outback today only because this is the only part of Australia in which they have not been displaced by white settlers, precisely because it is so arid and inhospitable.

[34] Hans Eysenck refers in his autobiography to a study supposedly conducted by one of his PhD students that he claims demonstrated statistically that people, both Jewish and Gentile, actually perform at no better than chance when attempting to distinguish Jews from non-Jews, even after extended interaction with one another (Rebel with a Cause: p35). However, since he does not cite a source or reference for this study, it was presumably unpublished, and must be interpreted with caution.
Eysenck himself, incidentally, was of closeted 
half-Jewish ancestry, practising what antiSemite Kevin Macdonald calls crypsis, which may be taken to suggest he was not entirely disinterested with regard to to question of the extent to which Jews can be recognized by sight alone. 
The only other study I have found addressing the quite easily researchable, if politically incorrect, question of whether some people can or cannot identify Jews from non-Jews on the basis of phenotypic differences is Andrzejewski et al (2009).

[35] This is one of the few occasions in the book where I recall Baker actually mentioning whether the morphological differences between racial groupings that he describes are statistically significant.

[36] Interestingly, Stephen Oppenheimer, in his book Origins of the British, posits a link between the so-called Celtic regions of the British Isles and populations from one particular area of the Mediterranean, namely the Iberian peninsula, especially the Basques, themselves, speaking a non-Indo-European language withno known relationship to any other language in the world, probably the descendants of the original pre-Indo-European inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula (see Oppenheimer 2006; see also Blood of the Isles).
This seemingly corroborates the otherwise implausible mythological account of the peopling of Ireland provided in Lebor Gabála Érenn, which claims that the last major migration to, and invasion of, Ireland, from which movement of people the modern Irish primarily descend, arrived from Spain in the form of the Milesians. This mythological account may derive from the similarity between the Greek and Latin words for the two regions, namely Iberia and Hibernia respectively, and between the words Gael and Galicia, and the belief of some ancient Roman writers, notably Orosius and Tacitus, that Ireland lay midway between Britain and Spain (Carey 2001).
However, while some early population genetic studies were indeed interpreted to suggest a connection between populations from Iberia and the British Isles, this interpretation seems to have been largely been discredited by more recent research.

[37] Actually, the position with regard to hair and eye colour is rather more complicated. On the one hand, hair colour does appear to be darkest in the ostensibly Celtic’ regions of the British Isles. Thus, Carleton Coon in his 1939 book, The Races of Europe, reports that, with regard to hair colour:

England emerges as the lightest haired of the four major divisions of the British Isles, and Wales as the darkest” (The Races of Europe: p385).

Likewise, Coon reports, that in Scotland:

“Jet black hair is commoner in the western highlands than elsewhere, and is statistically correlated with the greatest survival of Gaelic speech” (The Races of Europe: p387).

However, patterns of eye colour diverge from and complicate this picture. Thus, Coon reports:

“Whereas the British are on the whole lighter-haired than the Irish, they are at the same time darker-eyed” (The Races of Europe: p388).

Indeed, contrary to the notion of the Irish as a people with substantial Mediterranean racial affinities, Coon claims:

There is probably no population of equal size in the world which is lighter eyed, and bluer eyed, than the Irish” (The Races of Europe: p381).

On the other hand, the Welsh, in addition to being darker-haired than the English, are also darker-eyed, with a particularly high prevalence of dark eyes being found in certain more isolated regions of Wales (The Races of Europe: p389).
Interestingly, as far back as the time of the Roman Empire, the Silures, a Brittonic tribe occupying most of South-East Wales and known for their fierce resistance to the Roman conquest, were described by Roman writers Tacitus and Jordanes (the Romans themselves being, of course, a Mediterranean people) as “swarthy” in appearance and as possessing black curly hair.
The same is true of the, also until recently Celtic-speaking, Cornish people, who are, Coon reports, the darkest eyed of the English” (The Races of Europe: p389). Dark hair is also more common in Cornwall (The Races of Europe: p386). Cornwall is, Coon therefore reports, the darkest county in England(The Races of Europe: p396). (However, with the historically unprecedented mass migration of non-whites into the UK in the latter half of the twentieth century and beyond, this is, of course, no doubt no longer true.)
Yet another complicating factor is the prevalence of red hair, which is also associated with the Celtic’ regions of the British Isles, but is hardly a Mediterranean character, and which, like dark hair, reaches its highest prevalence in Wales (The Races of Europe: p385). Baker, for his part, does not dwell on this point, but does acknowledge
, “there is rather a high proportion of people with red hair in Wales”, something for which, he claims “no satisfactory explanation… has been provided” (p265).
However, Baker is skeptical regarding the supposed association of the ancient Celts with ginger or auburn hair. He traces this belief to a single casual remark of Tacitus. However, he suggests that the Latin word used rutilai is actually better translated as red (inclining to golden yellow), and was, he observes, also used to refer to the Golden Fleece and to gold coinage (p257). 

[38] The genetic continuity of the British people is, for example, a major theme of Stephen Oppenheimer’s The Origins of the British (see also Oppenheimer 2006). It is also a major conclusion of Bryan Sykes’s Blood of the Isles, which concludes:

We are an ancient people, and though the [British] Isles has been the target of invasion and opposed settlement from abroad ever since Julius Caesar first stepped onto the shingle shores of Kent, these have barely scratched the topsoil of our deep rooted ancestry” (Blood of the Isles: p338).

However, population genetics is an extremely fast moving science, and recent research has revised this conclusion, suggesting a replacement of around 90% of the population of the British Isles, albeit in very ancient times (around 2000BCE) associated with the spread of the Bell Beaker culture and Steppe-related ancestry, presumably deriving from the Indo-European expansion (Olalde et al 2018). Also, recent population genetic studies suggest that the Anglo-Saxons actually made a greater genetic contribution to the ancestry of the English, especially those from Eastern England, than formerly thought (e.g. Martiniano et al 2016; Schiffels et al 2016).

[39] However, in The Origins of the British, Stephen Oppenheimer proposes an alternative route of entry and point of initial disembarkation, suggesting that the people whom we today habitually refer to as ‘Celts’ arrived, not from Central Europe as traditionally thought, but rather up the Atlantic seaboard from the west coasts of France and Iberia. This is consistent with some archaeological evidence (e.g. the distribution of passage graves) suggesting longstanding trade and cultural links up the Atlantic seaboard from the Mediterranean region, through the Basque country, into Brittany, Cornwall, Wales and Ireland. This would also provide an explanation for what Baker claims is a Mediterranid component in the ancestry of the Welsh and Irish, as supposedly evidenced in distribution of blood groups and the prevalence dark hair and eye colours as recorded by Beddoe.

[40] Interestingly, in addition to gracialization having occurred least, if at all, in Fuegians and Aboriginals, Wade also reports that:

Gracialization of the skull is most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africans and East Asians, with Europeans retaining considerable robustness (A Troublesome Inheritance: p167).

This is an exception to what Steve Sailer calls ‘Rushton’s Rule of Three (see here) and, given that Wade associates gracialization with domestication and pacification (as well as with neoteny), suggests that, at least by this criteria, Europeans evince less evidence of pacification and domestication than do black Africans. This is perhaps a surprising finding given that domestication and pacification among humans are usually associated with the rise of civilization, yet, according to Baker himself, civilization was largely absent from sub-Saharan Africa prior to the arrival of Europeans (see discussion above).

[41] Actually, the meaning of the two terms is subtly different. ‘Paedomorphy’ refers to the retention of juvenile or infantile traits into adulthood. ‘Neoteny refers to one particular process whereby this end-result is achieved, namely slowing some aspects of physiological development. However, ‘paedomorphy’ can also result from another process, namely progenesis’, where, instead, some aspects of development are actually sped up, such that the developing organism reaches sexual maturity earlier, before reaching full maturity in other respects. In humans, most examples of paedomorphy result from the former process, namely ‘neoteny.

[42] Leading mid-twentieth century physical anthropologist Carleton Coon, writing a few years before Baker, denies that this trait is universal among Bushmen, writing:

According to early accounts, all unmixed Bushman males have penises which protrude forward as in infants, but this is not always true” (The Living Races of Men: p112).

Politically correct modern scholarship tends to dismiss the claim entirely as a nineteenth century racialist myth, rooted in stereotypes of native Africans as animalistic, highly-sexed and hence being in a state of permanant sexual arousal, as might be suggested by a semi-erect penis (e.g. Gordon 1998). On the other hand, the photographic evidence provided by Coon and other authors shows that the trait is at least found among some Bushmen.
Coon, interestingly, alludes to another supposed curiosity of San Bushman genitalia, claiming that:

Another oddity of Bushmen is monorchy, or the descent of only one testicle, but this also is not universal among Bushman males” (The Living Races of Men: p113)

An obvious problem with these claims is that, as with the supposed elongated labia of San women (discussed above), verification, or falsification, requires intimate examination, to which subjects might object.
At any rate, the alleged paedomorphic penises of San males contrast with those of neighbouring Negroids, at least according to popular stereotype
. For his part, Baker accepts the stereotype that black males have large penes. However, he cites no quantitative data, remarking only:

That Negrids have large penes is somtimes questioned, but those who doubt it are likely to change their minds if they will look at photographs 8, 9, 20, 23, 29, and 37 in Bernatzig’s excellently illustrated book Zwischen Weissem Nil und Belgisch-Kongo’. They represent naked male Nilotids and appear convincing” (p331).

But five photos, presumably representing just five males, hardly represents a convincing sample size. (I found several of the numbered pictures online by searching for the book’s title, and each showed only a single male.) Interestingly, Baker is rightly skeptical regarding claims of differences in the genitalia between European subraces, given the intimate nature of the measurements required, writing:

It is difficult to obtain measurements of theses parts of the body and statements about subracial differences in them must not be accepted without confirmation” (p219).

[43] Interestingly, in their book Big Brain: The Origins and Future of Human Intelligence, neuroscientists Gary Lynch and Richard Granger devote considerable discussion to a supposedly extinct species of hominid, termed Boskop Man or alternatively the Boskopoid race, who, they claim, possessed, as compared to other hominid species (ourselves included), extremely large brains, paedomorphic traits and some physical resemblence to living San Bushmen. However, anthropologist-blogger John Hawks has critiqued this claim in a blog post where he argues that the Boskops are no longer recognized as a distinct species (or subspecies) of hominid and also that the cranial capacity of those remains formerly identified as Boskop, though certainly large, has nevertheless been exaggerated. In this, Hawks cites Singer (1958), who argues that those skulls identified as Boskops’ should instead be classified as Khoisan, from whom they were formerly distinguished solely on the basis of their brain size. However, as Baker suggests, living San Bushmen have very small brains as compared to other extant human races, at least according to data cited by Richard Lynn in his book, Race Differences in Intelligence (reviewed here).

[44] Indeed, the claim that East Asians are especially paedomorphic or neotenized as compared to other races is not restricted to researchers in the racialist or hereditarian tradition. On the contrary, anthropologist  Ashley Montagu, though an early pioneer in race denial, nevertheless conceded at least one racial difference, namely:

The Mongoloid skull generally, whether Chinese or Japanese, has been rather more neotenized than the Caucasoid or European” (Growing Young: p18).

Similarly, no lesser leftist champion of racial egalitarianism than infamous scientific fraud and charlatan Stephen Jay Gould conceded:

It is hard to deny that Mongoloids… are the most paedomorphic of human groups (Ontogeny and Phylogeny: p134).

Interestingly, Gould made this concession in the context of arguing against the notion that the greater paedomorphosis of Caucasoids as compared to Negroids was indicative of the intellectual superiority of the former. Yet, since there is now widespread agreement among hereditarians that East Asians (but curiously not South-East Asians) score rather higher in IQ tests than do Caucasoids, his observations are actually supportive of both the link between paedomorphosis and encephalization and the hereditarian hypothesis with respect to to race differences in intelligence.
Perhaps recognizing this, in a later book Gould, while still acknowledging that Orientals, not whites, are clearly the most neotenous of human races”, rather contradicted himself just a couple of sentences later by also asserting:

The whole enterprise of ranking groups by degree of neoteny is fundamentally unjustified” (Mismeasure of Man: p121).

[45] Thus, anthropologist Carleton Coon, in Racial Adaptations: A Study of the Origins, Nature, and Significance of Racial Variations in Humans, does not even consider sexual selection as an explanation for the evolution of Khoisan steatopygia, despite their obviously dimorphic presentation. Instead, he proposes:

“[Bushman’s] famous steatopygia (fat deposits that contain mostly fibrous tissue) may be a hedge against scarce nutrients and draught during pregnancy and lactation” (Racial Adaptations: p105). 

[46] Others, however, notably Desmond Morris in The Naked Ape (which I have reviewed here), have implicated sexual selection in the evolution of the human female’s permanent breasts. The two hypotheses are not, however, mutually exclusive. Indeed, they may be complementary. Thus, Nancy Etcoff in Survival of the Prettiest (which I have reviewed here) proposes that breasts may be perceived as attractive by men precisely because they honestly advertise the presence of the fat reserves needed to sustain a pregnancy” (Survival of the Prettiest: p187). By analogy, the same could, of course, also be true of fatty buttocks.

[47] Thus, Baker demands rhetorically:

Who could conceivably fail to distinguish between a Sanid and a Europid, or between an Eskimid [Eskimo] and a Negritid [Negrito], or between a Bambutid (African Pygmy) or an Australid [Australian Aboriginal]?

[48] Baker does discuss the performance of East Asians on IQ tests, but his conclusions are ambivalent (p490-492). He concludes, for example, “the IQs of Mongolid [i.e. East Asian] children in North America are generally found to be about the same as those of Europids” (p490). Yet recent studies have revealed a slight advantage for East Asians in general intelligence. Baker also mentions the relatively higher scores of East Asians on tests of spatio-visual ability, as compared to verbal ability. However, he attributes this to their lack of proficiency in the language of their host culture, as he relied mostly on American studies of first and second-generation immigrants, or the descendants of immigrants, who were often raised in non-English-speaking homes, and hence only learnt English as a second-language (p490). However, recent studies suggest that East Asians score relatively lower on verbal ability, as compared to their scores on spatio-visual ability, even when tested in a language in which they are wholly proficient (see Race Differences in Intelligence: reviewed here).

[49] Rushton and Jensen (2005) favour the hereditarian hypothesis vis a vis race differences in intelligence, and their presentation of the evidence is biased somewhat in this direction. Nisbett’s rejoinder therefore provides a good balance, being very much biased in the opposite direction. Macintosh’s chapter is perhaps more balanced, but he still clearly favours an environmental explanation with regard to population differences in intelligence, if not with regard to individual differences. My own post on the topic is, of course, naturally enough, the most thorough and balanced treatment of this topic.

[50] Indeed, in proposing tenable environmental-geographical explanations for the rise and fall of civilizations in different parts of the world, Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel represents a substantial challenge to Baker’s conclusions in this chapter and the two books are well worth reading together. Another recent work addressing the question of why civilizations rise and fall among different races and peoples, but reaching less politically-correct conclusions, is Michael Hart’s Understanding Human History, which seems to have been conceived of as a rejoinder to Diamond, drawing heavily upon, but also criticizing the former work.

[51] Interestingly, Baker quotes Toynbee as suggesting that:

An ‘identifying mark’ (but not a definition) [of] civilization might be equated with ‘a state of society in which there is a minority of the population, however small, that is free from the task, nor merely of producing food, but of engaging in any other form of economic activities-e.g. industry or trade” (p508).

Yet a Marxist would view this, not as a marker of civilization, but rather of exploitation. Those free from engaging in economic activity are, from a Marxist perspective, clearly extracting surplus value, and hence exploiting the labour of others. Toynbee presumably had in mind the idle rich or leisure class, as well perhaps as those whom the latter patronize, e.g. artists, though the latter, if paid for their work, are surely engaging in a form of economic activity, as indeed are the patrons who subsidize them. (Indeed, even the idle rich or leisure class engage in economic activity, if only as consumers.) However, this criterion, at least as described by Baker, is at least as capable of applying to the opposite end of the social spectrum – i.e. the welfare-dependent underclass. Did Toynbee really intend to suggest that the existence of the long-term unemployed is a distinctive marker of civilization? If so, is Baker really agreeing with him?

[52] The full list of criteria for civilization provided by Baker is as follows:

  1. In the ordinary circumstances of life in public places they cover the external genitalia and greater part of the trunk with clothes” (p507);
  2. They keep the body clean and take care to dispose of its waste elements” (p507);
  3. They do not practice severe mutilation or deformation of the body” (p507);
  4. They have knowledge of building in brick or stone, if the necessary materials are available in their territory” (p507);
  5. Many of them live in towns or cities, which are linked by roads” (p507);
  6. “They cultivate food plants” (p507);
  7. They domesticate animals and use some of the larger ones for transportif suitable species are available (p507);
  8. They have knowledge of the use of metals, if these are available” (p507);
  9. They use wheels” (p507);
  10. They exchange property by the use of money” (p507);
  11. They order their society by a system of laws, which are enforced in such a way that they ordinarily go about their various concerns in times of peace without danger of attack or arbitrary arrest” (p507);
  12. They permit accused people to defend themselves and call witnesses” (p507);
  13. They do not use torture to extract information or punishment” (p507);
  14. They do practice cannibalism” (p507);
  15. The religious systems include ethical elements and are not purely or grossly superstitious” (p507);
  16. They use a script… to communicate ideas” (p507);
  17. There is some facility in the abstract use of numbers, without consideration of actual objects” (p507);
  18. A calendar is in use” (p508);
  19. “[There are] arrangements for the instruction of the young in intellectual matters” (p508);
  20. There is some appreciation of the fine arts” (p508);
  21. Knowledge and understanding are valued as ends in themselves” (p508).

[53] Actually, some of the criteria include both technological and moral elements. For example, the second requirement, namely that the culture in question keep the body clean and take care to dispose of its waste elements”, at first seems a purely moral requirement. However, the disposal of sewage is, not only essential for the maintenance of healthy populations living at high levels of population density, but also often involves impressive feats of engineering (p507).
Similarly, the requirement that some people live in towns or cities” seems rather arbitrary. However, to sustain populations at the high population density required in towns and cities usually requires substantial technological, not to mention social and economic, development. Likewise, the building and maintenance of roads linking these settlements, also mentioned by Baker as part of the same criterion, is a technological achievement, often requiring, like the building of facilities for sewage disposal, substantial coordination of labour.

[54] Indeed, even the former Bishop of Edinburgh apparently agrees (see his book, Godless Morality: Keeping Religion out of Ethics). The classic thought-experiment used by moral philosophers to demonstrate that morality does not derive from God’s commandments is to ask devout believers whether, if, instead of commanding Thou shalt not kill, God had instead commanded Thou shalt kill, would they then consider killing a moral obligation? Most people, including devout believers, apparently concede otherwise. In fact, however, the hypothetical thought-experiment is not as hypothetical as many moral philosophers, and many Christians, seem to believe, as various passages in the Bible do indeed command mass killing and genocide (e.g. Deuteronomy 20: 16-17; Samuel 15:3; Deuteronomy 20: 13-14), and indeed rape too (Numbers 31:18).

[55] For example, in IQ and Racial Differences (1973), former president of the American Psychological Association and confirmed racialist Henry E Garrett claims:

Until the arrival of Europeans there was no literate civilization in the continent’s black belt. The Negro had no written language, no numerals, no calendar, no system of measurement. He never developed a plow or wheel. He never domesticated any animal. With the rarest exceptions, he built nothing more elaborate than mud huts and thatched stockades” (IQ and Racial Differences: p2).

[56] These explorers included David Livingston, the famous missionary, and Francis Galton, the infamous eugenicist, celebrated statistician and all-round Victorian polymath, in addition to Henry Francis FlynnPaul Du ChailluJohn Hanning Speke, Samuel Baker (the author John R Baker’s own grand-uncle) and George August Schweinfurth (p343).

[57] This, of course, depends on precisely how we define the words machine and ‘mechanical’. Thus, many authorities, especially military historians, class the simple bow as the first true ‘machine’. However, the only indigenous people known to lack even the bow and arrow at the time of their first contact with Europeans were the Australian Aboriginals of Australia and Tasmania.

[58] With regard to the ruins of Great Zimbabwe, Baker emphasizes that “the buildings in question are in no sense houses; the great majority of them are simply walls” (p402). Nor, according to Baker, do they appear to have been part of a two-storey building, though he concedes that some of the structures may originally have been roofed, an other authors suggest huts were sometimes built atop these (p402).
Unlike some other racialist authors who have attributed their construction to the possibly part-Jewish Lemba people, Baker attributes their construction and design to indigenous Africans (p405). However, he suggests their anomalous nature reflected that they had been constructed in (crude) imitation of buildings constructed outside of the “secluded area” of Africa by non-Negro peoples with whom the former were in a trading relationship (p407-8).
This would explain why the structures, though impressive by the standards of other constructions within the “secluded zone” of Africa from the same time-period, where buildings of brick or stone were rare and tended to be on a much smaller scale (so impressive, indeed, that, in the years since Baker’s book was published, they have even bizarrely had an entire surrounding country named after them), are, by European or Middle Eastern standards of the same time period, quite shoddy. Baker also emphasizes:

The splendour and ostentation were made possible by what was poured into the country from foreign lands. One must acknowledge the administrative capacity of the rulers, but may question the utility of the ends to which much of it was put” (p409).

With regard to the technological achievements of black Africans more generally, Baker also acknowledges the adoption of iron smelting throughout most parts of Africa where the ore was available by the tenth century (p352; see also p373). However, while he attributes its origin to outside influence, recent research apparently suggests a much earlier, and indigenous, origin in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa. He also credits indigenous black Africans with great skill in forging iron into weapons and other tools (p353).

[59] Several plants seem to have been first domesticated in the Sahel region, and the Horn of Africa, both of which are part of sub-Saharan Africa. However, these areas lie outside of what Baker calls the “secluded area”, as I understand it. Also, populations from the Horn of Africa are, according to Baker predominantly Caucasoid (p225).

[60] The sole domestic animal that was perhaps first domesticated by black Africans is the guineafowl. Guineafowl are found wild throughout sub-Saharan Africa, but not elsewhere. It has therefore been argued, plausibly enough, that it was first domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Baker reports that the nineteenth-century explorers whose work he relies on “nowhere mention its being kept as a domestic animal by Negrids” (p375). Instead, he proposes it was probably first domesticated in Ethiopia, outside the “secluded area” as defined by Baker, and whose population are, according to Baker, predominantly Caucasoid (p225). However, he admits that there are no “early record of tame guinea-fowl in Ethiopia” (p375). 

[61] The relative absense of large wild mammals outside of sub-Saharan Afirca may partly be because such mammals have been driven to extinction or had their numbers depleted in recent times (e.g. wolves have been driven to extinction in Britain and Ireland, bison to the verge of extinction in North America). However, it is likely that Africa had a comparatively large number of large wild mammalian species even in ancient times.
This is because outside of Africa (notably in the Americas), many wild mammals were wiped out by the sudden arrival of humans with their formidable hunting skills to whom indigenous fauna were wholly unadapted. However, Africa is where humans first evolved. Therefore, prey species will have gradually evolved fear and avoidance of humans at the same time as humans themselves first evolved to become formidable hunters.
Thus, Africa, unlike other continents, never experienced a sudden influx of human hunters to whom its prey species were wholly unadapted. It therefore retains many of large wild game animals into modern times.

[62] Of course, rather conveniently for Diamonds theory, the wild ancestors of many modern domesticated animals, including horses and aurochs, are now extinct, so we have no way of directly assessing their temperament. However, we have every reason to believe that aurochs, at least, posed a far more formidable obstacle to domestication than does the zebra.

[63] Actually, a currently popular theory of the domestication of wolves/dogs holds that humans did not so much domesticate wolves/dogs as wolves/dogs domesticated themselves.

[64] Aurochs, and contemporary domestic cattle, also evince another trait that, according to Diamond, precludes their domestication – namely, it is not usually possible to keep two adult males of this species in the same field enclosure. Yet, according to Diamond, the social antelope species for which Africa is famous” could not be domesticated because:

The males of [African antelope] herds space themselves into territories and fight fiercely with one another when breeding. Hence, those antelope cannot be maintained in crowded enclosures in captivity” (Guns, Germs and Steel: p174).

Evidently, the ancient Eurasians who successfully domesticated the auroch never got around to reading Diamonds critially acclaimed bestseller. If they had, they could have learnt in advance to abandon the project as hopeless and hence save themselves the time and effort.

[65] With regard to the racial affinities of the ancient Egyptians, a source of some controversy in recent years, Baker concludes that, contrary to the since-popularized Afrocentrist Black Athena hypothesis, the ancient Egyptians were predominantly, but not wholly, Caucasoid, and that “the Negrid contribution to Egyptian stock was a small one” (p518). Indeed, there is presumably little doubt on this question, since, according to Baker, there is an abundance of well-preserved skulls from Egypt, not least due to the practice of mummifying corpses and thus:

More study has been devoted to the craniology of ancient Egypt than to that of any other country in the world” (p517).

From such data, Baker reports:

Morant showed that all the sets of ancient Egyptian skills that he analysed statistically were distinguishable by each of six criteria from Negrid skulls” (p518).

For what it’s worth, this conclusion is also corroborated by their self-depiction in artwork:

In their monuments the dynastic Egyptians represented themselves as having a long face, pointed chin with scanty beard, a straight or somewhat aquiline nose, black irises, and a reddish-brown complexion” (p518).

Similarly, in Race: the Reality of Human Differences (reviewed here, here and here), Sarich and Miele, claiming that Egyptian monuments are not mere ‘portraits but an attempt at classification’”, report that the Egyptians painted themselves as red, Asiatics or Semites as yellow, Southerns or Negroes” as black, and “Libyans, Westerners or Northerners” as “white, with blue eyes and fair beards” (Race: the Reality of Human Differences: p33).
Thus, if not actually black, neither were the ancient Egyptians exactly white either, as implausibly claimed by contemporary Nordicist Arthur Kemp, in his books, Children of Ra: Artistic, Historical, and Genetic Evidence for Ancient White Egypt and March of the Titans: The Complete History of the White Race.
In the latter work, Kemp contends that the ancient Egyptians were originally white, being part-Mediterranean (the Mediterranean race itself being now largely extinct, in Kemp’s eccentric view), but governed, he implausibly claims, by a Nordic elite. Over time, however, he contends that they interbred with imported black African slaves and Semitic populations from the Middle East and hence the population was gradually transformed and hence Egyptian civilization degenerated.
This is, of course, a version of de Gobineau’s infamous theory that great empires inevitably decline because, through their imperial conquests, they subjugate, and hence ultimately interbreed with, the inferior peoples whom they have conquered (as well as with inward migrants attracted by higher living standards), which interbreeding supposedly dilutes the very racial qualities that permitted their original imperial glories.
Interestingly, consistent with Kemp’s theory, there is indeed some evidence that of an increase in the proportion of sub-Saharan African ancestry in Egypt since ancient times (Schuenemann et al 2017).
However, this same study demonstrating an increase in the proportion of sub-Saharan African ancestry in Egypt also showed that, contrary to Kemp’s theory, Egyptian populations always had close affinities to Middle Eastern populations (including Semites), and, in fact, owing to the increase in sub-Saharan African ancestry, and despite the Muslim conquest, actually had closer affinities to Near Eastern populations in ancient times than they do today (Schuenemann et al 2017).
Importantly, this study was based on DNA extracted from mummies, and, since mummification was a costly procedure that was usually available only to the wealthy, it therefore indicates that even the Egyptian elite were far from Nordic even in ancient times, as implausibly claimed by Kemp.
To his credit, Kemp does indeed amass some remarkable photographic evidence of Egyptian tomb paintings and monuments depicting figures, according to Kemp intended to represent Egyptians themselves, with blue eyes and light hair and complexions.
Admitting that Egyptian men were often depicted with reddish skin, he dismisses this as an artistic convention:

It was a common artistic style in many ancient Mediterranean cultures to portray men with red skins and women with white skins. This was done, presumably to reflect the fact that the men would have been outside working in the fields” (Children of Ra: p33). 

Actually, according to anthropologist Peter Frost, this artistic convention reflects real and innate differences, as well as differing sexually selected ideals of male and female beauty (see Dark Men, Fair Women).
Most interestingly, Kemp also includes photographs of some Egyptian mummies, including Ramses II, apparently with light-coloured hair. 
At first, I suspected this might reflect loss of pigmentation owing to the process of decay occurring after death, or perhaps to some chemical process involved in mummification.
Robert Brier, an expert on mummification, confirms that Ramses’s “strikingly blond” hair was indeed a consequence of its having been “dyed as a final step in the mummification process so that he would be young forever” (The Encyclopedia of Mummies: p153). However, he also reports in the next sentence that:

Microscopic inspection of the roots of the hair revealed that Ramses was originally a redhead” (The Encyclopedia of Mummies: p153).

Brier also confirms, again as claimed by Kemp, that one especially ancient predynastic mummy, displayed in the British Museum, was indeed nicknamed Ginger on account of its hair colour (The Encyclopedia of Mummies: p64). However, whether this was the natural hair colour of the person when alive is not clear.
At any rate, even if both Ginger and Ramses the Great were indeed natural redheads, in this respect they appear to have been very much the exception rather than the rule. Thus, Baker himself reports that
:

It would appear that their head-hair was curly, wavy, or almost straight, and very dark brown or black” (p518).

This conclusion is again based on the evidence of their mummies, and, since mummification was a costly procedure largely restricted to the wealthy, it again contradicts Kemp’s notion of a ‘Nordic elite’ ruling ancient Egypt. On this and other evidence, Baker therefore concludes:

There is general agreement… that the Europid element in the Egyptians from predynastic times onwards has been primarily Mediterranid, though it is allowed that Orientalid immigrants from Arabia made a contribution to the stock” (p518).

In short, ancient Egyptians, including Pharaohs and other elites, though certainly not black, were not really exactly white either, and certainly far from Nordic. Despite the increase in sub-Saharan African ancestry and the probable further influx of Middle Eastern DNA owing the Muslim conquest, they probably resembled modern Egyptians, especially the indigenous, Christian Copts.

[66] The same is true of the earlier runic alphabets of the Germanic peoples, the Paleohispanic scripts of the Iberian peninsula, and presumably also of the undeciphered Linear A alphabet that was in use at the outer edge of the European continent during the Bronze Age.

[67] Writing appears to have been developed first in Mesopotamia, then shortly afterwards in Egypt (though some Egyptologists claim priority on behalf of Egypt). However, the relative geographic proximity of these two civilizations, their degree of contact with one another and the coincidence in time, make it likely that, although the two writing systems are entirely different to one another, the idea of writing was nevertheless conceived in imitation of Sumerian cunniform. A written script then seems to have been independently developed in China. Writing was also developed, almost certainly entirely independently, in Mesoamerica. Other possible candidates for the independent development of writing include the Indus Valley civilization, and Easter Island, though, since neither script has been deciphered, it is not clear that they represent true writing systems, and the Easter Island script has also yet to be reliably dated.

[68] Actually, it is now suggested that both the Mayans and Indians may have been beaten to this innovation by the Babylonians, although, unlike the later Indians and Muslims, neither the Mayans nor the Babylonians went on to take full advantage of this innovation, by developing mathematics in a way made possible by their innovation. For this, it is Indian civilization that deserves credit. The invention of the concept by both the Maya and the Babylonians was, of course, entirely independent of one another, but the Indians, the Islamic civilization and other Eurasian civilizations probably inherited the concept ultimately from Babylonia.

[69] Interestingly, this excuse is not available in Africa. There, large mammals survived, probably because, since Africa was where anatomically modern humans first evolved, prey species evolved in concert with humans, and hence gradually evolved to fear and avoid humans, at the same time as humans themselves gradually evolved to be formidable predators. In contrast, the native species of the Americas would have been totally unprepared to protect themselves from human hunters, to whom they were completely ill-adapted, owing to the late, and, in evolutionary terms, sudden, peopling of the continent. This may be why, to this day, Africa has more large animals than any other continent.

[70] Baker also uses the complexity of a people’s language in order to assess their intelligence. Today, there seems to be an implicit assumption among many linguists that all languages are equal in their complexity. Thus, American linguists rightly emphasize the subtlety and complexity of, for example, African-American vernacular, which is certainly, by no means, merely a impoverished or corrupted version of standard English, but rather has grammatical rules all of its own, which often convey information that is lost on white Americans not conversant in this dialect.
However, there is no a priori reason to assume that all languages are equal in their capacity to express complex and abstract ideas. The size of vocabularies, for example, differs in different languages, as does the number of different tenses that are recognised. For example, the Walpiri language of some Australian Aboriginals is said to have only a few number terms, namely words for just onetwo’ and ‘many, while the Pirahã language of indigenous South Americans is said to get by with no number terms at all. Thus, when Baker contends that certain languages, notably the Arunta language of indigenous Australians, as studied by Alf Sommerfelt, and also the Akan language of Africa, are inherently impoverished in their capacity to express abstract thought, he may well be right.

________________________

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Donald Symons’ ‘The Evolution of Human Sexuality’: A Founding Work of Modern Evolutionary Psychology

The Evolution of Human Sexuality by Donald Symons (Oxford University Press 1980). 

Research over the last four decades in the field that has come to be known as evolutionary psychology has focused disproportionately on mating behaviour. Geoffrey Miller (1998) has even argued that it is the theory of sexual selection rather than that of natural selection which, in practice, guides most research in this field. 

This does not reflect merely the prurience of researchers. Rather, given that reproductive success is the ultimate currency of natural selection, mating behaviour is, perhaps along with parental investment, the form of behaviour most directly subject to selective pressures.

Almost all of this research traces its ancestry ultimately to Donald Symons’ ‘The Evolution of Human Sexuality’ by Donald Symons. Indeed, much of it was explicitly designed to test claims and predictions formulated by Symons himself in this very book.

Age Preferences

For example, in his discussion of the age at which women are perceived as most attractive by males, Symons formulated two alternative hypotheses. 

First, if human evolutionary history were characterized by fleeting one-off sexual encounters (i.e. one-night standscasual sex and hook-ups), then, he reasoned, men would have evolved to find women most attractive when the latter are at the age of their maximum fertility

For women, fertility is said to peak around when a woman reaches her mid-twenties since, although women still in their teens have high pregnancy rates, they also experience greater risk of birth complications

However, if human evolutionary history were characterized instead by long-term pair bonds, then men would have evolved to be maximally attracted to somewhat younger women (i.e. those at the beginning of their reproductive careers), so that, by entering a long-term relationship with the woman at this time, a male is potentially able to monopolize her entire lifetime reproductive output (p189). 

More specifically, males would have evolved to prefer females, not of maximal fertility, but rather of maximal reproductive value, a term borrowed from demography and population genetics which refers to a person’s expected future reproductive output given their current age. Unlike fertility, a woman’s reproductive value peaks around her mid- to late-teens.  

On the basis of largely anecdotal evidence, Symons concludes that human males have evolved to be most attracted to females of maximal reproductive value rather than maximal fertility.  

Subsequent research designed to test between Symons’s rival hypotheses has largely confirmed his speculative hunch that it is younger females in their mid- to late-teens who are perceived by males as most attractive (e.g. Kenrick and Keefe 1992). 

Why Average is Attractive

Symons is also credited as the first person to recognize that a major criterion of attractiveness is, paradoxically, averageness, or at least the first to recognize the significance of, and possible evolutionary explanation for, this discovery.[1] Thus, Symons argues that: 

“[Although] health and status are unusual in that there is no such thing as being too healthy or too high ranking… with respect to most anatomical traits, natural selection produces the population mean” (p194). 

On this view, deviations from the population mean are interpreted as the result of deleterious mutations or developmental instability, and hence bad genes.[2]

Concealed Ovulation

Support has even emerged for some of Symons’ more speculative hunches.

For example, one of Symons’ two proposed scenarios for the evolution of concealed ovulation, in which he professed “little confidence” (p141), was that this had evolved so as to impede male mate-guarding and enable females select a biological father for their offspring different from their husbands (p139-141).

Consistent with this theory, studies have found that women’s mate preferences vary throughout their menstrual cycle in a manner compatible with a so-called ‘dual mating strategy’, preferring males evidencing a willingness to invest in offspring at most times, but, when at their most fertile, preferring characteristics indicative of genetic quality (e.g. Penton-Voak et al 1999). 

Meanwhile, a questionnaire distributed via a women’s magazine found that women engaged in extra-marital affairs do indeed report engaging in ‘extra-pair copulations’ (EPCs) at times likely to coincide with ovulation (Bellis and Baker 1990).[3]

The Myth of Female Choice

Interestingly, Symons even anticipated some of the mistakes evolutionary psychologists would be led into.

Thus, he warns that researchers in modern western societies may be prone to overestimate the importance of female choice as a factor in human evolution, because, in their own societies, this is a major factor, if not the major factor, in determining marriage and sexual and romantic relationships (p203).[4]

However, in ancestral environments (i.e. what evolutionary psychologists now call the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness or EEA) arranged marriages were likely the norm, as they are in most premodern cultures around the world today (p168).[5]

Thus, Symons concludes: 

There is no evidence that any features of human anatomy were produced by intersexual selection [i.e. female choice]. Human physical sex differences are explained most parsimoniously as the outcome of intrasexual selection (the result of male-male competition)” (p203). 

Thus, human males have no obvious analogue of the peacock’s tail, but they do have substantially greater levels of upper-body strength and violent aggression as compared to females.[6]

This was a warning almost entirely ignored by subsequent generations of researchers before being forcefully reiterated by Puts (2010)

Homosexuality as a ‘Test-Case

An idea of the importance of Symons’s work can be ascertained by comparing it with contemporaneous works addressing the same subject-matter.

Edward O Wilson’s On Human Nature was first published in 1978, only a year before Symons’s ‘The Evolution of Human Sexuality’. 

However, whereas Symons’s book set out much of the theoretical basis for what would become the modern science of evolutionary psychology, Wilson’s chapter on “Sex” has dated rather less well, and a large portion of chapter is devoted to introducing a now faintly embarrassing theory of the evolution of homosexuality which has subsequently received no empirical support (see Bobrow & Bailey 2001).[7]

In contrast, Symons’s own treatment of homosexuality is innovative. It is also characteristic of his whole approach and illustrates why ‘The Evolution of Human Sexuality‘ has been described by David Buss as “the first major treatise on evolutionary psychology proper” (Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology: p251).

Rather than viewing all behaviours as necessarily adaptive (as critics of evolutionary psychology, such as Stephen Jay Gould, have often accused sociobiologists of doing),[8] Symons instead focuses on admittedly non-adaptive (or, indeed, even maladaptive) behaviours, not because he believes them to be adaptive, but rather because they provide a unique window on the nature of human sexuality.

Accordingly, Symons does not concern himself with how homosexuality evolved, implicitly viewing it as a rare and maladaptive malfunctioning of normal sexuality. Yet the behaviour of homosexuals is of interest to Symons because it provides a window on the nature of male and female sexuality as it manifests itself when freed from the constraints imposed by the conflicting desires of the opposite sex.

On this view, the rampant promiscuity manifested by many homosexual men (e.g. cruising and cottaging in bathhouses and public lavatories, or Grindr hookups) reflects the universal male desire for sexual variety when freed from the constraints imposed by the conflicting desires of women. 

This desire for sexual variety is, of course, obviously reproductively unproductive among homosexual men themselves. However, it evolved because it enhanced the reproductive success of heterosexual men by motivating them to attempt to mate with multiple females and thereby father multiple offspring.

Thus, a powerful ruler like with a large harem like Ismail the Bloodthirsty’ of Morocco could reputedly father as many as 888 offspring.

In contrast, burdened with pregnancy and lactation, women’s potential reproductive rate is more tightly constrained than that of men. They therefore have little to gain reproductively by mating with multiple males, since they can usually gestate, and nurse, only one offspring at a time.

It is therefore notable that, among lesbians, there is little evidence of the sort of rampant promiscuity common among gay men. Instead, lesbian relationships seem to be characterized by much the same features as heterosexual coupling (i.e. long-term pair-bonds).

The similarity of heterosexual coupling to that of lesbians, and the striking contrast with that of male homosexuals, suggests that it is women, not men, who exert decisive influence in dictating the terms of heterosexual coupling.[9]

Thus, Symons reports:

There is enormous cross-cultural variation in sexual customs and laws and the extent of male control, yet nowhere in the world do heterosexual relations begin to approximate those typical of homosexual men This suggests that, in addition to custom and law, heterosexual relations are structured to a substantial degree by the nature and interests of the human female” (p300). 

This conclusion is, of course, diametrically opposite to the feminist contention that it is men who dictate the terms of heterosexual coupling and for whose exclusive benefit such relationships are structured.

It also suggests, again contrary to feminist assumptions of male dominance, that most men are ultimately frustrated in achieving their sexual ambitions to a far greater extent than are most women. 

Thus, Symons concludes: 

The desire for sexual variety dooms most human males to a lifetime of unfulfilled longing” (p228). 

Here, Symons anticipates Camille Paglia who was later to famously observe: 

Men know they are sexual exiles. They wander the earth seeking satisfaction, craving and despising, never content. There is nothing in that anguished motion for women to envy” (Sexual Personae: p19). 

Criticisms of Symons’s Use of Homosexuality as a Test-Case

There is, however, a potential problem with Symons’s use of homosexual behaviour as a window onto the nature of male and female sexuality as they manifest themselves when freed from the conflicting desires of the opposite sex. The whole analysis rests on a questionable premise – namely that homosexuals are, their preference for same-sex partners aside, otherwise similar, if not identical, to heterosexuals of their own sex in their psychology and sexuality.

Symons defends this assumption, arguing: 

There is no reason to suppose that homosexuals differ systematically from heterosexuals in any way other than their sexual object choice” (p292). 

Indeed, in some respects, Symons seems to see even “sexual object choice” as analogous among homosexuals and heterosexuals of the same sex.

For example, he observes that, unlike women, both homosexual and heterosexual men tend to evaluate prospective mates primarily on the basis their physical appearance and youthfulness (p295). 

Thus, in contrast to the failure of periodicals featuring male nudes to attract a substantial female audience (see below), Symons notes the existence of a market for gay pornography parallel in most respects to heterosexual porn – i.e. featuring young, physically attractive models in various states of undress (p301).

This, of course, contradicts the feminist notion that men are led to ‘objectify’ women only due to the sexualized portrayal of the latter in the media.

Instead, Symons concludes: 

That homosexual men are at least as likely as heterosexual men to be interested in pornography, cosmetic qualities and youth seems to me to imply that these interests are no more the result of advertising than adultery and alcohol consumption are the result of country and western music” (p304).[10] 

However, this assumption of the fundamental similarity of heterosexual and homosexual male psychology has been challenged by David Buller in his book, Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature.

Buller cites evidence that male homosexuals are ‘feminized’ in many aspects of their behaviour and morphology.

For example, one study reported that, despite stereotypically more likely to ‘hit the gym’, gay man nevertheless had relatively less muscular development than heterosexual men, and lower shoulder-to-hip ratios on average (Evans 1972). Another particularly interesting recent study found that male homosexuals have more female-typical occupation interests than do heterosexual males (Ellis & Ratnasingam 2012).

Likewise, one of the few consistent early correlates of homosexuality is gender non-conformity in childhood and some evidence (e.g. digit ratios, the fraternal birth order effect) has been interpreted to suggest that the level of prenatal exposure to masculinizing androgens (e.g. testosterone) in utero affects sexual orientation (see Born Gay: The Pyschobiology of Sexual Orientation).

Indeed, Symons himself mentions the evidence of an association between homosexuality and levels of masculinizing androgens in utero (albeit in respect of lesbians rather than of male homosexuality) just a few pages before his discussion of the promiscuous behaviours of male homosexuals (p289).

As Buller also notes, although gay men seem, like heterosexual men, to prefer youthful sexual partners, they also appear to prefer sexual partners who are, in other respects highly masculine.[11]

Thus, Buller observes: 

“The males featured in gay men’s magazines embody very masculine, muscular physiques, not pseudo-feminine physiques” (Adapting Minds: p227).

Indeed, the models in such magazines seem in most respects similar in physical appearance to the male models, pop stars, actors and other ‘sex symbols’ and celebrities fantasized about by heterosexual women and girls.

How then are we to resolve this apparent paradox?

One possible explanation that some aspects of the psychology of male homosexuals are feminized but not others – perhaps because different parts of the brain are formed at different stages of prenatal development, at which stages the levels of masculinizing androgens in the womb may vary. 

Thus, Glenn Wilson, writing in 1989 and citing the work of Ellis & Ames (1987), reports that:

The masculinization/feminization effects occur in different parts of the brain and, more importantly, at different times during pre-natal development. Indications are that sex orientation in humans depends critically upon the hormone balance prevailing during the third and fourth months of pregnancy, while secondary sex characteristics and sex-typical behaviour patterns are influenced more by hormones circulating during the fifth and sixth months of pregnancy” (The Great Sex Divide: p79).

Indeed, there is even some evidence that homosexual males may be hyper-masculinized in some aspects of their physiology.

For example, it has been found that homosexual males report larger penis-sizes than heterosexual men (Bogaert & Hershberger 1999). 
 
Researchers Glenn Wilson and Qazi Rahman propose, may be because: 

If it is supposed that the barriers against androgens with respect to certain brain structures (notably those concerned with homosexuality) lead to increased secretion in an effort to break through, or some sort of accumulation elsewhere… then there may be excess testosterone left in other departments” (Born Gay: The Psychobiology of Sex Orientation: p80). 

Another possibility is that male homosexuals actually lie midway between heterosexual men and women in their degree of masculinization.  

On this view, homosexual men come across as relatively feminine only because we naturally tend to compare them to other men (i.e. heterosexual men). However, as compared to women, they may be relatively masculine, as reflected in the male-typical aspects of their sexuality focused upon by Symons.

Interestingly, this latter interpretation suggests the slightly disturbing possibility that, freed from the restraints imposed by women, heterosexual men would be even more indiscriminately promiscuous than their homosexual counterparts.

Evidence consistent with this interpretation is provided by one study from the 1980s which found that, when approached by a female stranger (also a student), on a University campus, with a request to go to bed with them, fully 72% of male students agreed (Clark and Hatfield 1989). 

In contrast, in the same study, not a single one of the 96 females approached by male strangers with the same request on the same university campus agreed to go to bed with the male stranger.

Yet what percentage of the female students subsequently sued the university for sexual harassment was not reported.

Pornography as a “Natural Experiment

For Symons, fantasy represents another window onto sexual and romantic desires. Like homosexuality, fantasy is, by its very nature, unconstrained by the conflicting desires of the opposite sex (or indeed by anything other than the imagination of the fantasist). 

Symons later collaborated in an investigation into sexual fantasy by means of a questionnaire (Ellis and Symons 1990). 

However, in the present work, he investigates fantasy indirectly by focusing on what he calls “the natural experiment of commercial periodical publishing” – i.e. pornographic magazines (p182).

In many respects, this approach is preferable to a survey because, even in an anonymous questionnaire, individuals may be less than honest when dealing with a sensitive topic such as their sexual fantasies. On the other hand, they are unlikely to regularly spend money on a magazine unless they are genuinely attracted by its contents.

Before the internet age, softcore pornographic magazines, largely featuring female nudes, commanded sizeable circulations, despite the not insubstantial stigma attached to their purchase. However, their readership (if indeed ‘readership’ is the right words, since there was typically little reading involved, save of the ‘one-handed’ variety) was almost exclusively male.

In contrast, there was little or no female audience for magazines containing pictures of naked males. Instead, magazines marketed towards women (e.g. fashion magazines) contain, mostly, pictures of other women.

Indeed, when, in the 1970s, attempts were made, in the misguided name of feminism and ‘women’s liberation, to market magazines featuring male nudes to a female readership, one such title, Viva, abandoned publishing male nudes after just a few years due to lack of interest or demand, then subsequently went bust just a few years after that, while the other, Playgirl, although it remained in publication for many years and did not entirely abandon male nudes, was notorious, as a consequence, for attracting a readership composed in large part of homosexual men.

Symons thus concludes forcefully and persuasively: 

The notion must be abandoned that women are simply repressed men waiting to be liberated” (p183). 

Indeed, though it has been loudly and enthusiastically co-opted by feminists, this view of women, and of female sexuality – namely women as “repressed men waiting to be liberated” – represents an obviously quintessentially male persepective. 

Indeed, taken to extremes, it has even been used as a justification for rape.

Thus, the curious, though recurrent, sub-Freudian notion that female rape victims actually secretly enjoy being raped seems to rest ultimately on the assumption that female sexuality is fundamentally the same as that of men (i.e. indiscriminately enjoying of promiscuous sex) and that it is only women’s alleged sexual ‘repression’ that prevents them admitting as much.[12]

Romance Literature 

Unfortunately, however, there is notable omission in Symons’s discussion of pornography as a window into male sexuality – namely, he omits to consider whether there exists any parallel artistic genre that offers equivalent insight into the female psyche.

Later writers on the topic have argued that romance novels (e.g. Mills and Boon, Jane Austin), whose audience is as overwhelmingly female as pornography’s is male, represent the female equivalent of pornography, and that analysis of the the content of such works provides insights into female mate preferences parallel to those provided into male psychology by pornography (e.g. Kruger et al 2003; Salmon 2004; see also Warrior Lovers: Erotic Fiction, Evolution and Female Sexuality, co-authored by Symons himself).

Thus, popular science writer Matt Ridley reports:

Two industries relentlessly exploit the sexual fantasizing of men and women: pornography and the publishing of romance novels: Pornography is aimed almost entirely at men. It varies little from a standard formula all over the world… The romance novel, by contrast, is aimed entirely at a female market. It, too, depicts a fictional world that has changed remarkably little except in adapting to female career ambitions and to a less inhibited attitude toward the description of sex” (The Red Queen: p270-271)

Symons touches upon this analogy only in passing, when he observes that:

Heterosexual men are, of course, aware that the female sexuality portrayed in men’s magazines reflects male fantasy more than female reality, just as heterosexual women are aware that the happy endings of stories in romance magazines exist largely in the realm of fantasy” (p293).

Yet, while feminists perpetually complain about how pornography supposedly creates unrealistic expectations of women and girls and puts undue pressure on women and girls to live up to this male fantasy, few men complain about how the equally unrealistic portrayal of men in romance literature creates unrealistic expectations of boys and men and puts undue pressure on boys and men to live up to a female fantasy.

Female Orgasm as Non-Adaptive

An entire chapter of ‘The Evolution of Human Sexuality’, namely Chapter Three (entitled, “The Female Orgasm: Adaptation or Artefact”), is devoted to rejecting the claim that the female orgasm represents a biological adaptation.

This is perhaps excessive. However, it does at least conveniently contradicts the claim of some critics of evolutionary psychology, and of sociobiology, such as Stephen Jay Gould that the field is ‘ultra-Darwinian’ or ‘hyper-adaptionist’ and committed to the misguided notion that all traits are necessarily adaptive.[13]

In contrast, Symons champions the thesis that the female capacity for orgasm is a simply non-adaptive by-product of the male capacity to orgasm, the latter of which is of course adaptive.

On this view, the female orgasm (and clitoris) is, in effect, the female equivalent of male nipples (only more fun).

Certainly, Symons convincingly critiques the romantic notion, popularized by Desmond Morris among others, that the female orgasm functions as a mechanism designed to enhance ‘pair-bonding between couples.

However, subsequent generations of evolutionary psychologists have developed less naïve models of the adaptive function of female orgasm.

For example, Geoffrey Miller argues that the female orgasm, and clitoris, functions as an adaptation for mate choice (The Mating Mind: p239-241).

Of course, at first glance, experiencing orgasm during coitus may appear to be a bit late for mate choice, since, by the time coitus has occurred, the choice in question has already been made. However, given that, among humans, most sexual intercourse is non-reproductive (i.e. does not result in conception), the theory is not altogether implausible.

On this view, the very factors which Symons views as suggesting female orgasm is non-adaptive – such as the relative difficultly of stimulating female orgasm during ordinary vaginal sex – are positive evidence for its adaptive function in carefully discriminating between suitors/lovers to determine their desirability as father for a woman ’s offspring.

Nevertheless, at least according to the stringent criteria set out by George C Williams in his classic Adaptation and Natural Selection, as well as the more general principle of parsimony (also known as Occam’s Razor), the case for female orgasm as an adaptation remains unproven (see also Sherman 1989; Case Of The Female Orgasm: Bias in the Science of Evolution).

Out-of-Date?

Much of Symons’ work is dedicated to challenging the naïve group-selectionism of Sixties ethologists, especially Desmond Morris. Although scientifically now largely obsolete, Morris’s work still retains a certain popular resonance and therefore this aspect of Symons’s work is not entirely devoid of contemporary relevance.

In place of Morris‘s rather idyllic notion that humans are a naturally monogamous ‘pair-bonding’ species, Symons advocates instead an approach rooted in the individual-level (or even gene-level) selection championed Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (reviewed here).

This leads to some decidedly cynical conclusions regarding the true nature of sexual and romantic relations among humans.

For example, Symons argues that it is adaptive for men to be less sexually attracted to their wives than they are to other women – because they are themselves liable to bear the cost of raising offspring born to their wives but not those born to other women with whom they mate (e.g. those attached to other males).

Another cynical conclusion is that the primary emotion underlying the institution of marriage, both cross-culturally and in our own society, is neither love nor even lust, but rather male sexual jealousy and proprietariness (p123). 

Marriage, then, is an institution borne not of love, but of male sexual jealousy and the behaviour known to biologists as mate-guarding.

Meanwhile, in his excellent chapter on ‘Copulation as a Female Service’ (Chapter Eight), Symons suggests that many aspects of heterosexual romantic relationships may be analogous to prostitution.

As well as its excessive focus on debunking sixties ethologists like Morris, ‘The Evolution of Human Sexuality’ is also out-of-date in a more serious respect Namely, it fails to incorporate the vast amount of empirical research on human sexuality from a sociobiological perspective which has been conducted since the first publication of his work.

For a book first published thirty years ago, this is inevitable – not least because much of this empirical research was inspired by Symons’ own ideas and specifically designed to test theories formulated in this very work.

In addition, potentially important new factors in human reproductive behaviour that even Symons did not foresee have been identified, for example role of levels of fluctuating asymmetry functioning as a criterion for, or at least correlate of, physical attractiveness.

For an updated discussion of the evolutionary psychology of human sexual behaviour, complete with the latest empirical data and research, readers should consult the latest edition of David Buss’s The Evolution Of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating.

In contrast, in support of his theories Symons relies largely on classical literary insight, anecdote and, most importantly, a review of the ethnographic record.

However, this latter focus ensures that, in some respects, the work remains of more than merely of historical interest.

After all, one of the more legitimate criticisms levelled against recent research in evolutionary psychology is that it is insufficiently cross-cultural and, with several notable exceptions (e.g. Buss 1989), relies excessively on research conducted among convenience samples of students at western universities.

Given costs and practicalities, this is inevitable. However, for a field that aspires to understand a human nature presumed to be universal, such a method of sampling is highly problematic, especially given what has recently been revealed about the ‘WEIRD-ness’ of western undergraduate samples.

The Evolution of Human Sexuality’ therefore retains its importance for two reasons. 

First, is it the founding work of modern evolutionary psychological research into human sexual behaviour, and hence of importance as a landmark and classic text in the field, as well as in the history of science more generally. 

Second, it also remains of value to this day for the cross-cultural and ethnographic evidence it marshals in support of its conclusions. 

Endnotes

[1] Actually, the first person to discover this, albeit inadvertently, was the great Victorian polymath, pioneering statistician and infamous eugenicist Francis Galton, who, attempting to discover abnormal facial features possessed by the criminal class, succeeded in morphing the faces of multiple convicted criminals. The result was, presumably to his surprise, an extremely attractive facial composite, since all the various minor deformities of the many convicted criminals whose faces he morphed actually balanced one another out to produce a face with few if any abnormalities or disproportionate features.

[2] More recent research in this area has focused on the related concept of fluctuating asymmetry.

[3] However, recent meta-analyses have called into question the evidence for cyclical fluctuations in female mate preferences (Wood et al 2014; cf. Gildersleeve et al 2014), and it has been suggested that such findings may represent casualties of the so-called replication crisis in psychology. It has also been questioned whether ovulation in humans is indeed concealed, or is actually detectable by subtle cues (e.g. Miller et al 2007), for example, changes in face shape (Oberzaucher et al 2012), breast symmetry (Scutt & Manning 1996) and body scent (Havlicek et al 2006).

[4] Another factor leading recent researchers to overestimate the importance of female choice in human evolution is their feminist orientation, since female choice gives women an important role in human evolution, even, paradoxically, in the evolution of male traits.

[5] Actually, in most cultures, only a girl’s first marriage is arranged on her behalf by her parents. Second- and third-marriages are usually negotiated by the woman herself. However, since female fertility peaks early, it is a girl’s first marriage that is usually of the most reproductive, and hence Darwinian, significance.

[6] Indeed, the human anatomical trait in humans that perhaps shows the most evidence of being a product of intersexual selection is a female one, namely the female breasts, since the latter are, unlike the mammary glands of most other mammals, permanently present from puberty on, not only during lactation, and composed primarily of fatty tissues, not milk (Møller 1995; Manning et al 1997; Havlíček et al 2016). 

[7] Wilson terms his theory “the kin selection theory hypothesis of the origin of homosexuality” (p145). However, a better description might be the ‘helper at the nest theory of homosexuality’, the basic idea being that, like sterile castes in some insects, and like older siblings in some bird species where new nest sites are unavailable, homosexuals, rather than reproducing themselves, direct their energies towards assisting their collateral kin in successfully raising, and provisioning, their own offspring (On Human Nature: p143-7). The main problem with this theory is that there is no evidence that homosexuals do indeed devote any greater energies towards assisting their kin in raising offspring. On the contrary, homosexuals instead seem to devote much of their time and resources towards their own sex life, much as do heterosexuals (Bobrow & Bailey 2001).

[8] As we will see, contrary to the stereotype of evolutionary psychologists as viewing all traits as necessarily adaptive, as they are accused of doing by the likes of Gould, Symons also argued that the female orgasm and menopause are non-adaptive, but rather by-products of other adaptations.

[9] This is not necessarily to say that rampant, indiscriminate promiscuity is a male utopia, or the ideal of any man, be he homosexual or heterosexual. On the contrary, the ideal mating system for any individual male is harem polygyny in which the chastity of his own partners is rigorously policed (see Laura Betzig’s Despotism and Differential Reproduction: which I have reviewed here). However, given an equal sex ratio, this would condemn other males to celibacy and perpetual ‘inceldom. Similarly, Symons reports that “Homosexual men, like most people, usually want to have intimate relationships”. However, he observes:

Such relationships are difficult to maintain, largely owing to the male desire for sexual variety; the unprecedented opportunity to satisfy this desire in a world of men, and the male tendency towards sexual jealousy” (p297).  

It does indeed seem to be true that homosexual relationships, especially those of gay males, are, on average, of shorter duration than are heterosexual relationships. However, Symons’ claim regarding “the male tendency towards sexual jealousy” is questionable.
Actually, subsequent research in evolutionary psychology has suggested that men are no more prone to jealousy than women, but rather that it is sorts of behaviours which most intensely provoke such jealousy that differentiate the sexes (Buss 1992). Moreover, many gay men practice open relationships, which seems to suggest a lack of jealousy – or perhaps this simply reflects a recognition of the difficulty of maintaining relationships given, as Symons puts it, “the male desire for sexual variety [and] the unprecedented opportunity to satisfy this desire in a world of men”. 

[10] Indeed, far from men being led to objectify women due to the portrayal of women in a sexualized manner in the media, Symons suggests:

There may be no positive feedback at all; on the contrary, constant exposure to pictures of nude and nearly nude female bodies may to some extent habituate [i.e. desensitize] men to these stimuli” (p304).

[11] Admittedly, some aspects of body-type typically preferred by gay males (especially the so-called twink ideal) do reflect apparently female traits, especially a relative lack of body-hair. However, lack of body-hair is also obviously indicative of youth. Moreover, a relative lack of body-hair also seems to be a trait favoured in men by heterosexual women. For a discussion of the relative preference on the part of (heterosexual) females for masculine versus feminine physical appearance in male sex partners, see here.

[12] Thus, some men might indeed welcome being ‘raped’, albeit only under highly unusual circumstances – namely by an attractive opposite-sex partner (or, in the case of homosexual men, an attractive same-sex partner) to whom they are sexually attracted. Thus, Kingsley Browne, in his excellent Biology at Work (which I have reviewed here) quotes the perhaps remarkable finding that:

A substantial number of men ‘viewed an advance by a good-looking woman who threatened harm or held a knife as a positive sexual opportunity’” (Biology at Work: p196; quoting Struckman-Johnson & Struckman-Johnson 1994).

Of course, large numbers of women also report rape fantasies (Bivona & Critelli 2009). Yet this does not, of course, mean they would actually welcome real sexual assault, which would almost certainly take a very different form from the fantasy. In practice, therefore, members of neither sex are ever likely to welcome sexual assault in the form which it is actually likely to actually come.

[13] Incidentally, Symons also rejects the theory that the female menopause is adaptive, a theory which has subsequently become known as the grandmother hypothesis (p13). Also, although it does not directly address the issue, Symons’ discussion of human rape (p276-85), has also been interpreted as implicitly favouring the theory that rape is a by-product of the greater male desire for commitment free promiscuous sex, rather than the product of a specific rape adaptation in males (see Palmer 1991; and A Natural History of Rape: reviewed here). 

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